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HISTORY

OF THE

CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE

OF

FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

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FORMING A SEQUEL TO
"THE HISTORY OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTION."

SS-d.1

BY
M. A. THIERS,
MEMBER OF THE FRENCH ACADEMY AND OF THE INSTITUTE,
&c. &c. &c.

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CONTENTS

OF

THE NINTH VOLUME.

BOOK XXXI.

BAYLEN.

PAGE

State of Spain during the Events that were occurring at Bayonne—Disposition of the different Classes of the Nation—Repressed Indignation, ready to burst forth every moment—Official publication of the Abdications extorted from Ferdinand VII. and Charles IV.—Prodigious effect of this Publication—Simultaneous Insurrection in the Asturias, Gallicia, Old Castille, Estremadura, Andalusia, the Kingdoms of Murcia and Valencia, Catalonia, and Aragon—Formation of insurrectional Juntas; declaration of war against France; levy *en masse;* and massacre of the Captains-General—First measures ordered by Napoleon for suppressing the Insurrection—Old regiments drawn from Paris, and the Camps of Boulogne and Bretagne—Polish troops sent to Spain—General Verdier suppresses the movement at Logroño, General Lasalle that at Valladolid, General Frère that at Segovia—General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, at the head of a column, composed principally of cavalry, disperses the Aragonese at Tudela, Mallen, and Alagon, but is stopped short before Saragossa—Battles of General Duhesme around Barcelona—March of Marshal Moncey for Valencia, and his stay at Cuença—Movement of General Dupont towards Andalusia—He encounters the insurgents of Cordova at the bridge of Alcolea, overthrows them, breaks open the gates of Cordova, and forces his way into the City—Pillage of Cordova—Slaughter of the French sick and wounded on all the routes—General Dupont remains at Cordova—Dangerous situation of Admiral Rosily's squadron at Cadiz, the French not arriving there as expected—Attacked in the road of Cadiz by the Spaniards, it is obliged to surrender after a most obstinate resistance—General Dupont, surrounded by insurgents, makes a retrograde movement, in order to be nearer to the reinforcements for which he has applied, and takes a position at Andujar—Inconveniences of that position—Absolute ignorance at Madrid of what is passing in the different Corps of the French army, owing to the murder of all the couriers—Anxiety respecting Marshal Moncey and General Dupont—Frère's division sent to the aid of Marshal Moncey, Vedel's division to the aid of General Dupont—Fresh reinforcements dispatched from Bayonne by Napoleon—Columns of gendarmerie and of national guards stationed on the frontiers—Formation of Reille's division, to relieve General Duhesme, blockaded in Barcelona—Assemblage of an army for siege before Saragossa—Composition of a division of old troops under the command of General Mouton, to awe the North of the Peninsula and to escort Joseph—March of Joseph in Spain—Slowness of that march—Affliction felt by him on finding all his subjects in revolt against him—Military events in the provinces through which he passes—Fruitless Attack on Saragossa—Assemblage of the insurrectional forces of the north of Spain, under Generals Blake and Cuesta—Movement of Marshal Bessières towards them—Battle of Rio-Seco, and brilliant Victory won by Marshal Bessières—Under the auspices of this Victory, Joseph hastens to enter Madrid—His reception there—Military occurrences in the south of Spain—Campaign of Marshal Moncey in the kingdom of Valencia—Passage of the defile of Las Cabreras—Unsuccessful Attack of Valencia—Retreat by the route to Murcia—Importance of the events in Andalusia—Gobert's division sent after Vedel's division to the assistance of General Dupont—Situation of the latter at Andujar—Difficulty which he finds to procure subsistence—Suffocating heat—Vedel takes a position at Baylen, after forcing the defiles of the Sierra Morena—Gobert establishes himself at La Carolina—Obstinacy of General Dupont in continuing at Andujar—The insurgents of Grenada and Andalusia, having formed a junction, appear on the 15th of July before Andujar, and cannonade that position without serious result—Vedel, hastening unseasonably from Baylen to Andujar, is sent back just as unseasonably from Andujar to Baylen—While Baylen is left exposed, the Spanish General Reding forces the Guadalquivir; and General Gobert, attempting to oppose him there, is killed—General Dufour succeeds him—On a false report, which induces a belief that the Spaniards have proceeded by a cross-road to the defiles of the Sierra Morena, Generals Dufour and Vedel hasten to La Carolina, and a second time leave Baylen uncovered—Council of war in the camp of the insurgents—In this Council it is decided that, having found too much difficulty at Andujar, they will attack Baylen—Baylen, attacked in consequence of this resolution, is occupied without resistance—On receiving this intelligence, General Dupont marches thither—He finds the insurgents there in mass—Unfortunate Battle of Baylen—General Dupont, unable to force a passage, to rejoin his Lieutenants, is obliged to solicit a suspension of arms—Tardy and useless return of Generals Dufour and Vedel towards Baylen—Conferences terminating in the disastrous Capitulation of Baylen—Violation of that Capitulation as soon as signed—The French, who should have been conveyed back to France, with permission to serve, are detained prisoners—Barbarous treatment which they experience—Prejudicial effect of these tidings throughout all Spain—Enthusiasm of the Spaniards and dejection of the French—Joseph, alarmed, determines to evacuate Madrid—Retreat of the French army upon the Ebro—General Verdier, having entered Saragossa by main force, and being master of part of the city, is forced to evacuate it, to join the French army at Tudela—General Duhesme, after a fruitless attempt upon Girona, is obliged to shut himself up in Barcelona, without having received succour from General Reille—Counterpart to these events in Portugal—General rising of

PAGE

the Portuguese—Efforts of General Junot to suppress the Insurrection—Eagerness of the British Government to second the Insurrection in Portugal—Several Corps sent to the Peninsula—Landing of Sir Arthur Wellesley at the mouth of the Mondego—His march upon Lisbon—Brilliant combat of three thousand French against fifteen thousand English at Rolica—Junot hastens with insufficient forces to meet the English—Unfortunate Battle of Vimeira—Capitulation of Cintra, stipulating the Evacuation of Portugal—The French have nothing left of the whole Peninsula but the country comprised between the Ebro and the Pyrenees—Despair of Joseph, and his vehement desire to return to Naples—Mortification of Napoleon, speedily and severely punished for his faults 1

BOOK XXXII.

ERFURTH.

The capitulation of Baylen becomes known to Napoleon whilst he is on a tour in the southern provinces of the Empire—His intense emotion at the news of that unhappy event—Order for the arrest of general Dupont on his return to France—Napoleon makes his promised visit to La Vendée, and is received there with enthusiasm—His arrival in Paris on the 14th of August—Indignation of Austria at the events of Bayonne—Explanation with M. de Metternich—Napoleon wishes to force the court of Vienna to manifest its real sentiments before he comes to a final decision as to the redistribution of his forces—Obliged to withdraw a portion of his old troops from Germany, Napoleon consents to evacuate the territory of Prussia—Conditions of the Evacuation—The good-will of the court of Russia more than ever needful to Napoleon—Desire frequently expressed by the emperor Alexander to have another interview with Napoleon, in order to a direct mutual explanation as to the affairs of the East—The interview appointed to take place at Erfurth at the latter end of September—Pains taken to give it the utmost possible éclat—Meanwhile Napoleon makes his military preparations to meet every contingency—State of things in Spain whilst Napoleon is in Paris—King Joseph's operations—Napoleon's distribution of his forces—French and Italian troops ordered from Piedmont to Catalonia—Departure of the 1st and 6th divisions from Prussia for Spain—March of all the dragoon divisions in the same direction—Efforts to supply the place of the troops about to be abstracted from the Grand Army—Fresh conscription—Expense of these levies—Means taken to check the depreciation of the public funds—Effects produced on the several courts by Napoleon's diplomatic manifestations—Austria is intimidated and lowers her tone—Prussia joyfully accepts the Evacuation of her territory, at the same time appealing for a last alleviation of her pecuniary burdens—The emperor Alexander's eagerness for the meeting at Erfurth—His mother's opposition to his intended journey—Arrival of the two Emperors at Erfurth on the 27th September, 1808—Extreme courtesy towards each other—Afflux of sovereigns and great civil and military personages from all the capitals—Magnificent

PAGE

spectacle exhibited to Europe—Political ideas to be established by Napoleon at Erfurth—For the chimera of a partition of the Turkish empire he wishes to substitute an immediate gift of Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia—Effect of this new bait on Alexander's imagination—He enters into Napoleon's views, but in consenting to take less he insists on having it so much the more quickly—His impatience to be possessed of the Danubian provinces surpassed even by that of his old minister, M. de Romanzow—Agreement of the two Emperors—Reciprocal satisfaction and brilliant fêtes—M. de Vincent, representative of Austria, arrives at Erfurth—False position in which Alexander and Napoleon strive to place him—After coming to a mutual understanding, the two Emperors endeavour to put in writing the substance of their verbal resolutions—Wishing that peace should result from the interview at Erfurth, Napoleon would begin with pacific overtures to England—Alexander consents to this, provided the taking possession of the Danubian provinces be not thereby retarded—Difficulty of finding a phraseology which should satisfy these two conditions—Convention of Erfurth signed on the 12th of October—To oblige Alexander, Napoleon grants Prussia a further reduction of its contributions—First idea of a marriage between Napoleon and a sister of Alexander—Disposition on that subject manifested by the young Czar—Satisfaction of the two Emperors, and their separation on the 14th of October, after signal demonstrations of affection—Departure of Alexander for St. Petersburg, and of Napoleon for Paris—Arrival of the latter at St. Cloud on the 18th of October—His last arrangements before joining the army of Spain—Reassured for a while as to Austria, Napoleon withdraws from Germany another division, the 5th—The Grand Army becomes the army of the Rhine—Composition and organisation of the army of Spain—Departure of Berthier and Napoleon for Bayonne—M. de Romanzow left in Paris to pursue the negociation opened with England in the name of France and Russia—Manner in which the message of the two Emperors is received in London—Efforts of MM. de Champagny and de Romanzow to elude the difficulties raised by the British cabinet—Fearing to discourage the Spaniards and the Austrians, England abruptly puts an end to the negociation—Bitter reply of Austria to the communications addressed to her from Erfurth—From the manifestations made by the several courts, it may be foreseen that Napoleon will have time to make but a short campaign in Spain—His measures in order to render it decisive........................ 131

BOOK XXXIII.

SOMO-SIERRA.

Arrival of Napoleon at Bayonne—Non-performance of part of his orders—Manner in which he made amends for it—His departure for Vittoria—Ardour of the Spaniards in maintaining a war begun with successes—Project for arming five hundred thousand men—Rivalry of the provincial Juntas, and creation of a Central Junta at Aranjuez—Direction of the military operations—Plan of campaign—Division of

the forces of the Insurrection into armies of the left, of the centre, and of the right—Premature meeting of the corps of Marshal Lefebvre with the army of general Blake, in advance of Durango—Battle of Zornoza—The Spaniards defeated—Napoleon, having arrived at Vittoria, rectifies the position of his *corps d'armée*, forms the plan of suffering himself to be turned on his two wings, then to push briskly forward to Burgos, with a view to fall upon Blake and Castaños, and to take them in rear—Execution of this plan—March of the 2nd corps, commanded by marshal Soult, upon Burgos—Battle of Burgos, and capture of that city—Marshals Victor and Lefebvre, opposed to general Blake, pursue him unremittingly—Victor meets with him at Espinosa, and disperses his army—Movement of the 3rd corps, commanded by marshal Lannes, upon the army of Castaños—Manœuvre on the rear of that corps, by the sending of marshal Ney across the mountains of Soria—Battle of Tudela, and defeat of the armies of the centre and the right—Napoleon, having got rid of the masses of the Spanish Insurrection, advances upon Madrid, regardless of the English, whom he is desirous of drawing into the interior of the Peninsula—March towards the Guadarrama—Brilliant Battle of Somo-Sierra—Appearance of the French army under the walls of Madrid—Efforts to spare the capital of Spain the horrors of capture by assault—Attack and surrender of Madrid—Napoleon will not allow his brother to enter the city, neither does he enter himself—His political and military measures—Abolition of the Inquisition, of feudal rights, and of part of the convents—Marshals Lefebvre and Ney moved upon Madrid, marshal Soult directed upon Old Castille, with a view to ulterior operations against the English—Operations in Aragon and in Catalonia—Compulsory tardiness of the siege of Saragossa—Campaign of general St. Cyr in Catalonia—Crossing of the frontier—Siege of Roses—Skilful march to avoid the fortresses of Girona and Hostalrich—Meeting with the Spanish army, and Battle of Cardedeu—Triumphant entry into Barcelona—Immediate departure to take the camp of the Llobregat, and Victory of Molina del Rey—Continuation of the occurrences in the centre of Spain—Arrival of Marshal Lefebvre at Toledo, of marshal Ney at Madrid—Intelligence of the English army brought by deserters—General Moore, joined near Benavente by the division of general Baird, marches to meet marshal Soult—Manœuvre of Napoleon's to throw himself on the flank of the English and to envelop them—Departure of marshal Ney, with Marchand's and Maurice Mathieu's divisions, of Napoleon with Lapisse's and Dessoles' divisions, and with the imperial guard—Passage of the Guadarrama—Tempest, deep mud, inevitable delays—General Moore, apprised of the movement of the French, beats a retreat—Napoleon advances to Astorga—Couriers from Paris decide him to establish himself at Valladolid—He consigns the pursuit of the English army to marshal Soult—Retreat of general Moore, pursued by marshal Soult—Disorder and devastations of that retreat—Meeting at Lugo—Hesitation of marshal Soult—Arrival of the English at Coruña—Battle of Coruña—Death of general Moore, and embarkation of the English—Their losses in this campaign—Last instructions of Napoleon's before leaving Spain, and his departure for Paris—Plan for conquering the south

PAGE

of Spain after giving the army a month's rest—Movement of marshal Victor upon Cuença, for the purpose of definitively ridding the centre of Spain of the presence of the insurgents—Battle of Uclès, and capture of the greater part of the army of the duke de l'Infantado, formerly the army of Castaños—Under the influence of these successes, Joseph at length enters Madrid, with the consent of Napoleon, and is well received there—Spain seems disposed to submit—Saragossa is the only point in the north and the centre of Spain that continues to resist—Nature of the difficulties to be encountered before that important city—Marshal Lannes sent to accelerate the operations of the siege—Vicissitudes and horrors of that memorable siege—Heroism of the Spaniards and of the French—Surrender of Saragossa—Character and conclusion of this second campaign of the French in Spain—Chances for the establishment of the new royalty 199

BOOK XXXI.

BAYLEN.

State of Spain during the Events that were occurring at Bayonne—Disposition of the different Classes of the Nation—Repressed Indignation, ready to burst forth every moment—Official publication of the Abdications extorted from Ferdinand VII. and Charles IV.—Prodigious effect of this Publication—Simultaneous Insurrection in the Asturias, Gallicia, Old Castille, Estremadura, Andalusia, the Kingdoms of Murcia and Valencia, Catalonia, and Aragon—Formation of insurrectional Juntas; declaration of war against France; levy *en masse;* and massacre of the Captains-General—First measures ordered by Napoleon for suppressing the Insurrection—Old regiments drawn from Paris, and the Camps of Boulogne and Bretagne—Polish troops sent to Spain — General Verdier suppresses the movement at Logroño, General Lasalle that at Valladolid, General Frère that at Segovia—General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, at the head of a column, composed principally of cavalry, disperses the Aragonese' at Tudela, Mallen, and Alagon, but is stopped short before Saragossa—Battles of General Duhesme around Barcelona—March of Marshal Moncey for Valencia, and his stay at Cuença—Movement of General Dupont towards Andalusia—He encounters the insurgents of Cordova at the bridge of Alcolea, overthrows them, breaks open the gates of Cordova, and forces his way into the City—Pillage of Cordova—Slaughter of the French sick and wounded on all the routes—General Dupont remains at Cordova—Dangerous situation of Admiral Rosily's squadron at Cadiz, the French not arriving there as expected—Attacked in the road of Cadiz by the Spaniards, it is obliged to surrender after a most obstinate resistance—General Dupont, surrounded by insurgents, makes a retrograde movement, in order to be nearer to the reinforcements for which he has applied, and takes a position at Andujar—Inconveniences of that position—Absolute ignorance at Madrid of what is passing in the different Corps of the French army, owing to the murder of all the couriers—Anxiety respecting Marshal Moncey and General Dupont—Frère's division sent to the aid of Marshal Moncey, Vedel's division to the aid of General Dupont—Fresh reinforcements dispatched from Bayonne by Napoleon—Columns of gendarmerie and of national guards stationed on the frontiers—Formation of Reille's division, to relieve General Duhesme, blockaded in Barcelona—Assemblage of an army for siege before Saragossa—Composition of a division of old troops under the command of General Mouton, to awe the North of the Peninsula and to escort Joseph—March of Joseph in Spain—Slowness of that march—Affliction felt by him on finding all his subjects in revolt against him—Military events in the provinces through which he passes—Fruitless Attack on Saragossa—Assemblage of the insurrectional forces of the north of Spain, under Generals Blake and Cuesta—Movement of Marshal Bessières towards them—Battle of Rioseco, and brilliant victory won by Marshal Bessières—Under the auspices of this victory, Joseph hastens to enter Madrid—His reception there—Military occurrences in the south of Spain—Campaign of Marshal Moncey in the kingdom of Valencia—Passage of the defile of Las Cabreras—Unsuccessful Attack of Valencia—Retreat by the route to

Murcia—Importance of the events in Andalusia—Gobert's division sent after Vedel's division to the assistance of General Dupont—Situation of the latter at Andujar—Difficulty which he finds to procure subsistence—Suffocating heat—Vedel takes a position at Baylen, after forcing the defiles of the Sierra Morena—Gobert establishes himself at La Carolina—Obstinacy of General Dupont in continuing at Andujar—The insurgents of Grenada and Andalusia, having formed a junction, appear on the 15th of July before Andujar, and cannonade that position without serious result—Vedel, hastening unseasonably from Baylen to Andujar, is sent back just as unseasonably from Andujar to Baylen—While Baylen is left exposed, the Spanish General Reding forces the Guadalquivir; and General Gobert, attempting to oppose him there, is killed —General Dufour succeeds him—On a false report, which induces a belief that the Spaniards have proceeded by a cross-road to the defiles of the Sierra Morena, Generals Dufour and Vedel hasten to La Carolina, and a second time leave Baylen uncovered—Council of war in the camp of the insurgents—In this Council it is decided that, having found too much difficulty at Andujar, they will attack Baylen—Baylen, attacked in consequence of this resolution, is occupied without resistance—On receiving this intelligence, General Dupont marches thither—He finds the insurgents there in mass—Unfortunate battle of Baylen—General Dupont, unable to force a passage, to rejoin his lieutenants, is obliged to solicit a suspension of arms—Tardy and useless return of Generals Dufour and Vedel towards Baylen—Conferences terminating in the disastrous capitulation of Baylen—Violation of that capitulation as soon as signed—The French, who should have been conveyed back to France, with permission to serve, are detained prisoners—Barbarous treatment which they experience—Prejudicial effect of these tidings throughout all Spain—Enthusiasm of the Spaniards and dejection of the French—Joseph, alarmed, determines to evacuate Madrid—Retreat of the French army upon the Ebro—General Verdier, having entered Saragossa by main force, and being master of part of the city, is forced to evacuate it, to join the French army at Tudela—General Duhesme, after a fruitless attempt upon Girona, is obliged to shut himself up in Barcelona, without having received succour from General Reille—Counterpart to these events in Portugal—General rising of the Portuguese—Efforts of General Junot to suppress the insurrection—Eagerness of the British Government to second the insurrection in Portugal—Several corps sent to the Peninsula—Landing of Sir Arthur Wellesley at the mouth of the Mondego—His march upon Lisbon—Brilliant combat of three thousand French against fifteen thousand English at Rolica—Junot hastens with insufficient forces to meet the English—Unfortunate battle of Vimeira—Capitulation of Cintra, stipulating the Evacuation of Portugal—The French have nothing left of the whole Peninsula but the country comprised between the Ebro and the Pyrenees—Despair of Joseph, and his vehement desire to return to Naples—Mortification of Napoleon, speedily and severely punished for his faults.

HISTORY

OF

THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE

OF

FRANCE

UNDER

NAPOLEON.

BOOK XXXI.

BAYLEN.

When Napoleon left Bayonne, to visit, on his return, Gascony and La Vendée, he retained none of the illusions which he had conceived for a moment, concerning the spirit of Spain and the ease with which he should dispose of her. An insurrection, partial at first, soon universal, had just broken out, and cries of implacable hatred had rung even in his ear. He reckoned, however, upon his young soldiers and some veteran regiments, recently marched towards the Pyrenees, for quelling a movement, which might yet turn out to be but a partial insurrection like that in the Calabrias. Though he was already undeceived, and perhaps even repented of what he had undertaken, he had yet much left to learn on that head, and before he had reached Paris he was fated to know all the consequences of the fault committed at Bayonne.

The Spaniards, since the month of March, had passed in a short time through the most diverse emotions. Full of hope on seeing the French make their appearance, of joy on seeing the downfall of the old court, of anxiety on seeing Ferdinand VII. obliged to go and seek in France the acknowledgment of his royal title, they had been speedily enlightened relative to what was about to be done at Bayonne, and an ardent hatred was suddenly kindled in their hearts. By all of them, it is true, this sentiment was not shared in an equal degree. The higher, and even the middle classes, appreciating the benefits which might proceed from a regeneration of Spain by the civilizing hands of Napoleon, animated against foreigners by sentiments less savage than the populace, less disposed to agitation than it was, suffered only in their pride, deeply hurt by the manner in which their country was intended to be disposed of. Still, with mild treatment, and a sudden and irresistible display of force, they might have been overawed, and perhaps in time even reconciled.

But the people, and especially the monks, that cloistered portion of the people, were exasperated. Among these last nothing could mitigate the feeling of wounded pride—neither the hope of a regeneration which they were incapable of appreciating, nor tolerance in regard to foreigners whom they detested, neither the love of repose nor the fear of disorder. The Spanish people, the people of the streets and the fields, like those of the cloister, ardent, indolent, weary of quiet, so far from being fond of it, caring little about the burning of towns or country houses, in which there was nothing belonging to them, were ready to gratify that propensity to agitation, which the French people had gratified in 1789, by effecting a great democratic revolution. They were ready to exert in support of the old system all the demagogue passions which the French people had exerted for the foundation of the new one. They were about to be as violent, as tumultuous, as sanguinary, for the throne and the altar, as their neighbours had been against both. They were about to be so in proportion to the warmth of their blood and the ferocity of their disposition. In the Spanish people, nevertheless, a noble sentiment blended with the feelings that we have just mentioned—the love of their country, of their kings, of their religion, which they amalgamated into one affection, and under the inspiration of which they were destined to furnish splendid examples of fortitude and frequently of heroism.

I am not, I never shall be, the flatterer of the multitude. I have resolved, on the contrary, to defy its tyrannical power, because I have been doomed to live in times when it domineers and disturbs the world. Still I do it justice: if it sees not, it feels; and, on very rare occasions, when one must shut one's eyes and obey one's heart, it is, not an adviser to be listened to, but a torrent to be followed. The Spanish people, though, in rejecting the royalty of Joseph, they rejected a good prince and good institutions, were perhaps under better inspiration than the other classes. They acted nobly in rejecting the benefit proffered by a foreign hand, and, without eyes, they saw more correctly than enlightened men, in conceiving that they could make head against a conqueror whom the mightiest armies and the greatest generals had been unable to resist.

The departure of Ferdinand VII., followed by the departure of Charles IV., and then by that of the Infantes, had clearly revealed the intention of Napoleon; and the people of Madrid, incapable of refraining any longer, rose on the 2nd of May, as we have seen in the preceding Book. They rose to be cut in pieces by Murat, but had the inexpressible satisfaction of slaughtering a few Frenchmen who fell singly into their hands. In the twinkling of an eye, the news, spreading through Estremadura, La Mancha, and Andalusia, was about to kindle a fire which smouldered there, when the prompt and terrible measures of repression adopted by Murat struck terror into those provinces, and kept them quiet for some time. All faces re-assumed a dull, sullen aspect, but impressed with profound hatred. Men held back under the check of a threatening hand; but the exaggerated account of the blood spilt at Madrid, the particulars of the events at Bayonne, circulated by the correspondence of the convents, increased every moment the secret rage which reigned in minds, and prepared an explosion so sudden, so universal, that it could not have been prevented by any blow, though struck ever so opportunely. If, however, Napoleon, treating this grave enterprise more seriously, had had a sufficient force everywhere; if, instead of 80,000 conscripts, there had been 150,000 veteran soldiers, controlling at one and the same time Saragossa, Valencia, Carthagena, Grenada, Seville, Badajoz, as Madrid, Burgos, and Barcelona were controlled; if Murat, present and in health, had shown himself everywhere, perhaps it might have been possible to prevent the conflagration from spreading, admitting that it is given to material force to prevail against moral force, especially when the latter is strongly excited. Unfortunately, while marshal Moncey, with 20,000 young soldiers, occupied the left of the capital from Aranda to Chamartin; while general Dupont, with 18,000, occupied the right, from Segovia to the Escurial; while marshal Bessières, with about 15,000, occupied Old Castille, and general Duhesme Catalonia with 10,000;* in rear the Asturias, on the right Gallicia, on the left Aragon, in front Estremadura, La Mancha, Andalusia, Valencia, were left to themselves, and kept in order by the Spanish authorities alone, wishing no doubt to prevent disturbance, but grieved to the heart, and served by an army which shared all the sentiments of the people. It was quite plain that they would not use any great energy to suppress an insurrection with which they secretly sympathized. However, under the impression of the 2nd of May, and awaiting what was to be definitively done at Bayonne, people still restrained themselves, but with all the signs of extraordinary anxiety, and of a violent passion ready to break forth.

In this state, the popular imagination, strongly excited, grasped at the most absurd reports. The forced journeys to Bayonne were chiefly the text for them. It was said that, after the royal family, all the principal personages were to be carried to that town, now become the gulph in which all that was most illustrious in Spain was about to be absorbed. After royalty, after the grandees, the turn of the army would come. It would be taken, regiment by regiment, to Bayonne, and from Bayonne to the shores of the Ocean, where the troops of the marquis de la Romana already were, and perish in some distant war, in support of the greatness of the tyrant of the world. This was not all—the entire population was to be carried off by means of a general conscription which would be imposed upon the Peninsula, as it was imposed upon France, and they would see the flower of the Spanish population sacrificed to the atrocious projects of the modern Attila. On this subject the most singular details were circulated. Great quantities of manacles had been manufactured, it was said, and brought in the ammunition waggons of the French army, for the purpose of carrying away the unfortunate Spanish conscripts, bound hand and foot. People affirmed that they had seen and touched them. There were, in particular, thousands of them in the arsenals of Ferrol, where neither a battalion nor an ammunition waggon of the French had made its appearance, but where much work was going on, by order of Napoleon, for refitting the Spanish navy, and where an expedition was preparing to protect the rich colonies of La Plata against the attacks of the English. To these rumours were added a multitude of others of like value. Under a French king, they said, they should have to go and oblige all the world to speak and write French. A host of French *employés* would accompany this king, and appropriate all offices to themselves.

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* The rest of the 80,000 young soldiers sent to Spain were in the hospitals.

The first and the most serious consequence of these reports was to cause almost the whole Spanish army to desert, for fear of being carried by force to France. At Madrid, two or three hundred men were to be seen every night deserting at once. The soldiers went off without their officers, sometimes even with them, carrying away arms, baggage, military stores. The life-guards, who were at the Escurial, disappeared in this manner by degrees, so that in the course of a few days there was not one left. This desertion took place not only at Madrid, but at Barcelona, at Burgos, at Coruña. In general, the soldiers who deserted fled either towards the South, or to those provinces which the agitation and distance rendered a safer asylum for the fugitives. Those at Barcelona fled towards Tortosa and Valencia. Those of Old Castille made for Aragon and Saragossa, a country reputed among the Spaniards to be invincible. Those of Coruña went to join general Taranco, stationed with a corps of troops in the north of Portugal. Those of New Castille betook themselves partly to the left, towards Guadalaxara and Cuença, where they had Saragossa and Valencia for a retreat; partly to the right, towards Talavera, where they had a safe and impenetrable asylum in Estremadura. The Spanish generals, habituated to subordination, reported this alarming desertion, which left them no means of preserving order, whatever sovereign might be definitively imposed upon unhappy Spain.

There were none but the troops of the South, especially those of Andalusia, which were the furthest possible from the French, and to which all who were not with them would gladly have gone, that continued to be united and compact; and, unfortunately for us, these were the most numerous; for there were, besides the camp of St. Roque, before Gibraltar, 9000 strong, the garrison of Cadiz, which was at all times kept considerable, lastly the division of general Solano, marquis del Socorro, destined at first to occupy Portugal, drawn afterwards toward Madrid, and finally sent back to Andalusia, of which he was captain-general. These troops, united to those in the camp of St. Roque, under the command of general Castaños, amounted to no fewer than 25,000 men; and they were the only corps not addicted to desertion. To them must be added the Swiss troops long engaged in the service of Spain. The two Swiss regiments of Preux and Reding had been, by order of Napoleon himself, united at Talavera, for the purpose of being joined to general Dupont's first division, destined to occupy Cadiz, where, as we know, a French squadron was lying. By his order, too, the three Swiss regiments stationed at Tortosa, Carthagena, and Malaga, had been marched for Grenada, where general Dupont was to pick them up on his way. Napoleon thought, as he said, that by placing them in a *current of French opinion*, they would serve the cause of the new royalty, and not that of the old one. Unluckily, all his views were destined to be thwarted by the movement which hurried away all hearts. The Spanish military authorities, though, like the enlightened classes, they regretted but little the incapable and corrupt government which had recently been overthrown, were also indignant at the occurrences at Bayonne, and would gladly have deserted with their men to the provinces inaccessible to the French. Murat alone, who had a certain ascendency over them, could have kept them to their duty; but, attacked by a violent fever, weakened, exhausted, scarcely able to bear being talked to about business, painfully affected by the mere sound of the footsteps of his officers, he had taken an aversion to the country where he was not called to reign, attributed to it his death, which he believed to be at hand, asked with doleful cries for his wife and children, and insisted on being allowed to depart immediately. It was necessary to detain this heroic man, who had become all at once as weak as an infant, against his will, till the arrival of Joseph, lest the shadow of authority assumed by those about him, for ordering everything in his name, should completely disappear. The Spaniards, apprized of the state of Murat, who had been removed to the country, and who was no longer shown, regarded his illness as a punishment of Heaven, which they would rather have seen falling not on Murat, whom they pitied more than hated, but on Napoleon, who had become thenceforward the object of their inexorable detestation. Some of them went so far as to say that it was Napoleon himself, who, to bury in the tomb the secret of his abominable machinations, had caused Murat to be poisoned. Thus does the popular imagination, when once moved and excited, go astray, and invent, utterly regardless of truth, or even of probability.

So great was the anxiety at Madrid, that the slightest noise in a street, the mere tramp of a piquet of cavalry in a public place, was sufficient to draw out the population in a mass. In every town the people thronged to await the arrival of the courier, and to learn the news, and they remained assembled for whole hours, in order to descant upon it. The populace, the citizens, the grandees, the priests, the monks, mingled together with the customary familiarity of the Spanish nation, conversed incessantly about political events in the public places. In all quarters, curiosity, expectation, anger, hatred, agitated all hearts, and nothing was wanting but a slight spark to kindle a vast conflagration.

Such then was the state of minds, when all at once arrived the tidings of the two-fold abdication extorted from Charles IV. and from Ferdinand VII. It was published in the *Madrid Gazette* of the 20th of May, immediately after the manifestation imposed on the Council of Castille in favour of Joseph. In this intelligence there was assuredly nothing unforeseen, since it was known through a multitude of emissaries that Ferdinand was at Bayonne, a prisoner, and beset by the most menacing importunities to make him give up his crown to the Bonaparte family. But the official knowledge of the sacrifice wrung from the weakness of the father and the captivity of the son, acted upon the public feeling with inexpressible violence. People were deeply indignant at the act itself, and cruelly offended by its taunting form. The effect was instantaneous, general, prodigious.

At Oviedo, the capital of the Asturias, people were already strongly agitated by two accidental circumstances: in the first place, the convocation of the provincial Junta, which was accustomed to meet every three years; and secondly, a suit instituted against some Spaniards for having insulted the French consul at Gijon. This suit, ordered by the government at Madrid, had excited general disapprobation; for everybody felt ready to do what had been done by the authors of the outrage whose punishment was demanded. The news of the abdications having been brought by the courier from Madrid, the people were no longer to be restrained. In this province, which was a Spain within Spain, and which felt the same aversion for all innovations as La Vendée had formerly manifested, there was but one spirit; and the highest nobles completely sympathized with the people. They put themselves at the head of the movement, and, on the

24th of May, the day on which the courier arrived from Madrid, they concerted, through the medium of the monks and of the municipal authorities, with the country-people to take Oviedo. At midnight, at the sound of the alarm-bell, the people of the mountain actually descended to the town, made themselves masters of it, and, joined by the townsfolk, hastened to the authorities, deposed them, and conferred all the power on the Junta. The latter chose for its president the marquis de Santa Cruz de Marcenado, a distinguished personage of the country, a bitter enemy to the French, passionately attached to the house of Bourbon, and full of patriotic sentiments, which we must honour, though contrary to the cause of France. Under his instigation, the Junta hesitated not to consider the abdications as null, the transactions at Bayonne as atrocious, the alliance with France as broken, and solemnly to declare war against Napoleon.

After proceeding in this manner, they seized all the arms in the royal arsenals, which were most abundantly supplied in this province through local industry. One hundred thousand muskets were carried away, and partly distributed among the people, partly reserved for the neighbouring provinces. Considerable donations were made to fill the chest of the insurrection, donations to which the clergy and the great landholders contributed a large part. Lastly, peace with Great Britain was proclaimed, and two deputies were despatched in a Jersey privateer to London, in order to solicit the alliance and aid of England. One of these two deputies was the count de Matarosa, since count de Toreno, so well known by men of the present day, as a statesman, ambassador, and historian.

But, unfortunately, the patriotic enthusiasm of the Spaniards could not break forth without the accompaniment of horrible cruelties, and blood, which was soon to flow in the other provinces, began to flow in the Asturias, when, for the honour of that province, a priest put a stop to the effusion. There were at Oviedo two Spanish commissioners, sent at the instigation of Murat to accelerate the proceedings commenced against the offenders of the consul at Gijon. There were also the commandant of the province, named La Llave, who had appeared unfavourable to an insurrection, which seemed to him extremely imprudent; lastly, the colonel of the regiment of royal carbineers and the colonel of the regiment of Hibernia, who had both differed in opinion from their officers, when it became a question whether they should oppose or promote the popular movement. These five persons were immediately proclaimed traitors, and the new authority had put them in prison to appease the populace. With a view to remove them from its fury, the Junta resolved to send them out of the principality. The people took advantage of this opportunity to seize their persons, and a mob, composed principally of new volunteers, were about to bind them to trees, with the intention of shooting them, when a canon conceived the idea of going in procession to the spot where preparations were making for the crime; and covering his victims with the host he contrived to save them. This was not the only effort of honest ecclesiastics to prevent bloodshed, but the only successful effort; for Spain soon became a theatre of atrocious crimes, committed not only upon the French, but on Spaniards the most illustrious and the most devoted to their country.

The insurrection of the Asturias preceded by only two or three days that of the north of Spain. At Burgos the people could not stir, for marshal Bessières had his head-quarters there. But at Valladolid, where there were no longer any of Dupont's divisions, which were already beyond the Guadarrama, at Leon, Salamanca, and Benevente, lastly at Coruña, the news of the abdications had revolted all hearts. However, the plains of Castille and the kingdom of Leon, which the French cavalry could scour on the gallop without encountering any obstacle, were too open for the people not to hesitate a little longer about rising. It was Gallicia, protected like the Asturias by almost inaccessible mountains, that first responded to the signal of Oviedo. Coruña, the capital of that province, still contained a great number of Spanish troops, though most of them had gone to Portugal with general Taranco. The spirit of subordination, military and civil, prevailed in that province, one of the centres of Spanish power. The captain-general, Filangieri, brother of the celebrated Neapolitan lawyer, a discreet, mild, enlightened man, universally beloved by the population, but somewhat suspicious to the Spaniards in his quality of Neapolitan, strove to preserve order in his command, and was one of the military and civil chiefs who considered insurrection as neither prudent nor profitable to the country. Having perceived that the regiment of Navarre, which was in garrison at Coruña, was ready to lend a hand to the insurgents, he had sent it to Ferrol. He had thus gained a few days, for, till the 30th of May, the insurrection, which had broken out on the 24th in the Asturias, and which was reported to be accomplished or nearly so in Leon, Valladolid, and Salamanca, was prevented in Gallicia. But the 30th was the feast of Saint Ferdinand. It was customary on that day to hoist flags with the effigy of the saint at the hotel of the government and in the public places. On this occasion the authorities had not ventured to follow the practice, for, in doing honour to Saint Ferdinand, it would seem as though they were paying homage to the sovereign, detained at Bayonna, and who had just abdicated. At this sight, the people of Coruña could no longer contain themselves. A mob of men, women, and children, collected in front of the troops guarding the hotel of the government, shouting, "Long live Ferdinand!" and carrying images of the saint. The boys, bolder, pushed in among the soldiers, who allowed them to pass through their ranks. The women followed, and the hotel of the captain-general was soon stormed, ravaged, and surmounted by the ensigns of the saint, which had not been hoisted at first. The captain-general, Filangieri, found himself compelled to flee.

A Junta was immediately formed, insurrection proclaimed, war declared against France, a levy *en masse* ordered, as at Oviedo, and the muskets in the arsenal distributed among the multitude. Forty or fifty thousand muskets were taken from the royal arsenals to arm all the hands that offered themselves. The regiment of Navarre was immediately recalled from Ferrol, and received in triumph. Abundant donations poured in from the grandees and the clergy. The treasury of St. Jago de Compostella sent two or three millions of reals. People nevertheless esteemed the captain-general Filangieri; they felt the need of so eminent a personage at the head of the Junta, and offered him the presidency, which he consented to accept. That excellent man, giving way, though with regret, to the patriotic impulsion of his fellow-citizens, put himself honestly at their head, for the purpose of redeeming the temerity of resolutions by the wisdom of measures. He recalled general Taranco's troops from Portugal; he poured the insurgent population into the skeletons of the corps of the line, to swell their numbers; he employed the considerable *matériel* at his disposal in arming the new levies; and he thus lost no time in organizing a military force of some value.

In order to check the hostile troops which might come from the plains of Leon and Old Castille, he had meanwhile marched his best organized corps to the *débouché* of the mountains of Gallicia, between Villafranca and Manzanal. But, while he was himself engaged in placing his posts, some furious wretches, who forgave neither his hesitations nor a prudence not in harmony with their unruly passions, atrociously murdered him in the streets of Villafranca. At that place there was a detachment of the regiment of Navarre, still irritated on account of its few days' exile at Ferrol; and to this regiment was attributed a crime which became the signal for the massacre of most of the captains-general.

The commotion in Gallicia spread immediately to the kingdom of Leon. On the arrival of 800 troops sent from Coruña to Leon, the insurrection broke out there, in the same manner and with the same forms. A Junta was instituted, war was declared, a levy *en masse* was decreed, and people armed themselves with all the weapons brought from the arsenals of Oviedo, Ferrol, and Coruña. At Leon they were already in the plain, and pretty near the squadrons of marshal Bessières; but at Valladolid they were still nearer. It was sufficient, however, for the imprudent enthusiasm of the Spaniards not to see those squadrons, though but a few leagues off, to break out into insurrectional movements. The captain-general of Valladolid was Don Gregorio de Cuesta, an old officer, an inflexible observer of discipline, of a peevish and morose disposition, wounded to the heart, like all the Spaniards, by the occurrences at Bayonne, but not imagining that it was possible to withstand the power of France, and disposed to think that the regeneration of Spain ought to be accepted from her, as a compensation for the wound inflicted on the national pride by the benefits which would result from a general reform of the old abuses. A particular sentiment acted moreover upon his mind—this was aversion to the multitude, and to its interference in affairs of State. The populace of Valladolid, whom the occurrences at Oviedo, Coruña, and Leon had strongly excited, and who would not appear more insensible than the other populations of the North to the news of the abdications, assembled, went beneath the windows of the captain-general, Gregorio de la Cuesta, and obliged him to show himself. The old soldier made his appearance with looks of displeasure, and attempted to oppose some very sensible reasons to a rising in arms so near to the French troops; but his voice was drowned by hooting. A gibbet, brought by some of the populace, was set up in front of his palace: at this sight he yielded, and gave his assent to what he regarded as an act of insanity. Valladolid had its insurrectional Junta, its levy *en masse*, and its declaration of war.

Segovia, situated at some distance on the Madrid road, though within a few leagues of general Dupont's third division, Frère's division, encamped at the Escurial—Segovia also had its insurrection. In that city there was, in the castle which commands it, a military college for artillery. The whole college rose, and, joined by the people, barricaded the city. On the right, Ciudad Rodrigo followed the same example, and murdered its governor, because he had not been prompt enough in declaring himself. The city of Madrid started at these tidings; but the corps of marshal Moncey, the imperial guard, all the cavalry of the army, and lastly the presence of general Dupont's corps at the Escurial, at Aranjuez, and at Toledo, forbade it to show what it felt. Besides, that capital conceived that it had paid its patriotic debt on the 2nd of May, and expected the provinces of the monarchy to come and release it from its chains. Toledo, which had manifested a disposition to rise a few weeks previously, had been speedily curbed, and was now waiting also to be delivered, watching with ill-dissembled satisfaction the universal outbreak of the national indignation. La Mancha participated in this sentiment, and proved it by affording an asylum to the deserters from the army, who everywhere found lodging, food, assistance of every kind for reaching the remote provinces, where there were assemblages of Spanish troops.

But the wealthy and powerful Andalusia, calculating upon its strength and the distance which separated it from the Pyrenees, aspiring to become the new centre of the monarchy, since Madrid was occupied, had been among the first to resent the blow struck at the dignity of the Spanish nation. It had not waited, like some other provinces, for the feast of St. Ferdinand. The news of the abdications had sufficed for it, and, on the evening of the 26th of May, it had risen. A conspiracy had been for some time in progress at Seville. A Spanish noble, a native of Estremadura, the count de Tilly, brother of a Tilly who had figured in the French revolution, a restless, enterprising person, of bad character, ready to engage in any new schemes, whatever they might be, was secretly concerting with men of all classes preparations for a rising against the French. Another still more singular person, likewise a stranger to Seville, but who had been much there since the late events, named Tap y Nuñez, a sort of adventurer, engaged in smuggling with Gibraltar, for the rest a good Spaniard, endowed, in the highest degree, with a talent for acting upon the multitude, had acquired an immense ascendency over the lower classes in that city. He had an understanding with count de Tilly's accomplices, and on the arrival of the news of the abdications, all of them, with one accord, chose the 26th of May, Ascension-day, for effecting a rising of the province. Accordingly, on the night of the 26th, a mob collected by them, and among which appeared men of the lowest class with soldiers of the regiment of Olivenza, proceeded to the Maestranza, an extensive establishment of artillery, containing a rich depôt of arms, stormed it, and seized all that was in it. The populace of Seville was armed in a moment, and paraded the streets of that great city, in a sort of intoxication. In order to deliberate in more quiet and independence, the municipality had quitted the Town Hall, and removed to the military hospital. The Town Hall being left vacant, the people took possession of it, and an insurrectional Junta was instituted there, as was then the practice throughout all Spain. It was the leader of the populace, Tap y Nuñez, who nominated the members, under the inspiration of those who were conspiring with him. Such men were chosen as are favourites in times of agitation, that is to say, turbulent characters, with the addition of a few sedate persons, to cover the inconsistency of the others. This Junta, full of Andalusian pride, hesitated not to proclaim itself the *Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies.* It disguised not, as we see, the ambition of governing Spain during the occupation of the Castilles by the French. All this was done amidst an enthusiasm which it is impossible to describe. But, on the following day, this enthusiasm became sanguinary, as might be expected. The municipal authority, which had withdrawn to the military hospital, was suspected, like every old authority, for it was, we repeat it, popular factiousness that triumphed at this moment under the cloak of royalism. This municipal authority was accused of patriotic lukewarmness, and even of secret connivance with the government of Madrid. Its head, the count del Aguila, one of the most distinguished nobles of the province, came in its name to the Junta, to offer to concert with the latter. At the sight of him, the furious multitude demanded his head. The Junta, not participating in the ferocious sentiments of the populace, wished to save him, and, with this view, pretended to send him prisoner to one of the towers of the city. On the way, the unfortunate count del Aguila was carried off by the insurgents, dragged to the court of the prison, bound to a balustrade, and dispatched with carbines; the rabble then paraded the streets with the fragments of his body. Amidst the popular intoxication, and the terror which began to seize the higher classes, a series of measures, dictated by circumstances, were adopted. The Junta decreed the declaration of war against France; the levy *en masse* of all the men from the age of 16 to 45; the sending of commissioners to all the towns in Andalusia, to raise their populations, and to attach them to the Junta, which constituted itself the Supreme Junta of Spain and the Indies. These commissioners were to go to Badajoz, Cordova, Jaen, Grenada, Cadiz, the camp at St. Roque. In declaring war against France, the Junta engaged not to lay down arms till Napoleon should have replaced Ferdinand VII. in the Escurial; and they promised, when the war was over, to convoke the Cortes of the kingdom, in order to effect the reforms, of the utility of which they said they were sensible, and the merit of which they appreciated, without needing to be initiated by foreigners into the knowledge of the rights of nations; for the new insurgents comprehended the necessity of opposing some promises of meliorations to the constitution of Bayonne.

It was more particularly towards Cadiz that all eyes were turned, for there resided the captain-general Solano, marquis del Socorro, who combined with the command of the province that of numerous troops spread over the south of Spain. A commissioner was dispatched to him, to decide him to take part in the insurrection, and another had been sent to general Castaños, commandant of the camp at St. Roque. The count de Teba, who was sent to Cadiz, presented himself there with all the insurrectional surliness of the moment. He had come to the wrong person, so to address himself, to the marquis del Socorro, a man of fiery, haughty temper, esteemed by the army, and beloved by the population. Like all well-informed military men, he was thoroughly convinced of the power of France, and considered the insurrection into which people were blindly rushing as extremely imprudent. He had expressed this opinion, on his return from Portugal, both at Badajoz and at Seville, with a boldness of language which had much damped the conspirators. This they remembered, and they were filled with distrust in regard to him. General Solano summoned a meeting of generals, to hear the proposals from Seville. This assembly was of opinion, with him, that all military and political reasons concurred to oppose an armed contest with France; and it made a declaration, in which, arguing against and concluding for the insurrection, it ordered voluntary enrolments, thus conceding out of mere deference to a popular wish, which it declared to be unreasonable. This paper, which placed a censure beside an act of condescension, read publicly in the streets of Cadiz, produced the strongest emotion there. The mob repaired to the residence of the captain-general. A young man undertook to be spokesman, entered into discussion with general Solano, contrived to embarrass that brave officer, accustomed to command, not to reason with such interlocutors, and wrung from him a promise that on the morrow the popular wish should be fully gratified. The rabble, content for that day, was nevertheless desirous of enjoying the pleasure of ravaging, and ran off to the house of the French consul Leroy, which it pillaged. This unfortunate representative of France, lately so feared, had no other resource but to take refuge on board the squadron of admiral Rosily, who had been waiting in vain for three years in the harbour of Cadiz for a favourable opportunity to leave it.

Next day, the populace had conceived a new wish; it desired that war should be immediately commenced against the French, and that the fire of all the guns in the road should be poured upon admiral Rosily's squadron. The multitude feasted itself with transport on the idea of this triumph—a triumph easy and very senseless over a naval ally, for the benefit of the English marine. There was some difficulty, however, in destroying ships manned by brave crews, commanded by brave officers, unfortunate heroes of Trafalgar, who, on that terrible day, stayed to be killed at their post, while most of the Spanish seamen fled from the field of battle. Besides, they were so mingled with the Spanish ships, that these were liable to be burned first. Such was the declaration of rational men both of the army and of the navy. They added that Spain still had in the North the marquis de La Romana's division, which might possibly have to atone for the barbarities committed upon the French seamen. At this moment, however, reason and humanity had but little chance of obtaining a hearing.

Another meeting of the generals, convoked the next day by the marquis del Socorro, had acceded in every point to the wish of the people, and several of its members had, in conversation, basely thrown upon the marquis the blame of the demi-resistance opposed to it on the preceding day. There was yet left to be decided the very serious question of an immediate attack on the French fleet. This question concerned the naval officers more than the military officers; and they unanimously declared that, before the popular rage could be satisfied, the Spanish ships must run the risk of being burned. The communication of this opinion of competent men, made in the public place, had brought the populace once more before the residence of the unfortunate Solano. He was immediately called to account for this new resistance to the popular wish, and three deputies were sent to bring him to an explanation. One of these three deputies having appeared at the window of the hotel to report the result of his mission, and being unable to make himself heard amidst the tumult, the populace believed, or pretended to believe, that they were refused satisfaction, and broke into the hotel. The marquis de Solano, seeing the danger, fled to the house of a friend of his, an Irishman settled at Cadiz, who resided in his neighbourhood. Unluckily he was perceived by a monk, watched, and denounced. Pursued immediately by the furious rabble, found, wounded in the arms of the courageous wife of his Irish friend, who strove to rescue him from the assassins, he was conducted along the ramparts, riddled with wounds, and at last struck down by a mortal blow, which he received with the fortitude and dignity of a brave soldier. Thus did the Spanish people prepare for their resistance to the French, by commencing with the slaughter of the most illustrious of their best generals.

Thomas de Morla, an hypocritical flatterer of the multitude, disguising under great stateliness a base submission to all in power, was nominated by acclamation captain-general of Andalusia. He entered immediately into parley with admiral Rosily, and summoned him to surrender, which the brave French admiral declared he would not do till he had defended the honour of his flag to the last extremity. Thomas de Morla, however, sought to gain time, not daring to resist the Spanish populace or to attack the French: meanwhile he busied himself in making the Spanish ships take a position less dangerous for them. Cadiz had also its insurrectional Junta, which acknowledged the supremacy of that of Seville, and placed itself in communication with the English. The governor of Gibraltar, Sir Hew Dalrymple, commanding the British forces in those parts, and observing with extreme solicitude what was passing in Spain, had already sent emissaries to Cadiz, to negotiate a truce, to offer the friendship of Great Britain, her succours by land and sea, and a division of 5000 men which was coming from Sicily. The Spaniards accepted the offers of a truce and of alliance, but paused before so serious a measure as the introduction of an English fleet into their ports. The remembrance of Toulon was sufficient to bring the blindest of men to reflection.

While these things were passing at Cadiz, the commissioner sent to the camp of St. Roque had found no difficulty in obtaining a favourable reception from general Castaños, for whom Fortune had destined a higher part than he hoped or perhaps even wished for. General Castaños, like all the Spanish military officers of that time, knew no more of war than was learned under the old system, and particularly in the country farthest behindhand of any in Europe. But if he did not surpass many of his fellow-countrymen in military experience, he was a discreet politician, full of sagacity and shrewdness, but sharing none of the savage passions of the Spanish people. He had begun by judging of the insurrection quite as severely as any of the other military commandants his colleagues, had explained himself frankly to colonel Rogniat, who was sent to Gibraltar, to make an inspection of the coast, and had appeared to accept very cheerfully the regeneration of Spain from the hand of a prince of the house of Bonaparte; so that, at Madrid, the administration which governed till Joseph should arrive, conceived that it might reckon upon him. But when he saw the insurrection so general, so violent, so imperative, and the army disposed to join in it, he hesitated no longer, and submitted to the orders of the Junta of Seville, censuring at the bottom of his heart, but in profound secrecy, the conduct which in public he appeared to pursue with warmth and conviction. There were in the camp of St. Roque eight or nine thousand regular troops. There were as many at Cadiz, without reckoning the corps scattered over the rest of the provinces, which formed a disposable total of fifteen to eighteen thousand organised troops, fit to serve for a support to the popular rising, and for the nucleus of a numerous army of insurgents. When the title of captain-general was decreed to Thomas de Morla, the chief command of the troops was reserved for general Castaños, and by him accepted. He was ordered to concentrate them between Seville and Cadiz.

The example set by Seville was followed by all the cities in Andalusia. Jaen and Cordova declared themselves in insurrection, and acknowledged the supremacy of the Junta of Seville. Cordova, seated on the upper Guadalquivir, entrusted the command of its insurgents to an officer usually employed in the pursuit of the smugglers and banditti of the Sierra Morena: this was Augustin de Echavarri, accustomed to partisan warfare in the famous mountains of which he was the guardian. Out of the banditti, whom it was his business to put down, he made soldiers, uniting with them the peasants of Upper Andalusia; and he proceeded to the defiles of the Sierra Morena, to bar the access against the French.

Estremadura had participated in the general emotion, for, in that remote province, frequented by herdsmen and scarcely at all by traders, the new spirit had penetrated in a less degree than in the others, and the hatred of foreigners had retained all its energy. Though strongly agitated by the intelligence of the abdications and by the consequent insurrection at Seville, it did not declare itself till the 30th of May, the feast of St. Ferdinand. As at Coruña, the populace at Badajoz were irritated at not seeing the flag and effigy of the saint displayed on the walls of that fortress, and at not hearing the guns fire as usual on the anniversary of that solemnity. The people proceeded to the batteries, where they found the artillerymen beside their pieces, but not daring to discharge them in token of rejoicing. A bold woman, loading them with reproaches, seized the match which one of them was holding, and fired the first gun. At this signal the whole town was astir, assembled, and rose. The people ran, according to custom, to the residence of the governor, count de la Torre del Fresno, to enrol him in the insurrection or put him to death. He was a courtier-soldier, of extremely mild disposition, suspected as a friend to the prince of the Peace, and reputed to be not very favourable to the rash idea of a general rising against the French. The people began to parley with him, and were soon dissatisfied with his ambiguities. A courier bringing dispatches having arrived at the moment, they took umbrage at this circumstance, alleging that they were communications brought from Madrid,—that is to say, from the French authority, which, they said, had more empire over the captain-general than the inspirations of Spanish patriotism. Under the influence of these imputations, they broke into his hotel, and obliged him to flee. Finally, having pursued him to a guard-house, where he had sought an asylum, they murdered him in the very arms of his soldiers. After the death of this unfortunate officer, a Junta was formed, and acknowledged without hesitation the supremacy of that of Seville. The people were invited to take arms; all those in the arsenal of Badajoz were distributed among them, and as they were close to the frontier of Portugal, near Elvas, where Kellermann's division, detached from the army of general Junot, was then stationed, all well-disposed men were called upon to assist in the repair of the walls of Badajoz. The Junta sent an address to the Spanish troops in Portugal, exhorting them to desert. Badajoz offered them a secure asylum on the frontier, and useful employment for their devotion.

At the other extremity of the southern provinces, Grenada likewise rose, but, as in the provinces least prompt to bestir themselves, it needed, besides the emotion of the abdications, the feast of Saint Ferdinand to produce an insurrection there. It was agitated, like all Spain, when, on the 29th of May, an officer from the Junta of Seville entered the city in an ostentatious manner, amidst a populace disposed to turbulence, and drew the crowd after him to the residence of the captain-general Escalante, a prudent and timid man, who was extremely embarrassed by the proposal brought by that officer from Seville, which was nothing less than to rise and to declare war against France. He deferred his answer till the following day. The following day, the 30th, was the feast of St. Ferdinand. The people assembled tumultuously, and demanded a procession in honour of the saint. From the saint they passed on to the royal prisoner, whom they proclaimed by the title of Ferdinand VII.; and then obliged the governor-general Escalante to form an insurrectional Junta, of which he became president. A levy *en masse* was immediately ordered, and followed by a declaration of war. A young professor of the university, since ambassador and minister, M. Martinez de la Rosa, was sent to Gibraltar, to obtain arms and military stores. They were most cheerfully granted. A numerous population was immediately regimented and assembled every day to exercise. There were, as we have already observed, three fine Swiss regiments, one at Malaga, another at Carthagena, and the third at Tarragona, which Napoleon intended to concentrate at Grenada for the purpose of placing them on the high road to Andalusia, in order that Dupont, who had already rallied to him the two at Madrid, might pick them up on his way. Napoleon conceived that, by placing these five regiments along with French, they would follow precisely the impulsion of the latter. This combination was thwarted by the insurrection at Grenada. The regiment from Malaga was taken to Grenada, and Theodore Reding, governor of Malaga, a native of Switzerland, was appointed commandant-general of the troops of the province.

Blood flowed horribly in these parts, as in the others. At Malaga, the French vice-consul and another person, a Spaniard, were murdered. At Grenada, Don Pedro Truxillo, formerly governor of Malaga, suspected on account of his friendship for the demoiselles Tudo, to whom he was related, was, by desire of the populace, apprehended and taken to the Alhambra. The Junta, wishing to save him, determined to transfer him to a safer prison. Carried off on the way by the populace, he was basely assassinated, and his body dragged about the streets. Two other suspected persons, the corregidor of Velez-Malaga, and one Portillo, a skilful agriculturist, employed by the prince of the Peace to introduce the cultivation of cotton in Andalusia, were also apprehended, in compliance with the like demands, but placed out of the city in a Carthusian convent, where it was conceived that they would be safer. The monks, taking advantage of a feast-day, when the assembled people came to buy and drink their wine, excited the drunken peasants to murder the two unfortunate men confined in their convent, and were instantly obeyed. The hapless corregidor of Malaga and the accomplished Portillo were basely slaughtered. In all parts, ravage and murder accompanied and sullied the noble movement of the Spanish nation. Not far from Grenada, at Jaen, which had already risen, an odious crime marked the new revolution. In order to get rid of its corregidor, Jaen had sent him to Val de Peñas, and he had been there shot by the peasants of La Mancha.

Previously to all the risings which we have enumerated, Carthagena had hoisted the standard of insurrection. It was on the 22nd of the month of May, on the news of the abdications and the arrival of admiral Salcedo, who was about to sail, in order to conduct the squadron which had previously left Carthagena, from the Balearic islands to Toulon, that Carthagena rose, from the double motive of proclaiming the true king and of saving the Spanish fleet. A Junta was formed immediately, the levy *en masse* was ordered, and counter-orders were dispatched to the

Spanish fleet. This rising at Carthagena put into the hands of the insurgents an immense quantity of arms and warlike stores, which were immediately distributed among the inhabitants of the whole neighbouring country. At the call of Carthagena, Murcia rose two days afterwards, that is to say, on the 24th of May. The volunteers of the two provinces united under Don Gonzales de Llamas, formerly colonel of a regiment of militia, appointed to command them. The rendezvous assigned was on the Xucar, in order to give a hand to the Valencians.

At the same instant, in fact, Valencia also had risen, and with the accompaniment of horrible circumstances. The rich and populous Valencia, seated amidst its beautiful Huerta, had not less pretension to rule than Seville or Grenada. Its population, lively, ardent, tumultuous, was not capable of suffering itself to be outstripped by any other. It was on the very day of the arrival of the courier announcing the abdications that the rising took place. In one of the principal public places of Valencia, a popular haranguer, reading to the assembled crowd the *Madrid Gazette* containing the abdications, tore the paper in pieces, crying, "Down with the French! Ferdinand VII. for ever!" An immense multitude gathered round him, and ran to the authorities, to engage them in the insurrection. But first of all these people resolved to give themselves a chief. They chose Father Rico, a Franciscan monk, who was eloquent and daring, and put himself at their head to go and speak to the authorities. He then proceeded to the residence of the captain-general, count de la Conquista, whom he found, like all the captains-general, not disposed to comply, from prudence and aversion for the mob. He prevailed over him, nevertheless, without murdering him, promising himself to do something better shortly, and then repaired to the tribunal of *Accord*, the principal magistracy of the province, and dictated to it his resolutions, he, Rico, the monk, still talking, ordering, deciding for all. The formation of a Junta was immediately resolved upon and executed. The highest nobles of the country had seats in it along with the vilest agitators of the streets. The count de la Conquista not appearing zealous or energetic enough, a grandee of Spain, a rich proprietor of the province, the count de Cerbellon, was chosen to command the troops. A levy *en masse* was ordered, and application was made for arms to Carthagena, whence they were most cheerfully sent.

So far all was well, in reference to the insurrection and Spanish patriotism. But the authorities, though subjugated, appeared liable to suspicion. It was, in fact, only against their will that they had followed a movement which they regarded as mischievous, because it placed Spain between the French armies on the one hand and a furious populace on the other. It was therefore thought desirable to ascertain the nature of their reports to Madrid, and a courier was stopped and his dispatches were carried to the count de Cerbellon, to be read before the assembled multitude. These dispatches were actually of such a nature as to have caused the slaughter of the most exalted functionaries, for they solicited assistance from Madrid against the people who were rising. The daughter of count de Cerbellon, who was present at this scene, perceiving the danger, snatched up those dispatches, and tore them into a thousand pieces, before the eyes of the astonished crowd, disconcerted by the courage of that noble lady. Singular nation, which, like all yet simple nations, having only the vices and virtues of nature, blended the example of the most atrocious barbarity with that of the noblest devotedness!

But the Valencian populace soon made itself amends for the blood which it had been prevented from spilling. It had been remarked that a nobleman of the province, Don Miguel de Saavedra, baron of Albalat, was very remiss in attending the meetings of the Junta, of which he had been nominated a member. He went to them very rarely, because, as colonel of militia, he had a few years before ordered his men to fire upon the populace of Valencia for the purpose of restoring order. This recollection made him uneasy, and he remained in preference in the country. Presently a report was circulated that the baron of Albalat was betraying the cause of the insurrection. Messengers came to fetch him from his residence; they conducted him to Valencia, and he was conveyed to count de Cerbellon's, where those who interested themselves for him hoped that he would be safer. Father Rico had hastened forward to save him. The count de Cerbellon, less courageous than his daughter, showed no disposition to compromise himself in behalf of an old friend, who came to him to beg his life. He resolved to send him to the citadel, of which, owing to the complicity of the troops, the people had made themselves masters, and where all whom it was wished to save from the fury of the multitude were crowded together. Father Rico, full of zeal for the defence of this unfortunate gentleman, put himself at the head of the escort, and brought him unharmed through the streets of Valencia, notwithstanding the efforts of the populace, athirst for blood. But, on reaching the principal place of the city, the mob, having increased and become more compact, broke the square of soldiers in which the unfortunate baron of Albalat was, tore him from the hands of those who were defending him, dispatched him without mercy, and carried his head about on the end of a pike.

The consternation was general at Valencia, especially among the higher classes, who found themselves treated as suspected persons, like the French noblesse in 1793. To avert the danger, they multiplied their voluntary donations, and enrolled themselves in the new levies, without succeeding in soothing the distrust and the rage of the people, which increased every day. It became evident, in fact, that one victim would not appease their sanguinary fury. Rico, the Franciscan monk, already found his authority undermined by a rival. This rival was a fanatic, who had come from Madrid, the canon Calvo, whose passions were heated by a contest between the Jesuits and the Jansenists, in which he had supported the former against the latter. He had repaired to Valencia, conceiving apparently that he should there find a more extensive field for the exercise of his rage. He affected extreme devotion, took more time than any other person in saying mass, and had become the principal idol of the populace. Calvo adopted the usual theme of those who, in revolutions, wish to surpass others, and accused Father Rico of lukewarmness. In the citadel of Valencia there were three or four hundred French, traders attracted by commerce to that city, and many of whom had been long settled there. They had been put into this place out of humanity, and to withdraw them from the ferocity of the multitude. The atrocious Calvo had persuaded a fanatical band that here was the only holocaust well pleasing to God, the only one worthy of the cause which they were serving. Doubting whether he should be able to penetrate into the citadel with his troop of assassins, to consummate the abominable crime which he meditated, he stationed his band at a postern-gate opening upon the sea-shore: he then introduced himself into the citadel; and, affecting humanity, he persuaded the French that they should all be slaughtered, unless they fled in all haste by the postern leading to the shore. The unfortunate creatures, following his advice, sallied forth, women, children, and all, by the fatal outlet, which they considered as the only one to save their lives. No sooner did they appear than muskets, swords, knives, were pitilessly plied for their destruction. The murderers, gorged with blood, exhausted with fatigue, solicited mercy for about sixty, who were not yet dispatched. Calvo, perceiving that the zeal of his cut-throats had cooled, feigned compliance with their wish, and intimated that he would take with him the sixty victims thus spared. He conducted them to a by-place, where a fresh band completed the execrable sacrifice. Thus did our unfortunate countrymen expiate the faults of their government, without having any share in them!

All in Valencia not belonging to the vilest of the populace were deeply afflicted. Next day, Rico, the monk, incensed at these acts, which disgraced the cause of the insurrection, attempted to denounce to the public honour the crimes of Calvo: but he could not prevail, Calvo got the better of him, and Father Rico was obliged to conceal himself. Calvo was audaciously proclaimed a member of the Junta, to the great scandal and the great alarm of all honest men. Eight of the unfortunate French, who had escaped, as by miracle, from the general massacre, still lived. Not knowing where to take refuge, they went and threw themselves at the feet of the murderer in the very bosom of the Junta. Calvo ordered or suffered them to be slaughtered, and their blood spirted on the garments of the members of the Junta, who fled, seized with dread and horror.

So many crimes, however, at length produced a reaction. Father Rico took courage, issued from his retreat, repaired to the Junta, attacked Calvo to his face, denounced him, compelled him to defend himself, completely disconcerted him, and obtained an order for his arrest. Conveyed first to the Balearic islands, then brought back to Valencia, Calvo was tried, condemned, and strangled in his prison. Honest men regained some ascendency over the villains who had ruled Valencia. For the rest, extraordinary zeal in arming, for they were aware that they should soon have to defend themselves against the just vengeance of the French, though it did not excuse, yet made some slight amends for the atrocious crimes of which Valencia had just been the odious theatre.

All the towns on that part of the coast, such as Castellon de la Plana, Tortosa, Tarragona, followed the general example. The powerful Barcelona, containing as large a population as the capital of Spain, accustomed, if not to command, at least never to obey, burned with impatience to rise. Upon the arrival of the news of the abdications, on the 25th of May, all the posting-bills were torn down; an immense population thronged the public places, hate in their hearts and indignation in their eyes. But general Duhesme, at the head of 12,000 men, partly French, partly Italians, repressed the movement, and, from the lofty site of the citadel and the fort of Mont-Jouy, threatened to burn the city if it stirred. Under this iron hand, Barcelona trembled, but took no pains to dissemble its rage. Murat, still under illusion in regard to Spain, had granted to the Catalans the right to wear arms, which had been taken from them under Philip V., meaning thereby to reward them for their apparent submission. To this testimony of confidence they responded by immediately buying up all the muskets that were to be had, all the powder and lead for sale in the public depôts, and the peasants of the mountains and the people of the towns were seen parting with the most valuable things they possessed, in order to procure the means of obtaining arms. Every day, the most trifling accident at Barcelona became an occasion for riot. A stone that fell from the fort of Mont-Jouy had struck a fisherman. The poor fellow, wounded, it was alleged, by the French, was carried on a hand-barrow over the whole city, to excite the public indignation. The presence of our troops repressed the rising commotion. On another day, a fifer of one of the Italian regiments, observing a Spanish boy mimicking him in mockery, drew his sword to enforce respect: a fresh tumult ensued, and threatened this time to become general. But the French army again succeeded by its attitude in stopping the insurrection. The indiscipline of the Italian troops, less reserved in their conduct than ours, contributed also to the irritation of the Spaniards. The most turbulent of them, however, finding themselves too tightly curbed, fled to Valencia, Manresa, Lerida, and Saragossa; and Barcelona became not more friendly to the French, but more quiet.

The other towns of Catalonia, Girona, Manresa, Lerida, rose in insurrection. All the villages did the same. Barcelona, however, was kept down; Catalonia could not undertake anything very serious; and this proves that, if precautions had been better taken, and that if sufficient forces had been timely placed in the principal cities of Spain, the general insurrection might have been, if not prevented, at least quelled and greatly retarded in its progress.

Lastly, Saragossa, the immortal Saragossa, had not been the last, as it may well be supposed, in responding to the cry of Spanish independence. It was on the 24th of May, two days after Carthagena, two days before Seville, and as soon as the Asturias, that it had risen. On the arrival of the courier from Madrid, bringing the news of the abdications, the people, as in the other provinces, had thronged to the hotel of the captain-general, Don Juan de Guillermi, and, finding him timid, like the other captains-general, had deposed him, and placed general Mori, chief of the staff, in his room. The latter, on the following day, the 25th, convoked a Junta, to satisfy the people, and to surround himself with a council that should share his responsibility. General Mori and the Junta, sensible of the two-fold danger of being at the same time under the hand of the populace and under the hand of the French, who filled Navarre, were much perplexed. The people, whom the most ardent zeal would scarcely have satisfied, resolved to get rid of the chiefs who did not participate in its own excitement, but without murdering them, and gave the command to a celebrated personage, Joseph Palafox de Melzi, own nephew of the duke de Melzi, vice-chancellor of the kingdom of Italy. He was a handsome young man, of twenty-eight, had served in the life-guards, and was known for having boldly withstood the desires of a dissolute queen, whose notice he had attracted. Attached to Ferdinand VII., whom he went to visit at Bayonne, and whom he had found a captive and in duresse, he had come to Saragossa, his native place, awaiting, concealed in the environs, the moment for serving him whom he regarded as the only legitimate sovereign. The people, informed of these particulars, hastened to seek and to appoint him captain-general. Palafox accepted the office, called around him a monk, very clever and very brave, an old experienced officer of artillery, and a professor from whom he had formerly received lessons; and, availing himself of their knowledge to supply his own deficiency, for he knew nothing of war or of politics, he placed himself at the head of the affairs of Aragon. His heroic soul soon enabled him to make amends for the want of the qualifications for command. Palafox convoked the Cortes of the province, ordered a levy *en masse*, and called the fine and valiant Aragonese population to arms. His appeal was not only listened to, but anticipated everywhere. In short, such were the agitation and excitement, that, on the confines of Aragon and Navarre, at Logroño, only five or six leagues from the French troops, the people rose. They did the same at Santander, on our right, and even in the rear of our columns.

Thus, in eight days, from the 22nd to the 30th of May, all Spain, without any concert between one province and another, had risen, under the impulse of one sentiment, that of indignation, excited by the events at Bayonne. The characteristic traits of this national insurrection had been everywhere the same—hesitation of the higher classes, unanimous and irresistible indignation of the inferior classes, and very soon equal devotedness of all; local formation of insurrectional governments; levy *en masse;* desertion of the regular army to join in the insurrection; voluntary donations of the higher clergy, fanatical ardour of the inferior clergy; in short, everywhere patriotism, infatuation, ferocity, noble actions, atrocious crimes; a monarchical revolution, proceeding like a democratic revolution, because the instrument was the same, that is to say, the people, and because the result promised to be so too, namely, a reform of the ancient institutions which Spain was taught to hope for, in order to oppose France with her own weapons.

These spontaneous insurrections, which broke out between the 22nd and the 30th of May, were known only successively and tardily at Bayonne, where Napoleon resided, and where he continued to reside during the whole month of June and the first days of July. At first, those only were heard of which took place on the right and left of the French army, that is to say, in the Asturias, Old Castille, and Aragon. The difficulty of communication, always great in Spain, having been much increased at that moment, for the couriers were not only stopped, but most frequently murdered, was the cause that, at Madrid, even the French staff knew scarcely anything of what was passing beyond New Castille and La Mancha. They learned only that in the other provinces great disturbance, extreme agitation prevailed; still they were ignorant of the details; and it was but by degrees and in the course of June that they were informed of all that had happened up to the end of May, and this knowledge they derived only from confidential communications, or from the bravadoes of Spaniards, repeating at Madrid what private letters, brought by messengers, had revealed to them.

As soon as Napoleon was apprized at Bayonne of the events at Oviedo, Valladolid, Logroño, and Saragossa, which had occurred close to him, and of which he was not informed till seven or eight days after they happened, he gave prompt and energetic orders for stopping the insurrection, before it had spread and become consolidated. He had taken care to place between

Bayonne and Mâdrid, on the rear of marshal Moncey and of general Dupont, the corps of marshal Bessières, composed of Merle's, Verdier's, and Lasalle's divisions. Merle's division had been formed of some third battalions drawn from the coasts, and of the fourth battalions of the legions of reserve; Verdier's division of the provisional regiments from No. 13 to No. 18,* the first twelve composing, as we have seen, the corps of marshal Moncey. At this moment, the Polish corps admitted into the service of France were arriving: they consisted of a superb regiment of cavalry, 900 or 1000 strong, since celebrated by the name of Polish lancers; of three good regiments of infantry of 15 to 1600 men each, and known by the appellation of first, second, and third of the Vistula. Lastly, Napoleon had successively brought, either from Paris or from the camps established on the coast, the 4th light and the 15th of the line, the 2nd and 12th light, the 14th and 44th of the line, making them succeed one another from Paris to the camp of Boulogne, from the camp of Boulogne to the camps in Bretagne, from the camps in Bretagne to Bayonne, so as to afford them time to rest themselves, and occasion to be useful where they made any stay. He ordered, moreover, two seasoned battalions of the guard of Paris to be dispatched by post. If, therefore, he had not at hand the amount of resources that might have been sufficient to suppress the Spanish insurrection immediately, he made amends for the deficiency by his genius of organization; and he had already found means to collect some forces, which enabled him to apply a first remedy to the evil by the arrival of six French regiments of old formation and three Polish regiments. There arrived also, by the name of marching regiments, numerous detachments destined to recruit the provisional regiments,† and which, before their incorporation with the latter, rendered services all along the route which they had to traverse.

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* In fact, there were no more formed than the 13th, 14th, 17th, and 18th regiments, the detachments for the 15th and 16th being wanting.

† From these various designations, one may form some idea of the complication which the extent of the wants and the resources had produced in the organization, which Bonaparte managed with so much genius. There were old French regiments of the line, numbered 1 to 112, besides light regiments numbered 1 to 32, which were scattered in Poland, Germany, Italy, and Illyria, and which had their depôt battalions on the Rhine or on the Alps. There were, moreover, regiments called provisional, which had been formed of companies drafted from depôt battalions, and which were detached into Spain, to serve there under a temporary form. There were, besides, the detachments subsequently drafted from these same depôts, to reinforce the provisional regiments, and which, during their passage, formed marching regiments. The five legions of reserve, the first three battalions of which composed the corps of general Dupont, the fourth battalions of which formed one of the divisions of marshal Bessières, the fifth and sixth battalions of which remained to be organized, came under a new head. There were, lastly, the Italians, the Poles, the Swiss, who concurred, on their parts, in the composition of the forces which Napoleon had at his disposal. It is necessary, therefore, to follow with sustained attention these heads, so diverse and so numerous, if one would appreciate the prodigious art with which Napoleon managed his forces, and if one wishes above all to comprehend how it happened that, notwithstanding this prodigious art, his resources began to be below the immensity of the task which he had unfortunately undertaken.

Napoleon immediately ordered general Verdier to hasten to Logroño, with 1500 infantry, 300 horse, and four pieces of artillery, and to make a severe example of that town. He ordered general Lefebvre-Desnoettes, a brilliant officer, commanding the horse chasseurs of the imperial guard, to proceed to Pampeluna, with the Polish lancers, some battalions of provisional infantry, and six pieces of cannon, to collect, moreover, in that place some third battalions which formed its garrison, the whole composing a total of about 4000 men, and to fly to Saragossa, to restore order in that capital of Aragon. A deputation composed of several members of the Junta was to precede general Lefebvre-Desnoettes, and to employ persuasion before force; but, if persuasion proved unavailing, force was to be energetically applied to the evil. Napoleon prescribed to marshal Bessières, as soon as general Verdier should have finished with Logroño, to fall back with general Lasalle's cavalry upon Valladolid, to restore tranquillity in Old Castille. He dispatched general Savary to Madrid, to supply the place of Murat, who was ill, to issue orders in his name, so as that the command should not appear to be changed. He enjoined him to direct Frère's division, the third of general Dupont's, to march back from the Escurial to Segovia, which had risen, and to dispatch a column of 3 or 4000 men upon Saragossa, by a backward movement to the left on Guadalaxara. Having picked up some vague reports of the insurrection at Valencia, he ordered marshal Moncey's first division to be dispatched from Madrid, with a Spanish auxiliary corps, with directions to proceed to Cuença, to halt there if the reports of an insurrection at Valencia were not confirmed, and to push forward for that city if they were confirmed. Yet as it was a small force for reducing a city of 100,000 souls (60 in the city, 40 in the Huerta), Napoleon ordered general Duhesme to send Chabran's division from Barcelona upon Tarragona and Tortosa, which by the way would repress the movements in Catalonia, fix the Swiss regiment of Tarragona in the cause of France, and debouch by the coast upon Valencia, while marshal Moncey would debouch upon that city by the mountains.

But it was particularly towards Andalusia and the French fleet at Cadiz that the solicitude of Napoleon was directed. Ever since the first moments, he had thought of ordering Dupont towards Andalusia, where it appeared to him that too many Spanish troops had been suffered to accumulate, and where he apprehended, besides, some attempt of the English. He had placed that general in advance, with a first division, at Toledo; a second at Aranjuez, a third at the Escurial, so as to be *en échelon* on the road from Madrid to Cadiz, recommending to him expressly to hold himself in readiness to start at the first signal.

On the news of the insurrection, the order for departure had been dispatched, and general Dupont had marched (at the end of May) towards the Sierra Morena. Napoleon reckoned upon this general, who had hitherto been always brave, brilliant, and successful, and for whom he destined a marshal's baton on the first eminent occasion. Napoleon had no doubt that he would find it in Spain. That unfortunate general had no doubt of this himself. Horrible and cruel mystery of Fate, always unforeseen in its favours and in its severities!

Napoleon, who would not urge him too far into the extremity of Spain, without sufficient means for maintaining his ground there, sent him several reinforcements. Having dispatched him with his first division only, that of general Barbou, he ordered the second to be marched to Toledo, that it might rejoin him if he had need of it. He directed, moreover, that there should be given to him immediately the whole of the cavalry of the *corps d'armée*, the seamen of the guard, who were to man the two new ships prepared at Cadiz; lastly, the two Swiss regiments of the old garrison of Madrid (those of Preux and Reding), at that moment united at Talavera. Kellermann's division, belonging to Junot's *corps d'armée*, stationed at Elvas, on the frontier of Portugal and Andalusia, the three other Swiss regiments from Tarragona, Carthagena, and Malaga, which Napoleon supposed to be concentrated at Grenada, might make general Dupont's corps amount to 20,000 men at least, even without the junction of the second and third divisions—a force assuredly sufficient to keep down Andalusia, and to save Cadiz from any *coup de main* of the English. General Dupont was enjoined to march with the utmost haste towards the object which most engaged Napoleon's thoughts, that is to say, towards Cadiz and the squadron of admiral Rosily.

In consequence of these orders, there were to be left at Madrid two of marshal Moncey's divisions, and two of general Dupont's divisions, for these latter, placed between the Escurial, Aranjuez, and Toledo, were considered as being at Madrid itself. There were moreover to be left there the cuirassiers and the imperial guard, that is to say, about 25 or 30,000 men, exclusively of the escort of old regiments that was to accompany King Joseph. There was good ground to believe that this would be sufficient to guard against unforeseen cases; for it was not yet known how intense, how daring, and above all how general, the insurrection was. Orders were dispatched afresh to construct in Madrid, either at the royal palace or at Buen Retiro, real *places d'armes*, in which might be deposited the wounded, the sick, the military stores, the chests, and lastly the baggage of the army.

These orders, given directly for the northern provinces, and indirectly through the medium of the staff of Madrid for the southern provinces, were immediately executed. General Verdier marched first, with the 14th provisional regiment, about 200 horse, and four pieces of cannon, from Vittoria for Logroño. On reaching Guardia, not far from the Ebro, he learned that the bridge over the Ebro, which must be crossed to go to Logroño, was occupied by the insurgents. He crossed the river at El Ciego in a ferry-boat, and on the morning of the 6th of June he advanced towards Logroño. The insurgents, composed of the populace and peasants of the environs, to the number of two or three thousand, had obstructed the entrance of the town by an accumulation of all sorts of materials. They had placed in battery seven old pieces of cannon, mounted by cartwrights of the place upon carriages of their own making, and they kept behind their rude entrenchments, animated by much enthusiasm but little bravery. After the first discharges, they ran away from our young soldiers, who removed on the run all the obstacles with which the insurgents had endeavoured to stop them. The rout of these first opponents was so prompt, that general Verdier had not time to turn Logroño, to envelop and take them prisoners. Our infantry in the interior of the town, our horse outside the place, killed about a hundred of them with the bayonet and the sword. We had only one man killed and five wounded, but among them two officers. From the insurgents were taken their seven pieces of cannon and 80,000 infantry cartridges. The bishop of Calahorra, who had against his will been put at their head, obtained mercy for the town of Logroño, which at his solicitation was exempted from pillage, and merely subjected to a contribution of 30,000 francs for the benefit of the soldiers, among whom this sum was immediately distributed.

This conduct of the insurgents was not apt to produce any high idea of the resistance that the Spaniards could oppose to us. General Verdier returned immediately to Vittoria, in order to replace in marshal Bessière's corps the troops of generals Merle and Lasalle, which had just started for Valladolid. General Lasalle, with the 10th and 22nd chasseurs, and the 17th provisional infantry, borrowed from Verdier's division; general Merle, with his whole division, composed of one battalion of the 47th, one battalion of the 86th, one marching regiment, one regiment of the legions of reserve, had proceeded for Valladolid by way of Torquemada and Palencia, following the two banks of the Pisuerga, which runs from the mountains of Biscay into the Duero, after passing through Valladolid. While they were thus moving forward, general Frère, on leaving the Escurial, made, on the contrary, a retrograde movement upon Segovia, which was in insurrection. Old Castille was therefore traversed by two columns, one advancing upon the road from Burgos to Madrid, the other turning back upon the same road. General Frère, having a shorter distance to travel, arrived first at Segovia, which he found occupied by the pupils of the college of artillery and by a host of peasants, who had possessed themselves of the town, and were committing all sorts of excesses. They had completely barricaded the city, and placed in battery the artillery served by the pupils of the college. These obstacles could not long check our troops, who had all the ardour of youth, and who had been for a year in the ranks of the army without having fired a shot. With incredible spirit, they scaled the barricades of Segovia, killed a certain number of peasants with the bayonet, and drove off the others, who fled after plundering the houses which they were charged to defend. The unfortunate inhabitants had dispersed, that they might not be exposed to all the excesses of the defenders and of the assailants of their city. They did not escape the excesses of the former; and were, for this time at least, treated very indulgently by the latter. It was easy to comprehend why the wealthier classes inclined to submission to France, placed as they were between a sanguinary and plundering populace and the exasperated French armies. General Frère treated the city of Segovia very mildly, but seized the immense artillery stores kept in the military college.

The pretended defenders of Segovia had fled dispersed towards Valladolid, as if they had been pursued by general Frère, who, however, had no cavalry to dispatch after them. The director of the military college of Segovia, Don Miguel de Cevallos, had retired with them to Valladolid. According to the custom of soldiers who have fled before an enemy, the insurgents who escaped from Segovia pretended that M. Cevallos, by his cowardice or his treachery, had been the cause of their defeat. He was no such thing; but he was constituted prisoner and thus conducted to Valladolid. At the moment when he was entering the city, a great bustle took place. The new recruits of the insurrection were performing their exercise on an open place which he had to cross. They rushed upon him, and, in spite of the cries of his wife, who accompanied him, in spite of the efforts of a priest, who, upon pretext of receiving his confession, begged of them to grant him a few moments, he was mercilessly murdered, and then dragged through the streets. Bleeding fragments of his flesh were carried about by furious women in Valladolid.

This melancholy event, following so many others of the same kind, made a painful and a deep impression upon Don Gregorio de Cuesta, who had become, against his will, the head of the insurrection of Old Castille. He durst not, therefore, withstand an extravagant populace, who insisted on his hastening with the utmost speed to meet the French column marching from Burgos upon Valladolid. It was, as we have said, that of generals Lasalle and Merle, who had left Burgos with several thousand infantry, and about a thousand horse, that is to say, twice or thrice as strong a force as was needed for putting to flight all the insurgents in Old Castille. The old and soured captain-general thought with reason that the utmost that could be attempted was to make head against the French in a well-barricaded city, and with the resolution to defend themselves to the death. But he considered it as senseless to go out and defy in the open field the most efficient troops in Europe. Threatened, however, with a fate similar to that of Don Miguel de Cevallos, if he resisted, he marched with five or six thousand citizens and peasants, assisted by a few deserters from the regular troops, a hundred life-guards who had fled from the Escurial, a few hundred horse of the queen's regiment, and several pieces of cannon. He posted himself at the bridge of Cabezon, on the Pisuerga, about two leagues in advance of Valladolid, over which passed the high road from Burgos to that city.

General Lasalle had swept off the bands of insurgents posted in his way, especially at the village of Torquemada, which he had treated very roughly. At Valencia, the bishop had come forth to meet him, at the head of the principal inhabitants, imploring mercy for the town. It was granted by general Lasalle, who merely required some provisions for his soldiers. On the morning of the 12th of June he came in sight of the bridge of Cabezon, where Don Gregorio de la Cuesta had taken a position. The measures of the Spanish general denoted neither much experience nor great judgment. He had placed his cavalry in advance of the bridge, behind his cavalry a line of 200 infantry, his cannon on the bridge itself; some peasants as tirailleurs along the fords of the Pisuerga, and in rear, on the other side of the river, upon the heights which command its course, the rest of his little corps. General Lasalle, bringing two regiments of cavalry and the voltigeurs of the 17th provisional, led them on to the attack with his accustomed resolution. His cavalry upset that of the Spaniards, which it threw back upon their infantry. Our voltigeurs then charged that infantry, and drove it partly upon the bridge, partly upon the fords of the river. There was a horrible confusion, for foot, horse, cannon were jammed together upon a narrow bridge, under the volleys of the Spanish troops on the opposite bank, who fired indiscriminately on friends and foes. General Merle having supported general Lasalle with his whole division, the bridge was crossed, and the position beyond the Pisuerga quickly carried. The cavalry cut down the fugitives, a considerable number of whom were killed. Our loss consisted in fifteen killed, and twenty or twenty-five wounded; that of the Spaniards in five hundred killed and wounded. General Lasalle, without striking a blow, entered Valladolid, dismayed, but almost happy in being delivered from the banditti who had occupied upon pretext of defending it. The chief mortification of the Spaniards was to see their principal general beaten so speedily and so completely. Don Gregorio de la Cuesta retired with a few horse by the Leon road, surrounded by insurgents running off across the country, and telling them all that they were but rightly served for going with untrained bands to defy regular troops, accustomed to conquer Europe.

General Lasalle picked up in Valladolid a great quantity of arms, ammunition, and provisions, and spared the city. The actions of Logroño, Segovia, and Cabezon, indicated thus far great presumption, ignorance, and foolhardiness, and above all none of that tenacity which was subsequently met with. Accordingly, though it began to be understood in the army that the insurrection was universal, this excited little uneasiness, because it was imagined that there would be an outbreak indeed, but one as easily quelled as promptly produced. What was then occurring in Aragon was of such a nature as to inspire the same confidence. General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, having arrived at Pampeluna, had there organized his little column, consisting, as we have said, of three thousand foot and artillery, one thousand horse, and six pieces of cannon. Having completed his dispositions, he set out, on the 6th of June, from Pampeluna, leaving in that city the deputation which had undertaken to convey words of peace to Saragossa, for the violence everywhere shown by the insurgents plainly indicated that the lances of the Poles were the only means to which recourse could be had at the moment. In his march for Valtierra, on the 7th, general Lefebvre found everywhere the villages empty, and the peasants joined with the rebels. On reaching Valtierra itself, he learned that the bridge of Tudela over the Ebro was destroyed, and that all the craft on that river had been secured and taken to Tudela. He halted at Valtierra, to procure the means of crossing the Ebro. He had large barks, which served for ferry-boats, brought down the river of Aragon into the Ebro, drew them up opposite to Valtierra, and passed the Ebro at that point. Next day, the 8th, he appeared before Tudela. A host of insurgents were scouring the country, and firing from lurking-places behind the bushes. The main body of the assemblage, eight or ten thousand strong, was posted on the heights in advance of that city. The marquis de Lassan, brother of Joseph Palafox, commanded them. General Lefebvre, sending before him his voltigeurs and numerous parties of cavalry, led them from position to position till they were under the walls of Tudela. On arriving there, he opened a parley, with a view to avoid violent means, and above all the necessity of entering Tudela by main force. His flags of truce were answered by musket-shots, and the Spaniards even fired upon him. He then ordered a charge with the bayonet. His young soldiers, always ardent, dashed away on the run to the enemy's positions, and took his cannon. The lancers threw themselves at a gallop upon the fugitives, and dispatched some hundreds of them with their lances. The French entered Tudela at the charge step, and in the first moments the soldiers began to plunder the city. But order was soon re-established by general Lefebvre, and mercy granted to the inhabitants. We had not above a dozen men killed and wounded, while the insurgents lost three or four hundred killed, some behind their entrenchments, others on their flight across the country.

When master of Tudela, finding the bridge of that city destroyed, and the whole country to a distance in insurrection, general Lefebvre-Desnoettes, before he proceeded further, conceived that it behoved him to ensure the safety of his march by disarming the surrounding villages, and by repairing the bridge of Tudela, which is the necessary communication with Pampeluna. He employed, therefore, the 9th, 10th, and 11th of June in re-establishing the bridge, in scouring the country, in disarming the villages; putting to the sword the obstinate insurgents who would not surrender. On the 12th, having ensured his communications, he resumed his march, and on the morning of the 13th arrived before Mallen, where he again met with the insurgents, having the marquis de Lassan at their head, and consisting of two Spanish regiments and from eight to ten thousand peasants. Having beaten back the bands which had spread themselves in advance of Mallen, he caused the position itself to be attacked. This was not difficult, for those undisciplined insurgents, after one discharge, retired behind the troops of the line, firing over their heads, and killing more Spaniards than French. General Lefebvre, having attacked the enemy in flank, overthrew him without difficulty, and upset everything before him. The Polish lancers, sent in pursuit of the fugitives, gave them no quarter. Animated in this pursuit, they swam across the Ebro to get at them, and killed or wounded more than a thousand. Our loss was almost as inconsiderable as in the affair of Tudela, amounting to no more than about twenty men. The briskness of the attacks, the unsteadiness of the Spanish peasants, the embarrassment of the troops of the line, placed most frequently between our fire and that of the enemy, in short, the confusion in everything among the insurgents, account for the brevity of these petty combats, the insignificance of our losses, the importance of those of the enemy, who fell not so much in action as in the flight and by the lances of the Poles.

On the 14th, general Lefebvre, continuing his march towards Saragossa, again fell in with the insurgents posted on the heights of Alazon, treated them as at Tudela and at Mallen, and obliged them to make a precipitate retreat. However, on account of the fatigue of the troops, he did not pursue them so far as on the preceding days, and deferred till the next day his appearance before Saragossa.

He arrived there on the 15th of June. He would fain have entered by main force; but, to penetrate with 3000 infantry, a thousand horse, and six four-pounders, into a city containing from 40 to 50 thousand souls, full of soldiers, and, above all, of peasants, resolved to defend themselves with desperation, into a city, about the destruction of which they cared but little, since all of them were inhabitants of the neighbouring villages, was no easy matter. An old wall, flanked on one side by a strong castle, and from distance to distance by several massive convents, and terminating at both extremities at the Ebro, encompassed Saragossa.

Though great confusion prevailed in the city, and the regular troops, the insurgents, and the inhabitants were extremely dissatisfied with each other; the troops complaining of the banditti, who plundered, murdered, and were fit for nothing but to run away; the banditti complaining of the troops for not preventing their being beaten—only one sentiment prevailed upon the question of defence, that of resisting to the last extremity, and not surrendering the city but in ashes. These predatory and fanatical peasants, spurred by the need for excitement, after long inactivity, though useless and cowardly in the bare field, proved gallant defenders behind the walls of a city of which they were masters. The brave Palafox, moreover, shared their sentiments, and the resolution to sacrifice the city being taken by those to whom it did not belong, it became impossible to surprise it. Accordingly, no sooner had general Lefebvre appeared under its walls with his little force, than he beheld it filled to the very house-tops with a population of infuriated foes, and heard an incredible shower of balls issuing from all quarters. He was obliged to pause, for his principal force consisted of cavalry, and he had in fact no artillery but six four-pounders. He encamped upon the heights on the left, near the Ebro, and reported immediately his operations to head-quarters at Bayonne, desiring that more considerable force in infantry and artillery might be sent him, in order to batter the walls before him, which consisted not only in the wall surrounding Saragossa, but in a multitude of extensive edifices, which, when the wall was taken, must be conquered one after another.

In Catalonia, the situation presented difficulties of another kind, but perhaps still more serious. Instead of finding everything easy in the country, and everything difficult before the capital, it was precisely the reverse: for the capital, Barcelona, was in our hands, and the country presented a mountainous face, studded with fortresses and large insurgent villages. General Duhesme, with about 6000 French and 6000 Italians, found himself blockaded, as it were, in Barcelona, ever since the general insurrection in the last days of May. Girona, Lerida, Manresa, Tarragona, and nearly all the principal villages were in full insurrection, and the peasants came down even to the foot of the city walls to fire at our sentinels. Nevertheless, having, on the 3rd of June, received orders to send off Chabran's division towards Valencia, that it might lend a hand to marshal Moncey, he dispatched it on the 4th, prescribing to it the route of Lerida, so as that it might observe by the way what was passing in Aragon. General Chabran, at the head of a good French division, met with not many obstacles along the high road, to which he constantly kept, treated the inhabitants well, obtaining from them provisions, which they could not refuse to a division of such strength, and reached Tarragona, almost without striking a blow. He arrived there very opportunely to prevent the insurrection, for the Swiss regiment of Wimpfen, which occupied the town, was still hesitating. General Chabran pacified Tarragona, exacted from the Swiss officers their word of honour to continue faithful to France, who consented to take them into her service, and set all to rights, at least for a moment, in that important place.

But it was precisely his departure from Barcelona, and the division of the French forces, that the insurgents were awaiting in order to overwhelm our troops. The famous convent of Montserrat, situated amidst rocks in the girdle of mountains that encompasses Barcelona, was reputed to be the focus of the insurrection. The river Llobregat, which intersects this belt of mountains before it falls into the sea, is one of the obstacles which must be surmounted before one can reach Montserrat. The aim of the insurgents was to make themselves masters of the course of that river; to establish themselves strongly there; thus to shut up general Duhesme in the capital, and to cut him off from Tarragona: for the Llobregat runs to the south of Barcelona, between that city and Tarragona. General Duhesme, desirous of searching Montserrat, and preventing the insurgents from taking a position between him and general Chabran, dispatched general Schwartz at the head of a column of infantry and cavalry, with orders to proceed to the Llobregat, to cross it, and then to go by way of Bruch and make his appearance at Montserrat. That officer, setting off on the 5th of June, met at first with none but insurgents who gave up the ground to him without disputing it. He crossed the Llobregat, passed with equal ease through Molins del Rey, Martorell, Esparraguera, and thus reached Bruch. But on arriving at that place, the moment he began to direct his course towards Montserrat, he heard the alarm-bells ringing in all the villages, found himself assailed by a host of riflemen, learned that all around him they were barricading the villages, destroying the bridges, making the roads impassable, and, for fear of being enveloped, he resolved to turn back. He had then all sorts of difficulties to conquer, especially in the village of Esparraguera, which formed one long barricaded street. He had at every step to fight obstinate battles. The men fired from the windows, the women and boys threw stones and boiling oil from the house-tops upon the heads of the soldiers. Lastly, in passing a bridge, which had been so damaged as to give way at the first strain, one of our guns, in the act of passing, sank along with the bridge. General Schwartz, after losing many killed and wounded, reached Barcelona again on the 7th of June worn out with fatigue. It was evident that these fanatical peasants, useless in the open country, might prove very formidable behind houses, barricaded streets, obstructed bridges, rocks, bushes, any obstacle, in short, by which they could cover themselves while fighting.

On the 8th and 9th of June, the insurgents, emboldened by the retreat of general Schwartz, had the audacity to come and establish themselves on the Llobregat, occupying in force the villages of San-Boy, San-Felice, and Molins del Rey. Their plan still was to envelop general Duhesme, and to intercept the communication between him and general Chabran. General Duhesme was sensible that it was impossible to suffer them to accomplish such a design, and on the 10th of June he marched out of Barcelona, in three columns, to take the position of the insurgents. Arriving at day-break on the bank of the Llobregat, our soldiers crossed it with the water as high as the waist, and then rushed upon the villages occupied by the enemy, carried them with the bayonet, took many insurgents, of whom they killed a considerable number, and punished San-Boy by consigning it to the flames. In the evening they returned triumphant to Barcelona, bringing with them the enemy's artillery, to the great astonishment of the people, who had hoped not to see them again. This feat somewhat awed the tumultuous population of that great city, and kept up a wavering disposition in the superior classes, who there, as everywhere else, were divided between their deeply wounded national pride, and the dread of a contest with France under the sway of an unruly multitude. Meanwhile general Duhesme, anxious about general Chabran, who was far from him, at Tarragona, wrote to Bayonne, that the course prescribed to this general for lending a hand to marshal Moncey under the walls of Valencia was attended with too great danger, as well for Chabran's division itself, as for the troops left at Barcelona. For these reasons he begged permission to recall him.

Such were the events in the north of Spain, in consequence of the orders sent from Bayonne to the troops which were between the Pyrenees and Madrid. The orders transmitted through the medium of the staff of Madrid to the troops that were to act in the South were executed with the same punctuality. Murat was still in such a state as to be unable to issue any orders; but general Belliard, acting till the arrival of general Savary, himself dispatched the Emperor's orders to marshal Moncey and to general Dupont. Marshal Moncey, with his first division, commanded by general Musnier, left Madrid to proceed by way of Cuença towards Valencia. General Dupont set out from Toledo with his first division, under the command of general Barbou, to direct his course through La Mancha towards the Sierra Morena. There were left therefore at Madrid two of marshal Moncey's divisions, the imperial guard, and the cuirassiers. Vedel's division, the second of Dupont's corps, took the position at Toledo left vacant by Barbou's division. Frère's division, the third of Dupont's, on its return from Segovia to the Escurial, took at Aranjuez the position left vacant by Vedel's division. In the capital and its environs there were consequently left nearly 30,000 infantry and cavalry, a force sufficient for the moment. From it was detached only one column of nearly 3000 men, with directions to proceed by way of Guadalaxara to Saragossa, but which got no farther than Guadalaxara.

Marshal Moncey commenced his march on the 4th of June, with a French corps of 8400 men, 800 of whom were hussars, and 16 pieces of cannon. He was to be followed by a body of 1500 good Spanish infantry, 500 horse of the same nation, which would have made his corps amount to more than 10,000 men, and to fifteen or sixteen thousand under the walls of Valencia, in case of its junction with general Chabran's. Unluckily this junction was extremely doubtful, and what is more, in the night preceding the departure of the French division, two-thirds of the Spanish troops deserted—a defection which so weakened the auxiliary corps that it was not worth while to send it. Marshal Moncey, therefore, undertook his expedition with 8400 French troops, young, but ardent and highly disciplined. He passed the first night at Pinto, the second at Aranjuez, the third at Santa Cruz, the fourth at Tarancon, marching a very short distance every day, to avoid fatiguing his soldiers, and to accustom them to the heat, as well as to marching. Arriving on the 7th at Tarancon, marshal Moncey granted them a halt, and allowed them to remain there on the 8th. Marshal Moncey was anxious to spare both his soldiers and the inhabitants; he obtained everywhere provisions and a good reception. The Spaniards knew him from the war of 1793, and he had preserved a reputation for humanity which gained him favour with them. It is right to add that, in these central provinces, no important city having given a patriotic impulsion, great tranquillity continued to prevail. Marshal Moncey had therefore no difficulty to overcome either for marching or for subsistence. He passed the night of the 9th at Carrascosa, of the 10th at Villar-del-Horno, and arrived on the 11th at Cuença.

On reaching that town he resolved to stop there, to procure intelligence as well concerning Valencia as general Chabran, on whom he reckoned for accomplishing his mission. But the mountains which separated him on the left from Lower Catalonia, on the right from Valencia, prevented all intelligence from finding its way to him. As for Valencia, nothing passed the defile of Requena. All that was known was that the insurrection was violent and persevering there; that horrible massacres had been perpetrated, and that nothing could be done with the insurgent population but by force. Marshal Moncey, who was informed of the arrival of general Chabran at Tarragona, and who calculated that it would take that general till the 25th of June to proceed along the sea-coast to Tortosa and Castellon de la Plana, dispatched an order to him to repair thither without delay, and made dispositions for not debouching himself into the plain of Valencia before the 25th of June. He resolved to stop at Cuença till the 18th, then to leave it for Requena, and not to force the defiles of the mountains of Valencia till a favourable moment for acting in concert with general Chabran. He purposed, during these six days passed at Cuença, to allow his troops to rest, to provide means of conveyance, and to procure information concerning the difficult and unfrequented road which he was about to travel. This methodical mode of proceeding might assuredly have its advantages, but also baneful consequences; for it gave the insurrection time to organize and to establish itself solidly at Valencia.

Meanwhile, general Dupont was advancing at a very different rate towards Andalusia. Having left Toledo towards the end of May, he had been joined on the road by general Pryvé's dragoons, who supplied the place of the cuirassiers for his corps, and by the two Swiss regiments of Preux and Reding. Barbou's division might be estimated at 6000 men present under arms; the seamen of the guard at about 5 or 600 men, excellent for all services either on land or sea; the cavalry, composed of chasseurs and dragoons, at 2600; the artillery and engineers at 7 or 800; the Swiss at 2400; present under their colours.* General Dupont crossed La Mancha without difficulty, finding that province, generally desérted, still more deserted than usual, perceiving everywhere in the villages and hamlets signs of a repressed but violent hatred, and obliged to march with infinite precautions, so as not to leave any laggards in the rear. He passed, without encountering any resistance, the formidable defiles of the Sierra Morena, and arrived on the 3rd of June at Baylen, a place of sinister memory, and which, though he foresaw it not, was destined to become the theatre of the greatest of calamities for him. There he was informed of the insurrection at Seville and in the south of Spain, the rising of the whole population, and the uniting of the troops of the line with the insurgents. There were still doubts, however, of the conduct of general Castaños, commandant of the camp of St. Roque, and hopes were entertained that he might still be retained for the cause of the new royalty; for several recent conversations between him and French officers had betrayed much hesitation and even a decided disapprobation of the insurrection. So much was certain that the three Swiss regiments of Tarragona, Carthagena, and Malaga, which were supposed to be collected at Grenada, and ready to join the French army on its route to Seville, had been enveloped in the insurrection and hurried away by it. There might be danger for the fidelity of the two Swiss regiments which Dupont had with him, and there was nothing but victory that could attach them to us. The rising of Badajoz and Estremadura left little chance of being joined by Kellermann's division, sent from Lisbon to Elvas. These considerations, though far from cheering, were not of such a nature as to make general Dupont flinch; for, after having so often encountered the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian armies, and always conquered them, in spite of the disproportion of numbers, he cared but little for the mobs of peasants that he had before him. But, while boldly marching towards them, he thought it right to apprize the general staff at Madrid of the extent of the insurrection, and to make application for the union of his whole corps, that he might be able to control Andalusia, in which, as he said, he should only have to take a conquering walk (*promenade conquérante*).

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* These numbers are taken from the most authentic statements, and have not been adopted by me till after numerous verifications. It is important that they should be accurately given, because general Dupont, on his trial, attributed to himself a much less force than these figures assign, and because the accusation made it much greater. The strict truth is what I here give, after having verified the statements furnished by general Dupont, those which proceeded from the ministry of war, and, lastly, those which formed the private statements of Napoleon.

Having debouched from the defiles of the Sierra Morena upon Baylen, and finding himself in the valley of the Guadalquivir, he turned to the right, and resolved to follow the course of the river, and proceed to Cordova, to deal a severe blow upon the advanced guard of the insurrection. Arriving on the 4th of June at Andujar, he there learned further particulars of the events in Andalusia, persisted more strongly in his resolution of marching sharply against the insurgents, but persisted still more strongly in claiming the speedy union of the three divisions which composed his *corps d'armée*.

At Andujar, he learned with greater precision the difficulties which he should meet with on his way to Cordova. Augustin de Echavarri, formerly employed, as we have related, in clearing the Sierra Morena of the banditti that infested it, had put himself at the head of these banditti, of the peasants of the country, and of the people of Cordova and the surrounding towns. He had, moreover, two or three battalions of provincial militia, and some cavalry, the whole composing about 20,000 men, 15,000 of whom at least were undisciplined bands. This assemblage was called the army of Cordova, which was at this moment encamped on the Guadalquivir, at the bridge of Alcolea. Thoroughly despising such adversaries, general Dupont hastened to march straight up to them and to take the bridge, which could not equal that of Halle, taken by him with 8000 French from 20,000 Prussians. He continued therefore to descend the Guadalquivir, to approach Alcolea and Cordova. On the 5th he was at Aldea del Rio, on the 6th at El Carpio, at dawn on the 7th right facing the bridge of Alcolea.

The position which the insurgents had taken for covering Cordova was not ill chosen. The high road to Andalusia, which, as far as Cordova, almost always follows the bottom of the valley of the Guadalquivir, is sometimes on the left, sometimes on the right of the river, running with it along the foot of the most beautiful, most luxuriant hills of that country, covered with olive and orange trees, superb pines, and some palms. Beyond these hills are perceived on the right and very near you the dark summits of the Sierra Morena, on the left and at a great distance the misty and bluish tops of the mountains of Grenada. The road, which is at first on the right of the Guadalquivir, crosses to the left at Andujar. At the bridge of Alcolea it again passes to the right, and runs to Cordova, situated in fact on that side, and on the very bank of the river, which it commands with its Moorish towers. Though in this part the Guadalquiver is everywhere fordable, especially in summer, it is nevertheless an obstacle of some consequence, and the possession of the bridge of Alcolea, affording a clear passage to artillery, had a sort of importance. This bridge is long and narrow, and terminates at the village of Alcolea itself. The Spaniards had closed the entrance by means of a field-work, consisting of an epaulement of earth, and a deep ditch. They had manned and armed it with troops and artillery, and had taken care to scatter in advance, both on the right and left, a host of riflemen ambushed in the olive plantations. They had, moreover, obstructed the bridge, filled the village of Alcolea with peasants who were skilful marksmen, placed beyond it twelve pieces of cannon on a hill which commanded both banks, and drawn up, farther on, the rest of their force, upon an extensive plateau. To distract the assailants, they had prepared a diversion, by making a column of three or four thousand men cross the Guadalquivir below Alcolea, and who, ascending the left bank which the French occupied, were to pretend to take them in flank, while they were attacking the bridge of Alcolea in front.

It was necessary therefore for the French to clear away the swarm of riflemen posted in the olive-grounds, to attack the work, storm it, pass the bridge, make themselves masters of Alcolea, throw into the Guadalquivir the corps which had crossed it, then make a dash upon Cordova, which is only two leagues distant. They had time, for they had arrived at five in the morning in face of the enemy, on a splendid day in the month of June. General Dupont placed foremost Pannetier's brigade, formed of two battalions of the Paris guard and two battalions of the legions of reserve. He distributed some riflemen on the right and left, drew up Chabert's brigade in the second line, the Swiss in the third, and ranged on his left all his cavalry, under general Fresia, to be a check upon the corps that was ascending the Guadalquivir. He had taken the precaution to send the intrepid captain Baste, with about a hundred seamen of the guard, to slip under the bridge for the purpose of examining whether it was undermined. He gave orders that the attack should be sudden and brisk, so that men might not be lost in skirmishing.

At a given signal, the French artillery and the tirailleurs having begun firing, the battalions of the Paris guard, commanded by general Pannetier and colonel Estève, advanced upon the redoubt. The grenadiers threw themselves gallantly into the ditch, in spite of a smart fire of musketry, and, mounting on one another's shoulders, got into the work by the embrasures, while captain Baste, having finished his reconnoissance, entered at the side. The redoubt being thus stormed, the grenadiers ran to the bridge, passed it with bayonets fixed, lost a few men, and particularly their captain, who had led them valiantly to the assault, and arrived at the village of Alcolea. The third legion followed them: it attacked with them the village of Alcolea defended by a host of insurgents. More men were lost here than in the attack of the bridge: but, if we lost more, the insurgents also had more killed, and a great number of them were taken and put to death in the houses of the village. Alcolea was soon in our possession. During this warm engagement, general Fresia, on the other side of the Guadalquivir, had stopped the Spanish corps employed to make a diversion. Under the vigorous charges of our dragoons that corps soon fell back, and recrossed the Guadalquivir in disorder.

This brilliant action had not cost us more than 140 men killed and wounded. We had killed more than thrice as many in the interior of the village of Alcolea.

The bridge of Alcolea being carried, it took a few moments to fill the ditch of the redoubt, and to form a passage for the artillery and cavalry of the army. This was immediately done; the bridge was passed, and a battalion of the seamen of the guard left in charge of it. The main body of the Spaniards had rallied on the road to Cordova, on the summit of a plateau, which, on one side, was bounded by the Guadalquivir, and, on the other, connected with the Sierra Morena. The French army was at the foot of the plateau in close column, in battalions, the cavalry and artillery in the intervals. After allowing it to take breath, general Dupont gave orders to advance. At the mere sight of these troops, marching as if on parade, the Spaniards fled in confusion, abandoning to us the road to Cordova. Some more prisoners and part of their artillery were taken.

Our troops marched without intermission, notwithstanding the scorching heat of the middle of the day, and, at two in the afternoon, came in sight of Cordova, its towers, and its beautiful mosque, now the cathedral, which overlooks the city. General Dupont had no notion of giving the insurgents time to recover themselves, and to occupy Cordova in such a manner as to render its reduction difficult to an army provided with field artillery alone. In consequence, he resolved to storm it at once. He purposed, however, to summon it, with a view to spare a capture by assault. He sent for the corregidor, who had secreted himself, as much for fear of the Spaniards as of the French. That magistrate did not make his appearance. The insurgents refused to listen to a priest who was sent to them, and fired upon all the French officers who approached to parley. Force was, therefore, the only means of getting into Cordova. Cannon were brought forward, and the gates broken open; and the French entered the city in column. They had to take several barricades, and to attack one by one many houses in which the banditti of the Sierra Morena posted themselves. The battle became furious. Our soldiers, exasperated by this resistance, penetrated into the houses, killed the banditti who occupied them, and flung a great number of them out of the windows. While some maintained this conflict, the others had pursued in column the mass of the insurgents, who had fled by the bridge of Cordova to the Seville road. But the fight soon degenerated into a downright pillage; and that unfortunate city, one of the most ancient and most interesting in Spain, was sacked. The soldiers, after storming a certain number of houses at the cost of their blood, and killing the insurgents by whom they were defended, had no great scruple to establish themselves in them, and to exercise all the rights of war. Finding the insurgents whom they slew laden with pillage, they pillaged too, but rather to procure food and drink than to fill their knapsacks. The heat was suffocating, and what they most needed was drink. Going down to the cellars, stored with the best wines of Spain, they stove in the casks with the but-end of their muskets, and several of them were drowned in the wine thus wasted. Others, completely drunk, paying respect to nothing, stained the character of the army by falling foul of the women, and subjecting them to all sorts of outrages. Our officers, always worthy of themselves, made incredible efforts to put an end to these horrible scenes, and some of them were obliged to draw their swords upon their own soldiers. The troops who had pursued the fugitives beyond the bridge of Cordova wished to enter the city in their turn to procure refreshment also—for they had received no distribution since the preceding day—and thus increased the desolation. The peasants, on their part, had fallen to plundering, and the unfortunate city of Cordova was at this moment ravaged at once by the Spanish banditti, and by our exasperated and famished soldiers. It was a painful scene, and had most mischievous consequences, from the outcry which it subsequently produced in Spain and in Europe. General Dupont ordered the *générale* to be beaten to call the soldiers to their colours; but either they heard it not, or they refused to obey, and of the whole army no part remained orderly but the cavalry and the artillery, which were outside Cordova, and attached to their ranks, the one by their horses, the other by their cannon. An enemy's corps, had it come back, would have caught all the infantry dispersed, gorged with wine, overcome by sleep and intoxication. It was this very fatigue, this hideous drunkenness, that put an end to the disorder; for our soldiers, unable to hold up any longer, had thrown themselves on the ground, amidst the killed and the wounded, side by side with the Spaniards whom they had taken or slain.

Next morning, at the first sound of the drum, those same men, having become docile and humane as usual, repaired all of them to their colours. Order was immediately re-established, and the unfortunate inhabitants of Cordova were rescued from the desolation into which they had been plunged for some hours. Excepting the archbishop's palace, which had been taken by assault, and where the staff of the revolters had its quarters, the sacred edifices in general had escaped the devastation, though the convents were reputed to be the principal focuses of the insurrection. The soldiers were separated from the inhabitants and lodged in huts in the public places. Their knapsacks were examined; and the money which they were found to contain was thrown into the chest of each regiment. Several depôts of specie had been taken, some belonging to the insurgents, and arising from the voluntary donations made by individuals and the clergy to the insurrection, others belonging to the public treasury. The whole of these funds went to the general chest of the army, to clear off the arrears of pay.* The inhabitants, taking courage by degrees, returned, and even formed a wish to keep the French army with them, that they might not be liable to have fresh battles fought in their streets and in their houses. It is a singular fact, and one which may enable us to appreciate the services that are to be expected of the Swiss, that two or three hundred of them, who were serving with Augustin de Echavarri, came over to our side after the capture of Cordova; and that, at the same time, a nearly equal number of men of the two regiments which we had with us (Preux and Reding), left us to go over to the enemy. It was evident that these foreign soldiers, divided between their predilection for the French service and their old attachment to Spain, would waver between the two parties and side definitively with that which should prove victorious. One could, therefore, scarcely rely upon them in case of reverses, notwithstanding the known and justly esteemed fidelity of the soldiers of their nation.

The thunderbolt which had struck Cordova had at once terrified and exasperated the Spaniards. But, their hatred far surpassing their terror, they had soon formed throughout all Andalusia the plan of uniting in mass to crush general Dupont, and to revenge upon him the sack of Cordova, which they depicted everywhere in the darkest colours. They recapitulated even in the smallest villages the massacre of women, children, and aged men, the rape of virgins, the profanation of the sacred buildings—assertions atrociously false; for, though the confusion had been very great for a moment, the pillage had been inconsiderable, the massacre null, with the exception of some insurgents taken with arms in their hands. Throughout all Andalusia, there was, nevertheless, but one cry against the French, who were already too much detested to need any false statements to augment the hatred which they excited. The people vowed to destroy them to the last man, and as far as they were able they kept their word.

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* The only diversion, if such it were, consisted in the grant of a gratuity to the generals and superior officers, mentioned elsewhere in the accounts of the army, and for which they had the most urgent necessity. It varied between three and four thousand francs per head. This fact results from a strict and very detailed examination.

No sooner had our troops passed the Sierra Morena, leaving scarcely any post on their rear, on account of their small number, than swarms of insurgents, driven from Cordova, spread themselves over their line of communication, occupying the defiles, taking possession of the villages which border the high-road, and murdering without pity all the French travellers, sick, and wounded, whom they met with. General René was thus assassinated with atrocious circumstances. At Andujar, the revolters of Jaen, taking advantage of our departure, made themselves masters of the town, and slaughtered a whole hospital of sick. But for the interference of a priest, the wife of general Chabert would have been murdered. At the village of Montero, between Andujar and Cordova, occurred an event worthy of cannibals. A detachment of 200 men had been left to guard a bakery, where it was intended that bread should be made for the army till it reached Cordova. The day before it was to enter that city, and consequently before the alleged ravages which it committed there, the inhabitants of the environs, some of whom had come from the Sierra Morena, while others issued from the neighbouring villages, fell unexpectedly and in considerable number upon the French post, and slaughtered the whole. With an unparalleled refinement of cruelty, they crucified upon trees several of our unfortunate soldiers. They hung up others, kindling fires beneath their feet. They buried several half alive, and sawed others between two planks. The most brutal, the most infamous barbarity spared these hapless victims of war no sufferings. Five or six soldiers, who escaped as by miracle from the massacre, brought the army this intelligence, which made it shudder, and disposed it to anything but clemency. Thus the war assumed an atrocious character, without, however, changing the hearts of our soldiers, who, when the heat of battle was over, again became mild and humane as they were accustomed to be, as they have been over all Europe, which they have traversed as conquerors, never as barbarians.

General Dupont, established at Cordova, availing himself of the resources of that large city to recruit his army, to repair his *matériel*, but having no more than about 12,000 men, including upward of 2000 Swiss, upon whom he could not depend, could not prudently advance into Andalusia, before the junction of Vedel's and Frère's divisions, left, the one at Toledo, the other at the Escurial. He had most urgently applied for them, and, with this reinforcement of ten or eleven thousand infantry, which would have raised his corps to at least 22,000 men, he calculated upon traversing Andalusia as conqueror, on extinguishing the flame raging at Seville, on bringing back general Castaños to king Joseph and the regular troops, on pacifying the south of Spain, on saving the French squadron of admiral Rosily, and thus thwarting all the designs of the English upon Cadiz. He awaited, therefore, with impatience the demanded reinforcements, having no doubt of their speedy arrival, after such dispatches as he had sent to Madrid. It was nevertheless a question whether those dispatches would arrive, all the old banditti of the Sierra Morena having become its defenders, and slaughtering the couriers without suffering one to pass.

But, while general Dupont, who entered Cordova on the 7th of June, was waiting for reinforcements, the insurrection in Andalusia acquired greater consistence. The troops of the line, to the number of from twelve to fifteen thousand men, were concentrating around Seville. The new levies, though less numerous than had been hoped for, were, nevertheless, organizing, and began to be trained. Some of them were introduced into the ranks of the army to increase its effective, the others formed into battalions of volunteers. They were supplied with arms and were receiving instruction. Time was, therefore, entirely to the advantage of the insurrection, which was preparing its means, and to the disadvantage of the French army, whose situation became worse every moment; for, independently of the non-arrival of the reinforcements, the constantly increasing heat augmented the number of the sick, and especially affected the spirits of the soldiers. At the same time our squadron was exposed to great danger at Cadiz.

Ever since the unfortunate murder of Solano, the agitation had kept increasing in that city, where the lowest of the rabble had the rule. The new captain-general, Thomas de Morla, endeavoured to support himself by flattering the multitude, and by allowing it every day such an amount of excesses as could satisfy it. Immediately after butchering the captain-general Solano, this multitude had set about demanding the destruction of our fleet and the massacre of the French seamen. It was a thing natural enough to desire, but difficult of execution, against five French ships of the line and a frigate, manned by three or four thousand seamen, who escaped from Trafalgar, and mounting from four to five hundred guns. They would have fired the Spanish ships and the whole arsenal of Cadiz, before they would have suffered a single man to come on board of them. Add to this that, placed at the entrance of the road of Cadiz, near the city, mixed with the Spanish division, which was in a state of equipment, they might destroy that, and batter the city with their guns. The English, it is true, would have been called in, and our seamen would have succumbed under the cross-fires of the Spanish forts and the English ships; but they would have severely revenged themselves before they died on blind allies and barbarous enemies.

Thomas de Morla, who appreciated this situation better than the populace of Cadiz, was not willing to run the risk of such extremities; and he had, with his usual shrewdness, undertaken to negociate. He had proposed to admiral de Rosily to move his ships a little to one side, while working higher up into the road, to leave the Spanish division at the entrance, so as to separate the two squadrons and to prevent collisions between them, and thus to consign to the Spaniards alone the task of closing Cadiz against the English. It was said that they had resolved to do so; for, though they had concluded a truce with the latter, they disclaimed all intention of putting into their hands the great naval establishments of Spain. They persisted, in fact, in refusing the aid of 5000 land-troops which had been offered them. Admiral Rosily, expecting every moment the arrival of general Dupont, whom he knew to be on march, had agreed to these proposals, certain of being in a few days master of the port and of the establishment of Cadiz. In consequence, he had separated his ships from the Spanish ships, and taken a position in the interior of the road, while the Spanish division continued to occupy the entrance.

Thus had passed the first days of June, which time general Dupont had employed in reducing Cordova. But admiral Rosily had soon perceived that all the apparent attentions of the captain-general Thomas de Morla were but a device for gaining time, and for preparing the means of overwhelming the French squadron in the interior of the road, while no great harm could result from it to Cadiz and its vast arsenal.

In order to form an idea of this situation, you must know that the harbour of Cadiz, resembling, in this respect, that of Venice and all those of Holland, is composed of spacious lagoons which have been formed by the alluvions of the Guadalquivir. Amidst these lagoons have been constructed basins, canals, building-yards, and superb magazines; and advantage has been taken of a group of rocks, situated at some distance in the sea, and connected with the shore by a pier, to form an immense road and to close it. Upon this group of rocks Cadiz is built. It is from the top of this group that it commands the road which bears its name, and that, crossing its fires with the low ground of Matagorda, situated opposite, it renders entry impracticable to hostile fleets. The road opens to the west, and on the east extends a vast inlet, communicating by passages and canals with the great establishments known by the general name of the arsenal of the Caracas. From this entrance, of which Cadiz has the command, to the Caracas is a distance of three leagues. The guns near the entrance are very numerous, for the purpose of beating off an enemy; but on penetrating into the interior, and amidst the lagoons, which have been made subservient to the formation of basins, the impossibility of pushing so far has rendered it needless to be prodigal of defences and batteries.

On seeing the mortars and howitzers brought by the united efforts of many hands to all the batteries which could act upon the middle of the road, on observing the equipment of gun-boats and bomb-vessels, admiral Rosily had no further doubt of the object of these preparations, and he formed the plan, at full moon, when the tides would be higher, to take advantage of the draught of water, to push, with his ships, completely armed, into the channels terminating at the Caracas. He should there be covered from the most formidable fires, able to defend himself for a considerable time, and to do a great deal of mischief before he yielded. But for this purpose he should have needed a west wind, and none but easterly winds were blowing. He was, therefore, obliged to suspend the execution of his design. Besides, the foresight of the Spanish officers soon rendered this manœuvre impossible. They sank old ships in the passages leading to the Caracas; they placed at anchor a line of gun-boats and bomb-vessels, carrying very heavy artillery. They did the same on the other side towards Cadiz, where they placed another line of gun-boats and bomb-vessels, and also sank old ships. The squadron, therefore, was shut up in the centre of the road, fixed in a position which it could not quit, exposed to the fire of all the batteries on shore and of all the gun-boats, and cut off from the means of moving to a spot where it might have done the greatest mischief.

On the 9th of June, all these preparations being finished, M. de Morla, without taking the trouble to parley, issued orders for the fire upon the squadron of admiral Rosily to commence. Twenty-one gun-boats and two bomb-vessels on the side next to the Caracas, twenty-five gun-boats and twelve bomb-vessels on the side next to Cadiz, opened their fire upon our vessels. The *Prince of the Asturias* had been brought near to the line of gun-boats next to Cadiz, to serve them for a support. The land-batteries, covered with strong epaulements, which screened them from our projectiles, added to all these fires those of 60 pieces of cannon of large calibre, and of 49 mortars. Under a shower of balls and bombs, our five ships and the frigate, which completed the squadron, behaved with a coolness and vigour worthy of the heroes of Trafalgar.

Unfortunately, the state of the tide prevented them from approaching the land batteries, which they would have demolished, and they received the fire of the latter without being able to return it in an efficacious manner, on account of the thickness of the epaulements. But they revenged themselves upon the bomb-vessels and the gun-boats, a good number of which they shattered and sunk. The firing, commenced on the 9th, at three in the afternoon, lasted till ten at night. Next day, the 10th, it began again at eight in the morning, and was kept up without intermission till three in the afternoon, and with the same circumstances as on the preceding day. At the conclusion of this dreary combat, we had received 2200 bombs, eight only of which had fallen on board, without doing any considerable damage. We had thirteen men killed and 46 severely wounded. But 15 gun-boats and 6 bomb-vessels were destroyed, and 50 Spaniards were *hors de combat*. This would have been of little consequence had there been any prospect of obtaining a great result: it was too much, a thousand times too much, for a fight without any possible result, and which could only terminate in a useless butchery. Thomas de Morla, who conceived he had done enough to satisfy the populace of Cadiz, and who dreaded some act of despair, sent an officer with a flag of truce to summon admiral Rosily to surrender; representing the impossibility for the French to defend themselves in the middle of a closed road, and in which they were prisoners. He then caused it to be insinuated that the Spaniards were disposed, if the admiral assented, to offer an honourable arrangement. Admiral Rosily sent for answer that to surrender was inadmissible, for the crews would mutiny and refuse to obey; but that he offered the choice of two conditions—either to leave Cadiz upon a promise from the English that they would not pursue him for four days; or to remain motionless in the road, till the general events of the war should have decided his fate and that of Cadiz; engaging to send his guns ashore, that no alarm might be felt on that score. M. de Morla replied that he could not assent to either the one or the other of these conditions, and that he was obliged to refer the matter to the Junta of Seville, which had become the absolute authority, and was obeyed by everybody in the south of Spain. Whether the proposal of this new delay was a feint or not on the part of M. de Morla, who perhaps sought again to gain time for preparing further means of destruction, it suited admiral Rosily to agree to it; for it was known that general Dupont entered Cordova on the 7th of June, and his arrival was momentarily expected. He consented, therefore, waiting every day, as one awaits the announcement of life or death, for the report of the distant gun, the signal of the presence of the French army.

Having entered Cordova on the 7th, it was, in fact, likely enough that general Dupont might be on the shore of Cadiz by the 13th or the 14th. But during this interval the environs became covered with redoubts, cannon, and formidable means of destruction. The admiral, aware that, unless he were delivered by general Dupont, he should sink under that mass of fires, and lose to no purpose three or four thousand sailors, the best belonging to France, formed a desperate plan, which was not calculated to save them, but which offered at least a chance of salvation, and at any rate the satisfaction of revenging himself by destroying many more men than he should lose. Though the passages on the side next to Cadiz for sailing out of the road were obstructed, the admiral had discovered a practicable outlet, and resolved, whenever the firing recommenced, to fall furiously upon the Spanish division, which was very ill armed and not more numerous than his own, to burn it before the arrival of the English, to attack these latter the moment they appeared, to destroy, or to get destroyed, trusting to chance to save the whole or part of his squadron. But for this act of despair was required a first fortunate accident—a favourable wind. He waited, therefore, after making all the preparations for departure, either for the appearance of general Dupont, or for an acceptable answer from Seville, or for a fair wind.

The 14th of June arrived, and neither of these circumstances was realized. General Dupont had not appeared; the Junta of Seville required a pure and simple surrender; and, as for the wind, it blew from the east, towards the furthest extremity of the road, instead of impelling towards the outlet. It was precisely the wind that could have been wished for a few days earlier, for falling upon the Caracas, before the channels were obstructed. The enemy's means were trebled. Nothing was left but to submit to a slow and infallible destruction, under a cannonade, to which it was impossible to reply in such a manner as to be revenged. Surrender would leave at least a chance of being released from prison in a few days by a victorious French army. The admiral was therefore obliged to strike his flag, without any other condition than that life should be spared. The brave sailors of Trafalgar, always unfortunate through the combinations of a policy which had the continent in view much more than the sea, were again sacrificed here, and made prisoners by an allied nation, which, after having so ill seconded them at Trafalgar, revenged upon them general events of which they were not the authors. The ships were disarmed, and the officers conducted prisoners into the forts, amidst the frantic plaudits of a ferocious populace. Thus terminated, at Cadiz itself, the maritime alliance of the two nations, to the great joy of the English, who had landed, and who were conducting themselves in the port of Cadiz as though it had belonged to them. Thus vanished, one after another, the illusions which had been formed concerning the Peninsula, and each of them, as it vanished, left behind a prospect of immense danger.

Admiral Rosily had succumbed, because general Dupont had not arrived in time to lend him a hand—what was about to happen to general Dupont himself, thrown, with 10,000 young soldiers, amidst insurgent Andalusia? It had been calculated that all would go on smoothly with him; that five or six thousand Swiss would reinforce him by the way; that a French division, quietly traversing Portugal, would join him by Elvas, and that he might thus march upon Seville and Cadiz with 20,000 men. But the greater part of the Swiss, enveloped by the insurrection, had given themselves up to it. Portugal, beginning to participate in the emotion of Spain, was not easier to traverse, and general Kellermann had scarcely been able to reach Elvas with his cavalry. All the facilities anticipated from the ancient submission of Spain were transformed into difficulties. Every village became a den of cut-throats for our soldiers; provisions disappeared, and nothing was left but a burning climate.

General Dupont, when he paused in Andalusia, had been far from suspecting such a state of things. He had never relied much either upon the Swiss who were to meet him at Grenada, or on the French division from Portugal that was to join him. He had reckoned upon his own troops, upon the junction of his two divisions, and, at the head of 20,000 French, he had not doubted for a moment of accomplishing the object of his mission to Andalusia. But it was a question whether his couriers could have reached Madrid, where his two divisions had been detained, in the uncertainty of what might have happened in the centre of Spain. He tarried therefore for about ten days at Cordova, awaiting instructions and succours, which did not arrive. Meanwhile the intelligence of the disaster of the squadron, that of the defection of the Swiss and of the troops in the camp of St. Roque, and the answer given by general Castaños to an envoy whom he had sent to him, proving that he was irrevocably engaged in the insurrection, completely revealed to general Dupont the danger of his situation. On one side he beheld the army of Andalusia coming against him, on the right, from Seville, and on the other the army of Jaen, on the left, from Grenada. The latter was for the moment the most dangerous, for it was but a step from Jaen to Baylen, at the head of the defiles of the Sierra Morena, from which the general was about 24 leagues distant while staying at Cordova. Such a situation was not tenable, and he could not abandon to the enemy the possession of the passes of the Sierra Morena without perishing. It was bad enough to leave there the undisciplined bands of Augustin Echavarri, which infested them, and stopped couriers and convoys. He took, therefore, though with regret, the resolution to leave Cordova, and to fall back to Andujar, where he should be upon the Guadalquivir, seven leagues from Baylen, and much nearer to the defiles of the Sierra Morena. Thus, instead of the *conquering walk* through Andalusia, he was obliged to make a retrograde movement.

As nothing pressed him, he executed this retreat slowly and orderly. He set out in the evening of the 17th of June, purposing to march during the night, as it is customary to do at this season in so hot a climate. From what had been heard of the cruelty of the Spaniards, none of the sick or wounded who could bear the fatigue of removal would be left behind. It was necessary, therefore, to be followed by an immense train of carts, which took above five hours to file off, and which the Spaniards and English, in their newspapers, afterwards called ammunition waggons, filled with the plunder of Cordova. The troops had found 600,000 francs at Cordova, and carried off very little church plate. Most of this plate had been restored, and three or four waggons would have been sufficient to carry away the greatest possible booty in valuable effects. But the wounded, the sick in considerable number, many officers' families, who had accompanied our army into Spain, where it seemed destined for a long occupation rather than for an active war, were the cause of that endless train of baggage. Some sick and wounded, however, were left at Cordova, under the care of the Spanish authorities, who, for the rest, kept their word given to general Dupont, to have the greatest attention paid to them. If, in fact, the odious massacres which we have related were to be feared in Spain, in the hamlets and villages of which ferocious peasants were masters, they were less to be apprehended in the large towns, habitually under the rule of a humane and respectable *bourgeoisie*, who were strangers to the atrocities committed by the populace.

The troops had no hostility to repel during the march; but, on reaching Montero, the army was horror-struck on beholding the bodies of Frenchmen, surprised singly by the enemy, suspended to trees, half buried in mould, and torn to tatters. Never had our soldiers committed or suffered anything of that kind in any country, though they had warred everywhere—in Egypt, in Calabria, in Illyria, in Poland, in Russia. The impression produced upon them was profound. Though violently exasperated, they were far more grieved about the fate which awaited such of them as might be either wounded or sick, or delayed upon a road owing to fatigue, hunger, or thirst. A sort of dejection seized the army, and left behind it mischievous traces.

They arrived the next day, June the 18th, at Andujar on the Guadalquivir. All the inhabitants, fearing that vengeance would be wreaked upon them for the massacres committed as well at Andujar as in the neighbouring hamlets, had fled, so that this little town was found absolutely deserted. Search was made in it for provisions, and a sufficiency was discovered for the first days. General Dupont placed in Andujar itself the seamen of the guard, who were the most steady and best conducted troops that he had with him. He sent out emissaries to persuade all the inhabitants to return, promising that no harm should be done to them, and he actually succeeded in bringing them back. The town of Andujar afforded some resources for the sick and wounded, which were used sparingly, so as not to be uselessly exhausted. Efforts were also made to procure means of subsistence, either with money, a certain sum of which the army had brought with it, or by well-organized marauding expeditions. Andujar had an old bridge over the Guadalquivir with Moorish towers, which served for *tête de pont.* The towers were filled with picked troops. Some works were thrown up on the right and left. The first brigade was then posted upon the river, and a little in advance the second, to the right and left of Andujar, the Swiss in rear of that town, the cavalry at a distance in the plain, observing the country to the foot of the mountains of the Sierra Morena. In short, such an establishment was formed that, with much activity in procuring supplies of provisions, the force under general Dupont might have maintained its ground for a considerable time, and awaited in security the reinforcements solicited at Madrid.

In this resolution to fall back, in order to be nearer to the defiles of the Sierra Morena, all would have been well had the best position with respect to those defiles been taken. Unluckily this had not been done, and it was a first fault of which general Dupont had afterwards to repent. The real motive for leaving Cordova and the resources of that large city was the fear of seeing, on the left of the army, the insurgents of Grenada, advanced as far as Jaen, passing the Guadalquivir at Menjibar, proceeding to Baylen, and closing the defiles of the Sierra Morena. As at Cordova Dupont was 24 leagues from Baylen, that distance rendered the danger immense. At Andujar, it is true, he was not more than seven leagues from Baylen; but, at seven leagues, there was left a chance of seeing the enemy make a sudden dash upon the defiles. Moreover, beyond Baylen there were other avenues by which it was possible also to penetrate into the defiles of the Sierra Morena: there was the Baeza and Ubeda road, running to La Carolina, the point at which the defiles really begin. It was therefore necessary to watch from Andujar over Baylen, and not over Baylen alone, but over Baeza and Ubeda, which would require redoubled attention. The course most fitting to be pursued on leaving Cordova would have been to adopt in its fullest extent the prudent idea which induced the abandonment of that town, and to have proceeded at once to Baylen, where the French force, by its mere presence, would have guarded the head of the defiles, and where, by means of patroles of cavalry, one might easily have observed the secondary road to Baeza and Ubeda. Baylen had other advantages besides. It presented a fine position, on lofty hills, in good air, whence one could perceive the whole course of the Guadalquivir, and fall upon any enemy that attempted to cross it. No doubt, if this river had not been fordable in more than one place, one might have taken post on its very banks, for the purpose of being nearer at hand to defend the passage of it. But, as the Guadalquivir could be crossed at an infinite number of points, the best plan would have been to establish one's self a little in rear, on a commanding position from which one might see everything, and fall upon any corps that should have passed the river and flung it into the ravine that serves for its bed. Baylen possessed precisely all these advantages. The sacrifice of Andujar, as the centre of resources, was too unimportant a matter to cause the reasons which we have just enumerated to be overlooked. It was therefore, we repeat it, a real fault to stop at Andujar, instead of going to Baylen itself, to cut short any attempt of the enemy upon the defiles. For the rest, it would not have been impossible, with a vigilant superintendence, to repair this fault, and to prevent its consequences. General Dupont, then, established himself at Andujar, awaiting intelligence from Madrid, which did not arrive, for rarely did a courier succeed in crossing the Sierra Morena.

Such was, at the end of June, the result of the first efforts that were made to suppress the Spanish insurrection. General Verdier had dispersed the assemblage at Logroño, general Lasalle that at Valladolid and in Old Castille. General Lefebvre had driven back the Aragonese into Saragossa, but had been stopped before that city. General Duhesme, at Barcelona, was obliged to fight every day, to keep himself in communication with general Chabran, who had been dispatched toward Tarragona. Marshal Moncey, marching upon Valencia, had proceeded no farther than Cuença, waiting there till Chabran's division should have approached nearer to him. Lastly, general Dupont, having arrived victorious at Cordova, after taking and sacking that city, had fallen back towards the defiles of the Sierra Morena, on account of which he had apprehensions, and had changed the position of Cordova for that of Andujar. The French squadron at Cadiz had just surrendered for want of succour.

All these details were not known at Madrid and Bayonne. There nothing more was known than what related to Segovia, Valladolid, Saragossa, and at farthest Barcelona. Entire or nearly entire ignorance prevailed respecting the south of Spain. If anything was learned at Madrid, it was by means of secret emissaries belonging to the convents or to the great houses of Spain. Among the Spaniards devoted to Ferdinand VII. were joyfully circulated tidings that the French squadron was destroyed; that the regular troops of Andalusia and from the camp at St. Roque were advancing upon general Dupont; that he had been obliged to decamp; that he was blockaded in the defiles of the Sierra Morena; that marshal Moncey would not get out of other defiles quite as difficult, those of Requena; that Saragossa continued invincible; that the check received by Don Gregorio de la Cuesta at Valladolid was nothing; that this general was coming with general Blake, at the head of the insurgents of the Asturias, Gallicia, and Leon, to cut off the French from the road to Madrid; that the new king Joseph, who had been to set out every day from Bayonne, would not set out at all; and that the formidable French army would probably soon be obliged to evacuate the Peninsula. These tidings, false or true, having once reached Madrid, were inserted in manuscript bulletins, or in newspapers printed in the recesses of convents, and circulated throughout the whole Peninsula. Abundant collections made for the benefit of the insurgents indicated the joy that was felt at Madrid on account of their successes, and the desire that prevailed to furnish them with all possible succours.

The French staff collected these reports, and, though wholly disbelieving them, it was nevertheless uneasy, and transmitted them to Bayonne. The unfortunate Murat had so strongly insisted on returning to France, that, notwithstanding the desire which was felt to retain at Madrid this phantom of authority, he received permission to set out, and availed himself of it with the eagerness of a child. General Savary had, therefore, become the avowed head of the French administration, and made all Madrid tremble at his threatening countenance, and his reputation of being an inflexible executer of the commands of his master. Full of sagacity, he perfectly appreciated the situation, and disguised nothing of its alarming nature from Napoleon. Having conceived apprehensions for the advanced corps of marshal Moncey and general Dupont, he resolved to spare troops from Madrid, and to send off two divisions for the south of Spain. A convoy of biscuit and ammunition already dispatched to general Dupont had been stopped at Val de Peñas, and an obstinate battle had to be fought before it could pass that village. General Savary directed Vedel's division, consisting of nearly 6000 infantry, from Toledo upon the Sierra Morena, with orders to clear the defiles and to join his general-in-chief. It was calculated that the latter, having set out with 12 or 13 thousand men, and having, with Vedel's division, 17 or 18 thousand, would be enabled to maintain his ground in Andalusia. He was enjoined at any rate to secure the defiles of the Sierra Morena, to prevent the insurgents from penetrating into La Mancha. General Savary, however, endued with a very sure tact, and guessing that general Dupont was most compromised, on account of the regular troops of the camp of St. Roque and Cadiz, was preparing to send to him to Madridejos, that is to say, half-way to Andujar, his third division, that commanded by general Frère, which would have made his corps amount to 22 or 23 thousand men, and would have placed him above all events. Upon an observation of Napoleon's, however, he sent Frère's division not to Madridejos, in the centre of La Mancha, but to San Clemente. At San Clemente it would not be further from general Dupont than at Madridejos, and it might, in case of need, go to the assistance of marshal Moncey, of whose situation no more was known than of general Dupont's, and whom there was no further hope of succouring by Tarragona, for general Chabran, obliged to fall back upon Barcelona, had returned to that city.

These precautions being taken, general Savary conceived that he might be easy about the two French corps sent to the south of Spain, and await the course of events. At Madrid there were left but two divisions of infantry, the second and the third of marshal Moncey's corps, the imperial guard, and the cuirassiers. These were sufficient for the moment; for the arrival of king Joseph with fresh troops would soon replace the forces of the centre on a respectable footing. General Savary, however, with the approbation of the Emperor, renounced the idea of sending a column toward Saragossa, and left to the staff of Bayonne the duty of bringing before that insurgent city a force capable of reducing it.

At this moment, the constitution of Bayonne, as we have seen in the preceding Book, was just completed. It was of importance to hasten the departure of Joseph for Madrid for two reasons; in the first place, the necessity of transferring to a successor Murat's authority of lieutenant-general, and, secondly, the urgency of forwarding to Madrid the reinforcements detained for the purpose of escorting the new king. Napoleon had, in fact, made arrangements for procuring him a reserve of old troops, one part of which was to accompany him to Madrid, another to reinforce marshal Bessières, by the way, in order to make head against the insurgents of the Asturias and Gallicia, who were bringing up to the fight the insurgents of Old Castille, beaten at the bridge of Cabezon, under Gregorio de la Cuesta; while a third and last was to go before Saragossa and contribute to the reduction of that important city. Napoleon, as we have said, had brought from Paris to the camp of Boulogne, from the camp of Boulogne to Rennes, from Rennes to Bayonne, six old regiments, the 4th light and 45th of the line, the 2nd and 12th light, lastly the 14th and 44th of the line, two battalions of the guard of Paris, the troops of the Vistula, and several marching regiments. To the six regiments of old formation ordered to Spain, he had added two taken from the Rhine, the 51st and the 49th of the line; and he had directed that there should be drawn from the banks of the Elbe four others of the greatest value, the 32nd, 58th, 28th, and 75th of the line, which formed part of the troops of observation of the Atlantic: this was a total of twelve old regiments added to the provisional corps originally sent to Spain. He thus prepared at Bayonne a considerable reserve, to meet the difficulties of that war, which had greatly increased in magnitude. He did not limit his precautions there. Apprehensive lest the bands of Navarre, Aragon, and Upper Catalonia might come and insult the French frontier, which would be a severe mortification for a conqueror who, two months before, fancied himself master of the Peninsula from the Pyrenees to Gibraltar, he formed four columns along the Pyrenees, each from 12 to 1500 strong, composed of horse gendarmerie, national guards of the *élite*, mountaineers of the Pyrenees, organized in rifle companies, lastly some hundred Portuguese, relics of the Portuguese army carried to France. These columns were to keep guard on the frontier, to repel any insult of the guerillas, and to descend the back of the Pyrenees, to lend a hand to the French troops, if they were in want of it.

For the Eastern Pyrenees, however, this was not sufficient; and it was necessary to afford succour to general Duhesme, blockaded in Barcelona. Things had come to such a pass in this province that the fort of Figueras, into which a small garrison had been introduced when the Spanish fortresses were surprised in March last, was completely blockaded and likely to be obliged to surrender for want of provisions.

Napoleon resolved to form there a small corps of seven or eight thousand men, under one of the ablest of his aides-de-camp, general Reille, to send him with a convoy of provisions to Figueras, and to unite him afterwards, under Girona, with general Duhesme, in order to increase the corps of Catalonia to about 20,000 men. But it was not easy to collect such a force in Roussillon, no troops being in general stationed either in Provence or in Languedoc. Napoleon nevertheless found means to accomplish this. To the column of gendarmerie, national guards, mountaineers, and Portuguese, under general Ritay, which was to guard the Eastern Pyrenees, he added two new Italian regiments, one of cavalry, the other of infantry, which formed part of the Tuscan troops, and which he had taken the precaution to move off early for Avignon. There were in Piedmont the corps from which Chabran's French division and Lechi's Italian division had been taken. Napoleon borrowed from them fresh detachments, easily found, owing to the abundance of conscripts in the depôts, and directed them towards Languedoc, by the designation of marching battalions of Catalonia. He took, moreover, at Marseilles, Toulon, and Grenoble, several third battalions, which were in depôt in those cities, a battalion of the 5th legion of reserve, stationed at Grenoble, and, lastly, addressing himself to all the regiments which had their depôts on the banks of the Saone and the Rhone, and which could send in a few days detachments to Avignon, he borrowed one company from each, and formed with them two excellent battalions, which he called the first and second provisional battalion of Perpignan. It was with this industry that he contrived to collect a second corps of seven or eight thousand men for Catalonia, without weakening either Italy or Germany in a perceptible manner. Fortunately for him, the tranquillity prevailing in France allowed him to spare without inconvenience even troops in depôt. These troops, it is true, of all countries, of all formations, some of them Italians, others Swiss, Portuguese, and French, mostly young and not seasoned, exhibited odd assemblages, and would not have been good for much, but for the ability of the officers appointed to command them.

These measures being taken for bringing the requisite forces upon the frontier of Spain, Napoleon turned his attention towards disposing of them conformably to the wants of the moment. He had successively directed upon Saragossa the three infantry regiments of the Vistula, part of Verdier's division, with general Verdier himself, a great quantity of siege artillery, and a column of national guards of the *élite*, raised in the Pyrenees, the whole forming a corps of ten or eleven thousand men. He commissioned general Verdier to take the direction of the siege, general Lefebvre-Desnoettes being only a cavalry officer, and gave him one of his aides-de-camp, general Lacoste, to direct the operations of the engineers. There was every reason to hope that, with such a force and abundance of artillery, that insurgent city would be reduced. Napoleon, however, destined for it some more of his old regiments on march toward the Pyrenees.

He then turned his attention to organizing, with the regiments arrived at Bayonne, the corps of Marshal Bessières, which was commissioned to cover the march of Joseph to Madrid, and to make head against the revolters of the North, the reports concerning whom became daily more and more alarming. Of the six old regiments sent for, four had arrived—the 4th light and the 15th of the line, and the 2nd and 12th light—and the two Paris battalions. Napoleon placed them under the command of the brave general of division, Mouton, who had been in Spain ever since the French entered that country, and formed two brigades out of them. The first, composed of the 2nd and 12th light, and detachments of the imperial guard, was commanded by general Rey. The second, composed of the 4th light and the 15th of the line, with a battalion of the guard of Paris, was commanded by general Reynaud. The old division of general Verdier, part of which had accompanied him to Saragossa, was wholly joined to Merle's division, and formed into four brigades, under generals Darmagnac, Gaulois, Sabattier, and Ducos. The cavalry general, Lasalle, who had already the 10th and 22nd chasseurs, and a detachment of grenadiers and horse chasseurs of the imperial guard, was to join with them the 26th chasseurs and a provisional regiment of dragoons. Mouton's division might be computed at 7000 men, that of Merle at 8000 and some hundred, that of Lasalle at 2000, in all 17,000 men. Various small corps, composed of depôts, convalescents, marching battalions, and squadrons, formed, at St. Sebastian, Vittoria, and Burgos, garrisons for the safety of those towns, and increased to 21,000 men the corps of marshal Bessières, destined to keep down the north of Spain, to repress the revolters of Castille, the Asturias, and Gallicia, to cover the road to Madrid, and to escort king Joseph.

Thus Napoleon had already sent successively more than 110,000 men into Spain, 50,000 of whom, spread beyond Madrid, were divided between Andujar, Valencia, and Madrid, under general Dupont, marshal Moncey, and general Savary; 20,000 of whom were in Catalonia, under generals Reille and Duhesme; 12,000 before Saragossa, under general Verdier; 21 or 22 thousand around Burgos, under marshal Bessières; and some thousand scattered in the various depôts on the frontier. Against troops of the line, and for a regular war with Spain, this would have been a large force, perhaps even larger than would have been needed, though our soldiers were young and unseasoned. Against a whole nation in insurrection, keeping nowhere in the open country, barricading every town and every village, intercepting convoys, murdering the wounded, obliging every corps to send out detachments, which weakened it to such a degree as to reduce it to nothing, we shall see that it was far too small. It would have required inmmediately 60 or 80,000 men, and veteran troops too, to suppress this formidable insurrection, and probably they might have succeeded. But Napoleon would not draw from any other source than the depôts on the Rhine, the Alps, and the coasts, and had no idea of diminishing the great armies which ensured his empire in Italy, Illyria, Germany, and Poland; a new evidence of that truth so often repeated in this history, that it is impossible to act at once in Poland, Germany, Italy, and Spain, without running a risk of being insufficient upon one or other of these theatres of war, and soon perhaps on all.

The moment having arrived for making Joseph enter Spain, Napoleon decided that one of the two brigades of Mouton's division, Rey's brigade, taking the new king to Irun, should escort him through the whole extent of marshal Bessières' command, which comprehended from Bayonne to Madrid. His new ministers, Messrs. O'Farrill, Azanza, Cevallos, and Urquijo, some of them taken from the very council of Ferdinand VII., the others from anterior cabinets, all united by the pressing interest of sparing Spain a horrible war by rallying about the new dynasty, accompanied him, with the members of the former Junta. More than a hundred carriages, travelling at the same pace as the troops, composed the royal train. Joseph was mild, affable, knew very little of Spanish, and still less of Spain itself, and, by his face, his language, his questions, showed but too plainly that he was a foreigner. Received, therefore, and judged of with a malevolence that was quite natural, he furnished matter for the most unfavourable interpretations. Stopping every night in a small town or a large village, attempting to hold conversations with the principal inhabitants in which he had difficulty to join, he afforded subject for mirth by his strange manners and his un-Spanish accent. Though he sometimes touched them by his visible good nature, on leaving him they nevertheless drew a thousand pictures, more or less ridiculous, of the *intruder* king, as they called him. Most of them chose to say that Joseph was an unhappy man, forced to reign against his will in Spain, and a victim of the tyrant who oppressed his family as well as the world.

The impressions experienced by Joseph at Irun, Tolosa, Vittoria, were deeply melancholy, and his weak soul, which had already regretted more than once the kingdom of Naples during the days passed at Bayonne, was filled with poignant grief on seeing the whole nation over whom he was called to reign risen in arms against him, slaughtering the French soldiers, or getting slaughtered by them. From Vittoria, Joseph's letters evince deep affliction. *I have nobody for me*, were the first words which he addressed to the Emperor, and which he most frequently repeated. *We want fifty thousand old troops and fifty millions; and, if you delay, we shall want a hundred thousand men and a hundred millions*—such was daily the conclusion of all his letters. Leaving to the French generals the cruel task of suppressing the rebellion, he naturally reserved for himself the part of clemency, and to all his demands for men and money he began to join daily complaints of the excesses in which the French military indulged, setting himself up for their constant accuser, and the equally constant apologist of the insurgents—a species of crimination which could not fail soon to produce mischievous differences between him and the army, and to irritate Napoleon himself. It is too true that our soldiers committed many excesses; but those excesses were far less than what the atrocious cruelty of which they were the victims might have deserved.

There was no need of this correspondence to reveal to Napoleon the full extent of the fault which he had committed, though he would not acknowledge it. He now knew all: he knew the universality and the violence of the insurrection. But he had found the insurgents so prompt to run away in the open field, that he hoped to be able to reduce them without too great an expenditure of strength. "Have patience," he replied to Joseph, "and have good courage. I will not let you want any resource; you shall have troops in sufficient quantity; with a tolerable administration, you will never be at fault for money in Spain. But do not set yourself up for the accuser. of my soldiers, to whose devotedness you and I owe what we are. They have to do with brigands, who murder them, and whom they must repress by terror. Strive to gain the affection of the Spaniards, but do not discourage the army; that would be an irreparable fault." To these lectures Napoleon added the most rigid instructions for his generals, expressly recommending to them not to take anything, but to exercise merciless severity against revolters. Not to plunder, but to shoot, in order to take away the motive and the disposition to revolt, became the order most frequently expressed in his correspondence.

While Joseph's journey was performing at the pace of the infantry, the contest continued with various vicissitudes in Aragon and Old Castille. General Verdier, arriving before Saragossa, with 2000 men of his division, and finding the different reinforcements successively sent by Napoleon, such as the Polish infantry and the marching regiments, had about 12,000 men and a numerous artillery brought from Pampeluna. He had already caused the outer positions to be carried by general Lefebvre-Desnoettes, cooped up the besieged in the place, and erected numerous batteries, through the exertions of general Lacoste. On the 1st and 2nd of July he resolved, on the urgent importunity of Napoleon, to try a decisive attack with twenty pieces of cannon of large calibre, and 10,000 foot-soldiers led to the assault. The city of Saragossa is situated wholly on the right of the Ebro, and has but one suburb on the left. Unluckily, general Verdier had not succeeded, notwithstanding the repeated orders of the Emperor, in throwing a bridge over the Ebro, so as to be able to move the cavalry to any quarter, and to deprive the besieged of their communications outside the city. Provisions, stores, reinforcements of deserters and insurgents reached it, therefore, without difficulty, by the suburb on the left bank, and almost all the insurgents of Aragon had by degrees collected in the place. Situated entirely, as we have said, on the right bank, Saragossa was surrounded by a wall, flanked on the left by a strong castle, called the castle of the Inquisition, in the centre of a massive convent, that of Santa Engracia, and on the right by another solid convent, that of St. Joseph. General Verdier had ordered a powerful breaching battery to be directed against the castle, and had reserved for himself this attack, the most difficult and the most decisive. He had directed two other breaching batteries against the convent of Santa Engracia in the centre, and against the convent of St. Joseph on the right, and had confided these two attacks to general Lefebvre-Desnoettes.

On the 1st of July, at a given signal, the twenty mortars and howitzers, supported by the whole of the field artillery, opened a violent fire, as well upon the strong buildings which flanked the wall of the enclosure as upon the city itself. More than 200 bombs and 1200 balls were thrown into that unfortunate city, and set it on fire in several places, without daunting in the least its defenders, who were mostly strangers, and who, posted in the houses contiguous to the points of attack, had not much to suffer. Under the direction of some Spanish engineer officers, they had placed in battery 40 pieces of cannon, which punctually replied to ours. They had, at those points where we could have presented ourselves, columns composed of soldiers who had deserted from the Spanish army, and not fewer than 10,000 peasants in ambush in the houses. On the morning of the 2nd of July, large breaches having been made in the castle of the Inquisition and the two convents which flanked the enclosure, our troops rushed to the assault, with the ardour of young and inexperienced soldiers. But they were received on the breach of the castle of the Inquisition with so terrible a fire that they were quite staggered; and, in spite of all the efforts of the officers, they durst not penetrate any further. The result was the same at the centre, at the convent of Santa Engracia. On the right only, general Habert succeeded in forcing the convent of St. Joseph, and in procuring entrance into the city. But, when he attempted to penetrate into it, he found the streets barricaded, the houses furnished with a thousand loop-holes, and vomiting showers of balls. The soldiers of Austerlitz and Eylau would no doubt have endured this fire with greater coolness; but before material obstacles of this kind they might not perhaps have made more progress. It was evident that against such a resistance new and more powerful means of destruction were required, and that, instead of marching men uncovered past such houses to be killed, they must be battered down by cannon-balls over the heads of those who defended them.

General Verdier, retaining the convent of St. Joseph, which he had taken on the right, ordered his troops to return to their quarters, after losing from four to five hundred men killed and wounded—a very serious loss out of an effective of 10,000 men. The great number of officers who had suffered proved what efforts they had had to make to support their young soldiers in the face of such difficulties.

General Verdier resolved to wait for reinforcements, and particularly for more powerful means in artillery, before he renewed the attack upon a place which it had been at first thought possible to reduce in a few days, and which held out much better than a regularly fortified town. Napoleon, apprised of this state of things, sent him immediately the 14th and 44th of the line, which had just arrived, and several convoys of heavy artillery.

The tidings of this resistance excited extreme emotion throughout all the north of Spain, and greatly increased the boasting of the Spaniards. Joseph, on arriving at Briviesca, received on all sides proofs of their hatred of the French and their confidence in their own strength. He everywhere met with either solitude, or coldness, or an incredible degree of pride; as if the Spaniards had gained over us the thousand victories which we had gained over Europe. It was, in particular, the army of Don Gregorio de la Cuesta and of Don Joaquin Blake, composed of the insurgents of Gallicia, Leon, the Asturias, Old Castille, coming towards Burgos by Benevente, that was the principal foundation of their hopes. They had no doubt that a signal victory would soon be gained by this army over the troops of marshal Bessières; and then this victory, added to the resistance of Saragossa, could not fail, according to them, to set at liberty all the north of Spain. There was no certain intelligence from the South; but the sinister rumours concerning the situation of marshal Moncey at Valencia, of general Dupont in Andalusia, redoubled, and were aggravated from day to day; and, at all events, said the Spaniards, they would both be obliged very soon to retreat, in order to repair the checks sustained in the North. It was, in fact, the opinion of Napoleon that the danger was now greatest in the North, for the North was the base of operations of our armies; and he had ordered marshal Bessières to take with him Merle's and Mouton's divisions, excepting Rey's brigade, left for Joseph; to join with them Lasalle's division of cavalry; to march briskly to meet Blake and Cuesta, to dash upon them, and to beat them at any price. To be master in the North, on the route from Bayonne to Madrid, was, according to him, the primary interest of the army, the first condition for maintaining itself in Spain. While strongly recommending to general Savary's attention that South, so impenetrable, so little known, he had enjoined him to send to marshal Bessières by way of Segovia all the forces which were not indispensably needed in the capital; for, said he, a check in the South would be a misfortune; but a serious check in the North would be perhaps the loss of the army, at least the loss of the campaign, for they should be obliged to evacuate three-fourths of the Peninsula, to recover the position lost in the North.

Accordingly marshal Bessières left Burgos on the 12th of July, with Merle's division, with half of Mouton's division (Reynaud's brigade), and with Lasalle's division, forming a total of 11,000 infantry and 1500 horse, as well chasseurs and dragoons as cavalry of the guard. With these forces he marched resolutely towards the great assemblage of the insurgents of the North, commanded, as we have said, by generals Blake and de la Cuesta.

The captain-general, Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, had retired into the kingdom of Leon, after his mishap at the bridge of Cabezon; and, though extremely dissatisfied with the insurrection, the imprudence of which had exposed him to a disastrous check, he was anxious to repair it, and had endeavoured to introduce some order into the confused elements of which the insurgent army was composed. He had two or three thousand regular troops, and about seven or eight thousand volunteers, citizens, students, men of the lower classes, peasants. To this assemblage he purposed to add the levies of the Asturias, and in particular those of Gallicia, much more efficient than those of the Asturias, because they comprehended a great part of the troops of Taranco's division, which had returned from Portugal. The Asturians, thinking first of themselves, and fancying that they were invincible in their mountains, so long as they continued shut up in them, had refused to comply with the invitation of

Cuesta, and merely sent him two or three battalions of regular troops. But the Junta of Coruña, less prudent and more generous, had decided, in spite of general Don Joaquin Blake, who had succeeded the captain-general Filangieri, that the forces of the province should be sent in a body into the plains of Old Castille, to try there the fortune of arms. Don Joaquin Blake, sprung from one of those English Catholic families which went to seek their fortune in Spain, was a soldier by profession, for which he had been well educated. In employing the troops of the line which he had at his disposal, he had exerted himself to compose a regular army, capable of making head against an enemy so broken in to war as the French. He had swelled the skeletons of his troops of the line with a part of the insurgents, and with the rest formed battalions of volunteers, which he exercised every day, in order to give them some consistency. Whether he was desirous not to measure his strength too early with the French, or whether he was really aware how far a good organization decides everything in war, he solicited a few months more before descending into the plains of Castille, and he proposed in the mean time to have his army trained behind the mountains of Gallicia. Overruled by the will of the Junta, he was obliged to march, and to advance as far as Benevente. He might have taken with him 27 or 28 thousand troops, half old battalions, half new ones; but he left behind two divisions at the *débouché* of the mountains, and with three, which formed an effective of 15 or 18 thousand men, he pursued his march along the road to Valladolid. He formed his junction with Don Gregorio de la Cuesta, in the environs of Medina de Rio-Seco, on the 12th of July. These two generals were not formed to agree. One was imperious and testy, the other displeased at being obliged to come and risk himself in the open country, against an enemy hitherto invincible, and consequently was not disposed to be particularly compliant. Gregorio de la Cuesta assumed the command as being senior officer, and he had an interview with his colleague at Rio-Seco, to concert operations. Between them they could bring into line from 26 to 28 thousand men. With better soldiers, they might have had some chance of success against the French, who numbered no more than from 11 to 12 thousand.

Medina de Rio-Seco is seated on a plateau. On the left (for the Spaniards) runs the Burgos and Palencia road, by which the French, under marshal Bessières, were coming, on the right that of Valladolid. At dawn of day, which, at that season of the year, takes place very early, the Spanish generals discovered that they were mistaken, and de la Cuesta, who had set himself in motion last, halted, taking care to appuy to the left towards the Palencia road, by which the French were advancing. Conceiving himself to be more in danger, he applied for assistance to Blake, who hastened to send him one of his divisions. The Spanish generals, therefore, found themselves ranged in two lines; the first of which, placed in advance, and more to the right, was commanded by Blake; the second, considerably in rear and more to the left, was commanded by de la Cuesta. They continued motionless in this situation, awaiting the French on the summit of the plateau, and too much accustomed to manœuvres to rectify so close to the enemy the position which they had taken.

Marshal Bessières, who, after a rapid march, had 9 or 10 thousand infantry and 1200 horse left, in presence of 26 or 28 thousand men, felt not the slightest uneasiness on that account; for he had the highest opinion of his soldiers. With two old regiments, the 4th light and the 15th of the line, and some squadrons of the guard, he deemed himself capable of overturning all before him. The brave Bessières, a cavalry officer, brought up in the school of Murat, born, like him, in Gascony, had much of his brag, his promptness, and his bravery. He was advancing with his troops to the foot of the plateau of Medina de Rio-Seco, when he perceived in the distance the two Spanish lines, one behind the other, the second with its left projecting considerably beyond the first. He resolved to take advantage of the distance left between them to get upon the flank of the first, and, after breaking it, to dash in mass upon the second. He advanced immediately; general Merle, on his left, being to attack Blake's line; general Mouton, on his right, being to flank Merle, and then to throw himself upon de la Cuesta's line. The cavalry followed under the brave and brilliant Lasalle.

Our young troops, sharing the confidence of their generals, climbed the plateau with extraordinary assurance. They resolutely attacked Blake's line by its left, under a violent fire of artillery, for the artillery was the best thing about a Spanish army. Having come within musket-shot, they poured in a well-directed fire, having been much exercised since they entered Spain. They then marched up to the enemy's line and attacked it with the bayonet. The Spaniards gave way; a charge by general Lasalle with the chasseurs completely upset them, and, the left of the first Spanish line being overthrown, the second was left uncovered. At this sight, part of the latter spontaneously moved forward, and gallantly endeavoured to make head against our troops, taking advantage of the disorder which success itself had produced in our ranks. It checked them in fact for a moment, and the Spaniards succeeded in laying hands on one of our batteries, which had followed the movement of our infantry. It was supported in this effort by the life-guards and the royal carbineers, who charged valiantly. The Spanish foot, supposing themselves conquerors, were already throwing their hats into the air and shouting *Viva el rey!* But marshal Bessières had in reserve 300 horse, as well grenadiers as horse chasseurs of the imperial guard, who started off at a gallop, shouting on their part, *Vive l'Empereur! Plus de Bourbons en Europe!* They overturned in an instant the life-guards and the royal carbineers, treating them as they had treated at Austerlitz the horse-guards of the emperor Alexander. General Merle, having completed the overthrow of the first line, that of Blake, then fell upon the centre of the second, de la Cuesta's; general Mouton attacked on his side. It could not hold out long against this double attack of the young soldiers of general Merle and the veteran soldiers of general Mouton. The second Spanish line, overthrown like the first, gave way entire, and fled in disorder over the plateau of Medina de Rio-Seco, seeking to escape towards that town. At that instant, Lasalle's 1200 horse, rushing upon a mass of 25,000 fugitives, seized with inexpressible terror, throwing away their arms, setting up howls of despair, made a horrible carnage among them. Presently this immense plain exhibited a most lamentable spectacle, for it was strewed with four or five thousand wretched men, cut down by the swords of our cavalry. The vast fields of battle in the North, which we had covered with so many corpses, were not a more hideous sight. Eighteen pieces of cannon, many colours, and a great quantity of muskets, thrown away in the flight, were left in our hands. While the cavalry, having no other means of making prisoners but to strike the fugitives, furiously plied their swords, the infantry had hastened to the town of Medina. Its inhabitants, on the false report of some soldiers, who had left the field of battle before the end of the action, conceived that the Spanish army was victorious, and were all at the windows. But they were soon undeceived, on seeing the torrent of fugitives pouring along before their eyes. Part of the Spanish soldiers, recovering their courage behind walls, stopped to make resistance. General Mouton, with the 4th light and the 15th of the line, entered at the point of the bayonet, and overthrew all the obstacles that were opposed to him. Amidst this tumult, the soldiers, behaving as in a town taken by assault, fell to pillaging Medina, which was given up for a few hours to their discretion. The Franciscan monks, who had fired upon the French from the windows of their convent, were put to the sword.

This sanguinary victory, which subjected to us the whole north of Spain, and for some time discouraged the insurgents of those parts from descending into the plain, had cost us but 70 killed and 300 wounded. It was the successful effect of an attack well conceived and executed with great vigour.

The news of the victory of Rio-Seco produced, at least for the moment, a notable change in the language and dispositions of the Spaniards. They were not quite so confident that the North—that is to say the Madrid road—would soon be wrested from us, and that our whole establishment in the Peninsula would be razed to the foundation.

Joseph, continuing to proceed at the same slow rate, had reached Burgos. He had endeavoured to gain hearts on the way, by dint of obligingness and affectation of humanity, always allowing the French soldiers to be in the wrong and the insurgents in the right. Perceiving, however, that the conquests which he made were an inadequate compensation for the time which he lost, receiving also repeated solicitations from general Savary to come and show himself in his new capital, and emboldened above all by the victory of Rio-Seco, he put an end to his useless caresses of people who made no return for them, and repaired at once from Burgos to Madrid. He entered the city on the evening of the 20th, amidst a cold curiosity, hearing not a shout except from the French army, which, though far from pleased with him, hailed in his person the glorious Emperor, for whom it was ready everywhere to fight and to die. Joseph, though he had entered Madrid after a victory of the French army, which ought to have restored the balance of opinion in his favour, found there, as everywhere else, a repugnance to approach his person that was truly mortifying. The ministers who had accepted office were dismayed, and declared to him that, had they foreseen to what a degree the country would have been inimical to the new royalty, they would not have espoused his cause. The members of the Junta of Bayonne dispersed by degrees. The magistrates composing the council of Castille, who had been so bitterly accused of complying with all Murat's wishes, refused the oath. The members of the clergy alone, obeying the injunction to *render unto Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's*, had come to greet in him the royalty *de facto*, and especially the brother of the author of the Concordat. Joseph expressed himself before them in the most emphatic manner in favour of religion; his words, and especially his attitude, affected them, and their language, after their interview with him, had produced a good effect in Madrid. The diplomatic body, out of courtesy, not to the new king of Spain, but to the Emperor of the French, were eager to pay their homage to him. Some of the grandees of Spain, habitual and inevitable associates of the court, could not refrain from presenting themselves, and out of all these—French generals, foreign ministers, superior clergy, courtiers coming from habit—Joseph had been enabled to form a court of tolerably respectable appearance, which speedy victories would easily have changed into a court respected and obeyed, if not beloved.

But if the French had gained a signal victory in the North, they felt great doubt of obtaining a similar victory in the South. A month had elapsed without receiving intelligence from general Dupont, and, to learn what had become of him, his second division, general Vedel's, which had been sent to release him from blockade, had been obliged to pass by main force the defiles of the Sierra Morena. Tidings had thus been gained of the capture of Cordova, the subsequent evacuation of that city, and the establishment of the army at Andujar. Ever since, the insurrection had closed upon him and general Vedel, like the sea upon a ship that is ploughing its billows, and again no information was received concerning him. As for marshal Moncey, nothing had been known for a long time about his situation, of which at length intelligence was obtained. What had befallen him, during the very different events in Castille, Arragon, Catalonia, and Andalusia, was as follows.

We have seen him waiting at Cuença, till general Chabran should be able to advance to Castellon de la Plana; while general Chabran had been obliged to turn back, lest he should be definitively cut off from Barcelona. The latter had even been obliged to exert considerable vigour to pass through the insurgent hamlets of Ambos, Vendrell, and Villafranca, and to rejoin his general-in-chief, who had gone as far as Bruch to meet him. Both had entered Barcelona, where they were obliged every day to fight obstinate battles with the insurgents, who came to the very gates of the city to attack them.

Marshal Moncey, who was ignorant of these circumstances, had waited from the 11th to the 17th of June at Cuença, and then, conceiving that sufficient time had elapsed for general Chabran to be approaching Valencia, he had set himself in motion upon the almost impassable road of Requena, adding to his too protracted stay at Cuença a slowness of march, beneficial no doubt for his troops, who left not a man behind, but very detrimental to the general plan of operations. He had passed through Tortola, Buenache, and Minglanilla, where he had arrived on the 20th. On the 21st he was on the bank of the Cabriel, having before him several battalions of the enemy, one of which consisted of Swiss troops, in ambuscade at the bridge of Pajazo, in one of the most difficult of positions to be forced. The Cabriel rolls at this place amidst frightful rocks. You have to pass through a narrow defile to the bridge which crosses it, and, after passing this bridge, another quite as difficult defile remains to be cleared. The insurgents of Valencia, who had been allowed time to establish themselves in this position, had obstructed the bridge, planted cannon in advance of it, and placed thousands of tirailleurs on the neighbouring rocks. Marshal Moncey brought to this point by a very rugged road some pieces of cannon, drawn by hand, caused the obstacles accumulated upon the bridge to be removed, then detached to the right and left columns which, fording the Cabriel, turned the posts in ambush on the rocks, killed a great number of the enemy, and thus made himself master of the position.

The 22nd was passed by marshal Moncey in resting himself, and in rendering the road more passable for his artillery and baggage. On the 24th he arrived in front of a long and narrow defile, leading through the mountains of Valencia into the famous plain, so renowned for its beauty, called the Huerta of Valencia. This defile, known by the name of the defile of Las Cabreras, and formed by the bed of a rivulet, which must be forded six times, was reputed to be impregnable. Marshal Moncey had by his dilatoriness allowed the insurgents to take post and to multiply their means of resistance there. To overcome in front the obstacles which were opposed to us was almost impossible, and must have cost enormous losses. Marshal Moncey directed general Harispe, the hero of Biscay, to take with him the nimblest men, the best marksmen, and, after making them put off their knapsacks, to conduct them over the surrounding heights on the right and left, to dislodge the Spaniards from them, and to neutralize the defences of the defile by turning them. General Harispe, after incredible efforts and a thousand petty fights, conquered, rock by rock, the approaches to the position; and at length succeeded in descending upon the rear of the Spaniards who were defending the defile. At this sight the enemy fled, leaving to the army a pass which could not have been forced, if the attack must have been made in front. Marshal Moncey, victorious, again halted at the Venta of Buñol to give time for the baggage to rejoin and for his artillery to be repaired. The roads which he had travelled had, in fact, put it into a very bad state. The wild country which they had been traversing was destitute alike of the means of repair and the means of subsistence. But the whole of the Spanish artillery, having fallen into the hands of the French, furnished a change of pieces; and on the 26th the column set itself in motion for Chiva. Next day, the 27th, it debouched in the beautiful plain of Valencia, intersected by a thousand canals, by which the water of the Guadalquivir is distributed in all directions, covered with hemp of extraordinary height, studded with orange-trees, palms, and the whole vegetation of the tropics. This was a sight to cheer our soldiers, tired of the dreary places which they had traversed. But if, thanks to the slowness of their march, they arrived in tolerably good condition, all rallied to their colours, sufficiently fed and quite capable of fighting, they also found, in consequence of this same tardiness, the enemy well prepared, and able to defend his capital. At the village of Quarte, two leagues from Valencia, they had to cross the great canal which turns off the waters of the Guadalquivir, to repair the bridge over that canal, which was broken down, to carry the village of Quarte, besides a multitude of petty posts, ambushed on the right and left in the houses on the plain, or hidden by the height of the hemp. These obstacles detained our men not long; they crossed the canal, repaired the bridge, carried the village, and, running over the fields and the small canals, killed, with the loss of some of their own men, the numerous tirailleurs, who poured a shower of balls upon them from every side.

At night they bivouacked under the walls of Valencia. Marshal Moncey resolved to storm the city, by attacking the two gates of Quarte and St. Joseph, which were the first that presented themselves to him in coming from Requena. Valencia was surrounded by a massive wall, having water at its foot. Chevaux-de-frise, obstacles of all sorts, covered the gates; and thousands of insurgents, posted on the roofs of the houses, were ready to pour down a most murderous fire of musketry.

On the 28th, at day-break, marshal Moncey, having obliged the enemy's tirailleurs to fall back, directed two columns of attack against the gates of Quarte and St. Joseph. The first obstacles were speedily overcome; but, on approaching the gates, it was necessary, before employing cannon, to wrench off the chevaux-de-frise which covered them. Our gallant young fellows dashed several times through the fire with hatchets to perform these perilous operations. But, after several attempts directed by the engineer general Cazals, and productive of considerable losses, it was found to be impossible to force the gates, the object of our attacks. Had they even proved successful, it would have been discovered, as at Saragossa, that the ends of the streets beyond were barricaded, and there would have been so many new assaults to make. After acquiring this conviction, marshal Moncey called off his troops, remaining, however, master of the suburbs which he had taken.

This sanguinary attempt, which had cost him 300 men killed and wounded, furnished him with a subject for much reflection. He had brought with him eight thousand and some hundred men. He had already left behind on his route a thousand, sick or *hors de combat.* He had just learned from prisoners that general Chabran had fallen back upon Barcelona. He had before him a city of 60,000 souls, increased to at least 100,000 by the assemblage within its walls of all the husbandmen of the plain, determined to defend themselves to the death, from the apprehension which they entertained that the French would revenge upon them the odious massacre of their fellow-countrymen. For conquering such a resistance the marshal had no heavy artillery. He very wisely renounced, therefore, all idea of renewing an attack which had no chance of success, and which would only have augmented the difficulties of his retreat, by augmenting the number of the wounded to be carried along with him. He had the good sense, when this resolution was once taken, to execute it without delay. He had been informed that the captain-general Cerbellon, who was not in Valencia, but in the open country at the head of the insurgents of the province, was then, with seven or eight thousand men, on the banks of the Xucar, a small river, which, after turning the mountains of Valencia, falls into the sea a few leagues from that city at Alcira. The presumed intention of the captain-general was to cross the Huerta, and to post himself in the defiles of Las Cabreras in order to bar the passage of them against the French. This would have been a serious difficulty; for marshal Moncey, having already lost the best soldiers of his *corps d'armée*, and carrying with him a great quantity of wounded, might possibly fail in an operation in which he had once been successful. Besides, the high road, which, to avoid the mountains of Valencia, crosses the Xucar at Alcira, and runs through the province of Murcia to Almansa, though rather longer, was much better. Marshal Moncey resolved, therefore, to march direct for Xucar, to force the defile of Almansa, and to return by Albacete.

Arriving on the 1st of July on the banks of the Xucar, he there found the insurgents of Valencia and Carthagena posted behind the river, the bridge of which they had broken down. The army forded the Xucar at three points, then repaired the bridge, and sent over its immense baggage. It rested on the 2nd. On the 3rd, apprised that other insurgents purposed to defend the pass of the mountains of Murcia, called the defile of Almansa, he hastened to get through it, met with no serious difficulty, repulsed the insurgents everywhere, and even took from them their artillery. Resuming his slow and methodical march, he arrived on the 5th at Chinchilla, on the 6th at Albacete. There he learned with real joy that Frère's division, which at first had been placed at Madridejos *en échelon* on the road to Andalusia, and which had since been placed, by order of the Emperor, at San Clemente, was close to him, and on the 10th of July he effected his junction with it.

He brought back his division in good condition, though fatigued, and had not left behind either one wounded man or one gun. But we must repeat it, if his tardiness had allowed him to bring back his division entire, it had caused him to fail in reducing Valencia, which he would certainly have taken, as general Dupont had taken Cordova, if he had marched briskly enough to surprise the insurgents before they had had time to make their preparations for defence. At any rate, his slow and firm manner of marching amidst insurgent provinces, beating the enemy everywhere, and not strewing the roads with baggage, wounded, sick, had a merit which Napoleon took a certain pleasure in acknowledging and proclaiming.

While marshal Moncey was executing this difficult march, the province of Cuença, at first quiet, then rising, had taken the hospital which marshal Moncey had established there for the reception of his sick. General Savary had been obliged to send general Caulaincourt with a column of troops to punish it. The latter had inflicted on the town of Cuença two hours' pillage, of which the soldiers had availed themselves to their great material profit, but to the great moral injury of the army.

The events at Valencia had preceded by some days the battle of Rio-Seco, but they were not known at Madrid till nearly about the same time as that battle. Though the Spaniards triumphed much in the obstinate resistance which we had met with before Saragossa and Valencia, and though this resistance revealed the necessity for serious attacks in order to the reduction of great insurgent cities, still we kept the field everywhere in a victorious manner. The insurgents could not make their appearance in any quarter without being immediately dispersed. General Duhesme, rejoined by general Chabran, had left Barcelona along with him, stormed the fort of Mongat, taken and sacked the little town of Mataro, and, though he had failed in the escalade of Girona, he had returned to Barcelona, spreading terror upon his route, and exercising an energetic repression. General Verdier, still detained before Saragossa, had sent a column under general Lefebvre, which had chastised the town of Calatayud. Lastly, at Rio-Seco, as we have seen, we had annihilated the only considerable army that had yet appeared before us. Our ascendency was, therefore, ensured in the North. The difficulty lay in the South. There general Dupont, encamped on the Guadalquivir, and backed on the Sierra Morena, had to do with an army which appeared numerous, composed not only of insurgents but of troops of the line. The Spaniards did not merely keep the field before him, but reduced him to the defensive in the position of Andujar; and, if any disaster happened at this point, the insurgents of Andalusia and Grenada, joining those of Carthagena and Valencia on the one hand, those of Estremadura on the other, could cross La Mancha and appear before Madrid in considerable force, which would give the war a totally new aspect. Such a misfortune, indeed, was far from being apprehended, notwithstanding the reports circulated by the Spaniards on this subject. General Dupont, in fact, had received Vedel's division, which raised his *corps d'armée* to 16 or 17 thousand men. Confidence was placed in his tried ability: it was not imagined that the general who, before Albeck, had found himself with 6000 men opposed to 60,000 Austrians, who had extricated himself from this situation and taken 4000 prisoners, could succumb to undisciplined insurgents, among whom marshal Bessières, with so few soldiers, had just made such frightful slaughter. But if confidence was felt, it was not wholly unmixed with anxiety. In accordance with Napoleon, who could only direct the military operations from a distance, and with that uncertainty of direction produced by time and distances, general Savary had sent general Gobert to Madridejos, to replace there Frère's division, the third of general Dupont's, employed as we have seen in aiding marshal Moncey towards San Clemente. General Gobert had orders to proceed to the middle of La Mancha, and, if circumstances rendered it necessary, to advance to the Sierra Morena, and there join general Dupont. He went, therefore, to do the duty of third division under that general, instead of Frère's division, engaged elsewhere. One of his regiments having already been sent off as convoy to Andujar, he brought with him only three regiments of infantry, but very fine ones, though young, and a superb provisional regiment of cuirassiers, commanded by an excellent officer, major Christophe. This junction effected, no doubt seemed possible respecting events in Andalusia. But general Savary's precautions were not limited to this. He had brought under Madrid Musnier's division, returned from Valencia, Frère's division sent to its support, Caulaincourt's column, directed to punish Cuença. He had always had Morlot's division of Moncey's corps, the imperial guard, and he had just received Rey's brigade, which had served as escort to king Joseph. This still formed a total of 25,000 men, which, had there not been many wounded and sick, would have exceeded 30,000. With this force he had sufficient to baffle all the hopes of the Spaniards. The latter persisted, nevertheless, in asserting that Saragossa would not surrender any more than Valencia; that general Dupont would be obliged to repass the Sierra Morena; that the insurgents of Estremadura, Andalusia, Grenada, Carthagena, and Valencia, would presently be at his heels; that those of the North would soon make their appearance again on the Burgos road; and that, before this mass of forces, the new royalty would be obliged to return from Madrid to Bayonne. The French, on the contrary, expected soon to see Saragossa carried by assault, general Verdier's army, set at liberty, marching back to Valencia with marshal Moncey's corps, general Dupont, victorious, advancing into Andalusia, and reducing the whole south of Spain to submission. One or other of these alternatives must be realised, according to what was to happen in Andalusia. All eyes, both of Spaniards and French, were, in consequence, at this moment (from the 15th to the 20th of July), exclusively directed towards that quarter.

General Dupont, as we have already had occasion to relate, had come, on leaving Cordova, and established himself at Andujar on the Guadalquivir, an ill-chosen position, for he had much better been at Baylen itself, at the entrance of the defiles, which he would have closed by his mere presence, and where he would have found himself in a healthy, elevated, and commanding position, from which he could throw into the Guadalquivir all who should attempt to pass it. This general, as we have likewise said, had placed Pannetier's brigade a little to the left and in advance of the bridge of Andujar, Chabert's brigade a little in rear and on the right, the seamen of the guard in Andujar itself, the two Swiss regiments in rear of the town, the cavalry at a distance in the plain. He had been left there, without any attempt to disturb him, during the whole of the concluding part of June and the first half of July, because the insurgents of Andalusia and Grenada had need of that time to organize themselves, to concert measures, and to effect a junction between Cordova and Jaen. The only hostility that he had experienced was the occupation of the Sierra Morena by a host of banditti, who murdered couriers and intercepted convoys. Echavarri's men were so intently on the watch that not a single horseman could pass between Puerto del Rey and La Carolina without being robbed; women and even children mounting guard incessantly, and giving notice of every individual, the moment he came in sight. During this pernicious inaction of nearly a month, partly occasioned by the delay of the reinforcements applied for, general Dupont had sent out several detachments round about him to chastise the insurgents and to procure provisions. He had sent to Jaen captain Baste, of the seamen of the guard, an officer equally intelligent and intrepid, with the commission to punish that town, which had contributed to the massacres of our wounded and our sick, and to draw from it the resources in which it abounded. Captain Baste, with a battalion, two pieces of cannon, and about a hundred horse, had daringly entered Jaen, put the inhabitants to flight, and brought back an immense convoy of provisions, wine, and all sorts of medical stores.

Unfortunately, general Dupont, not considering the inconveniences attached to the position of Andujar, but having a confused notion of them, was always uneasy about Baylen and the ferry of Menjibar, which affords a passage across the Guadalquivir before Baylen. In consequence, he had not failed to place a detachment there, and to make incessant reconnoissances in that part. His anxiety extended still further, for he was obliged to push his reconnoissances to the left of Baylen, as far as Baeza and Ubeda, whence ran a cross-road, by Linares, in the rear of Baylen, to the environs of La Carolina, quite close to the entrance of the defiles. Here we may repeat that he would not have been under this concern had he taken post at Baylen itself, which he would have guarded by his mere presence, and where a few patroles of cavalry, sent towards Baeza and Ubeda, would have been sufficient to secure him from all surprise. His most usual concern, however, was about provisions, though he was in rich Andalusia. Sheep, which abounded in Castille and Estremadura, were not so plentiful in the Sierra Morena, where scarcely any animals but goats were to be met with, the flesh of which is not wholesome or nutritious. Wheat was scarce, the crop of the preceding year having been consumed or destroyed by the insurgents. That of the current year was still standing. The soldiers were obliged to cut the corn themselves in order to have bread, and in general they had but half-rations. They had barley given them instead, which they boiled with their meat. They had but a single mill for grinding their corn, on the bank of the Guadalquivir, and they had frequently to defend this mill against the attacks of the enemy. On this parched soil they were destitute of fresh vegetables. The wine, though excellent at some distance, at Val de Peñas, could come only through the Sierra Morena, for Val de Peñas is in La Mancha. It was not obtainable but by means of money, and was reserved exclusively for the sick. Vinegar, so useful in hot countries, was not to be had. The water of the Guadalquivir was almost always lukewarm. For the young soldiers, not accustomed to extreme climates, this long stay at Andujar became detrimental and dangerous. Independently of the wounded, there were a great number of sick, attacked by dysentery. The privation of all news added to bodily suffering a feeling of profound dejection. Still the soldier, though not much seasoned by war, had a sense of his own superiority and great confidence in his general, and was desirous of having occasion to measure his strength with the enemy.

The arrival of Vedel's division soon afterwards served to increase this confidence. Having set out in the last days of June, it had arrived on the 26th at Despeña-Perros, at the entrance of the defiles, had forced them, killing some of Augustin d'Echavarri's men, and had then debouched on La Carolina, a pretty German colony, founded towards the end of last century by Charles III. The narrow valley by which you cross the Sierra Morena somewhat widens at La Carolina, a little more at Guarroman, and still more at Baylen, where it opens completely, debouching on the Guadalquivir. Between La Carolina and Baylen terminates that cross-road which we have mentioned, and which leads from Baeza or Ubeda to the entrance of the defiles.

Vedel's division, having halted at La Carolina, and put itself in communication with general Dupont, had taken position at Baylen itself, having one battalion in rear to guard the entrance of the defiles, and two in front to guard the ferry of Menjibar across the Guadalquivir.

No sooner had general Vedel joined than general Dupont assigned him his position, recommending to him extreme vigilance on his rear and on his left, lest the enemy should possess himself of the defiles and close them against the French army. After the arrival of general Vedel, the inconvenience of leaving Baylen unoccupied was less, but there was still that of being in a defensive position, six leagues from one another, behind a river that was everywhere fordable. A daring enemy could, in fact, pass it in the night, and place himself between our two divisions. Now, notwithstanding the junction of general Vedel, the number of the French troops, in presence of the insurgents of Andalusia, was not so considerable that they could divide without danger. The corps of Dupont was much weakened by sickness. Barbou's division could not present more than about 5700 men to the enemy, 6400 including the engineers and artillery. The seamen were at most 400, the dragoons and chasseurs 1800, which formed a total of 8600 French. The Swiss, sometimes sending deserters to the insurgents, sometimes receiving deserters from them, were reduced to 1800, and in a sort of wavering state which forbade their being trusted in all cases. Vedel's division brought 5400 men of all arms and 12 pieces of artillery.

With general Dupont's 8600 men, and general Vedel's 5400, there were 14,000 combatants, 16,000 including the Swiss. This number was not too large, even if kept united, before the 40 or 50 thousand insurgents, whose coming was announced. Gobert's division having soon afterwards arrived, and brought a reinforcement of about 4700 men, infantry and cavalry included, the corps of general Dupont was gradually augmented to the desired force (which, however, was not more than 18,000 French and 2000 Swiss) at the very moment when the insurgents were deciding to take the offensive. With Gobert's division, general Dupont received intelligence of the check sustained before Saragossa and Valencia, of the retreat of marshal Moncey upon Madrid, of the insulated situation in which this retreat placed the army of Andalusia, and at the same time a recommendation to keep firmly upon the Guadalquivir, but not to penetrate further into Andalusia. It would have been imprudent, in fact, in the then state of things, to advance further into the south of Spain.

At this moment there appeared favourable opportunities for striking severe blows at the insurrection without abandoning the defensive. The insurgents of Grenada under general Reding, partly Swiss, partly Spaniards, had marched to Jaen to the number of 12 or 15 thousand. While the insurgents of Grenada were thus advancing towards Jaen, those of Andalusia, under general Castaños, to the number of 20 and odd thousand, having ascended the Guadalquivir, arrived before Bujalance, and, from some bands of tirailleurs and some patroles of cavalry, it might be inferred that they were not far off. Though military espionnage was impossible in Spain, for not a peasant would betray the cause of his country (a noble sentiment which redeemed the ferocity of that people, and accounted for it), yet it was easy, from the signs picked up every moment of that double march, to form a correct idea of it, and consequently to oppose it. General Dupont might very well, by leaving Gobert's division at Baylen and Menjibar, advance with Barbou's and Vedel's divisions beyond the Guadalquivir, place himself with 14 or 15 thousand men between the enemy's two armies, beat them one after the other or both together, and return to his position after mauling them roughly. Whatever might be their force, there was no rashness in encountering them in the proportion of one against two. This operation, which would have obliged him to make a forward movement of three or four leagues, was assuredly no infraction of the order not to penetrate into the south of Spain. If however this resolution appeared to him too bold, he could, while keeping a strict defensive and waiting for the enemy, unite with Vedel and Gobert at Baylen itself, and he was very certain, with 20,000 men in that position, to crush any force that should present itself. To leave Andujar for Baylen was no infraction either of the order not to repass the Sierra Morena, any more than to advance four leagues to oppose an active defensive to the enemy was an infraction of the order not to penetrate into Andalusia.

Motionless in presence of the Spaniards, conceiving nothing, ordering nothing, general Dupont, who had at last three divisions at hand, made no other disposition than that of remaining for his own person at Andujar, leaving Vedel at Baylen, Gobert at La Carolina, recommending to each of them to be vigilantly on his guard, to keep a continual look-out around him, lest the defiles should be turned by Baeza, Ubeda, and Linares.

On the 14th of July, in the evening, the enemy appeared on the heights that border the Guadalquivir, opposite to Andujar. The troops of Grenada, under general Reding, had remained at Jaen, preparing to form their junction with those of Andalusia. The latter, who were perceived before Andujar, and who were commanded by general Castaños, came from Lower Andalusia, by Seville and Cordova. They had, like those of Grenada, a junction for their object, but they purposed first to examine the position of Andujar, to ascertain whether it were possible to carry it. They were about 20,000 strong, partly regular troops augmented by new enrolments, partly volunteers recently regimented in skeletons of recent creation. They had more steadiness and solidity than any of those that we had yet seen, for they were chiefly composed of troops from the camp at St. Roque, and of the division which was to have invaded Portugal under general Solano.

On the morning of the 15th of July, appearing in mass, they forced our advanced posts to retire and to abandon to them the heights that command the banks of the Guadalquivir. Each then took his position for battle, the Paris guard in the works in advance of the bridge, the third legion of reserve on the bank of the river, the seamen of the guard in Andujar, Chabert's brigade on the right of the town, the Swiss in rear, the cavalry, with the 6th provisional, at a distance in the plain, to observe the undisciplined guerillas hovering around the Spanish army, like the Cossacks about the Russian army.

The sight of the enemy rejoiced the French soldiers by dispelling their *ennui;* though many of them were ill, they had an extreme desire to come to blows. But the Spaniards were not able to pass the river in the face of the French army. They confined themselves to an insignificant cannonade, which did us no great harm, and which was but coolly replied to, in order to avoid expending our ammunition; but our balls, being well directed, and falling among the thick masses, swept off many men at once. The guerillas showed themselves on the right of the river, which we occupied. Some had crossed the Guadalquivir at a distance; the others descended upon our rear from the gorges of the Sierra Morena. General Fresia directed his squadrons upon them, while the 6th endeavoured to come at them with the bayonet. Some of them were killed, and these flocks of birds of prey were soon obliged to fly off into the mountains.

This affair denoted nothing more than a preparatory trial of the enemy's strength against our position, and an endeavour to ascertain the point at which he might attack it with the least difficulty. There was reason, however, to expect a more serious effort on the following day. General Dupont dispatched, therefore, one of his officers to general Vedel, to learn what was passing as well at Baylen as at the ferry of Menjibar, and to desire him, in case he had no enemy before him, to send to his aid either a battalion or even a brigade; a precaution which would have been superfluous, as we have already several times observed, had all been united at Baylen. The close of that day passed off at Andujar in the profoundest tranquillity.

Towards Baylen, the insurgents of Grenada, established in advance of Jaen, had appeared along the Guadalquivir, feeling their way everywhere, and everywhere seeking the weak side of our positions. Before Baylen they had passed the ferry of Menjibar, and repulsed the advanced posts of general Vedel. But the latter, hastening up with the bulk of his division, and deploying his battalions in a very ostensible manner, had so intimidated the Spaniards that they had completely disappeared. Further to our left, towards Baeza and Ubeda, points that still occasioned uneasiness, the insurgents had crossed the Guadalquivir, and had detached some of those bands of scouts, who were little to be feared, but who might at a distance afford occasion for strange mistakes. General Gobert, posted at La Carolina, being informed of their presence, had hastily sent cuirassiers to observe and to awe them.

In this state of things, general Vedel, seeing no longer any enemy before him, was about to ascend again from Menjibar to Baylen, when an aide-de-camp of general Dupont's arrived to desire the reinforcement of a battalion or a brigade, according to circumstances. Learning from this aide-de-camp that the main body of the enemy had appeared before Andujar, supposing the danger to be there only, and prompted by an inconsiderate zeal, he resolved to proceed with his whole division for Andujar, and sent word to general Gobert to come and occupy Baylen, which would be left vacant by the departure of the second division. Setting off immediately, towards the close of the 15th, he marched the whole night between the 15th and 16th. Though an honourable sentiment actuated general Vedel, his conduct was nevertheless imprudent, for he knew not what might happen at Baylen after his departure, and what was to befal in his absence that point so important for the safety of the army.

On the morning of the 16th he came in sight of Andujar with all his troops. General Dupont, so far from reprimanding him for his precipitation, was gratified to find himself reinforced in presence of an enemy who appeared more numerous than on the preceding day, and more disposed to a serious attack: he approved what general Vedel had done, and even thanked him. The soldiers, who had seen no French for two months, shouted for joy on perceiving their comrades, and imagined that they were going at last to punish the Spaniards for their boasting. It was really an occasion for repairing the faults committed, to fall upon the enemy with 14,000 French and 2000 Swiss, and to beat them off for a long time to come. With the ardour that animated all our young soldiers, nothing would have been easier. But general Dupont suffered the Spaniards to cannonade Andujar the whole day, merely enjoying their hesitation, their inexperience, without doing anything more than firing volleys of cannon at them from time to time. The Spaniards would fain have forced the position of Andujar, but, not daring to attempt it, they descended and ascended several times in the course of the day the heights which they occupied, to and from the bank of the river; but never tried to cross it in presence of our bayonets. For a moment they showed an inclination to cross the Guadalquivir higher up, but from that point was descried Vedel's division marching on the opposite bank, and this sight damped their courage. This day, therefore, ended as peaceably as the preceding, with very few dead and wounded on our side, but a considerable number on that of the Spaniards, who had suffered infinitely more by our cannonade, though it was more rare and slacker than theirs.

Things had not gone off so well about Baylen and the ferry of Menjibar. On the morning of the 16th, when general Vedel was marching without necessity to Andujar, general Reding, who, at the head of the army of Grenada, had also made on the 15th some attempts before Baylen, renewed them with rather more boldness than on the preceding day. After crossing the ferry of Menjibar, he found at the foot of the heights of Baylen nobody but general Liger-Belair, with one battalion and a few companies of *élite*. He then debouched in force, and appeared, with several thousand men, before general Liger-Belair, who, having scarcely a few hundred, could do no other than retire in good order. At this moment arrived general Gobert, apprised by general Vedel of the evacuation of Baylen, and bringing, in order to provide for it, three battalions with some cuirassiers. General Gobert's division, already reduced by several detachments that had been left behind—for it had been obliged to leave detachments at La Carolina, Guarroman, and Baylen—Gobert's division had been thinned in passing through the gorges of the Sierra Morena, and could not get at the enemy but with the head of one column. Nevertheless, this young general, full of intelligence and fire, with his three battalions and his cuirassiers, stopped short the Spaniards. Major Christophe, commanding the cuirassiers, made a vigorous charge, and drove back the Spanish infantry, unused to the rude shock of those heavy horse. But, while he was himself directing these movements, he received in the middle of the forehead a ball, which issued from a bush where was concealed one of those Spanish marksmen who were found everywhere in ambush. He fell insensible, having but a few hours to live, and was bitterly regretted by the whole army.

General Dufour, whose rank pointed him out for general Gobert's successor, hastened to the ground, found the French troops shaken by the loss of their general, and conceived that he could not do better than make them fall back upon Baylen. The Spaniards, who were seeking the weak point of our positions, without having resolved upon an attack in earnest, went no further, but they felt convinced that, if thrust on this side, the sword would enter.

General Dufour returned to Baylen, where he had a considerable part of Gobert's division. Perceiving that the Spaniards did not follow him, but continued fixed on the bank of the Guadalquivir, he was led to believe that their serious attack was directed elsewhere. In fact, while the danger had appeared so small towards Menjibar, it assumed alarming proportions on the side next to Baeza and Ubeda. The reconnaissances sent in that direction, whether the officers who executed them were not intelligent men, or whether the irregular bands which had crossed the Guadalquivir, above Menjibar, made a great appearance, all denounced the presence of a real army on the cross-road, which, running from Baeza and Ubeda by Linares, terminates at La Carolina, passing behind Baylen. To these indications were added the reiterated instructions of general Dupont, who, having committed the fault of not placing himself at Baylen, aggravated instead of repairing it by the continual apprehensions which he felt, and which he communicated to his lieutenants. On the preceding day, and on that same day, he had written to general Gobert to keep his eye incessantly upon that cross-road from Baeza and Ubeda to Linares; that, on the first sign of the movement of the enemy on that side, he must fall back in mass from Baylen to La Carolina, for there was the salvation of the army; and that this point must be preserved at any price,—strange precaution, and which lost the army that it was intended to save!

General Dufour, to whom were transmitted of right the instructions of the general-in-chief, after the death of general Gobert, receiving the most alarming information concerning the cross-road from Baeza to Linares, would wait no longer, but set out the same evening for Baylen, purposing to proceed to La Carolina, imagining that he should thus preserve the army from the misfortune of being turned. That fatal Baylen, where we were destined to meet with the first rock of our greatness, was therefore once more evacuated and exposed to the invasion of the enemy.

General Dufour had, it is true, for excuse, the instructions which he had received, the tidings that had been brought him, the certainty he felt of the speedy return of general Vedel to Baylen. He set out, therefore, in the evening of the 16th, to hasten to La Carolina, leaving scarcely a detachment on the heights commanding Menjibar and the Guadalquivir.

The intelligence of the death of general Gobert and of the falling back of his division reached Andujar in the very evening of the 16th, for they were but six or seven French leagues distant, and that an officer on horseback would travel in two or three hours. These tidings arrived just at the close of day, and with it that of the sterile cannonade, the insignificant effects of which we have related. General Dupont, who had shared the fault of general Vedel in approving it, began to regret that the latter had left Baylen and come to Andujar. Though still ignorant of the departure of general Dufour for La Carolina, struck by the seriousness of an attack which had occasioned the death of general Gobert and the retreat of his division, he directed general Vedel to set out immediately for Baylen, to occupy that point in force, to beat the insurgents at Baylen, at La Carolina, at Linares, in short, wherever their presence should be revealed to him; and, this done, to return in all haste, and assist him to destroy those whom he had before him at Andujar. It never entered into his mind for a moment to accompany Vedel himself, or to follow him forthwith, or in a day's time, to make the more sure of preventing all the results which he dreaded. Fatal and incredible blindness, which is not without example in war, but which, fortunately for the safety of nations and of armies, is not often productive of such calamitous consequences! Let us not accuse Providence: after Bayonne we deserved not to be successful.

The heat for some days had been suffocating. The nights were scarcely cooler than the days, and, moreover, there was always a great scarcity of provisions at Andujar. It was with difficulty, and not without submitting to privations, that Vedel's soldiers could be supplied with refreshment. They left Andujar at midnight of the 16th, still much fatigued with the march which they had made in the day to arrive there; and leaving their comrades of Barbou's division sorely grieved at this separation. The march was continued the whole night, and it was not till eight in the morning of the 17th that they reached Baylen; the sun was already very high above the horizon, and the heat scorching.

On his arrival at Baylen, general Vedel was extremely astonished to learn that general Dufour had set out for La Carolina, leaving only a weak detachment before Baylen. His astonishment soon ceased when he learned what had drawn general Dufour towards La Carolina, that is to say, the report everywhere circulated of a Spanish army having passed through Baeza and Linares to occupy the defiles. On this intelligence, without more consideration than on the preceding day, when he had hurried from Menjibar to Andujar, he doubted not for a moment what was reported to him. He fully believed that the Spaniards, who had hung back before Andujar, who had not followed up the success obtained at Menjibar over general Gobert, were proceeding in the execution of a skilfully calculated plan for deceiving the French by a false attack, and turning them by Baeza and Linares. However, though swayed by one idea, which he sought not to examine thoroughly, he directed a reconnaissance to be made in advance of Baylen, to ascertain whether, from those positions, which overlooked the whole valley of the Guadalquivir, anything could be discovered. The detachment sent out could not discover anything either at the foot of the heights or on the Guadalquivir itself. Not the slightest doubt could then be felt: the entire force of the enemy, according to general Vedel, had passed through Baeza and Linares, in its progress to La Carolina, for the purpose of closing the defiles of the Sierra Morena on the rear of the French army. He hesitated no longer, and, but for the mid-day heat, which was not less than 40 degrees of Réaumur, and under which men and horses sank struck with apoplexy, he would have set out instantly. But, at the close of that same day, the 17th, he left Baylen, taking with him even the post that guarded the heights above the Guadalquivir, so apprehensive was he that he should not arrive in sufficient force at La Carolina. Generals-in-chief, in their prosperous days, find lieutenants who correct their faults; general Dupont, on this occasion, found such as cruelly aggravated his.

Of all these alleged movements of the Spaniards towards La Carolina, by Baeza and Linares, not one was true. Bands of guerillas, more or less numerous, had inundated the banks of the Guadalquivir, gained the Sierra Morena, and misled officers either unintelligent or inattentive. But the two principal armies had moved, that of Grenada before Baylen, that of Andalusia before Andujar. Their real intention had been to sound the position of the French, to ascertain on which side it might be attacked with the greatest probability of success. The impatience of the insurgents urged them to demand an immediate attack, no matter on what point, and the prudence of the general-in-chief, Castaños, had to battle with the declaimers of the staff, to spare himself a check, like that of Cuesta's and Blake's. His soundings were a mode of occupying the impatient, and of seeking the point where the imprudence of the offensive would be least serious. The imposing attitude of the French before Andujar on the 15th and 16th, their resistance less invincible between Menjibar and Baylen, since one of their generals had been killed there and the ground abandoned, indicated that to Baylen they must proceed, if they would risk an effort which had any chance of success. This reasoning of general Castanos' did honour to his military perspicacity, and he was about to be favoured by Fortune for a moment of clearsightedness, while general Dupont was doomed by her to suffer for a moment of error. A council of war was convoked at the general-in-chief's. There the impatient insisted on attacking the position of Andujar in front, without further delay. The wise and wary Castaños conceived that it would be tempting Fortune much too far, and would not run the risk of a reverse so easy to be foreseen. The events of the preceding day promised, according to him, much more success to an attack on the side of Baylen, and this plan suited him the better, inasmuch as it threw the responsibility on general Reding and the insurgents of Grenada. To second this attempt, it was agreed that the army of Andalusia should strengthen general Reding with Coupigny's division, one of the best organised in the army of Andalusia, and that general Castaños should remain with the two divisions of Jones and La Peña before Andujar, in order to deceive the French respecting the real point of attack. General Reding, having already about 12,000 men, and being reinforced by six or seven thousand, would have under him at least 18,000. The commander-in-chief would have about 15,000 left to occupy the attention of the French at Andujar.

This plan being agreed upon, they proceeded forthwith to its execution, and, while Coupigny's division was marching to ascend the Guadalquivir, as high as Menjibar, to join general Reding and to concur in the attack of Baylen, on the following day, the 18th, the troops of general Castaños deployed with ostentation on the heights which face Andujar.

Meanwhile, in the course of this same day, the 17th, there might be discerned, with some attention, in the French camp, a movement of the Spaniards towards their right, a consequence of the plan which they had just adopted. General Fresia, commanding the French cavalry, had sent a regiment of dragoons over the bridge of Andujar, to the other side of the Guadalquivir, with directions to approach very near to the Spaniards, who, on seeing them, drew up in order of battle, and saluted our horse with discharges of musketry. But the colonel of that regiment of dragoons clearly discerned the movement of the Spaniards from their left to their right, towards Menjibar, that is to say, towards Baylen, and instantly made his report to the general-in-chief Dupont. The latter, struck at first by this circumstance, took for a moment the salutary resolution, which would have changed his destiny and perhaps that of the Empire, to decamp during the day and march to Baylen. Without knowing the enemy's secret, it was evident, from the direction which the Spaniards were pursuing, and even from the false reports of an attempt upon La Carolina, that the danger was accumulating towards the left of the French, towards Baylen, towards La Carolina, and that, to concentrate himself upon those points was the safest of all manœuvres. Moreover, the intelligence which general Dupont received on the evening of general Vedel's departure for La Carolina after general Dufour, and of the complete evacuation of Baylen, ought to have decided him to set out immediately. There was still time in the evening of the 17th to proceed to Baylen, since the Spaniards were not to enter it till the 18th.

But general Dupont, still bewildered by the mass of enemies that he had before him at Andujar, having difficulty to believe that the danger had removed to another place, having above all an immense quantity of sick to carry away, and determined not to leave any behind, for every unfortunate creature so left was sure to be murdered, deferred till the morrow the execution of his first idea, with a view to give the administration of the army twenty-four hours which it needed for the evacuation of the hospitals and the baggage—a fatal and ever-to-be-lamented delay!

The resolution to decamp was postponed, therefore, till the next day, July the 18th. On that day, general Dupont received intelligence from generals Dufour and Vedel: he learned that they were still seeking the enemy in the bottom of the gorges; that they had advanced to Guarroman without finding him; that they should march to La Carolina and St. Helena, to every point, in short, where he was said to be; that they would attack him with impetuosity, destroy him, and then take their position at Baylen, either to remain there or to rejoin the general-in-chief at Andujar. But meanwhile Baylen was uncovered, liable to fall before the weakest detachment, and everything indicated that the Spaniards were marching thither in force. A patrole had pushed, in the course of the day, to the bank of the Rumblar, a torrent which must be crossed in going from Andujar to Baylen, and had fallen in with troops of the enemy. It was necessary, therefore, to hasten to leave Andujar, without losing a moment, in order to reach Baylen before the Spaniards.

General Dupont, not yet entertaining any serious uneasiness, and supposing that the troops seen on the bank of the Rumblar were only a detachment sent on reconnaissance, gave his orders for the 18th. He would not set out till night, in order to conceal his movement from general Castaños, and to get seven or eight hours' start of him. He might have blown up the bridge of Andujar, which would have delayed the pursuit of the Spaniards; but, fearful of apprising the enemy by such an explosion, he contented himself with obstructing the bridge in such a manner that it would take some time to clear it; and, at night-fall, between eight and nine o'clock, he began to decamp. Unfortunately, he had, as we have said, an immense quantity of baggage, the number of the sick having singularly increased, owing to the heat and bad provisions. Half of the corps was attacked with dysentery. None but the weakest had been admitted into the hospitals, and a great number of men who could scarcely carry their arms had been left in the ranks. The worst of the sick were placed in carriages, and five or six hundred men, for whom there were no means of conveyance, followed the baggage on foot, wasted, pale, and piteous to be seen. The heat had never been more intense; it exceeded 40 degrees. The oldest Spaniards did not recollect to have ever experienced the like. At night, then, the French set out, oppressed with the heat of the weather, men and horses scarcely able to breathe, and moving in an atmosphere of fire, though the sun had sunk beneath the horizon. The army had not had its entire ration. The soldier set out on his march hungry, thirsty, and deeply depressed at a retreat which did not denote that affairs were in a good situation.

It was necessary to keep vigilant watch over the rear; for general Castaños, being better served than general Dupont, might receive from Andujar itself information of the retreat of the French, and start in pursuit of them. General Dupont, therefore, placed at the head of the baggage only one brigade of infantry, Chabert's brigade, that which was in rear and to the right of the bridge. This brigade was farthest from the enemy, and its departure would be least remarked. It moved off silently from right to left, in rear of Andujar, and formed the head of the column. It was composed of two battalions of the fourth legion of reserve, and of a French Swiss battalion—Freuler's regiment—a regiment to be depended upon, because it had been long in the service of France. A battery of six four-pounders accompanied this brigade, about 2800 strong. Then came the baggage, covering two or three leagues of ground. The Spanish Swiss regiments (of Preux and Reding), reduced by desertion to about 1600, marched after the baggage. They were followed by Pannetier's brigade, composed of two battalions of the third legion of reserve, and of two battalions of the Paris guard, forming about 2800 men. Lastly the cavalry, consisting of two regiments of dragoons, two of chasseurs, and a squadron of cuirassiers, reduced from 2400 horse to 1800, closed the march with the seamen of the guard and the rest of the artillery. This *corps d'armée*, which comprehended more than 10,000 French and 2400 Swiss on leaving Toledo, 8600 French and 2000 Swiss on leaving Cordova, scarcely contained 7800 French and 1600 Swiss, in all 9400 men, when it left Andujar. Besides the smallness of their number, they were divided by the baggage into two masses, one of which, that marching at the head, was by far the weaker, and that which formed the rear-guard by far the stronger, from the number and quality of the troops. The general, as we have just seen, had so arranged it, because, apprehensive of being pursued, he beheld danger in rear and not in front.

The troops proceeded all night amid the heat, which not a breath of air arose to diminish, and through a cloud of dust, raised by the marching columns. The horses, exhausted, dripping with sweat, swallowed nothing but dust instead of air when they breathed. Never did a more miserable night precede a more frightful day.

About three o'clock the corps reached the banks of the Rumblar. This torrent, when it contains water, rolls between steep rocks, and in a deep ravine. A small bridge thrown over its bed conducts from one bank to the other. The soldiers, on arriving at it, expected to quench their thirst, but it was found completely dried up. They were obliged to march on. Having crossed the bridge, the road rises over heights covered with olive-trees. Here were usually stationed the advanced posts of the French division charged to guard Baylen, which is only three-quarters of a league distant from the Rumblar. Instead of general Vedel's advanced posts, were perceived, by the daylight which began to peep, Spanish posts, which received our troops with a discharge of musketry. General Chabert's advanced guard immediately put itself in a posture of defence, and replied to the fire of the enemy. The road, jammed between heights, was barred by several Spanish battalions, drawn up in close column. If these battalions had defended the banks of the Rumblar, we should certainly not have been able to cross it. They formed the advanced guard of generals Reding and Coupigny, who, conformably to the plan adopted by the Spanish staff, had crossed at the ferry of Menjibar in the day-time of the 18th, marched immediately to Baylen, found it abandoned, and established themselves there. They had in the evening placed several battalions in close column on the Andujar road, and it was these that we found on the morning of the 19th barring the Baylen road against us.

The French advanced guard immediately stood upon its defence, on the left of the road and in the olive plantations. It was composed of a battalion of Chabert's brigade, four companies of voltigeurs and grenadiers, a squadron of chasseurs, and two four-pounders. It commenced a very brisk fire of tirailleurs, while an aide-de-camp gallopped off to fetch general Chabert's three other battalions, the rest of his artillery, and the brigade of chasseurs. While waiting for this reinforcement, the advanced guard did its best, kept up the tirailleur fire for an hour or two, killed a good many of the Spaniards, lost many itself, and maintained its ground. At length, about five in the morning, the sun being already high above the horizon, the rest of Chabert's brigade arrived. The soldiers of that brigade, though out of breath, which they had not had time to recover, neither could they quench their thirst, charged through and through the Spanish battalions, either in front or in flank, and obliged them to abandon that cooped-up road, and to fall back upon their main body. Our soldiers then came to the entrance of a small undulated plain, bordered on the right and left by heights covered with olive-trees, and terminated at the further end by the village of Baylen. The Spanish army under Reding and Coupigny, 18,000 strong, having in front an artillery formidable by its number and the calibre of its guns, appeared drawn up in three lines. It was about to march for Andujar, to take us in rear, while general Castaños was to attack us in front, when our advanced guard had put a stop to this intended movement.

No sooner had we beaten back the Spanish battalions which obstructed the road, and debouched in this plain, than the artillery of the Spaniards poured a horrible fire of balls and grape upon our troops. General Chabert immediately ordered six four-pounders to be placed in battery. But before they had fired more than a few rounds, they were dismounted and rendered unserviceable. What, in fact, could six four-pounders do against upwards of 24 well-served twelve-pounders? About eight in the morning, when this battle had already lasted for four hours, arrived the rest of the artillery, the cavalry, and the Swiss brigade, composed of the regiments of Preux and Reding. Pannetier's brigade, which closed the march, with the seamen of the guard, had orders, on its arrival, to take post, as rear-guard, at the little bridge of Rumblar, so as to prevent the troops of general Castaños from crossing, if it should turn out that he was in pursuit of the army. It was a new mishap, after so many others, not to have employed in mass all the troops there were to force a passage through Baylen, and thus to rejoin Vedel's and Dufour's divisions.

Be this as it may, on the arrival of the reinforcements, the fight became more animated and more general. Chabert's brigade, the Swiss brigade, and the cavalry, debouched in the little plain of Baylen, striving at the same time to gain ground. Our artillery had in vain endeavoured to silence with four and eight-pounders the formidable battery of twelves, which covered the middle of the Spanish line. It beheld every moment some of its pieces dismounted, without doing much harm to those of the enemy. It threw balls, indeed, amidst the deep mass of the Spaniards, and swept away whole files. The Swiss brigade of the regiments of Preux and Reding, placed at the centre, behaved with firmness, though it was grieved to fight against the Spaniards whom it had always served, and against its countrymen, of whom there were several battalions in the enemy's army.

At this moment, the Spaniards, purposing to take advantage of their great number in order to surround us, attempted to ascend a small height which rises on our left. General Dupont immediately sent thither general Pryvé's dragoons, the French Swiss battalion of Freuler, and a battalion of the 4th legion of reserve. These two infantry battalions advanced resolutely, while, on their right, general Pryvé led up his squadrons on the trot. The road, covered with brushwood and olive-trees, preventing the cavalry from marching in good order, general Pryvé directed it to disperse as tirailleurs, and to get forward as it could, while the two battalions sustained, deployed, the fire of the Spaniards. Our horse, having arrived at the height, formed, and then, dashing at a gallop upon the Spanish battalions, broke them, and obliged them to fall back upon their line of battle, after taking from them three colours.

The attempt which had just been repulsed on our right was repeated by the Spaniards upon our left, on some heights which commanded it. General Dupont, who had at length decided to bring into line all the rest of his troops excepting a battalion of the Paris guard, left in observation at the bridge of Rumblar, opposed Pannetier's brigade to this new movement of the Spaniards, and ordered the dragoons, drawn from the right to the left, to repeat the manœuvre, which had already succeeded with them.

While the three battalions of Pannetier's brigade were making head against the Spaniards, who threatened our left, by keeping up a fire of small arms with them, general Pryvé, recommencing what he had before done, led his horsemen as tirailleurs through the thorns and olive-trees, formed them when they had arrived on the plateau, and then directed them upon the Spaniards, who, broken by the shock, again fell back upon their main body. Meanwhile the Swiss brigade continued to maintain its ground in the midst of the plain with the same firmness, while the brave general Dupré, brought into line with his horse chasseurs, made brilliant charges upon the centre of the Spaniards. But every time that they were charged on the right, on the left, at the centre, either with bayonet or sword, they fell back on two immoveable lines, which were perceived in the back-ground of the field of battle, like an impenetrable wall of brass. These two lines, independently of their number, three or four times as large as ours, were appuyed in rear on the village of Baylen, protected on their wings by wooded heights, lastly, covered in front by a formidable artillery. At this sight our soldiers began to feel their courage fail them. It was ten in the morning, the heat overwhelming, men and horses gasping for breath, and, on that field of battle parched by the sun, there was nowhere a drop of water or a patch of shade to cool them during the short intervals of a horrible combat.

But what was general Vedel doing—he who yesterday and the day before was so prompt to march when there was no occasion for him, but who came not now when his presence would have been so serviceable? He was expected, however, for he could not refrain from hastening up on the report of the cannon, which in those deep gorges must have been heard at La Carolina. General Dupont directed his coming to be announced in the ranks, in order to animate his soldiers, and then decided to try a general movement with a view to carry the position by assault. He went along the front of his troops, and had the colours taken by the cavalry brought before them. At this sight, their young courage reviving burst forth in shouts of *Vive l'Empereur!* Some officers, excited by the danger, then advised that they should form in close column on the left, and charge upon one point—that one which could afford a passage to the road from Baylen to La Carolina, that is to say, towards Vedel's division, and save themselves by submitting to a painful but necessary sacrifice, that of the baggage full of our sick. General Dupont, ever blind on those fatal days, was not sensible of the merit of this counsel. He persisted in charging the whole line of the Spaniards in front, as if he meant to take their entire army at a blow. At a given signal his soldiers rushed in mass upon the enemy, but they were met by a murderous fire of musketry and grape, and their line wavered and reeled. The officers set them to rights and led them forward, while the brave general Dupré dashed, with his horse chasseurs, through the intervals of our infantry, and set an example by charging through the Spanish line. He made breaches in it, which he entered, taking even some guns, which he could not bring away; but, when he attempted to proceed further, he was always stopped by a solid, impenetrable barrier, which there was no hope of breaking through. The unfortunate general, after heroic efforts, fell from his horse struck by a ball in the abdomen.

It was now noon. This so unequal combat had already lasted eight or nine hours. Almost all the superior officers were killed or wounded. Captains were commanding battalions, serjeant-majors companies. All the artillery was dismounted. General Dupont, in despair, having received two gun-shot wounds, redeemed his faults by his valour. He required one more proof of devotedness from his soldiers. He led them back into line. They marched, supported by the example of the seamen of the imperial guard, who never ceased to be worthy of themselves. But, after a fresh effort on the first line, they perceived the second still immoveable; and they again returned to the entrance of that melancholy and fatal plain, which they had not been able to pass. At this horrible moment an event, unexpected, though easy to be foreseen, completed their demoralisation. The Swiss regiments of Preux and Reding, which at first behaved honourably, were nevertheless deeply grieved to be obliged to fire upon Swiss and upon Spaniards, the one their countrymen, the other their old companions in arms. Though the French Swiss of Freuler fought by their side with rare fidelity, they could not bear up either against grief or ill fortune, and, in spite of the efforts of their officers, almost all of them deserted. In a few moments 1600 men quitted the field of battle, where our number was already so small. In fact, not 3000 men were left on their legs upon that ground out of 9000 who appeared there in the morning. Eighteen hundred, struck down by the fire, were dead or wounded; sixteen hundred had gone over to the enemy. Two or three thousand more, worn out with fatigue, overcome by heat and the dysentery, had sunk to the ground and dropped their arms beside them. Despair had seized every soul. General Dupont went through the thinned ranks of his army, and found every face impressed with the same grief that was consuming himself. Still he clung to a last hope, and listened to catch the sound of general Vedel's cannon. But he listened in vain. On that scorching and blood-drenched plain not a sound was to be heard but that of single musket-shots; for the fight had ceased on one side as well as on the other. All at once, however, reports of artillery broke the dull silence that began to prevail. An additional cause for despair! those sounds came not from the left, but from the rear, that is to say, from the bridge of Rumblar. General Castaños, apprized at two or three o'clock in the morning of the evacuation of Andujar by the French, had immediately sent in pursuit of them all the troops he had left, under the command of general de la Peña, who by a concerted signal gave notice to general Reding of his approach by discharges of artillery. All, therefore, was lost. The three thousand men left in the ranks, the three or four thousand dispersed over the country, the wounded, the sick, must all be slaughtered between the armies of general Reding and general de la Peña, amounting to about 30,000 men. At this idea, general Dupont's affliction was at its height, and he perceived no other resource than that of treating with the enemy.

He had among his officers an equerry of the Emperor's, M. de Villoutreys, who, desirous of engaging in active service, had been attached to his *corps d'armée:* he charged him to go to general Reding, to propose a suspension of arms. M. de Villoutreys traversed that melancholy plain, the theatre of our first disasters. He went to general Reding, and applied in the name of the French general for a truce of a few hours on the ground of the fatigue of both armies. General Reding, extremely glad to have done with the French, for he was still fearful of a change of fortune with such adversaries, assented to the truce, on condition of its being ratified by the general-in-chief, Castaños. For the moment, he promised to suspend his fire.

M. de Villoutreys returned to general Dupont, who gave him a fresh commission, that was to go and meet general de la Peña, and to stop him at the bridge of Rumblar. Villoutreys hastened to the bridge of Rumblar, and there found the troops of general de la Peña skirmishing already with some soldiers of the Paris guard. General de la Peña, less accommodating than M. de Reding, and full of Spanish passions, declared that he was willing to accede to the truce, but provisionally, and till the adhesion of the general-in-chief. He likewise intimated that the French would obtain quarter only by surrendering at discretion. The firing was suspended on both sides. The French rested themselves at last on that fatal plain upon which lay pell-mell so many dead and dying, where a consuming heat prevailed, where an awful silence reigned, and where no water was to be found but in some muddy holes of the Rumblar, and the possession of which was violently disputed. All else was motionless: but joy filled the hearts of the one, despair those of the others.

M. de Villoutreys, returning to his general-in-chief, was directed to follow the Andujar road, to meet general Castaños, and to obtain his ratification of the truce, agreed to by his lieutenants. The unfortunate general Dupont, hitherto so brilliant, so successful, retired to his tent, overwhelmed by moral pains which rendered him almost insensible to the physical pains of two severe wounds. Such is the mutability of fortune, in war as in politics, as in everything else in this world, an agitated world, a changeful theatre, where prosperity and adversity are linked together, succeed, efface each other, leaving after a long series of contrary sensations only nothingness and misery. Three years before, on the banks of the Danube, this same general Dupont, arriving breathless to the succour of marshal Mortier, saved him at Diernstein. But other times, other places, another spirit. It was in December and in the North; they were veteran soldiers, full of health and vigour, braced by a colder atmosphere, instead of being depressed by an enervating climate, accustomed to all the vicissitudes of war, actuated by a high sense of honour, never hesitating between death and surrender. If the position of these men became bad for a moment, one had time to come up to their aid and to save them. And then Fortune again smiled and made amends for all: none came too late, none made a mistake; or, if this did happen to one, the other corrected his fault. Here, in this Spain, which had been so foully entered, the men were young, weak, sickly, oppressed by the climate, new to suffering. They began to be no longer prosperous; and if the one committed a fault, the other aggravated it. Dupont had come to succour Mortier at Diernstein; Vedel did not come to succour Dupont till it was too late.

What, then, we again say, was general Vedel doing, who, but a few leagues off, with two divisions, one of which only would have changed the issue of that fatal day, never made his appearance? Twice he had already deceived himself; and he deceived himself a third time. Setting out from Baylen in the evening of the 17th, he arrived in the night at Guarroman; resuming his march on the 18th for La Carolina, pursuing the phantom of an enemy, who had gone, it was said, to secure the defiles, he had at length, on the 18th, acquired the conviction that he and general Dufour were running after a chimera. The supposed Spanish army which had proceeded entire to the defiles, to shut up the French army in them, turned out to be a few guerillas, whom some officers, either incompetent observers or easily frightened, had taken for formidable masses. Reconnaissances sent out in every direction, prisoners examined, peasants questioned, had at length convinced generals Dufour and Vedel of the truth. They immediately formed the plan of returning to Baylen, for it was not in zeal that they were deficient. General Vedel, setting out last and not having entered so deeply into the gorges, had to fall back first upon Baylen. But by these multiplied goings and comings, he had exhausted his unfortunate soldiers with fatigue. Almost without eating, without halting, they had marched from Baylen to Andujar, from Andujar to Baylen, from Baylen to La Carolina, and he could not help granting them the remainder of the 18th to rest themselves. The coolness of the place, the fruit, the vegetables, the provisions, which they had at La Carolina, were at the moment a strong reason for making a halt there. Moreover, the artillery carriages, broken in consequence of the bad roads and the dry weather, required some repairs. Lastly, they were ignorant of the melancholy secret of events, and imagined that they should be in time if they arrived at Baylen on the morrow. It might not have been too late, indeed, had they started at three o'clock the next morning, the 19th; for they would have reached Baylen by eleven, they would have caught M. de Reding between two fires, and have converted the fatal day of Baylen into another battle of Marengo.

At three in the morning of the following day, the 19th, some diligent officers, stirring before the others to attend to their troops, heard the cannon at Baylen, the sound of which, transmitted from echo to echo, was reverberated to the furthest extremity of the gorges of the Sierra Morena. These guns, according to them, could be no other than those of the general-in-chief, engaged with the Spaniards, for none but he had been left behind on the Guadalquivir. Yet how was it possible that he, who had been left with the Spaniards at Andujar, should be firing his cannon in a position which must be that of Baylen? This they could not make out: but certain it was that they heard repeated discharges of artillery, and the vulgar precept of going straight up to cannon, so often cited and so often misunderstood, did not permit them to hesitate. By setting off immediately in the cool of the morning, and hastening their steps, they might arrive in time to deal the enemy decisive blows. General Vedel, so prompt in forming a resolution on the 16th and 17th, manifested on this occasion an inexplicable indecision. He lost two hours in rallying his column, and did not start before five o'clock. The heat was already great; the troops, marching in columns near to each other, on account of the proximity of the enemy, raised a dust that suffocated them. It was, therefore, not till about eleven o'clock that they reached Guarroman, mid-way between La Carolina and Baylen. At this moment, the fight having slackened at Baylen, the echoes of the guns were much less heard. Still, however, the reports of guns continued to be heard, sometimes more distinct, sometimes more faint, according to the direction of the wind.

General Vedel, without any ill intention, for he was, on the contrary, deeply devoted to the honour of the French arms, but from an infatuation similar to that which had persuaded general Dupont that the danger was at Andujar alone, persisted in doubting and in considering what was heard as only an affair of advanced posts on the banks of the Guadalquivir. He resolved, in particular, not to return to Baylen till he had completely explored the gorges and ascertained that the enemy was not in the cross-road of Linares, which terminates exactly at Guarroman, and he sent thither a reconnaissance of cavalry. By this time it was noon. The guns ceased to roar, for the battle was over at Baylen. This silence of defeat and despair left no doubt in the mind of general Vedel, and he concluded definitively that people had been mistaken. At this moment his troops had just got hold of a flock of goats; they were hungry; he allowed them two hours to make their soup. In two hours they again started. They marched without impatience, for the most profound silence everywhere prevailed. About five o'clock they debouched on Baylen and perceived the Spaniards. Without figuring to themselves precisely what might have happened, they imagined that the enemy had placed himself between general Dupont and Vedel's and Dufour's divisions. General Vedel hesitated no longer, and would have passed the main body of the Spanish army to rejoin his general-in-chief. He was preparing, therefore, to attack by the right, for it was on this side that, by turning Baylen, he could force a passage to the Andujar road, and meet with general Dupont, no matter at what point of that road. At the moment when he was giving his orders, a Spanish flag of truce came to inform him that there was a suspension of arms. General Vedel refused to believe it, and dispatched one of his officers to general Reding's camp to ascertain what was the real fact; declaring that he would grant a delay of half an hour, after which, if he received no answer, he should open his fire. While waiting, he continued to make his dispositions, and the half-hour having elapsed, as the officer whom he had sent had not returned, he attacked vigorously. His troops marched up with ardour, enveloped a battalion of infantry, and made the men prisoners. The cuirassiers charged and overturned all before them. But all at once a groupe of Spanish officers, in which was an aide-de-camp of general Dupont's, came to him to desire him to cease his fire, and to replace all in its former state. Before this order of the general-in-chief's, general Vedel, though highly animated for fighting, was obliged te desist. But such was the power of his illusions, that he could not yet imagine the extent of the misfortune of the army; and he fancied that the truce referred to in order to stop him was but a commencement of negociations with general Castaños, whose zeal for the insurrection had always been deemed doubtful in the French army, and who was believed to be disposed to treat on the first occasion.

Such was the manner in which general Vedel had employed his time on the 19th, such the manner in which he finished that fatal day. On learning that Vedel's division had arrived, the Spaniards were seized with fear, and transported with rage at the news that the men of one of their battalions were already prisoners. They would have fallen upon Barbou's division, and slaughtered the whole of it, supposing that the truce demanded had only been a feint to give general Vedel time to arrive and to renew the fight the moment he appeared. They raised furious outcries, which general Dupont hastened to appease by giving the order that we have just reported. It was a fitting occasion for taking counsel from the terror and the very rage of the Spaniards to renew the fight, while moving in close column upon his left. General Pryvé, commanding the dragoons, made this proposal to general Dupont, and even pointed out to him the heights by which they might rejoin Vedel's division. But the unfortunate general, himself weakened by the disease which had for some time past prevailed in the army, suffering severely from his wounds, and seized with the general dejection, was absorbed in his affliction, and heard what general Pryvé said to him without making any reply. He seemed, in his despair, no longer to comprehend the words that were addressed to him.*

The night was passed on the field of battle, awaiting the negociations of the morrow. But, while the Spaniards were enjoying abundance, our soldiers were destitute of everything, and they passed the night as they had passed the day, without bread, without water, without wine. Those only who still had some remnants of their ration in their knapsacks, or some drink in their gourds, had anything to refresh themselves with.

Next morning, the 20th, M. de Villoutreys, who had been sent to the Spanish head-quarters, to obtain the ratification of the truce, returned, intimating that general Castaños was ready to treat on equitable bases, and, with this view, he would come himself to Baylen. General Dupont thought of employing, on this occasion, the celebrated engineer general Marescot, who was on passage in his division on a mission to Gibraltar, and who had been well acquainted with general Castaños in 1795. He sent for him and urged him to use his influence with the Spanish general, in order to obtain the better conditions. General Marescot, having no desire to negociate and sign a capitulation which could not be advantageous, at first refused the mission that was offered him, but afterwards yielded to the solicitations of the general-in-chief, and consented, to proceed to the Spanish head-quarters.

In order to come at general Castaños, it was necessary to take the road to Andujar and to pass through la Peña's division. General Marescot found general de la Peña at the bridge of Rumblar, indignant, threatening, complaining of alleged movements of the French army to escape, saying that he had powers for treating, requiring that all the French divisions should immediately surrender at discretion, and declaring that, if he had not an answer in two hours, he should attack and crush Barbou's division. To stop him, general Marescot was obliged to promise that an answer should be given in two hours.

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* All these particulars are extracted from the very curious, very secret, and voluminous proceedings instituted against general Dupont from 1808 to 1811.

He returned, therefore, without loss of time, to report these melancholy details to general Dupont. At this intelligence the latter roused himself, exclaiming that he would rather perish with the last of his men than surrender at discretion. He summoned to him all his generals of division and of brigade, to ascertain if he could rely upon their devotedness and that of their soldiers. But almost all of them replied that the soldiers, worn out with fatigue and famine, and utterly discouraged, wished for no more fighting. General Dupont, to assure himself of this, went out of his hut, walked through the bivouacs with his lieutenants, and strove to revive the depressed courage of his young troops. Veteran soldiers of Egypt or of St. Domingo, accustomed to defy hunger, thirst, and heat, would not have been deaf to his voice. But what was to be expected of boys of twenty, dispirited by the excessive heat, who had neither eaten nor drunk for thirty-six hours, knowing that they were placed between two fires, and must fight in the disproportion of one to five or six, and with their artillery dismounted! They complained to their generals that they had been sacrificed: some of them, in their despair, even flung their arms and their cartouch-boxes on the ground. Instead of raising the spirits of others, general Dupont needed some one to raise his own. He returned in dismay. The officers who had behaved the most gallantly on the preceding day, themselves declared the case desperate, and maintained that they might treat honourably, after they had fought so valiantly. They forgot that the last act always effaces those which precede it, and that it is by the last that we are judged. In another situation, without general Vedel on their left, it would have been excusable in them to treat, for there would have been no other resource but to provoke their slaughter, though that is sometimes a resource which succeeds. But with general Vedel on their left, and having a chance of rejoining him by a last effort, they were inexcusable to surrender till they had made that effort. Physical exhaustion and moral depression could alone account for such a weakness. Besides, they flattered themselves that the enemy would be satisfied with their evacuation of Andalusia, and allow them to retire to the north of Spain, without requiring the surrender of their arms. They were, therefore, in favour of treating with the enemy instead of recommencing what in their opinion was an impossible combat.

The unfortunate general Dupont, carried away by the general demoralization, yielded, and gave his powers to general Chabert, who was selected because on the preceding day he had conducted himself at the head of his brigade with extreme intrepidity. General Marescot had declined accepting any other mission than that of accompanying, advising, and supporting general Chabert. M. de Villoutreys, who had already carried proposals to the commanders of the Spanish armies, was associated with generals Chabert and Marescot.

They set out immediately to treat, not with general de la Peña, but with general Castaños himself, whom they found at the post-house half way between Baylen and Andujar. He had with him the count de Tilly, one of the most influential members of the Junta of Seville, and the captain-general of Grenada, Escalante. General Castaños, a mild, humane, and discreet man, received the French officers with a politeness which they did not experience from the captain-general Escalante, who made up for his weakness by his violence, or from count Tilly, who conducted himself as a demagogue. Agreeably to their instructions, the French officers required, in the first place, that Vedel's and Dufour's divisions, which had taken no part in the battle, were not enveloped, and might therefore escape the fate of Barbou's division (that which had fought under general Dupont), should not be comprehended in the capitulation, and that, as for Barbou's division, it should be allowed to retire upon Madrid, either laying down or not laying down its arms, according to the result of the negociation. The Spanish generals obstinately refused these propositions, for they had in their hands the fate of Barbou's division; and if they consented to treat, it was to acquire the disposal of Vedel's and Dufour's divisions, which were not in their power. They insisted, therefore, that these should be included in the capitulation, granting, in other respects, to each of the French divisions a treatment conformable to its actual situation. They proposed, therefore, that Barbou's division should remain prisoners, while Vedel's and Dufour's divisions should be conveyed to France by sea.

The French negociators strongly opposed these various pretensions, and at length, after long discussion, the parties agreed to the two following conditions: in the first place, that the three divisions should retire upon Madrid; secondly, that Vedel's and Dufour's divisions should make their retreat without laying down their arms; while Barbou's division, being enveloped, should surrender theirs. These conditions, grievous to the honour of the French arms, would save the three divisions, and they were subscribed to. The negociators were just proceeding to digest them, when a fresh incident occurred to crown the misfortunes of that army of Andalusia, on which Fortune seemed to wreak her malice without pity. General Castaños received a note taken upon a young French officer, who had been sent from Madrid by general Savary to general Dupont. This note contained instructions dispatched on the 16th or 17th of July, before the favourable news of the battle of Rio-Seco had reached Madrid. Before intelligence of this success was received there, great anxiety had been felt, many doubts entertained respecting the reduction of Saragossa, a general concentration of the troops of the South upon Madrid ordered, and, in consequence of this order of concentration, it was intimated to general Dupont, that, notwithstanding antérior instructions, it was time that he should return to La Mancha. On reading this precious dispatch, which accident put into his hands, general Castaños comprehended perfectly well that to grant the return to Madrid would not be obtaining the voluntary evacuation of Andalusia and La Mancha on the part of the French, but merely lending one's self to their plan of concentration; that, even without the events of Baylen, they would have retired; that consequently the Spaniards would gain nothing by this capitulation but the sterile honour of taking Barbou's division, its artillery, and its small arms, with which it would soon be supplied again at Madrid; that the return of these twenty thousand men to the north of Spain must therefore be prevented, as their presence there would not fail to re-establish the affairs of the new king.

When, therefore, the negociators were proceeding to digest the conditions of the capitulation, and it was proposed to specify the return by land of the three divisions, one without arms, the two others with arms, general Castaños, always moderate in form, but this time peremptory in substance, declared that this article was not agreed to. The French generals then exclaimed against this sort of breach of faith, observing that, some moments before, the condition now contested had been admitted. This M. de Castaños acknowledged; but, to prove his good faith, he gave general Marescot general Savary's intercepted letter to read, and asked if, after what he had just learned, he could require him to adhere to the conditions first granted. General Marescot read the letter, and communicated it to his dismayed colleagues, who were obliged to treat upon new bases. In consequence, it was stipulated that Barbou's division should remain prisoners of war; that Vedel's and Dufour's divisions should merely engage to evacuate Spain by sea; that they should not lay down their arms, but that, in order to prevent all quarrels, they must be given up, and restored to them on their embarkation at San Lucar and Rota; that they should sail under the Spanish flag, and the Spanish generals engaged to cause this flag to be respected by the English. They then proceeded to some material details, and our negociators obtained what is customary, permission for the officers to keep their baggage, and for the superior officers to have a waggon exempt from examination; but the knapsacks of the soldiers were to be searched, to ascertain that they were not carrying away any sacred utensils. A warm discussion took place on this article, defamatory of the soldiers, and which ought never to have been subscribed to. M. de Castaños, always extremely shrewd, alleged the fanaticism of the Spanish populace, to which it was necessary to give some satisfaction, and said that, if they could not announce that the knapsacks of the soldiers had been searched, the people would imagine that they were carrying away the sacred vessels of Cordova, and would not fail to fall upon them; that, for the rest, the French officers themselves should make this search, and that of course there would be nothing in it to wound the honour of the army. The French negociators were disposed to yield; they did yield, and the whole was settled, except the definitive drawing up, which was postponed to the following day, the 21st.

While the grievous conditions of this capitulation were under discussion, and getting accepted one after another, an aide-de-camp of general Vedel's, and captain Baste, of the seamen of the guard, arrived at the place of the conferences. These officers came to plead the interests of Vedel's division on the following grounds. When, on the morning of the 20th, general Vedel, better informed, had learned the misfortune which had befallen general Dupont's division, partly through his fault, he was sorely grieved, and he immediately offered to renew the attack in the night of the ensuing day (that between the 20th and 21st), promising to cut his way through general Reding's corps, and to extricate his general-in-chief, if the latter would but make an effort on his part. He added that, if the general-in-chief would not venture, he ought at least not to sacrifice Vedel's division, which, from its situation, totally different from that of Barbou's division, for it was not enveloped, had a right to totally different treatment. He directed captain Baste and one of his aides-de-camp to convey this message to general Dupont. Captain Baste, intelligent, intrepid, fond of mixing himself up in matters of command, urged general Dupont to authorize a desperate attack to be attempted in the following night, abandoning all the baggage and even the artillery, if he must, setting in motion all who were able to stand, and endeavouring to force a passage, general Dupont by his left, general Vedel by his right. It is evident that success was possible; but general Dupont, still overwhelmed with dejection, scarcely heard what was said to him, alleged the deep discouragement of his army, a negociation already begun, a treaty almost concluded, perhaps even signed on the road to Andujar, and sent off captain Baste to the negociators themselves to plead the cause of Vedel's division.

It was in consequence of this reference that captain Baste appeared at the place of the conferences. He first addressed himself to the French negociators, whom he found fatigued by a long disputation, and not capable of renewing a discussion in which they had always been beaten. Captain Baste, having come from a place where the greatest ardour and indignation were felt at the bare idea of surrender, and transferred to another where all was dejection and despair, could not comprehend sentiments which he did not feel, and returned indignant to general Dupont.

After this incident, the three French negociators accompanied the three Spanish negociators to Andujar, where was to be definitively drawn up the capitulation devoted to so grievous an immortality; and captain Baste returned to Baylen, to the camp of general Dupont, to report what had passed. At this account, general Dupont, awakened to all his sentiments of honour, directed captain Baste to advise general Vedel to set out immediately for La Carolina and the Sierra Morena, in order to get away in all haste towards Madrid. Generals Vedel and Dufour might take back nine or ten thousand men to Madrid, and, by gaining the start of the Spaniards, it is beyond doubt that they would have many chances of successfully effecting their retreat. This would be more than half the French army saved from that cruel catastrophe by a noble inspiration of general Dupont's, who well knew to what a degree he should thereby aggravate the lot of the other half.

Captain Baste set out instantly for general Vedel's camp, situated between Baylen and La Carolina, and brought him, along with the melancholy result of the conferences at Andujar, the authorization to retire upon Madrid. Without losing a minute, general Vedel issued orders for departure, and in that same night all his troops set themselves in motion with those of general Dufour. In consequence of the continual marches backward and forward of these two divisions, six hundred men at least were lame. They had had some wounded in the action at Menjibar, and so they must leave behind seven or eight hundred men destined for slaughter. It was a sore affliction to part from them, but such is war! The welfare of all, constantly placed above the welfare of some, hardens the heart, or disposes it at least to a continual resignation to each other's misfortunes. They left their unhappy comrades in the villages bordering the road, and pursued with incredible precipitation the route for Madrid. By day-break next morning, the 21st, they were at La Carolina, and pushed on, notwithstanding the heat of the weather, to St. Helena.

A few hours after the departure of the column, the Spaniards at Baylen were informed of it, both in general Reding's camp and in that of general de la Peña, which soon rang with the cries of cannibals. The French, it was alleged, had broken the truce, a charge for which there was very little foundation; for nothing prevented Vedel's division, which was out of reach, from moving, and the Spaniards moreover did not impose upon themselves that immobility, since they had been for thirty-six hours incessantly manœuvring about Barbou's division, for the purpose of investing it more completely; which really constituted an infraction of the truce, but which the French had neither complained of nor revenged, for want of the means of enforcing respect under their calamity. But no reason, no sense of justice, were left to those furious foes, who had become conquerors by chance. They all cried out that Barbou's entire division must be exterminated. They forgot that six thousand French, pushed to extremity, were capable of being roused from a temporary despondence by a noble despair, and of cutting their way through their enemies.

Perhaps it is to be regretted that they did not follow up the suggestions of their barbarity, and give rise to that noble despair which, by raising the courage of all, would have saved all. Be this as it may, numerous officers hastened to Andujar to carry the news of the departure of Vedel's and Dufour's divisions, and to report the exasperation of the Spanish army. The Spanish negociators immediately made themselves the organs of an ignoble military populace, declaring that the most terrible treatment should be inflicted on Barbou's division, unless Vedel's and Dufour's divisions returned to their first position. The answer was easy; for what more could be done against Barbou's division than make prisoners of it? To threaten to put prisoners to death would have been infamous; and it would have been necessary to reply to those who dared utter such a threat as one replies to murderers. But the hero of Genoa, the inflexible Masséna, was not there. His officers hurried to the unhappy Dupont; they beset him with fresh importunities; they told him that he was likely to occasion the massacre of his faithful division, that which had fought so gallantly by his side, and all for the purpose of saving two divisions which were the real cause of the ruin of the army: and this, indeed, was true in regard to the latter. Yielding once more, he sent a formal counter-order to general Vedel.

On the arrival of the counter-order, there was a unanimous outbreak in Vedel's division, which insisted on continuing its march upon Madrid. Another officer had to be dispatched after it, charged to render general Vedel responsible for all consequences if he persisted in retiring. General Vedel then assembled his officers, communicated to them the situation in which they stood, represented the danger in which they should place their brethren in arms, and prevailed upon them to submit. The troops, less compliant, would not accede to these proposals, and, in a country where solitary individuals would not have been murdered, they would almost all have deserted. In Spain they were obliged to keep together and to act all in common. They submitted, therefore, and returned from St. Helena to La Carolina, and from La Carolina to Guarroman, resigned to share the lot of Barbou's division.

At length, on the 22nd, that fatal capitulation was brought from Andujar to Baylen, to general Dupont. He hesitated several times before he signed it. The unhappy chief struck his forehead and flung down the pen: then, urged by those men who had all been so brave under fire, and who were all so weak out of fire, he wrote his name, once so glorious, at the foot of that document, which was destined to be the everlasting torment of his life. Why had he not fallen at Albeck, at Halle, at Friedland, or even at Baylen? How deeply he regretted it subsequently, before judges who inflicted on him a dishonouring condemnation!

Hunger had been the cruel ally of the Spaniards in this negociation. While Barbou's division was kept blockaded, it had not been allowed a morsel of bread, and ever since the evening of the

18th our poor soldiers had not received any distribution. They had nothing but a few remnants of rations to subsist on, so that on the 22nd there were many of them who had not tasted food for three days. They were under the olive-trees, dying of hunger, gasping for breath, without even a draught of water to allay their thirst.

The capitulation being signed, general Castaños consented to grant them provisions. He could be humane, since Fortune had just prepared for him such a triumph that he could afford to be generous, as men are when the heart is satisfied. For the rest, he showed himself worthy of a triumph owing more to chance than to valour and genius, by genuine humanity, perfect modesty, and a conduct which denoted extraordinary discretion. He said to our officers, with the most honourable frankness, "De la Cuesta, Blake, and I, were not in favour of the insurrection. We yielded to the national movement. But this movement is so unanimous that it acquires chances of success. Let not Napoleon insist upon an impossible conquest; let him not oblige us to throw ourselves into the arms of the English, who are hateful to us, and whose assistance we have hitherto rejected. Let him restore our king to us, requiring such conditions as can satisfy him, and the two nations will be reconciled for ever."

On the following day our soldiers filed before the Spanish army. They were cut to the heart. They were too young to be able to compare their present humiliation with their past triumphs; but among the officers there were some who had seen Melas's and Mack's Austrians, Hohenlohe's and Blücher's Prussians, file off before them, and they were overwhelmed with shame. Vedel's and Dufour's divisions did not lay down their arms, which, however, they would have to do by and by; but Barbou's division underwent that humiliation, and at this moment was sorry that it had not rather perished to the last man.

The French troops were immediately marched off for San Lucar and Rota, where they were to be embarked for France in Spanish vessels. Their route was made to avoid the two great cities of Cordova and Seville, in order to withdraw them from the popular fury, and lay through the less important towns of Bujalance, Ecija, Carmona, Alcala, Utrera, and Lebrija. In all these places the conduct of the Spanish populace was atrocious. Those unfortunate French, who had behaved like brave men, who had made war without cruelty, who had suffered without revenging the massacre of their sick and wounded, were pelted with stones, and often attacked with knives, by men, women, and children. At Carmona, at Ecija, the women spat in their faces, and children flung mud at them. They trembled with rage, and, though disarmed, were more than once tempted to take a terrible revenge, by seizing such as they could lay hands on and making weapons of them: but their officers restrained them, in order to prevent a general massacre. Care was taken to make them pass the night outside villages and towns, and to collect them in the open field like droves of cattle, to spare them still more cruel treatment. At Lebrija, and in the towns near the coast, they were stopped and doomed to tarry, upon pretext that the Spanish vessels were not ready. But they soon learned the cause of this delay. The Junta of Seville, governed by the lowest demagogue passions, had refused to acknowledge the capitulation of Baylen, and declared that the French should be detained prisoners of war, under various pretexts, all illusory, and false even to impudence. One of the reasons alleged by this Junta was, that they were not sure of obtaining the consent of the English to the passage by sea—a false reason, for the English, notwithstanding their animosity, manifested a generous pity for our prisoners, and, as we shall see, soon suffered other troops, which they would have been greatly interested in detaining, to pass by sea. Our officers addressed themselves to the captain-general, Thomas de Morla, remonstrating against this unworthy violation of the law of nations, but received from him only the most indecorous answers, to the effect that an army which had violated all laws, divine and human, had forfeited the right of appealing to the justice of the Spanish nation.

At Lebrija the furious populace broke, in the night, into a prison, in which was one of our regiments of dragoons, and slaughtered seventy-five, of whom twelve were officers. But for the clergy, they would have put all of them to death. Lastly, the generals, who had committed the serious fault of separating themselves from their troops, in order to travel apart with their baggage, were severely punished for having thus withdrawn themselves. No sooner had they arrived at Port St. Mary, with their waggons exempt from examination, than the people, unable to contain themselves at the sight of those vehicles, crammed, as they said, with all the riches of Cordova, fell upon them, broke them in pieces, and plundered them. Men belonging to the Spanish authorities were not the last to assist in this pillage. But, though these waggons contained the whole of the savings of the officers, and even the chest of the army, no more was found in them than eleven or twelve hundred thousand reals, according to the Spanish newspapers themselves, that is to say about 300,000 francs. That was the whole result of the sacking of Cordova. The French generals had well nigh been slaughtered, and they escaped the fury of the populace only by throwing themselves into boats. They were conducted to Cadiz, and detained prisoners till their embarkation for France, where other hardships not less cruel awaited them.

Such was that famous capitulation of Baylen, the name of which, in our boyhood, rang in our ears as frequently as that of Austerlitz or Jena. At this period, the ordinary persecutors of misfortune, judging of that deplorable event without knowledge and without pity, imputed to cowardice and to anxiety to save the waggons laden with the spoils of Cordova the terrible disaster which befel the French army. Thus it is that the baseness of courtiers, ever rancorous against those whom power gives it the

35038

signal for immolating, is accustomed to judge! There were many faults, but not a single infraction of honour, in that deplorable campaign of Andalusia. The first fault was that of Napoleon himself, who, after exciting, by the events of Bayonne, an unparalleled popular fury, before which every operation of war became extremely perilous, contented himself with sending 8000 men to Valencia, and 12,000 to Cordova, apparently conceiving that these were sufficient. After this fault of Napoleon's came the military fault of general Dupont and his lieutenant, general Vedel. General Dupont, leaving Cordova, to move nearer to the defiles of the Sierra Morena, ought, from this very motive, to have drawn so near to them as to close them completely, and, to this end, to have placed himself at Baylen, which would have rendered all separation of his divisions impossible. After committing the fault of establishing himself at Andujar and not at Baylen, it was a fault not less serious not to have followed general Vedel, when he sent him back in the evening of the 16th to Baylen, and, this fault committed, in not decamping on the 17th instead of having decamped on the 18th, in having, on the day of the battle of Baylen, engaged partially, successively, and in parallel line to the enemy, with the forces at his disposal, instead of making an attack and in close column on his left;* lastly, in having, after the most honourable efforts of valour, given way too much to the general despondency. The fault of general Vedel was his coming on the 16th with his whole division to Andujar, and leaving Baylen uncovered (for which the approbation of the general-in-chief himself was but a very imperfect excuse); his great fault was following general Dufour to La Carolina, thus leaving Baylen a second time without any precaution for defending it; and, lastly, when undeceived at La Carolina, not having returned immediately, but, on the contrary, wasted the whole of the 19th in vain loitering. Lastly, the fault of the generals about general Dupont was, to urge him to the capitulation, and, after fighting valiantly on the field of battle of Baylen, showing the most culpable weakness in the general negociation, yielding to the threats of the Spanish generals like the most cowardly of men, while they were some of the bravest: a fresh proof that moral courage and physical courage are two very different qualities.

Thus a serious error of Napoleon's in regard to Spain, a military position ill chosen by general Dupont, too great delay in changing it, an ill-planned battle, false movements of general Vedel's, demoralization of generals and soldiers—such were the causes of the cruel reverse of Baylen. All that has been said in addition is mere calumny. The long file of baggage, it has often been repeated, brought upon us all our misfortunes. Supposing that a general had been capable of so stupid a calculation as to sacrifice his honour, his military profession, the marshal's baton that was reserved for him, for a few hundred thousand francs, a sum far inferior to what Napoleon gave to the least favoured of his lieutenants, eight or ten waggons would have carried all the pretended riches of Cordova in gold and silver plate, and the question related to several hundred carriages, the extraordinary number of which was evidently occasioned by the moral state of the country, in which not a sick or wounded man could be left behind. At last, as we have seen, those famous baggage-waggons were plundered, and the chest of the army carried off: it contained not more than three or four hundred thousand francs. All that can be said, in short, is, that general Dupont, intelligent, capable, brilliant under fire, had not the indomitable firmness of Masséna at Genoa and Essling. But he was ill, wounded, exhausted by a heat of forty degrees; his soldiers were boys, worn out with fatigue and hunger; disasters followed close upon disasters, accidents upon accidents; and if we sound this tragic event to the bottom, we shall see that the Emperor himself, who placed so many men in a false position, was not in this case the most irreproachable. Still we must add, for the interest of military morality, that, in these extreme situations, the resolution to die is the only worthy, the only salutary resolution; for certainly, on general Vedel's arrival, the resolution to die in the attempt to cut a passage through Reding's division would have enabled the two parts of the French army to join, and to get triumphantly out of the scrape, instead of finding themselves humbled and prisoners. By sacrificing on the field of battle one-fourth of the men who afterwards died in a cruel captivity, one might have transformed into a triumph the most signal of the reverses of that extraordinary period.*

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* If I venture to express these opinions on purely special questions, it is because they are conformable to plain common sense, and supported by the soundest of all irrefragable authorities, Napoleon and Berthier. In fact, in all that relates to the military operations of general Dupont, these judgments are but the ideas of Napoleon and Berthier, drawn for the former from the questions which the *procureur-général* put by his direction to the accused, and, for the second, from the speech which he delivered during the proceedings.

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* I here express, from pure love of truth, and especially from the disgust that I have always felt for injustice towards the unfortunate, this opinion concerning the affair of Baylen, which will shock all the prejudices of the imperial period. But every man of upright mind, after reading the documents which I have had in my possession, will not be able to pronounce any other judgment than I here pronounce myself. These documents have been of different sorts, and are infinitely curious and conclusive. In the first place there are in the depôt of war several volumes of papers relative to the affair of Baylen, with the models of the interrogatories, which were dictated by the Emperor, and which reveal the opinion that he formed respecting the military faults committed in that campaign. There is his correspondence with general Savary, which forms not the least important of these documents, the correspondence of general Dupont with his lieutenants, and, lastly, the proceedings instituted againstgenerals Dupont, Marescot, Vedel, Chabert, &c. Napoleon had resolved, in a first paroxysm of rage, to have all the authors of the capitulation shot. Very soon, on the remonstrances of the wise, and always wise, Cambacérès, and under the inspiration of his own heart, which would have been sufficient to stop him after the first moment was past, he referred the decision on the affair of Baylen to a tribunal of honour composed of grandees of the Empire. The sentence pronounced was degradation, and an imperial decree ordered three manuscript copies of the entire proceedings to be deposited, one with the Senate, one in the depôt of war, and the third in the archives of the high imperial court. When, after the Restoration, general Dupont was taken into favour (and at that moment he became, in my opinion, more culpable than at Baylen),

The news of this strange disaster, deemed impossible at Madrid, since the army of general Dupont had been increased to 20,000 men by the successive dispatch of Vedel's and Gobert's divisions, spread rapidly, at first by the secret communications of the Spaniards, then by some officers who had escaped and got from post to post into La Mancha, and lastly by the arrival of M. de Villoutreys himself, who was commissioned to carry to the Emperor the convention of Baylen. The details of such a reverse struck with dismay all who were French or attached to the fortune of France. The Spaniards were intoxicated with pride, and they had a right to be proud, not of the ability or valour displayed on this occasion, though they had behaved gallantly, but of the obstacles of all kinds which their patriotic insurrection had created for us, obstacles which had been the principal cause of general Dupont's misfortunes. The twenty thousand men who were destined to conquer Andalusia, and, in case of ill-success, to fall back upon La Mancha and cover Madrid, being all at once withdrawn, the situation became most difficult. It was evident that the insurgents of Valencia, Carthagena, and Murcia, giving a hand to those of Grenada and Seville, elated by their unforeseen triumph, drawing after them those of Estremadura and La Mancha, who had not yet ventured to show themselves, would soon march upon Madrid. Though the number of those who were regimented with troops of the line was greatly exaggerated, and there were no numerous bodies but the bands of rovers, who, by the title of guerillas, covered the country, intercepting convoys, slaughtering the wounded and the sick, and ravaging Spain much more than the French armies themselves, still general Castaños might arrive with the troops of Valencia, Murcia, Carthagena, Grenada, Seville, Badajoz, that is to say, at the head of sixty or seventy thousand men, greatly encouraged by the events at Baylen, and all we had to oppose to them were Musnier's,

he obtained an ordinance from the king, cancelling the imperial decree, and prescribing the destruction of the three copies of the proceedings. The two copies belonging to the Senate and the depôt of war were readily found and destroyed. The third, assigned to the high imperial court, was not in the archives of that court, because it had never been organized. It was in the hands of one of the great families created by the Empire, and there it has remained. It is this valuable manuscript, in which everything is found in my opinion completely cleared up, which contains the justification of general Dupont, that, at least, which one can furnish with reason and justice. If general Dupont had succeeded in destroying it, he would have destroyed the elements of his reinstatement with posterity; an evident proof that we ought always to trust to truth, and to leave that to act. For the rest, whoever reads in these proceedings the judgment of prince Berthier, for each of the grandees of the Empire delivered his own, will there find, besides a rare superiority of reason and an honourable humanity, of which other personages, and particularly personages of the civil order, did not set an example, nearly the same judgment that I express here. Let me add that Napoleon himself, subsequently influenced by more justice, frequently repeated, "Dupont was more unfortunate than culpable." He then felt himself the assaults of misfortune, and, with his great mind and his great heart, he appreciated better to what point one ought to make allowance for circumstances, in order to judge more equitably. For the rest, I have not, in my career, met with any of the actors who figure in this narrative, either with them or their families, and what I say proceeds from a pure feeling of impartiality.

Morlot's, and Frère's divisions, Rey's brigade, and the imperial guard. All these corps, without wounded and sick, ought to have furnished about 30,000 men in line, and in the then state of health of the troops would supply 20 or 25 thousand at most. Nevertheless, with an energetic general, Murat, for instance, instead of Joseph, one might beat 60,000 Spaniards with 20,000 French, and make the conquerors of Baylen fall back upon La Mancha and Andalusia, if they should appear before Madrid. The French, it is true, had behind them a great capital, which they were obliged to guard and to awe, but it was possible (as Napoleon has since observed) to bring towards that capital a considerable reinforcement, sufficient to daunt the enemy, within or without. Marshal Bessières, after his victory at Rio-Seco, had marched towards Gallicia, and was preparing to penetrate into it. It was necessary to call him back to Burgos, and to limit his part to the covering of the road to Bayonne. There might then be taken from him Lefebvre's brigade, temporarily detached from Morlot's division, before the victory of Rio-Seco was known, Mouton's division composed of old regiments, the 26th chasseurs recently arrived, the 51st and 43rd of the line ready to arrive at Bayonne (and forming part of twelve old regiments called to Spain), which would present a reinforcement of about 10,000 excellent troops, capable of fighting against all the armies of Spain. Marshal Bessières would besides have, with the marching troops and the moveable columns placed at Vittoria, Burgos, and Aranda, about 14 or 15 thousand men. Lastly, the 14th and 44th of the line, also forming part of the old regiments called to Spain, had strengthened the corps of general Verdier before Saragossa and increased it to 17,000 men. One might, in strictness, whether the new attack prepared against Saragossa, and the success of which was daily announced as probable and near at hand, were executed or deferred, detach these two regiments and take them to Madrid. In case of the reduction of Saragossa, they would arrive with their material force and a great moral effect to boot. In the contrary case, the capture of Saragossa would only be retarded, and Madrid would be covered from any attempt, and the enemy, whoever he might be that should approach it, must be driven off to a distance. Spain, after all, with the 30,000 men who might be collected at Madrid, the 14,000 who would be left with marshal Bessières, general Verdier's 17,000, general Duhesme's 11,000 in Catalonia, and general Reille's 7000, would still contain about 80,000 French: and assuredly it was possible with such a force to make head against the Spaniards, without taking into account that fresh reinforcements, prepared by Napoleon, would be arriving every moment at Bayonne. But there was required a military prince, we repeat it, not a mild, discreet, well-informed prince, but no soldier, though, in moments of peril, he might recollect that he was the brother of Napoleon.*

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* These observations are not wholly derived from my own mind. When reflecting upon these events, I always thought that there were left, even after the

There was consequently no reason to despair, since, by calling back marshal Bessières from Gallicia to Old Castille, by limiting his duty to guarding the Madrid road, by drawing to one's self part of the forces under him, besides a portion of the troops besieging Saragossa, and lastly those that were soon to pass through Bayonne, one would be enabled to keep Madrid, and to beat the insurgents who should dare to show themselves under its walls. But the unfortunate king of Spain had not the case-hardened character of his brother. The joy of the Spaniards who were hostile to him, and they were far the greater number, the despondence of those who had attached themselves to his cause, the perplexity of his ministers, the want of firmness of the French generals about him, his embarrassment in finding himself amidst a city that was strange to him, all contributed to shake his soul profoundly, and to impel him to take the disastrous resolution to leave his new capital ten days after he had entered it. He ought to have braved everything rather than resolve to evacuate Madrid, for the mere moral effect could not fail to be immense. While he was there, the events of the war might be considered as alternations of misfortune and success. Rio-Seco might be opposed to Baylen, though not so important; the justly anticipated reduction of Saragossa might soon be set down against the resistance of Valencia; and Madrid continuing to be occupied served for a proof of the superiority of the French in the Peninsula. The insurrection might still feel doubtful of its cause, and the English, presuming less on its power, would not have made such mighty efforts to second it. But the evacuation of Madrid looked like a formal avowal of the new royalty that it was incapable of retaining by force the kingdom which it pretended to have received from Providence. What Providence wills, it knows how to sustain, and suffers it not to fall. From this moment all Spain would be astir, and the particular disgrace of Baylen, which lighted upon a few generals, was destined to be succeeded by a cruel confusion for Napoleon, the confusion of his policy, a consequence of the total evacuation of almost the whole of Spain.

General Savary was still at Madrid, though Joseph, disliking both his person and his way of thinking and acting, had done his best to get rid of him. General Savary was the representative of the system of military executions, of application to keep the French army well, let it cost Spain what it might, of absolute sub-

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disaster of Baylen, sufficient forces to continue to occupy Madrid; but I have lately found a note of the Emperor's, dated Bordeaux, the 2nd of August, which confirms me in this opinion, and it is from this very note that I extract the calculations which I have just given, as well as the indication of the concentrations that might be effected. I have only reduced a few exaggerated figures in that note relating to the force of the corps remaining in Spain. Napoleon, solicitous to induce his brother to be firm, naturally flattered the situation in some degree, and, between doubtful figures, always preferred the highest. Though he reckoned more than 80,000 men in Spain, after the loss of Dupont's 20,000, there was scarcely that number, diseases and the fire had made such ravages.

mission to the will of Napoleon, and of indifference to the orders of Joseph, when they were not strictly conformable to those emanating from the imperial staff. Joseph, desirous to make himself popular in Spain, and consequently disposed to sacrifice the interest of the army to that of the Spaniards, felt a deep aversion for general Savary, and the whole of the things which he represented at his court. Accordingly, he applied to Napoleon to grant him marshal Jourdan, whom he had been in the habit of employing at Naples, who was upright, discreet, quiet, not more active than was requisite for the indolence of his master, and not at all disposed to prostrate himself before Napoleon, whom he comprehended little and liked still less. Joseph, impatient to have marshal Jourdan, and to have done with general Savary, had given the latter to understand that he might as well set off; and general Savary, always intractable unless towards Napoleon, replied that he should be delighted to leave him, as soon as he should receive permission from the Emperor, his only master. While awaiting this permission, he had remained at Madrid, drawing every day, in his correspondence with the Emperor, pictures of men and things that were far from flattering. After the disaster of Baylen, Joseph was too happy to have general Savary about him, to share the responsibility of the important resolutions which he had to take, and he consulted him with much more deference than usual. General Savary, who was not a weak man, but who saw how incapable this unfortunate monarch was to maintain himself in Madrid with 20,000 men, thought it more prudent to let him leave it, and he even advised him to retire as soon as possible. "And what will the Emperor say?" asked Joseph meanwhile with some uneasiness. "The Emperor will scold," replied general Savary; "his fits of anger are boisterous, you know, but they don't kill. He no doubt would stay here; but what is possible for him is not so for others. One disaster like that of Baylen is enough; let us not have a second. When we shall be upon the Ebro, well concentrated, solidly established, and able to resume the offensive, the Emperor will decide what is to be done, and send you the necessary reinforcements."

King Joseph afforded general Savary no occasion for repeating this advice a second time, and issued orders for retreating from Madrid. But there were at Madrid more than 3000 sick and wounded, and an immense quantity of military stores accumulated in the Buen Retiro, which had begun to be converted into a fortress. It would take therefore much time, and require great exertion, to remove so many men and such a mass of *matériel.* They fell to work without delay. Unfortunately the ill disposition of the inhabitants added to the difficulty of the operation. The rumour of the retreat of the French soon spread at sight of their preparations, and the Spaniards, transported with joy, resolved to render this retreat as disastrous as they could, collected all their carts, piled them up in heaps, and set fire to them. They chose rather to destroy those vehicles than to suffer them to be serviceable to the

French. Hence the transport of the wounded, the sick, the administrations, was attended with much more difficulty, and it was several days before the troops could be allowed to march.

On the mere rumour of such a resolution, all who had for a moment espoused the cause of the French disappeared. Two of Joseph's ministers, Messrs. Pinuela and Cevallos, absented themselves without the slightest explanation. The latter, in particular, who afterwards became a pamphleteer, intent on defaming France, held a conduct worthy of the rest of his life. Long the base flatterer of the prince of the Peace, afterwards his implacable enemy, the obsequious servant of Ferdinand VII. during his two months' reign, a minister of Joseph's, whom he ought never to have thought of serving, he went off disgracefully on the news of Baylen, saying nothing to the French whom he was leaving, but telling the Spaniards, to whom he went back, that, if he had consented to be Joseph's minister, it was that he might have permission to return to Spain, and the occasion to attach himself again to a cause, the triumph of which he had always foreseen and desired. Old Azanza, and Messrs. O'Farrill and Urquijo, acting like grave men who had known their own mind in accepting the French royalty, that is to say, who aimed at the regeneration of Spain, did not desert Joseph, but followed him with hearts rent with grief. M. de Caballero, treated by his comrades with an insulting contempt, which he deserved much less than M. de Cevallos, remained at Joseph's court, as in an asylum. Among the grandees, the prince of Castel Franco, who had confronted the storm, found his courage fail him at the last moment, and did not depart, after promising to do so. Not one of those who followed Joseph could take a Spanish servant along with him. All persons of that condition stayed at Madrid. There were more than two thousand individuals employed in the palaces and the stables of the Crown, on account of the great number of magnificent horses usually kept by the Spanish royal family. For fear of being carried away, almost all of them stole off in one night. Joseph could scarcely obtain any attendance in his retreat.

He set out on the 2nd of August for Chamartin, without any insulting demonstration, for his person had gained a sort of respect. The people beheld the French troops march away with a perfectly natural joy, but durst not offend them, for they trembled at the mere sight of them, and, notwithstanding a well-founded presumption on this occasion, they had a vague impression that they might see them again. From the time of this retreat, Joseph had not a creature in Spain on his side, neither the populace, whom he had never had, nor the middling and higher classes, who, after hesitating a moment for fear of France and in the hope of the meliorations which might be expected from her, now hesitated no longer, since France herself seemed to acknowledge that she was conquered, by retiring from Madrid.

The army fell back slowly, by way of Buytrago, Somo-Sierra, Aranda, and Burgos. Having found numerous traces of cruelty upon its route, it could not repress its exasperation, and revenged itself in more than one place. Rage being aggravated by hunger, the troops destroyed a great deal upon their passage, and left everywhere marks of their presence, which increased the hatred of the Spaniards to the highest degree. Joseph, apprehensive of the effects which would thus be provoked, strove in vain to prevent the excesses committed along the route. But he only offended the army itself, the soldiers saying that he ought to interest himself a little more about them by whom he was supported, than about the Spaniards who rejected him. When things go on ill, disharmony is associated with disaster. Joseph's ministers agreed very ill with the French generals, and the new court of Spain with the army, which was its sole stay. Sadness prevailed among the chiefs, irritation among the soldiers, the fury of revenge among the populations through which they passed.

King Joseph and those about him, more and more disheartened at every step, did not conceive themselves in safety even at Burgos. They were afraid lest they should still have upon their rear the whole country comprehended between Burgos and the Biscayan provinces; and they judged it proper to proceed to the line of the Ebro, taking Miranda for the head-quarters. They had brought marshal Bessières upon their right, and purposed to bring general Verdier upon their left, caring little about throwing away all the efforts which had hitherto been made for taking Saragossa, and which, at this moment, were on the point of being crowned with success. Not till they were behind the Ebro did they recover some assurance, having, besides the 20,000 men from Madrid, the 20 and odd thousand of marshal Bessières, general Verdier's 17,000, and all the reserves at Bayonne.

To all these faults was to be added that of abandoning so much ground, so many works, and in particular those accumulated before Saragossa. Since the last attacks, the means of all kinds had been considerably augmented for reducing that obstinate city, which proved that the most skilfully-combined defences of art are less powerful than the courage of inhabitants determined to perish in their houses. Two old regiments, the 14th, so fortunate and so heroic at Eylau, and the 44th, which distinguished itself in the same battle and at Dantzig, had just arrived, and increased the besieging corps to sixteen or seventeen thousand men. The heavy artillery, necessary for battering down the convents which flanked the wall enclosing the city, had been conveyed from Pampeluna by the Ebro and the canal of Aragon. The Emperor's aide-de-camp, colonel Lacoste, of the engineers, had made skilful dispositions for effecting in a short time large breaches in the outer wall and battering down the strong buildings which served it for a support. All being ready, on the morning of the 4th of August, 60 pieces of ordnance, mortars, howitzers, sixteen-pounders, poured their fire upon the city and the convent of Santa-Engrazia, which is in the centre of the enclosing wall, at a salient angle which it forms at about the middle of its extent. On the left and right of this convent are two gates, by which it was proposed to penetrate, and then to proceed rapidly through a tolerably wide street toward the Cosso, a sort of inner boulevard which runs through the whole length of Saragossa; and, once masters of that, the besiegers might consider themselves in possession of the whole city. The French artillery having about noon silenced that of the enemy, and made large breaches in the wall of enclosure, the columns for storming were formed, and two of these columns, one on the right under general Habert, one on the left under general Grandjean, rushed to the battered wall, shouting *Vive l'Empereur!* The Spaniards, who had not made their resistance consist in the defence of an enclosure which was neither bastioned nor terraced, but in their barricaded streets and their embattled houses, awaited our soldiers on the other side of the two breaches, and, as soon as they had passed them, received the assailants with a shower of balls. The right column, the more fortunate of the two, entered first, and, destroying the obstacles that stopped the left towards the gate of the Carmelites, assisted it to enter in its turn. In spite of the fire from the houses, it then threw itself into the street, that of Santa-Engrazia, which descended perpendicularly towards the Cosso, the principal object of our attacks. Three great barricades, armed with cannon, divided that street. Our soldiers, hurried away by their ardour, carried these barricades by assault, took thirteen pieces of cannon, killed the Spaniards who served them, and debouched on the Cosso, considering themselves already as masters of the city. But on their rear they left insurgents, some, peasants and monks, others, soldiers of the line, entrenched in the houses, and resolved to let them be set on fire before they would leave them. The French were therefore obliged to turn back to dislodge them, before they established themselves on the Cosso. This they did, fighting from house to house, losing men in taking them, and revenging themselves when they were taken by the death of those to whose fire they had been exposed.

The left column had found a serious obstacle in its way: this was a vast edifice, the convent of the Carmelites, which had been surrounded with a ditch, and in which were lodged many Spanish troops under experienced officers, as in an entrenched camp. It had been necessary to take this convent, which had been done with vigour, but not without great loss. This business being finished, they, and the right column as well, had begun to attack with small arms one house after another, while the artillery continued to throw in bombs and balls, which, passing over the heads of our soldiers, proceeded to punish and ravage the city. This horrible conflict had been kept up ever since morning with incredible animosity, when our weary soldiers began to disperse themselves in the houses which they had conquered, to seek provisions, which they were in great need of, particularly wine, with which they knew that all the towns of Spain were abundantly supplied. In this interior search they found unfortunately the wreck of their valour; for presently half our troops were overpowered with sleep and intoxication. In spite of all the exertions of our generals, most of them wounded, they could not rouse the soldiers either to the fight or at least to provide for their own safety. If the Spaniards had suspected the state in which the assailants were, they might have made them repent the sanguinary success of the day. It was necessary to wait till morning to recommence and to prosecute the difficult conquest of Saragossa, house by house, and street by street. We had, besides many officers wounded, and especially the two generals-in-chief, Verdier and Lefebvre-Desnoettes, the first by a ball in the thigh, the second suffering from a violent contusion of the ribs—we had about eleven or twelve hundred men *hors de combat*, three hundred of whom were dead, and eight or nine hundred wounded. The two old regiments, the 14th and the 44th, fancied that in the streets of Saragossa they found themselves again in the musketry fire of Eylau.

Next morning, general Verdier being unable, from his wound, to resume the command of the attacks, general Lefebvre-Desnoettes, taking his place, rallied the troops dispersed in the houses, barricaded himself, for the account of the French, the conquered streets leading to the Cosso, and resolved, in order to spare blood, to employ sapping and mining, conceiving that he was not bound to show much tenderness for a Spanish city for which the Spaniards felt none themselves.

In this state of things arrived the news of the disaster of Baylen, of the evacuation of Madrid, and of the general retreat upon the Ebro. Our generals and our soldiers were extremely mortified to see so much blood spilt to no purpose, and the prey on which they had been so obstinately bent ready to escape from their clutches. As the corps of Saragossa was to form at Tudela, on the Ebro, the left of the new position which the French army was about to occupy in Spain, the wounded were first sent off, then the artillery that could be removed, the rest being spiked, and the troops marched, vexation in their hearts and grief in their faces, humbled to the lowest point at having to fall back before soldiers whom they held of little account, notwithstanding the obstinacy displayed in the streets of Saragossa by peasants and monks. They brought back about 16,000 men to Tudela, some of old, the others recently, seasoned to war, but all capable of beating in the open field three or four times as many Spaniards as they numbered men in their ranks.

In Catalonia, the French had been obliged to shut themselves up within the walls of Barcelona. General Duhesme had at first endeavoured to suppress the insurrection in the south of that province, that he might be able to communicate with Valencia; but, having no need to concern himself about what was passing in that quarter, since the retreat of marshal Moncey, he had then attempted to act in the north, in order to maintain his communications with

France, and to give a hand to general Reille's column. He had marched at the head of the principal part of his troops by Mataro and Hostalrich, upon Girona, with the intention to possess himself of this latter place, one of the most important in Catalonia, which the French had been wrong not to occupy. On reaching Mataro, he had been obliged to take that little town by assault, and to give it up to the fury of the soldiery, daily more exasperated at the barbarous war that was carried on against them. From Mataro he had marched upon Girona, which he had hoped to surprise and to carry by escalade. His grenadiers, provided with ladders, had already climbed the enclosure of the town, and were about to enter it, when they were repulsed by the people, mixed with soldiers and monks. Without heavy artillery, and despairing of carrying the place by main force, general Duhesme returned to Barcelona, obliged to fight incessantly by the way, and to sack villages, to revenge the murder of his soldiers. During this incursion it had not been possible for him to communicate with general Reille, who had gone on his part to Figueras, but not been able to advance further. All that the latter could do had been to revictual the fort of Figueras, occupied by a small French garrison, and to deposit there a sufficient quantity of provisions and ammunition. But, whenever he had attempted to push further, he had been assailed on all sides by the bold Miquelets, baffling by their swiftness and their skill in firing the courage of our young soldiers, who were not qualified to run after mountaineers accustomed to the hunting of the chamois.* General Reille had thus sustained considerable losses to no purpose, and, being informed of the return of general Duhesme to Barcelona, he had confined himself to the guarding of the frontier, waiting, before he attempted anything, for new means and new orders.

Such was our situation in the month of August, 1808, in that Spain which we had so rapidly overrun, and which we had deemed it so easy to conquer. We had lost the whole of the South, after leaving one of our armies prisoners in it. Under the impression of that check, we had abandoned Madrid, broken off the siege of Saragossa when nearly finished, and fallen back to the Ebro; and the only one of our corps which had not evacuated the province which it was charged to occupy, that of Catalonia, was shut up in Barcelona, blockaded on land by innumerable Miquelets, by sea by a British fleet, which had come in all haste from Gibraltar on the report of the Spanish insurrection.

At the furthest extremity of the Peninsula was left a French army, respecting the fate of which serious uneasiness might justly be felt: it was Junot's, peaceably established in Portugal, before the terrible commotion which had so violently shaken all Spain. No intelligence was received from it, neither could any be transmitted to it, Andalusia and Estremadura having risen in the South, Gallicia and the kingdom of Leon in the North, and intercepting all communications.

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* I employ the most general appellation; but in the Pyrenees the chamois is called *izard*.

As soon as the insurrection of the month of May had broken out, the Spaniards, according to their custom, claiming the victory before they had won it, had not failed through Gallicia and Estremadura to fill Portugal with sinister news for the French army. The Juntas had written to all the Spanish corps, to induce them to desert in mass, and to come and join the insurrection. General Junot, soon informed confusedly of what was passing in Spain without knowing all the details, had felt the necessity of taking the strictest precautions against the Spanish troops which had been sent to second him, and which, instead of affording him any assistance, became, in the present state of things, the principal of his difficulties. He had near Lisbon Caraffa's division of three or four thousand men, charged to assist in reducing the Alentejo. He surrounded it unawares by a French division, and, on the ground of circumstances, summoned it to lay down its arms, which it did shuddering. However, several hundred foot and horse contrived to escape across Alentejo, towards Spanish Estremadura. A French regiment of dragoons, sent in pursuit of them, retook some. The others succeeded in reaching Badajoz.

General Junot had collected in the Tagus a certain number of vessels past service. These were anchored in the middle of the channel, and in them he placed the Spanish soldiers, deprived of their arms, but sufficiently provided with all necessaries.

During these proceedings at Lisbon, Caraffa's division, Taranco's division, comprehending 16 battalions, and which there were no French troops to control at Oporto, had risen, made the French general Quesnel and all his staff prisoners, and set out for Gallicia to join general Blake, at the same time calling the Portuguese to arms: not that the Portuguese wanted inclination to rise, for the Portuguese, though enemies to the Spaniards, are at bottom only Spaniards, who detest all other nations. At the sight of the French they had certainly felt that they were of that race of Christian Moors who inhabit the Peninsula and hate whatever is beyond it. They would have desired nothing better than to rise, but, before the face of the French army, they had not dared, and the good order maintained by Junot among his troops had contributed to render this submission less galling. But, when informed of the rising in Spain, on hearing the Spaniards told that they had conquered the French, they had naturally conceived a desire to follow such an example, and nothing was wanting but the appearance of their old allies the English, at once allies and tyrants, to produce a general insurrection among them.

Admiral Sir Charles Cotton was cruising, in fact, from Cape Finisterre to Cape St. Vincent; nothing, however, was yet to be seen but ships sailing in the offing, not making for the shore, and the Portuguese waited with impatience for the convoy that should bring at last an English army. Lisbon, which Junot kept down with the bulk of his troops, could not well permit a rising; whereas, at Oporto, which had all the Portuguese sentiments in its heart, and moreover the mortification of no longer seeing the English in its port—Oporto was ready to break out on the first signal of England.

The brave general Junot was fully sensible of the critical nature of this situation. At the moment of general Dupont's catastrophe he had been a month without news from France, for the sea, subject to the English, suffered not a vessel to pass, and the Spanish insurrection, which enveloped Portugal from north to south, suffered not a courier to pass. The report of the event at Baylen, transmitted by Spanish enthusiasm to Portuguese hate, spread with incredible celerity throughout Portugal and excited an extraordinary commotion there. On the contrary, the victory of Rio-Seco, though much anterior to the disaster of Baylen, was not yet known; for the human mind propagates facts which flatter it, and has no echo for others. There was no harm in this, however, and that success, which the public was soon to be informed of, was destined to become, as we shall presently see, a resource for the encouragement of our soldiers. Though young, they had been already seasoned by a difficult march to Portugal. They had recruited themselves, and, reorganised, trained, and habituated to the climate, they exhibited the finest aspect. Having entered to the number of 23,000, being joined by 3000 more, they still found themselves, after their disastrous march last autumn, amounting to 24,000, perfectly capable of supporting the honour of the French arms, before they surrendered, if they too were doomed to succumb, in expiation all over the Peninsula of the outrage at Bayonne.

General Junot, seeing himself so far from France, shut up between the Spanish insurrection which proclaimed itself victorious, and the sea which appeared covered with English sails, did not delude himself respecting his dangers; but he was intelligent and brave, and he resolved to conduct himself in such a manner as to obtain the approbation of Napoleon. He held a council of war composed of generals brought up in the school of Napoleon, and the resolutions adopted in this council were conformable to the true principles of war. Unfortunately, if the true principles were recognised in theory, they were not followed up in practice with the vigour and precision which the master alone was capable of applying. To abandon all the accessory points which they occupied, to concentrate themselves in mass at Lisbon in order to control the capital, and to put themselves into a posture to fling into the sea the first English troops that should land, naturally constituted the plan which every one would conceive and adopt. It was therefore resolved to evacuate the Algarves, Alentejo, the Beyras, in short all the parts where they had troops, excepting the two fortresses of Almeida to the north, Elvas to the south, excepting also the positions of Setubal and Peniche, on the coast, and to concentrate themselves between Lisbon and Abrantes. The resolution was a good one, but not complete enough, for there was still at those points what would absorb four or five thousand men, of the 20 or 22 thousand effectives; and, reckoning what would be requisite for Lisbon itself, they could not have more than 10 or 12 thousand soldiers wherewith to oppose a landing, whereas 15 or 18 thousand ought to have been reserved for a decisive action.

They had near them an ally, who could have rendered great service; this was the Russian admiral Siniavin, with his squadron, manned by crews which were indifferent sailors, but excellent soldiers. Had he frankly espoused the common cause, it would have been easy for him singly to have guarded Lisbon, and then three or four thousand more French troops would have been disposable. But he insisted, as he had already done, on returning to Russia, being strongly attached to England, full of hatred against France, and quite disposed to open his arms to the enemy. He replied coldly or negatively to all the proposals for concurrence that were addressed to him, although, from his position in the middle of the Tagus, it behoved him to defend the entrance more than Junot himself. For the latter it was a serious difficulty, especially as he had to control an hostile population of 300,000 souls, in which were comprehended 20,000 mountaineers of Gallicia, engaged, like the Savoyards and Auvergnats at Paris, in laborious occupations, who manifested no very amicable dispositions. However, as the principal establishment of the French army was at Lisbon, Junot hoped, with the depôts, the sick, and the store-keepers, to repress the disaffection of the capital. He ordered general Loison to quit Almeida with his division, general Kellermann to quit Elvas with his, leaving only a garrison in those two places. His plan was, when once those two divisions had returned, to keep a mass in constant readiness to act upon the coast against the English army, the speedy landing of which was announced.

The insurrection, though it had not yet broken out, was at this time secretly hatching in Portugal; and it was almost impossible to effect the arrival of a courier. So many messengers, however, were sent to general Kellermann, and particularly to general Loison, who was more difficult to reach than general Kellermann, on account of the remoteness of the province which he occupied, that both received timely notice. General Loison, at the moment of departure, was already surrounded by insurgents, infected by the contagion of the Spanish insurrection. The priests, not less ardent in Portugal than in Spain, had put themselves at the head of the peasantry, and guarded all the passes, carrying on the same kind of warfare that was then practised all over the Peninsula; that is to say, barricading the entrances of the villages, carrying away the provisions, murdering the sick, the wounded, and stragglers. But general Loison was as vigorous as any officer of his time. He left in the forts of Almeida fourteen or fifteen hundred men, the least capable of sustaining the fatigues of a long march, supplied them with provisions and ammunition, and proceeded with three thousand to traverse the whole north of Portugal, by way of Almeida, La Guarda, Abrantes, and Lisbon. He had several times to cut a passage through the revolters, and to punish them severely; but he knew how to enforce respect everywhere, to open the roads for himself, and to procure subsistence; and he at length reached Abrantes, having lost but two hundred men during this toilsome and perilous march.

General Kellermann withdrew quite as successfully from Elvas. On the report of the insurrection in Andalusia and Estremadura, the Algarves and Alentejo had already begun to rise. General Kellermann sent detachments in various directions, particularly to Bega, where he inflicted a severe execution, found means to repress the revolters, then left at Elvas, as general Loison had done at Almeida, all who were least capable of marching in the suffocating heat of July, and arrived without obstacle at Lisbon, by the left bank of the Tagus. There were then no French troops but at Almeida, Elvas, Setubal, Peniche, Lisbon, and the environs.

Accounts from all quarters actually announced as certain the arrival of a British army, coming, according to some, from Gibraltar and Sicily, coming, according to others, from Ireland and the Baltic. Admiral Sir Charles Cotton had touched several times upon the coast, parleyed, now at the mouth of the Tagus, now at that of the Douro, and everywhere promised a speedy landing. The intelligence of general Dupont's disaster, received at the same time, acted as a last stimulant to the minds of the people, and, in the twinkling of an eye, Portugal, which had as yet but partially revolted, rose universally from the Minho to the Algarves.

It was at Oporto that the flame first burst forth. A convoy of bread was preparing there for a detachment of French troops. At this sight the people rose, seized the carriages, plundered them, and in an instant the whole city was astir. The bishop put himself at the head of the insurrection, and the Portuguese flag was everywhere hoisted, amidst shouts of "Long live the Prince Regent!" The conflagration spread into the provinces, had well nigh communicated to Lisbon itself, crossed the Tagus, extended into Alentejo, and at length joined the flames, kindled a second time towards Elvas by the contact with Estremadura. At Oporto the authorities were in open communication with the English; at Elvas they entered into quite as open communication with the Spaniards. A corps of the latter, composed of regular troops, advanced even from Badajoz to Evora, to serve for a support to the Portuguese insurrection.

Junot, who was brisk and enterprising, unluckily yielded to a desire to suppress the insurrection wherever it might show itself. He dispatched general Loison, with his division, to disperse the insurgents of Alentejo, who were in the environs of Evora. He directed general Margaron, with the cavalry, against an assemblage that was coming from Coimbra towards Lisbon. It had been much better, in that intensely hot season, to keep his troops fresh and resting around Lisbon, than to diminish their number by fighting and fatigue, for the purpose of suppressing seditions as ready to break out again the moment they were gone as to submit when they were marching against them.

General Margaron had but to appear with his cavalry, in order to disperse and cut down the few hundred insurgents collected towards Coimbra. As for general Loison, he was obliged to traverse the whole of Alentejo, to come at the insurrection of that province, assembled near Evora, and supported by a corps of Spanish troops. After a difficult and fatiguing march, he arrived before Evora, and there found the Spaniards and Portuguese in order of battle. He attacked them in flank, overthrew them, took their artillery, and killed a good number of them. The gates of Evora having been closed, he scaled the walls, entered the town, and sacked it. In a few days the Spaniards were sent home, and the Portuguese reduced to a momentary obedience. The soldiers were laden with booty, but exhausted with fatigue, and had to march back to Lisbon in an overpowering heat.

Meanwhile, the English, so often announced, made their appearance at last. On the insurrection of the Asturias and the mission of two deputies to London, to make known there the general rising of the Spanish provinces, the English government had been apprised of the unforeseen occasion that presented itself for multiplying our embarrassments. The Canning and Castlereagh administration had naturally resolved to transfer all its efforts to the Peninsula, and to raise up there, in far more enlarged proportions, and in a much more durable manner, the obstacles which it had for a moment raised against us in the Calabrias. Orders were sent to all the British forces, military and naval, scattered in the Mediterranean, the Gulf of Gascony, the Channel, and the Baltic, to concur towards this single object. Cargoes of arms, supplies of money, were dispatched to the coasts of Spain and Portugal. All the troops for the organization of which the Boulogne [query, Baltic?] expedition had furnished occasion, and part of which had recently distinguished itself at Copenhagen, were destined to act on this new field of battle. It was impossible, in fact, to offer England one that was better chosen or more convenient for her. With a fair wind, one might pass in four days from the coast of England to Cape Finisterre, to the bays of Coruña and Vigo, to the mouths of the Douro and the Tagus. The immense navy of England, cruising incessantly around this girdle of coasts, might at all times supply an army there with provisions and ammunition, while the adversaries of that army in a half-wild country, destitute of roads, would have the greatest difficulty to procure subsistence. The heavy and solid British battalions, disembarked in the numerous gulfs of the Peninsula, setting foot, on landing, in well-entrenched posts, advancing boldly in case of success, falling back promptly if they experienced a reverse, to reach that sea which was their *appui*, their refuge, their magazine of provisions and ammunition, supporting in offensive operations the nimble Spaniards against the impetuous onset of the French army, or perhaps leaving them, in case of retreat, to get off as they could, by dispersion or by a momentary submission, beginning this manœuvre again without tiring, till the French force succumbed from exhaustion—the British battalions, we say, were about to wage the only war which they are fit for, and in which they could be successful on the Continent.

All the orders for a great expedition were issued with extreme dispatch. Five thousand men, under general Spencer, who had come from Egypt to Sicily, had been conveyed from Gibraltar to Cadiz, where the Spaniards, scrupling to receive them, had deferred the acceptance of their services. These five thousand English, refused at Cadiz, had landed at the mouth of the Guadiana, on the territory of Portugal, till a favourable moment for acting should arrive. Ten thousand men were at Cork, in Ireland. These were immediately embarked in a flotilla escorted by several ships of the line: for their commander was selected an officer who had already distinguished himself in India, and who had recently rendered important services to general Cathcart before Copenhagen; this was Sir Arthur Wellesley, since celebrated for his good fortune, as much as for his eminent military qualities, by the title of duke of Wellington. His instructions were to sail for Coruña, to offer the Spaniards of the Asturias and Gallicia the concurrence of the English forces, and to exert himself in short everywhere against the French to the utmost of his power. General Spencer had orders to place himself under the command of Sir Arthur, as soon as he should be required. Sir Arthur Wellesley would then find himself at the head of 15,000 men. But these troops were only a part of those which were destined for the Peninsula. Five thousand men, under generals Anstruther and Acland, were at Ramsgate and Harwich. Transports were already ordered to those points of embarkation, to convey them to Sir Arthur Wellesley. Owing to the proximity of the places and the vast means of the English navy, it was an operation of ten or twelve days only to assemble all these forces at one spot. Lastly, Sir John Moore, returning from the Baltic with 11,000 troops, was to be sent soon to the point which the English generals should have designated on the coast of the Peninsula for there effecting a general concentration.

It was not thought fitting to put this entire force of about 30,000 men, when united, under the command of Sir Arthur Wellesley, still too young in age and renown to be placed at the head of an army which, in the estimation of the English, might be reckoned very considerable. The supreme command of it was therefore assigned to Sir Hew Dalrymple, then governor of Gibraltar, who was to have under him Sir Harry Burrard, as chief of the staff. Till all these troops should be assembled, and Sir Hew Dalrymple should arrive, Sir Arthur Wellesley was to direct the first operations, with the 10,000 men who sailed from Cork, and the 5000 landed on the coast of the Algarves. Admiral Sir Charles Cotton, commanding the naval forces of England in those seas, had orders to second all the movements of the armies.

Embarking on the 12th of July, the English troops from Cork were, on the 20th, off Coruña, and exhibited to the Spaniards, delighted to find themselves so well supported, an immense flotilla. The sight of this considerable force, which foreboded many more, had somewhat cheered them under the defeat of generals Blake and de la Cuesta at Rio-Seco, and had caused them to conceive new and great hopes of the contest in which they were engaged against Napoleon. Still they had not consented, any more than the Andalusians, to admit the English troops into their territory, especially so near the arsenal of Ferrol. They had, therefore, accepted a large quantity of arms, money to the amount of 500,000*l*. sterling (12½ million francs), but they had recommended to the English to turn all their efforts towards Portugal, which it was not less important to wrest from the French than Spain itself.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had immediately proceeded to Oporto, where he had been received with extreme joy; for the Portuguese merchants, living entirely by their commercial connection with the English, felt, at sight of the latter, their interests as much gratified as their passions. From that moment the action of the British army had been decidedly directed towards Portugal. This resolution, which suited the Spaniards, always jealous of foreigners, suited the English also, who could not but desire above all things the deliverance of Portugal, and it served the common cause in an equal degree, the aim of the new coalition being to expel the French from every part of the Peninsula. It was left to be seen what part of Portugal they would choose for landing, in presence of a French army, without running a risk of being flung unceremoniously into the sea.

Sir Arthur Wellesley left his convoy cruising between the mouths of the Douro and those of the Tagus, and repaired personally to Sir Charles Cotton, off the Tagus, to concert with him his plan of debarkation. To land at the entrance of the Tagus would be attended with the advantage of disembarking very near the goal, since Lisbon is but two leagues off; and one could, moreover, give the numerous population of that capital such an impulsion that the French would not be able to withstand the commotion which it would excite; for they were 15,000 at most, including the sick, amidst 300,000 inhabitants, all enemies. In fact, if this population were to rise at a moment when the English army should be advancing to support it, the business might perhaps be finished in a single day. But the French occupied all the forts; they had acquired the habit of controlling the people of Lisbon; the coast on the right and left of the mouth of the Tagus is abrupt, exposed to breakers, and a change of weather might put one part of the English army into the hands of the French, before the other part had completed its landing. It would moreover be coming ashore very near to a strong and formidable adversary, whom the English were not yet accustomed to challenge and to fight.

From all these considerations, Sir Arthur Wellesley, in concert with Sir Charles Cotton, resolved to land between Oporto and Lisbon, at the mouth of the Mondego, near a very commodious bay, commanded by the fort of Figuera, which was not occupied by the French. The choice of this point, situated at a certain distance from Lisbon, gave Sir Arthur Wellesley time to land before the French could come to meet him, to await general Spencer's corps, which he had sent for, and, when once on the soil of Portugal, to advance towards Lisbon, following the coast, in order to take advantage of such occasions as Fortune might offer. The French, whom he knew to be at most 20 or 22 thousand strong, having several places to guard, particularly the capital, never could march against him with more than 10 or 12 thousand; and, by keeping constantly near the sea, either for the sake of receiving supplies, or of re-embarking, in case of need, he had a chance of approaching Lisbon, and there making some attempt that might succeed, without running too much risk. Knowing that Sir Hew Dalrymple was soon to supersede him, he was impatient to achieve something brilliant before he passed under superior command. These resolutions were most judicious, and denoted those qualities in the English general which his career soon revealed—good sense and firmness, the first of all next to genius.

He began to land on the 1st of August, at the mouth of the Mondego. That sea, so frequently agitated by gales from the west, several times interrupted the disembarkation of the men and the *matériel.*

Nevertheless, in five or six days the English troops that came from Cork were all put on shore to the number of nine or ten thousand men, with the immense train that always follows English armies. At this moment, general Spencer's corps arrived at the same anchorage. General Spencer, before he received Sir Arthur Wellesley's orders, on the news of general Dupont's disaster, had embarked to transfer his efforts to some other quarter, well aware that there was no further service to render in Andalusia, delivered for the moment from the presence of French troops. Apprised of the arrival of the Cork convoy, he had come to join it off the mouth of the Mondego; and on the 8th of August he had finished his disembarkation, and effected his junction with the corps of Sir Arthur Wellesley. The latter thus found himself at the head of an army of about 14 or 15 thousand men, composed almost entirely of infantry and artillery. It numbered at most 400 horse; and this is the usual state of every expedition by sea, the transport of cavalry being difficult, and even impossible to any great distance. But that infantry was very fine, possessing all the qualities of the English army. That army, as everybody knows, is composed of men of all sorts, enlisting voluntarily into its ranks, serving for the whole of life or nearly so, subject to a formidable discipline, which flogs them to death for the slightest faults, which, out of the good or the bad subject, makes a uniform and obedient subject, marching to danger with invariable submission, led by officers full of honour and courage. The English soldier, well fed, well trained, firing with remarkable precision, travelling slowly, because he is not formed for marching and wants the requisite ardour, is solid, almost invincible in certain positions where the nature of the place seconds his resisting character, but becomes weak, if forced to march, to attack, to conquer those difficulties which are not to be overcome without animation, hardihood, and enthusiasm. In short, he is firm, not enterprising. In like manner as the French soldier, by his ardour, his energy, his disposition to brave everything, was the predestined instrument of the genius of Napoleon, so the solid and slow soldier of England was formed for the limited capacity, but discreet and resolute mind, of Sir Arthur Wellesley. Such a soldier one ought, if one could, to draw away from the sea, to oblige him to march, to be enterprising; in short, to show his defects, instead of running one's head against his qualities by attacking him in strong positions. But the brave and boiling Junot was not a man to conduct himself with so much prudence and calculation, and there was reason to fear that he would come and wreck his impetuosity upon the cold obstinacy of the soldiers of England.

On the 8th of August Sir Arthur Wellesley commenced his march along the sea-coast, so as to be always within reach of his supplies and of his means of retreat. He had, from his first arrival, rather warm disputes with the Portuguese army. The insurgents of Portugal had formed, by uniting all their forces in the north of their territory, an army of five or six thousand men, under general Freyre. Sir Arthur Wellesley was desirous to have it with him, to cover his flanks. But they, whether they were afraid, as the English general in writing to his government accused them of being,* to meet the French too close, or had no great confidence in these auxiliaries, ever ready to retire to their ships on the first reverse, and to leave their allies exposed by themselves to the blows of the enemy, made demands with which the English general would not comply—namely, to be subsisted by the British army with the supplies drawn from the ships. This requisition being rejected, the Portuguese resolved to act for themselves, and took the roads to the interior, leaving to their allies the route along the coast. They gave them, however, 1400 light infantry and 400 horse to serve for scouts.

No sooner was Junot apprized at Lisbon, at first by the ill-dissembled joy of the inhabitants, and soon by positive intelligence, of the landing of the British army, than he formed the resolution to hasten to it and throw it into the sea. To concentrate himself, to withdraw the soldiers to the very last man from all posts of secondary importance, to confine himself to the guard of Lisbon alone, to leave there none but such as were incapable of marching, that he might advance against the English with 15 or 18 thousand men, to chuse, for the purpose of fighting them, a moment when they should not have their natural advantages, those of the defensive, was the only wise resolution that could be adopted. Unluckily, Junot concentrated himself very incompletely, and he was seized with an extreme impatience to attack the English, no matter where, no matter how, and fling them into the sea as soon as possible.

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* Such is the assertion of the duke of Wellington, in his correspondence with the British cabinet, recently printed in England, as everybody knows, and containing a mass of documents equally valuable and interesting.

Between Almeida, Elvas, Setuval, Peniche, and various posts, Junot had already sacrificed four or five thousand men. By the expeditions which he had recently sent out, under generals Loison, Margaron, and others, he had many soldiers too valuable not to have been preserved put *hors de combat* or worn out with fatigue; and he had at most about 10,000 men to oppose to an enemy who already numbered fourteen or fifteen, and could soon increase his force to twenty or thirty. Junot recalled general Loison from Alentejo, and he sent off general Delaborde, with his division, to go and meet the English, to observe them, to harass them, till all the disposable troops could be collected against them. He prepared to march himself with the reserve when they should be nearer to Lisbon; and then to meet them, to fight them, to beat them, would not require him to be absent from Lisbon more than three or four days. He thought, and justly, that his presence and that of the reserve could not long be spared at Lisbon without serious inconveniences.

In consequenee, general Delaborde, with the troops of general Margaron, was to proceed first, by way of Leiria, to meet the English; while general Loison, returning from Alentejo by forced marches, was to rejoin him by Abrantes, and Junot himself would go and complete this concentration of forces, by taking with him all that he could abstract from the guard of Lisbon.

General Delaborde, on his march upon the Leiria road, came in sight of the English on the 14th or 15th. He waited before he came to closer quarters with them for the junction of general Loison, who was doing his best to arrive, but whose troops were exhausted with fatigue and overcome by the heat. On the 16th of August he fell in with the enemy's advanced posts, and on the 17th he had to fight them in a manner which proved what advantages are to be gained by leaving to the English the initiative of attacks.

General Delaborde, an old officer, full of energy and experience, kept alongside of the English upon that coast-road, which terminated near Torres Vedras, at the mountains with which Lisbon is surrounded; and, in the evening of the 16th, he had met with them in the environs of Obidos. He retired quietly before them, till a favourable position should offer for making them feel the valour of his soldiers, without engaging in any decisive action, which he ought not and would not risk before the general concentration of the French troops. In the environs of Roliça he found the position which he sought, in the midst of a sandy plain, crossed by several streamlets, closed by heights on which the high road rose in a serpentine line, and descended again to the village of Zambugeiro. On the morning of the 17th the English army followed general Delaborde's division, not three thousand strong, across this plain of Roliça. The English marched slowly and collectedly after nimble, resolute Frenchmen, in no wise intimidated by their numerical inferiority, though they were but one to five, three thousand against fourteen or fifteen thousand. General Delaborde thought that he ought not to make a point of defending Roliça in the middle of the plain, for, even in defending this point successfully, he could not fail to be soon surrounded, and, to avoid being taken, obliged to leave it precipitately and in confusion. He preferred retiring to the extremity of the plain, to the heights which the road ascends before it runs down to Zambugeiro. Accordingly, he placed himself on the summit of the hills along which the road ascended, and there waited resolutely for the English. General Nightingale's brigade marched first in a single line, supported by Hill's and Fane's brigades in close columns, while, on its left, Craufurd's brigade made a circuit to turn the French, and on its right the Portuguese detachment did the same, to get to Zambugeiro before them.

General Delaborde, leaving the English to pursue their toilsome course through ravines full of myrtle, cistus, and other large shrubs, which grow in southern countries, chose the moment when they were most impeded by the obstacles of the ground for attacking them. He first had a fire of musketry poured upon them by dexterous tirailleurs, and then caused them to be briskly charged with the bayonet by his battalions, and thrown to the foot of the heights. He repeated this manœuvre several times, and in this manner killed or wounded twelve or fifteen hundred of the enemy. He kept up this fight for four successive hours, always manœuvring with extraordinary art and precision, and destroying twice or thrice as many men as he lost himself. He did not retire till he found himself in danger of being turned by the columns that were marching on the right and left upon Zambugeiro. Several detachments attempted in vain to stop him: he forced his way through them, and arrived at Zambugeiro, having himself five or six hundred men *hors de combat*, but leaving behind the dead only, carrying off all his wounded, and impressing the heart of the enemy with a dread of what French troops, well conducted, were capable of doing; for what was there not to fear from a general union of their forces, when fewer than three thousand men had made so vigorous a resistance!

General Delaborde proceeded to Torres Vedras, where he was to be joined by general Loison coming from Abrantes, and by general Junot coming from Lisbon.

Sir Arthur Wellesley had learned from his own experience in this fight what he before knew, that he had to do with an enemy very difficult to conquer, and he had determined not to advance but with extreme circumspection. A numerous convoy, bringing fresh troops, had just been descried at sea. These were Anstruther's and Acland's brigades, recently embarked, and followed very closely by the main body of Sir John Moore's army. These two brigades brought him a reinforcement of five thousand men at least, but did not bring Sir Hew Dalrymple, which had the twofold advantage of strengthening him without rendering him dependent. He resolved therefore to approach the sea by Lourinha, in order to pick up Anstruther's and Acland's two brigades; and for this purpose he took a position on the heights of Vimeiro, which cover an anchorage favourable for landing. In the evening of the 19th he was joined by Anstruther's brigade, and on the 20th by Acland's brigade. Deducting the killed and wounded at Roliça, this reinforcement increased his army to 18,000 men present under arms.

General Junot, on the news of the approach of the English, had hastened to leave Lisbon with all the force disposable, and directed his course towards Torres Vedras, where general Loison had just arrived. From having endeavoured to retain too many posts, though he had evacuated many, from having run to suppress the principal insurrections, though he had neglected secondary insurrections, general Junot could not collect more than nine thousand and some hundred men present under arms. He would, therefore, have to fight that redoubtable English infantry brought by Sir Arthur Wellesley, in the proportion of one against two. He had a great superiority over him in cavalry, an arm of not much utility in the positions that were about to serve for fields of battle. Nine thousand French, however, conducted as general Delaborde's three thousand had been, would be able, by stoutly defending the positions which are in advance of Lisbon, to make head against 18,000 English, and to render it impossible for them to conquer the capital of Portugal, provided that their ground were chosen as skilfully as it had been at Roliça.

The English had to cross the promontory which forms the right of the Tagus, and on the back of which Lisbon is seated. This promontory presents narrow defiles, which must be passed in order to reach Lisbon, and in which the English might have been overwhelmed when they had once entered them, by leaving to them all the inconveniences of the offensive. Junot, hurried away by his excessive ardour, would not wait for them in these passes, where it would have been possible to beat them, and resolved to go and seek them in their position, to storm them there, and to throw them into the sea. He arrived on the evening of the 20th before the heights of Vimeiro.

Sir Arthur Wellesley would have been in a critical situation, if he had been vigorously attacked and with sufficient forces; for he occupied heights, the back of which rose perpendicularly from the sea. If forced in these positions, he might be precipitated into the waves before he had time to embark. He was, therefore, between a victory and a disaster. But he had 18,000 men, a numerous artillery, positions of very difficult access. He knew, from various reports, that he should have to fight an enemy inferior by half; lastly, he was endowed with a firmness of character which equalled that of his soldiers. He was, therefore, not at all uneasy. The chain of positions which he occupied was cut in two by a ravine which formed the bed of the little river Maceira. The village of Vimeiro was at the bottom of this ravine. But he possessed sufficient means of communication for going from one of these groups of heights to the other. He had four brigades on the group situated on his right, two on the group situated on his left. His infantry, ranged in three lines, with a formidable artillery in the intervals, exhibited three stages, rising one above another, and one strengthening the other.

Had this position, strong as it was, been previously reconnoitred, the French must either have abandoned the idea of taking it, or have attacked it on one side only with their whole united force. The English, when once partly dislodged, might have been completely shaken and precipitated into the abyss which they backed. But the French arrived at daybreak on the morning of the 21st, without having taken suitable precautions, and without concealing their movements from the enemy. General Junot, perceiving that the left of the English was their least defended wing, ordered a movement from his left to his right, that he might be more numerous on that side, a movement which Sir Arthur Wellesley, discovering it from the heights that he occupied, hastened to imitate, for the purpose of restoring the balance of forces, but much more rapidly than his adversary; for he had only the cord of the bow to describe, and it took him less time by half to move his troops from one wing to the other.

The French, while their right was manœuvring, attacked Vimeiro with their left. Vimeiro formed the right of the English and their strongest side. Thomière's brigade, of Delaborde's division, marched resolutely towards the enemy. The brave general Delaborde conducted this attack with extreme vigour; but the ground, which he had not chosen, as at Roliça, presented almost insurmountable obstacles. Besides the difficulty of climbing a steep position, he would have to brave two lines of infantry, an artillery powerful by number and calibre, and then find, without being discouraged, a third line, formed by Hill's brigade, crowning the heights in rear. The French dashed gallantly forward, liable to fall first under the fire of grape, and then under the continuous and well-directed musketry fire of the English: but they could not even reach their lines. When they found themselves thus stopped, general Kellermann, who commanded the reserve, composed of two regiments of grenadiers, picked out of all the corps, proceeded with one of these regiments to the attack of the plateau of Vimeiro. He was preceded by a battery of artillery, which attempted to place itself in position. The tremendous fire of the English soon dismounted it. Colonel Foy was severely wounded. General Kellermann, nevertheless, pushed forward with the grenadiers. He climbed the hill, debouched on the plateau, but encountered such a fire in front, in flank, and from all directions, that his brave soldiers, flung back upon one another, and unable to advance, were driven to the foot of the plateau. On seeing this, four hundred dragoons, composing the whole of the English cavalry, would have taken advantage of the dangerous situation of our grenadiers to charge them. But general Margaron, who was at that point with his brave cavalry, rushed at gallop upon the English dragoons, and, cutting them in pieces, revenged on them the reverse of our infantry. The second regiment of grenadiers marched, in its turn, to attack the enemy, though without hope of carrying the position. During these occurrences on the left, Solignac's brigade, of Loison's division, met with the same obstacles on the right. Everywhere three lines of infantry, a formidable artillery, a steep hill which it was impossible to climb under the downward fire, stopped our brave soldiers, foolishly directed against a position where the enemy fought with all his advantages, and where we had none of ours.

It was noon. This combat, so unfortunately commenced, without the least chance of our conquering the difficulties opposed to us, had already cost us 1800 men, that is to say, a fifth part of our effective. To persist further in it would be to risk the destruction of the whole army to no purpose. General Junot, therefore, made up his mind, on the advice of his bravest officers, to retreat, which he did in good order to Torres Vedras, his cavalry cutting down the tirailleurs or the English horse who had the boldness to follow us.

After this fruitless attempt to throw the English into the sea, the French had no further hope of maintaining their ground in Portugal. On assembling all the disposable force at Lisbon, there were found to be not more than 10,000 men in a condition to fight, and these 10,000 men had to control an hostile population of 300,000 souls, and to stop an English army, which in a few days would be increased to 28 or 29 thousand combatants. One resource it is true was left: that was, to make a retreat through the north of Portugal and Spain, similar to that of the Ten Thousand, through insurgent populations, leaving several thousand sick in the hands of the Portuguese, and strewing the roads with dead and dying. One would thus have lost more than half the army. These two resolutions were therefore impossible to be fulfilled. To enter into negociation with the English nation, which performed the engagements which it contracted, would therefore assuredly be a step that honour would not condemn, especially after the battle of Roliça, and the battle of Vimeiro.

In consequence, general Kellermann, who united extreme shrewdness with great military talents, was selected and sent to the

English head-quarters to treat respecting the fate of the prisoners and wounded. At this moment a change had just taken place in the British army. Sir Hew Dalrymple had arrived, with Sir Harry Burrard, chief of his staff, to assume the command. Sir Arthur Wellesley, always fortunate in his brilliant career, was not superseded till after a victory, chiefly due to the faults of the enemy. He was not sorry that the campaign should cease with this victory, and that the conquest of Portugal should be exclusively attributed to him. Sir Hew Dalrymple and Sir Harry Burrard, on their part, unacquainted with the state of things, ignorant of the difficulties which might be left for them to conquer, were delighted, at their outset, to find the French ready to give up Portugal to them, and to have no new risks to run. If, however, they had appreciated the situation, and what it was about to become for them by the arrival of the army of Sir John Moore, they might not have shown themselves so easy. In a long conversation with general Kellermann, whom they treated with all the distinction that he deserved, they suffered their disposition to negociate to be perceived. The latter, with great tact, seized the opportunity, and at first agreed with them upon a suspension of arms, reserving a definitive arrangement for the evacuation of the country for future negociation.

General Kellermann, returning to the French head-quarters, informed the commander-in-chief and his companions in arms of the disposition of the English, and it was agreed that they should treat for the evacuation of Portugal, if the conditions were perfectly honourable. He returned to the head-quarters of the enemy, and the meeting for the conferences was fixed at Cintra. They lasted several days, and displayed not less courtesy in the forms than vivacity in the discussion ofsubjects. The English would not grant so many advantages in regard to military honour as the French demanded. They refused in particular to treat the Russian admiral Siniavin so well as Junot required, from a scruple of honour much more than from duty; for that admiral, who might have saved the common cause by seconding the French, and who had ruined it by not doing so, did not deserve that the negociations should be rendered more difficult on his account. Junot, nevertheless, demanded that the Russian admiral should be at liberty to retire to the North Sea with his squadron, and he threatened to destroy all with fire and sword, not to surrender Lisbon till it was half in ruins, if what he claimed were not granted. Fortunately, admiral Siniavin, an ally as disagreeable as he was backward at assisting, expressed a desire to negociate on his own account, apparently unwilling to owe anything to the French army, from which he was sensible that he had not deserved anything. Junot hastened to assent to it, and then, the principal difficulty being removed, the parties speedily came to an agreement.

The convention dated from Cintra was signed on the 30th of August. It stipulated that the French army should retire with all the honours of war, taking with it all that belonged to it; that it should be conveyed in English vessels to the nearest ports of France, those of La Rochelle, Lorient, or others; that it might serve immediately; that the wounded and the sick should be treated with care, and sent home in their turn, as soon as their state would allow them to bear the voyage; that this should apply also to the garrisons of Almeida and Elvas, left in the interior of the country. It was agreed, moreover, that the French should not carry away anything belonging to Portugal, the finances of which they had administered with equal regularity and integrity, and where they left nine millions in the chests which they had found absolutely empty on their arrival. Lastly, it was stipulated that no inquiry should be made into the past; and that the Portuguese who had sided with the French should not be molested in person or property.

This arrangement was as honourable as could be desired for the French army, for it was saved entire, and replaced in a state to resume arms against Spain in a month. The English were incapable of imitating the Spaniards and violating the convention of Cintra, as the latter had violated the capitulation of Baylen. Accordingly, they assembled at the mouth of the Tagus the numerous vessels which had just landed 30,000 of their soldiers upon the coasts of Portugal, and prepared them to convey the 22,000 French left of the 26,000 which had accompanied general Junot. They took them on board in the first days of September, and landed them faithfully on the coasts of Saintonge and Bretagne.

Thus the whole Peninsula, overrun so easily in February and March, was evacuated by the end of August as far as the Ebro. Two French armies had capitulated, the one honourably, the other in a humiliating manner; and the others occupied on the Ebro nothing more than the *débouché* of the Pyrenees. Of the 130,000 men who had crossed the Pyrenees there were not 60,000 under arms, though 80,000 were left, exclusively, it is true, of the 22,000 returning to France under the British flag.

Such was the recompence of an enterprise undertaken with raw troops and too few of them, planned moreover by a knavish and iniquitous policy. We had lost in a moment our renown for honour, the spell of our invincibility; and Europe had a right to believe for an instant that the French army had lost its superiority. This, however, was not the case, and that heroic army was about to prove again in a hundred fights that it was still the same.

To crown the confusion, those rich Spanish colonies which occupied so large a space in the projects of Napoleon were escaping from us in all quarters. Mexico, the vast southern continent, from Peru to the mouths of the La Plata, rose on the news of the events at Bayonne, opening their ports to the English, and embracing the cause of the captive dynasty.

Thus all the combinations of Napoleon were baffled at once by the indignation of a deceived and exasperated people. Thus nothing was wanting to the chastisement of his fault, assuredly nothing; for his brother himself, terrified at the task which he had imposed upon him, deeply regretting the quiet and peaceful kingdom of Naples, wrote him on the 9th of August, from the banks of the Ebro, a most distressing letter, which was no doubt to him the most poignant of reproaches:—"I have not a single Spaniard left who is attached to my cause. Philip V. had but one competitor to conquer; while I—I have a whole nation. As general, my part would be endurable, nay easy, for, with a detachment of your veteran troops, I would conquer the Spaniards, but as king my part is insupportable, since I must slaughter one part of my subjects to make the other submit. I decline, therefore, to reign over a people who will not have me. Still I desire not to retire as conquered. Send me, therefore, one of your old armies; I will return at its head to Madrid, and there I will treat with the Spaniards. If you wish it, I will restore Ferdinand VII. to them in your name, but retaining part of their territory as far as the Ebro; for France victorious will have a right to exact payment for her victory. She will thus obtain the price of her efforts, of her blood spilt, and I—I shall demand back from you the throne of Naples. The prince for whom you destined it has not yet taken possession of it. I am, besides, your brother, your own blood: justice and consanguinity require that I should have the preference, and I will then go and continue, amidst the quiet which suits my tastes, the happiness of a people that consents to be prosperous under my care."—Such was the substance of what Joseph wrote from the banks of the Ebro to Napoleon. No judgment could be more severe and more just than that which resulted from this language of a deeply-afflicted king, forced against his will to reign over a people in revolt. Napoleon comprehended it, and proved by the answer, which the reader will find by and by, how keenly he felt the involuntary harshness of this judgment pronounced by his own brother.

BOOK XXXII.

ERFURTH.

THE capitulation of Baylen becomes known to Napoleon whilst he is on a tour in the southern provinces of the Empire—His intense emotion at the news of that unhappy event—Order for the arrest of general Dupont on his return to France—Napoleon makes his promised visit to La Vendée, and is received there with enthusiasm—His arrival in Paris on the 14th of August—Indignation of Austria at the events of Bayonne—Explanation with M. de Metternich—Napoleon wishes to force the court of Vienna to manifest its real sentiments before he comes to a final decision as to the redistribution of his forces—Obliged to withdraw a portion of his old troops from Germany, Napoleon consents to evacuate the territory of Prussia—Conditions of the evacuation—The good-will of the court of Russia more than ever needful to Napoleon—Desire frequently expressed by the emperor Alexander to have another interview with Napoleon, in order to a direct mutual explanation as to the affairs of the East—The interview appointed to take place at Erfurth at the latter end of September—Pains taken to give it the utmost possible éclat—Meanwhile Napoleon makes his military preparations to meet every contingency—State of things in Spain whilst Napoleon is in Paris—King Joseph's operations—Napoleon's distribution of his forces—French and Italian troops ordered from Piedmont to Catalonia—Departure of the 1st and 6th divisions from Prussia for Spain—March of all the dragoon divisions in the same direction—Efforts to supply the place of the troops about to be abstracted from the grand army—Fresh conscription—Expense of these levies—Means taken to check the depreciation of the public funds—Effects produced on the several courts by Napoleon's diplomatic manifestations—Austria is intimidated and lowers her tone—Prussia joyfully accepts the evacuation of her territory, at the same time appealing for a last alleviation of her pecuniary burdens—The emperor Alexander's eagerness for the meeting at Erfurth—His mother's opposition to his intended journey—Arrival of the two emperors at Erfurth on the 27th September, 1808—Extreme courtesy towards each other—Afflux of sovereigns and great civil and military personages from all the capitals—Magnificent spectacle exhibited to Europe—Political ideas to be established by Napoleon at Erfurth—For the chimera of a partition of the Turkish empire he wishes to substitute an immediate gift of Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia—Effect of this new bait on Alexander's imagination—He enters into Napoleon's views, but in consenting to take less he insists on having it so much the more quickly—His impatience to be possessed of the Danubian provinces surpassed even by that of his old minister, M. de Romanzow—Agreement of the two emperors—Reciprocal satisfaction and brilliant fêtes—M. de

Vincent, representative of Austria, arrives at Erfurth—False position in which Alexander and Napoleon strive to place him—After coming to a mutual understanding, the two emperors endeavour to put in writing the substance of their verbal resolutions—Wishing that peace should result from the interview at Erfurth, Napoleon would begin with pacific overtures to England—Alexander consents to this, provided the taking possession of the Danubian provinces be not thereby retarded—Difficulty of finding a phraseology which should satisfy these two conditions—Convention of Erfurth signed on the 12th of October—To oblige Alexander, Napoleon grants Prussia a further reduction of its contributions—First idea of a marriage between Napoleon and a sister of Alexander—Disposition on that subject manifested by the young czar—Satisfaction of the two emperors, and their separation on the 14th of October, after signal demonstrations of affection—Departure of Alexander for St. Petersburgh and of Napoleon for Paris—Arrival of the latter at St. Cloud on the 18th of October—His last arrangements before joining the army of Spain—Reassured for a while as to Austria, Napoleon withdraws from Germany another division, the 5th—The grand army becomes the army of the Rhine—Composition and organisation of the army of Spain—Departure of Berthier and Napoleon for Bayonne—M. de Romanzow left in Paris to pursue the negociation opened with England in the name of France and Russia—Manner in which the message of the two emperors is received in London—Efforts of MM. de Champagny and de Romanzow to elude the difficulties raised by the British cabinet—Fearing to discourage the Spaniards and the Austrians, England abruptly puts an end to the negociation—Bitter reply of Austria to the communications addressed to her from Erfurth—From the manifestations made by the several courts, it may be foreseen that Napoleon will have time to make but a short campaign in Spain—His measures in order to render it decisive.

BOOK XXXII.

THE months of June and July, during which were accomplished the events which we have just narrated, were spent by Napoleon at Bayonne and in the departments situated at the foot of the Pyrenees. He visited in succession Pau, Auch, Toulouse, Montauban, and Bordeaux, and was everywhere received with transport by populations, always delighted to hail the passing appearance of the sovereign who for a moment occupies their leisure, but now more than usually eager to behold that extraordinary sovereign who so justly excited their curiosity and admiration. The Basques performed before him their graceful and picturesque dances, and impetuous Toulouse displayed all its customary vivacity of sentiment. Scarcely anything was known even in those provinces about the events in Spain, for Napoleon permitted nothing to be published that was contrary to his own views. It was known indeed, by means of the communications inevitably subsisting between the two opposite slopes of the Pyrenees, that Aragon was in insurrection, and that the establishment of king Joseph was encountering some rather serious difficulties; but no importance was attached to any resistance which unhappy Spain, enfeebled and disorganised by twenty years of bad government, could offer to the vanquisher of the continent. The people, therefore, shared in their sovereign's delusion respecting the progress of events beyond the Pyrenees. They ceased not to regard him as the emblem of success, power, and genius. At the very most, a few obstinate old royalists, rendered prophetic by their vindictive feelings, predicted at random disasters that should trace their origin to Spain. But the multitude ran with noisy enthusiasm to greet the restorer of order, of religion, and of the greatness of France. They still believed him fortunate at the moment when he was beginning to be so no longer, and when a ray of sadness had already shot into his daring and intrepid heart.

When he quitted Bayonne, Napoleon was disabused of almost all his illusions regarding the affairs of Spain. He knew the extent and violence of the insurrection; he was informed of the retreat of marshal Moncey, the obstinate resistance of Saragossa, and the difficulties which general Dupont had encountered in Andalusia. But he knew also of the brilliant victory won by marshal Bessières at Rio-Seco, the entry of Joseph into Madrid, the numerous succours sent to Dupont, and the great preparations for attack made before Saragossa. He flattered himself, therefore, that marshal Bessières would follow up his advantages, and drive back the northern insurgents into Gallicia; that with reinforcements sent him, Dupont would repel the southern insurgents to Seville, perhaps to Cadiz; that one day or other Saragossa would be taken, and that it would be possible, with the old regiments which were coming, to reinforce sufficiently the various divisions of our army, and gradually to consummate the submission of Spain. A victory on the Guadalquivir, like that of Rio-Seco, would have sufficed to substitute these brilliant results for the sad ones we have just depicted; but unhappily it was Baylen, instead of another Rio-Seco, that was to be inscribed in the bloody and heroic history of that time! As for Portugal, there had been no news from it, absolutely none, for more than a month.

It was at Bordeaux, where he passed the first three days of August, that Napoleon became aware of that eternally deplorable catastrophe of Baylen. The affliction it caused him, his sense of the humiliation endured by the French arms, the bursts of rage to which he gave way, are not to be described. They have left a deep impression on the memory of all around him, as I have a hundred times gathered from their own lips. His mortification exceeded that which he had experienced at Boulogne on learning that admiral Villeneuve declined entering the British Channel; for to defeat was added dishonour, the first and only dishonour inflicted on his glorious banners. Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII. were avenged! Pious souls in all ages have believed that beyond this life there is a remuneration for good and for evil, and the wise have regarded this belief as accordant with the general scheme of things. But there is a remark which all profound observers have likewise made, namely, that even in this life events carry with them a certain remuneration for good and for evil. The violation of good sense, reason, and justice, soon encounters here below a just and first chastisement. God, no doubt, has appointed another place and time for finally balancing the account of the master of an empire as well as of the humblest swain.

Napoleon perceived at a glance all the probable consequences of the occurrence of Baylen; the discouragement it would cause in the French army; the enthusiastic energy it would infuse into the insurgents; and he regarded the evacuation of almost the whole Peninsula as certain, before information of that event had reached him. The dispatches that hourly arrived soon acquainted him with the extent to which the consequences of the disaster were doomed to be aggravated under the rule of a good but weak and vain prince. Had Murat been king of Spain, he would have rallied all his remaining troops and fallen upon Castaños before the latter had entered Madrid. Joseph, weak Joseph, through ignorance still more than timidity, retreated in all haste to the Ebro, raised the siege of Saragossa, a town half won, stopped Bessières in his victorious march, and scarcely believed himself safe when he had put the Ebro behind him and had his foot already on the Pyrenees.

The least important consequences of this disaster were those which concerned Spain only; its European consequences were far more momentous. The dejected enemies of France took courage again. Austria, always engaged in preparations for war since the Polish campaign, feignedly quiescent since the convention that had given her back Braunau, excited anew by the events of Bayonne, and superexcited by those of Baylen, was now becoming hostile. Her apparent rupture with England, procured by force of threats, was about to be changed into a close and secret alliance with that power. And it was in the face of such a state of things that it was necessary to recal a part of the Grand Army from the banks of the Vistula and the Elbe to be transferred to the Ebro and the Tagus! From a triumphant position Napoleon was, through his own fault, about to enter upon one of difficulty at least, and one that called for the fullest display of his genius. He was strong enough certainly to meet the crisis, for the grand army was still entire, and capable of crushing Austria even after sending off a strong detachment to Spain. But from being absolute arbiter of events, as he had been in 1807, Napoleon was now reduced to the necessity of struggling to control them. These were weighty cares, and they were aggravated by mortified pride. He had deceived himself, visibly deceived himself: of that fact nobody in Europe could entertain a doubt. His invincible soldiers had been beaten; and by whom? By undisciplined bands of insurgents; and public opinion, that inconstant harlot who delights in forsaking those she has flattered most, would doubtless exaggerate the event by concealing the facts that explained it, such as the youth of the soldiers; the influence of climate an unparalleled combination of unfortunate circumstances; in fine, the momentary error of a general of incontestable ability. Doubtless that fickle opinion would depreciate at once the political foresight of Napoleon and the heroic valour of his armies. The great man's self-love and his prudence were both assailed by this disastrous news, and he was punished, punished in every way—punished as offenders are wont to be by infallible Providence. Still the blow might prove to be but a salutary warning, and he might yet triumph over the momentary disaster, and triumph so completely as to remain all potent in Europe, if he knew how to profit by that first bitter lesson.

What often happens happened in this case: an unfortunate man who had his share, and no more than his share, in a series of blunders, paid the penalty for everybody. Deeply incensed against general Dupont, and descrying with his superior sagacity the military errors which the latter had committed, and which sufficed to explain everything,* but suffering himself also to believe all the dishonouring suppositions which malevolence added thereto, Napoleon exclaimed that Dupont was a traitor, a dastard, a wretch, who had lost his army for the sake of saving a few waggons, and that he would have him shot. "They have sullied our uniform," he said, in speaking of Dupont and the other generals; "it shall be washed in their blood." Accordingly he ordered that general Dupont and his lieutenants should be arrested on their arrival in France, and delivered up to the High Imperial Court. But real as his anger was in the main, it was also to a certain degree feigned. He wished to account to those about him for the disappointments experienced in Spain, by attributing the unexpected turn of events to the errors, the pretended crimes and the dastardy of one general. Docile to his will, the servile courtiers soon railed implacably against general Dupont. That unfortunate man had erred in judgment as we have seen, and had been prostrated by a combination of overwhelming circumstances; and now he was at once proclaimed a coward and a robber that deserved capital punishment. After all, these insults were still confined to the circle of the imperial staff; for in order to restrain as much as he could the babbling tongue of rumour, Napoleon had forbidden the publication of anything relating to Spain; and that none might suspect the extent of the difficulties he had brought upon himself, he had applied that prohibition to the victory of Rio-Seco no less than to the capitulation of Baylen. Involved in that catastrophe, marshal Bessières saw the fairest exploit of his military life covered by the same veil that hung over the disaster of general Dupont. But the English press soon conveyed, not to the multitude but to the enlightened classes, the knowledge of the reverses sustained by our armies in Spain. Moreover, the exasperation against general Dupont, because he had succumbed, became so violent, that Napoleon's dormant generosity was stirred, and he exclaimed frequently, "The unfortunate man! What a fall after Albeck, Halle, Friedland! What a thing war is! One day, one single day is enough to tarnish the lustre of a lifetime." And thus contradicting himself, he fell into the habit of saying that Dupont had only been unlucky; and his genius, discerning the hard conditions of human life, seemed to behold his own destiny written in that of one of his lieutenants.

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* There exists, as I have said, in the archives of the Secrétairerie d'Etat a minute of the questions addressed to general Dupont by order of Napoleon.

The discreet and quickwitted people of Bordeaux gave him magnificent entertainments, at which he appeared with a serene aspect, and without betraying any of the feelings that filled his soul. To those who, without venturing to question him, nevertheless touched, in talking to him, upon the grand object that had brought

With the help of that document an exact idea may be formed of the opinion Napoleon had conceived of the catastrophe of Baylen and the conduct of general Dupont. He saw plainly the military faults which sufficed to explain the catastrophe; but he allowed himself to be influenced for a while by the calumnious rumours propagated respecting general Dupont, and he caused the latter to be interrogated on the subject of them, without himself putting much faith in them. Some time afterwards he had ceased to believe them altogether.

him to the south, he said that some peasants, wrought to fanaticism by priests, and hired by England, were endeavouring to embarrass his brother, but that *he had never seen a more cowardly rabble since he had been in the service;* that marshal Bessières had put several thousands of them to the sword; that a few French squadrons were enough to put to flight a whole army of those Spanish insurgents; that the Peninsula would ere long be subjected to the sceptre of king Joseph, and that the provinces of the south of France, to which it was of so much interest that good relations should be maintained with Spain, should reap the principal fruit of this new enterprise. Those with whom he conversed believed whatever he pleased whilst their eyes were on him, and they were satisfied; but when his back was turned, their thoughts assumed a very different complexion on learning, through commercial correspondence, the momentous facts that were occurring beyond the Pyrenees.

Napoleon would have wished to proceed without any delay from Bordeaux to Paris, in order to apply himself to his three pressing occupations of the moment: the explanation with Austria, the consolidation of the union with Russia, and the transference of a part of the Grand Army from the Vistula to the Ebro. But he had promised to pass through La Vendée, and he would have appeared either to regard that province with distrust, or to have such formidable business on hand as compelled him to break all his engagements. Now he had made one with the Vendéans which he could not and would not break without absolute necessity. He resolved therefore to journey by way of Rochefort, La Rochelle, Niort, Napoleon-Vendée, Nantes, Saumur, Tours, and Orléans, dictating his orders on the road, receiving hundreds of despatches at every station, and sending off as many as he received.

He arrived at Rochefort on the 5th, and was hailed with enthusiasm by a wholly maritime population, whose arsenals and dockyards had become doubly active under his reign. He visited the isle of Aix and the works at fort Bayard, glad to examine personally those places respecting which he was constantly giving orders of the greatest importance. Curiosity, admiration, and gratitude, drew the urban and rural populations around him. Proceeding from Rochefort to La Rochelle, Niort, and Napoleon-Vendée, he was everywhere greeted with every demonstration of respect by immense multitudes. The prodigious man who had rescued those provinces from civil war, and had given them back quiet, safety, prosperity, and the exercise of their religion, was in their eyes more than a man; he was a sort of demigod. But just punished in Spain for the evil he had done, Napoleon was now recompensed for the good he had accomplished in France! If he had suffered for his bad deeds, he enjoyed the fruits of his good ones, and his cares were almost dissipated at the sight of grateful and enthusiastic La Vendée. The province could not have given a better reception to Louis XVI., could he have risen from the grave to which he had been consigned by the crime of '93. At Nantes and at Saumur the welcome was as cordial, and Napoleon could not restrain the pleasure with which it filled him; it overflowed into his correspondence, which at Bordeaux had been full of vexation, anger, and hurried orders.

He arrived in Paris late on the 14th of August, the eve of the grand *fête* of the 15th, when he was preparing to appear in all the lustre of power, and with a serenity of visage which should disconcert the conjectures of malevolence. It was, above all, before the *corps diplomatique*, eagerly on the watch to observe him, that he wished to display an imposing attitude, and to hold a language that should resound through all Europe.

He had just received highly satisfactory news from Russia, which depicted that power as still acquiescent in his designs, in consideration of the advantages she expected in the East. But the news from Austria was of a very different nature. In that quarter everything was beginning to look threatening. It will be recollected that Austria,—always hostile at heart, notwithstanding the promises made by the emperor Francis at the bivouac of Urschitz; dissatisfied with herself for not having taken advantage of the battle of Eylau to occupy the banks of the Oder, whilst Napoleon was embarrassed on the Vistula; then soothed for awhile by the convention that gave her back Braunau,—had affected, after the battle of Copenhagen, to participate in the indignation of the continental powers against England. She had, in fact, dismissed Mr. Adair, the British minister, but had probably given him to understand at the same time that this rupture of intercourse meant nothing, and was not to be regarded as of any importance. It is certain that the English ships of war in the Adriatic had continued to allow free passage to the Austrian flag, and that the colonial trade had not been for a moment interrupted at Trieste. But on being made aware of the snare laid at Bayonne for the royal family of Spain, and of the disasters that had followed, Austria could contain herself no longer, and had almost thrown off the mask. A terror, partly feigned, partly real, had seized the court and its familiars. "This, then, is the fate that awaits all the old royalties of the continent!" was the cry in the salons of Vienna. "It is a horrible trap, an evident danger, which must be a warning to any one who has the least foresight; for every sovereign who shall have neglected to defend himself will be treated like Charles IV. and Ferdinand VII.!" The archduke Charles himself, usually more reserved than the rest, and less malevolent towards France, exclaimed, "We will die, if it must be so, with arms in our hands; but the crown of Austria shall not be disposed of as easily as that of Spain has been."

The news from Rome had likewise contributed to excite emotion and passionate comment in Vienna. General Miollis having, as we have elsewhere stated, received and executed an order to take military possession of Rome, and having left the pope only the spiritual authority, the latter had withdrawn into the palace of St. John of the Latran, barricaded the doors and windows as if he had to sustain a siege, shut himself up with his domestics, refused to communicate with any but the foreign ministers, declared himself oppressed, enslaved in his own dominions, and a victim to an abominable usurpation, and protested every day against the violence under which he succumbed. To these events were added the annexation of the provinces of Ancona, Macerata, and Fermo to the kingdom of Italy, under the titles of departments of the Métaure, the Musone, and the Tronto.

These facts had exasperated the public of Vienna almost as much as the events in Spain, and both court and town indulged in the bitterest language, even in presence of the French ambassador, general Andréossy. Some of those who did so, really believed what they said, and seriously imagined that Napoleon desired to supersede all the reigning families of the continent. The rest believed nothing of the kind, and aware that his system, modelled upon that of Louis XIV., might extend to Italy and Spain, but not to Austria, they nevertheless reiterated the current expressions in order to excite the credulous multitude. All, however, were agreed in saying that, without attacking, it was necessary to make preparations for self-defence; and even, after the highly exaggerated disasters of our armies, they suffered themselves to be carried away far beyond the idea of a merely defensive policy. The military preparations were in conformity with this state of public feeling.

The Austrian army had never ceased to be kept up at its full complement, and in perfect training and organisation, by the assiduous care of the archduke Charles. Not content with this effort, ruinous as it was to the Austrian finances, new measures, some of which were imitated from France herself, had just been adopted for an extraordinary augmentation of the forces of the monarchy. Independently of the army in actual service, a system of reserve had been devised, which consisted in assembling and exercising a certain number of recruits in each locality, and holding them in readiness to march. The avowed number of these recruits was 60 thousand and their real number 100 thousand, making the effective force of the army amount to more than 400 thousand men. Then, under the name of a militia, very much resembling our national guards, nearly the whole population had been enrolled, clad, armed, and exercised every day. The people of Austria, usually strangers to their own government, felt in a manner flattered to find that recourse was had to them; and partly moved by the pleasure of being counted for something, partly by the fear of danger from without, they had enrolled themselves with singular alacrity—nobles, burghers, populace and all. Voluntary donations made by the states and by individuals had furnished sufficient means for equipping that mass of men; and it was computed that not fewer than 300 thousand persons were prepared to serve locally, or even generally, for the maintenance of the monarchy. Four hundred thousand men enrolled for active service, and three hundred thousand men in local corps, for a population of 15 or 16 millions then subject to the house of Austria, constituted an enormous force, such as that house had never before displayed. It was probable in fact that it could have actually brought three hundred thousand fighting men under fire; and that was an immense thing which it had never yet accomplished, nor had it yet been done by any of the powers opposed to France. The government had just purchased 14 thousand artillery horses, and given orders for a million of infantry muskets. Whilst Braunau on the Inn was being dismantled, twenty thousand workmen were occupied in Hungary upon the fortifications of Comorn, works which proved the intention of waging a long and obstinate war, and retiring, if beaten on the frontier, into the interior of the monarchy, and there maintaining a desperate resistance. Already even troops, that had somewhat the appearance of divisions of an army, were beginning to assemble towards Bohemia and Gallicia, no doubt in order to confront the French forces on the Vistula and the Oder.

The emotion of the court spread gradually to all classes of the population, and whilst at the waters of Toeplitz, Carlsbad, and all Germany, there was an affected desire to assume towards the French an attitude of unwonted arrogance, in the streets of Vienna the populace threatened general Andréossy's people; in Trieste the people insulted the French consul, and in Istria our couriers were assassinated on the military roads that had been surrendered to us. Germany, humiliated by our triumphs, and trampled by our armies, was beginning to thrill with wrath and hope. The events in Spain, serving at once to excite her indignation and to encourage her, had evoked the display of her secret feelings.

Though Napoleon, backed by Russia, had nothing to fear from the continent, yet it was so serious a matter to march a part of the grand army from the Vistula to the Ebro; this transfer of his forces from the north to the south might so embolden his enemies, that he wished previously to force Austria to explain, that he might know exactly how he stood with regard to her. If she desired war, he preferred making war upon her immediately (postponing the suppression of the Spanish insurrection), and making it with all his forces, so as to dispense even with the aid of the Russians, have done with Austria for ever, and then fall back from the Danube to the Pyrenees to subdue the Spaniards and sweep the English into the sea. But this was only an extremity. He would rather not have had that new war to wage, for war was no longer his ruling passion. After Rivoli, the Pyramids, Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland, military glory could no longer be for him a source of very keen delight. Thenceforth war was to be for him but a means of upholding his policy—a policy unfortunately exorbitant, and which would still render necessary many a bloody triumph. Thus, without wishing to provoke Austria, he was bent on exacting from her the clearest explanation.

Receiving the representatives of the powers, as well as the great state corporations, on the 15th of August, he took the opportunity to have an explanation with M. de Metternich; not passionate and provocative, like the explanation he had formerly had with Lord Whitworth, and which had led to the war with England, but mild, calm, and yet peremptory. His demeanour towards the ministers of all the courts was gracious and serene; he was affable with M. de Tolstoy, though he had reason to complain of his military sallies; with M. de Metternich he was amicable, open, but pressing. Without raising his voice so as to be heard by all present, he yet spoke in a manner to be understood by some of them, especially M. de Tolstoy. "You wish either to make war on us or to frighten us," he said to M. de Metternich.* M. de Metternich having replied that his cabinet did not wish to do either the one or the other, Napoleon instantly replied, mildly but positively, "Wherefore then your armaments, that agitate yourselves and Europe, put peace in jeopardy, and ruin your finances?" On receiving an assurance that these armaments were only defensive, Napoleon applied himself, like one who was profoundly acquainted with the subject, to prove to M. de Metternich that they were of a very different nature. "If your armaments," he said, "were as you assert, purely defensive, they would not be so much hurried. When a new organisation is to be created, one takes one's time, and does nothing abruptly, because things are done best that are done slowly; but one does not erect magazines, order assemblages of troops, and buy horses, particularly artillery horses. Your army amounts to nearly 400 thousand men. Your militia will nearly equal that number. Were I to imitate you I should add 400 thousand men to my effective force, and that would be an armament out of all reason. I have no need to do so. Less than 200 thousand conscripts will be enough to maintain my grand army on a formidable scale, and enable me to send a hundred thousand veteran troops into Spain. I will not follow your example, therefore, for it would soon be necessary to arm women and children, and we should relapse into a state of barbarity. But meanwhile your finances suffer; your exchange, already so low, will fall still lower, and your trade will be interrupted. And wherefore all this? Have I demanded anything of you? Have I advanced claims to any one of your provinces? The treaty of Presburg has settled all questions between the two empires; your master's word, in the interview we had together, ought to have settled everything between the two sovereigns. There remained yet to be made some arrangements respecting Braunau, which was still on our hands, and on the subject of the Izonzo, the thalweg of which was not sufficiently determined; these have been provided for in the convention of Fontainebleau (convention of October 10, 1808). I demand nothing of you—I want nothing of you—except mutual quiet and security. Is there any difficulty—any one difficulty beween us? Let it be known, that we may settle it on the spot." M. de Metternich having again affirmed that his government had no thought of attacking France, and alleging in proof that it had not ordered any movement of troops, Napoleon immediately replied, with the same quiet decision, that he was mistaken, that assemblements of troops had taken place in Gallicia and Bohemia, opposite Silesia, in front of the quarters of the French army; that the fact was incontestable; that the immediate consequence would be the assemblement of no less considerable forces on the French side; that instead of demolishing the fortresses in Silesia, he was about to repair some of them, arm and provision them, convoke the contingents of the confederation of the Rhine, and put everything again on a war footing. "I shall not be taken by surprise, you are well aware," he said to M. de Metternich; "I shall be always prepared. You reckon, perhaps, on the emperor of Russia, and you deceive yourself. I am certain of his adhesion, of the disapprobation he has formally manifested respecting your armaments, and the course he will adopt on the occasion. If I had doubts on this subject I would make war at once on you and him alike, for I should not choose to leave the affairs of the continent in doubt. If I confine myself to mere precautions, it is because I am perfectly confident with regard to the continent, because I am so with regard to the emperor of Russia. Do not imagine, then, that the opportunity is a fair one for attacking France; it would be a grievous mistake on your part. You do not desire war; I believe this of you, M. de Metternich, I believe it of your emperor, and of the enlightened men of your country. But the German nobility, dissatisfied with the changes that have occurred, fill Germany with their rancour. You let yourselves be moved; you communicate your emotion to the masses in urging them to arm; from armament to armament, you come at last to an extraordinary situation, which cannot be long maintained; and by and by you will be brought perhaps to that point at which one longs for a crisis as a means of escaping out of an insupportable situation, and that crisis will be war. Moral and physical nature alike when they are come to that troubled state which precedes the storm, have need to explode in order to purify the air and bring back serenity. This is what I fear from your present conduct. I repeat to you," continued Napoleon, "I want nothing of you, I demand nothing but peace—nothing but a peaceable and stable condition of our mutual relations; but if you make preparations, I will make such that the superiority of my arms shall not be more dubious than in the preceding campaigns; and thus, in order to preserve peace, we shall have brought on war."

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* This conversation, committed to paper on the instant by M. de Champagny, was sent to Vienna to M. Andréossy, and is preserved in the archives of the foreign-office. I give only the substance of it in the text.

On concluding this conversation Napoleon was most gracious in his demeanour towards M. de Metternich, and behaved in all respects like a man who desired peace without fearing war, but who was resolved not to remain in a state of uncertainty. M. de. Metternich and the others who heard the conversation could not entertain any doubt as to his real intentions, for his manner was as decided as it was calm and business like.

Next day, the 16th, was a day of multifarious orders. M. de Champagny had to transmit to Vienna an account of Napoleon's conversation with M. de Metternich, and to draw precise conclusions from its general tenor. M. de Metternich was told in Paris, and general Andreossy was instructed to repeat in Vienna, that it was absolutely necessary either to stop the armaments that had been begun, and to do so in a satisfactory manner, or to fight forthwith. Then, in order the more surely to sound the disposition of Austria, Napoleon addressed a demand to her for the immediate recognition of Joseph. This was beyond all doubt the most infallible means of knowing what she thought, or at least what she desired at that moment; for were it possible to extort from her, contrary to all her sentiments, and to her most emphatic and most recent declarations, the recognition of Joseph's royalty, it would be proof that she was incapable of encountering any risk, and that for some time at least one might be at ease as regarded her.

M. de Metternich, who in Paris displayed great zeal for the maintenance of peace, and was lavish of pacific assurances in all his conversations, whether with the imperial ministers or with the Emperor himself, replied with alacrity, that full satisfaction should be given relatively to the armaments of Austria. But as to the recognition of king Joseph, assuming a less affirmative tone, and a more constrained manner, he declared that as far as he was aware, he foresaw no resistance on the part of his cabinet, but that he could not give a definite answer without referring for instructions to Vienna. It was evident that the point in question was the greatest of the existing difficulties, and that to obtain from Austria such a disavowal of her sentiments, and her most recent language, to inflict such a humiliation upon her, would require no less an effort than it would cost to extort fresh provinces from her. It was nevertheless a means of embarrassing her and forcing her to more circumspection, if she was not prepared to fight.

In reality, Napoleon was beginning to believe, that he should be obliged to have one more conflict with her in order to bring her finally into submission; but he wished to know if he should previously have at least six months leisure to make a rapid campaign in Spain, and move thither a hundred thousand of his veteran soldiers, without hazarding his preponderance beyond the Rhine.

All his demonstrations and demands for explanation had no other object than this.

In order to give them a still more imposing character he called upon all the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine for a first contingent, a small one indeed, but sufficient to excite much uneasy comment in Germany, and to give Austria matter for reflection. Should war finally break out between her and France, those small contingents would be raised to their legal effective amount; otherwise they were to go as they were to Spain to aid in the new war Napoleon had brought upon himself; for he chose that the princes of the Rhine should be engaged with him in all his quarrels, and should take their full share of the burden laid on France. This was good policy in one sense, bad in another; for if he thus forced them to identify their cause with his own, on the other hand he exposed them to experience the general hatred which was sure to be provoked, soon or late, by these repeated conscriptions, both right and left of the Rhine, and north and south of the Alps and Pyrenees.

The care Napoleon had taken to make Austria explain, was not the only one imposed on him by circumstances. Whatever were the number of troops detached from the Grand Army for the war in Spain, it would be necessary to effect a new retrograde movement in Poland and Germany in order to approach the Rhine. Already, when he had finally determined on engaging with Spain, Napoleon had made a first change in the positions of his troops, and transferred them from the space between the Pregel and the Vistula to that between the Vistula and the Oder. Marshal Soult, leaving the Oudinot grenadiers in Dantzig, and the heavy cavalry in the delta of the Vistula, had fallen back with the 4th division into Pomerania, Brandenburg, and Hanover. Marshal Bernadotte had continued to occupy the Hanseatic towns with the Boudet and Molitor divisions, the Spaniards, and the Dutch. Marshal Davout with the 3rd division, the Saxons, the Poles, and the rest of the cavalry, had fallen back into the duchy of Posen, having his base on the Oder. General Victor, raised to the rank of marshal, had established his quarters at Berlin with the 1st division. Marshal Mortier with the 5th and 6th divisions was cantoned in Silesia.

Napoleon's intention in prolonging this occupation of Prussia was to force it finally to settle the question of the war contributions; next, to observe from a strong position the development of the consequences of his alliance with Russia, and his latent strife with Austria; and lastly, to keep his army always in serviceable condition, living on the enemy's country—at least, in part, for he defrayed a portion of its expenses from the extraordinary treasury.

It was indispensable, however, to put an end to this prolonged occupation. In fact, since the war in Spain, it was becoming impossible to keep so vast an extent of country, and it was necessary to abandon a certain number of provinces. It was necessary, not in order to please Russia, with whom everything depended on a concession in the East; not to please Prussia, who, borne down by her heavy burthen, demanded to treat on any conditions, reserving to herself the faculty of not executing those conditions at a future time, should she be unable to do so, or should fortune relieve her from the necessity; nor yet was it to please Austria, with whom there was an end to conciliation; but it was necessary in order to bring the French forces into greater compactness, and move a portion of them towards the Pyrenees. It was expedient, however, to derive from this retrograde movement, which had become necessary, an advantageous settlement with Prussia; it was expedient also to extract from it something agreeable to the emperor of Russia; for, next after the arrangement of the affairs of the East, what the emperor Alexander most desired, in order to be delivered, as he said, *from the importunities of unfortunate people, who upbraided him with their misfortunes*, was the evacuation of Prussia, and the final arrangement of the war contributions, which were still insisted on at the hands of that power.

For many months had been resident in Paris prince William, brother of the king of Prussia, and envoy to Napoleon, for the purpose of obtaining, if possible, a reduction of the charges imposed on his country. This prince had won the esteem of everybody, and particularly that of Napoleon, by his dignified deportment and his prudence. Still he had hitherto ineffectually alleged the inability of Prussia to pay the sums demanded of her, and had quite as vainly offered the most complete and absolute submission of the house of Brandenburg, to be guaranteed by a treaty of alliance offensive and defensive. Napoleon had not suffered himself to be moved either by the prince's allegations or his offers, because he believed that whatever resources he restored to Prussia she would employ in reconstituting her forces, in order to turn them against him. Before Jena he might have counted upon her; but since that date he felt she must be implacable, and that to exhaust, if he could not destroy her, was the only sagacious policy. Obliged, however, to recall his troops, he consented at last to hear prince William's propositions; and, after rather long debate, he agreed to evacuate Prussia entirely, with the exception of three fortresses on the Oder—Glogau, Stettin, and Custrin—which he would keep until the payment of the stipulated contributions; and he granted this evacuation on condition of the payment of a sum of 140,000,000, as well for the ordinary contributions as for the extraordinary contributions not defrayed. This sum was to be paid half in money or good bills of exchange, half in mortgages on the territorial domains of Prussia, in such sort that the whole should be liquidated within a brief term—the bills of exchange in eleven or twelve months, at the rate of 6,000,000 a month; the mortgages in a year and a half at the most. The evacuation was to begin immediately, and the French troops were to retire into Swedish Pomerania, the Hanse towns, Hanover, Westphalia, and the Saxon and Franconian provinces taken from Prussia and retained by France. But with Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau on the Oder, Magdeburg on the Elbe, and his troops in Hanover, Saxony, and Franconia, Napoleon was still present as before in Germany, and in a condition to command it. For the greater security he had a secret article inserted in the convention for the evacuation, an article hitherto unknown, by which Prussia bound herself for ten years to confine her military effective within the following limits: ten regiments of infantry, containing 22 thousand men; eight regiments of cavalry, 8 thousand strong; a corps of artillery and of engineers, amounting to 6 thousand; and the royal guard, 6 thousand—making together a total of 42 thousand men. The king of Prussia furthermore bound himself not to create any local militia which might serve to disguise any process of arming whatever. Finally, he engaged to make common cause with the French empire against Austria, and to furnish it against her, in case of war, a division of 16 thousand men of all arms. For the year 1809 alone, if war broke out, Prussia, not having yet reconstructed her army, was to limit her contingent to 12 thousand. Napoleon, whose wish was to hold Prussia in check, not to humiliate her, consented to leave this disagreeable part of the treaty unknown. The worthy and discreet prince who defended the interests of his country in Paris could obtain no better terms, for Napoleon, though he had dealt himself the blow which was one day to destroy his power, was still formidable enough to make Europe tremble, and to dictate the law to all his enemies.

Having signed this convention, he wrote to the king and queen of Prussia, congratulating himself that an end had been put to all the differences between the two courts, and promising for the future to maintain the most amicable relations with the court of Berlin, if the latter was not again misled by hostile passions. Hard as was this treaty for Prussia, it was better than the state of things it superseded, for she was at last delivered from the French troops; and if she was limited in her armaments, it is doubtful that she could have paid for more than the treaty allowed her.

Besides the advantage for Napoleon of settling his accounts with Prussia, and allowing him to withdraw his troops, this arrangement was further recommended by its being agreeable to Russia, which was exceedingly importuned by the complaints of the Prussians, and very desirous to be relieved from them. Now, to be agreeable to Russia was become for the moment one of the conventional rules of Napoleon's policy, and he was as eager to be on a good understanding with her as to bring Austria to an explanation, and to end his disputes with Prussia.

The state of things had undergone no change in St. Petersburg. Alexander, who was always engrossed by the passion of the moment, set no bounds to his complaisance since Napoleon had consented to entertain the question of partitioning the Turkish empire. Constantinople above all was an object on which his heart was set more than on the fairest provinces of that empire, because Constantinople implied glory and renown as well as utility. But to give away that key of the straits was of all concessions in the world the very one most repugnant to Napoleon. As the reader has already seen, he had never given it his formal assent; and when he permitted his ambassador, M. de Caulaincourt, to listen to the expression of such desires, it was with a simultaneous announcement of an intention to have the Dardanelles if the Bosphorus was given up to the Russians; an arrangement which could not be acceptable to the court of St. Petersburg. Alexander did not despair of carrying his point with Napoleon. He was incessantly repeating that he desired no territory south of the Balkans, no portion whatever of Roumelia, nothing but the precincts of Constantinople, and anybody else might have Adrianople. In the familiar jargon he talked with the French ambassador he used to give the name of *the cat's tongue* to that tongue of land which is destined as it were to be the lodging of the gatekeeper of the straits.—"Well," he would often say to M. de Caulaincourt, "have you heard from your master? Has he mentioned *the cat's tongue?* Is he disposed to understand and admit the wants of my empire, as I understand and admit the want of his?"—M. de Caulaincourt gave only evasive answers to these questions, always alleging Napoleon's engrossing occupations, his absence from the capital and his approaching return, after which he should be able to turn his attention from the affairs of the West to those of the East. Alexander rejoined by saying that another interview was necessary to end these differences, that it was indispensable towards the vigorous revival of the policy of Tilsit, and that it could not take place too soon. He himself, however, had not his hands freer than Napoleon's; for the affairs of Finland had taken almost as bad a turn as those of Spain. His troops, after driving back the Swedish armies to Uleaburg, and thereby concentrating them, had themselves been driven back in turn, and even beaten, thanks to the incapacity of general Buxhoevden, a court favourite, and secured against the indignation of the army by that circumstance only. At the same time, an English fleet, blockading the Russian fleet in the Gulf of Finland, spread terror along the coast. It was not possible, therefore, for the emperor Alexander to leave home immediately. But the closing of the navigation in September, and the shutting out of the English for several months, would set Alexander free again, and he asked that the interview in which he hoped to arrange everything with Napoleon should be fixed at the latest for that month. M. de Caulaincourt always replied to these pressing instances in the manner most likely to make him have patience, and promised that the interview should certainly take place at the time he specified.

Alexander certainly spared no pains to induce Napoleon to enter into his views. The introduction of the French armies into Spain, the occupation of Madrid, the forcible removal of the Spanish princes to Bayonne, the spoliation of their rights, and the proclamation of Joseph's royalty, all this he had found natural, legitimate, and necessary by way of completing Napoleon's policy.—"Your emperor," he said to M. de Caulaincourt, "cannot suffer any Bourbons so near him. This is on his part a consistent policy which I entirely admit. I am not jealous of his aggrandisements," he was continually saying, "especially when they are prompted by the same motives as the last. Let him not be jealous of those which are in like manner necessary to my empire, and quite as easy to justify."

The higher circles in St. Petersburg, emboldened by the disagreeable, rather than dangerous, checks sustained in Finland, shocked more or less sincerely at the events of Bayonne, and finding a plausible pretext for their complaints in the interdiction of the navigation, were again holding disparaging language as to the policy of an alliance with France; and it is true that the said policy was not distinguished at that time either by morality or by success; for the act of wresting Finland from a relation, whose natural extravagance one had long excited, and over whose weakness it was painful to triumph, was not much better than what was passing in Spain, and was even very like it. "You must *make the best of a bad job*" (*bonne mine à mauvais jeu*), said Alexander to M. de Caulaincourt, "and go through with this difficult affair without flinching."—With his usual tact he avoided as much as possible talking to M. de Caulaincourt about our disadvantages in Spain, and only adverted to the subject when he could not be silent respecting it without an affectation that would be disagreeable to the very person whose feelings he wished to spare. And when the English party in St. Petersburg proclaimed general Dupont's disaster with shouts of joy, and so much exaggerated our losses as to announce as destroyed the army which was still entire on the Ebro, and as prisoner king Joseph, who was holding his court in Vittoria, he spoke on the matter to M. de Caulaincourt as being neither publicly nor secretly pleased at the disaster of an army that had long been opposed to his own; but on the contrary, as being grieved at such an occurrence, and as seeing in what had occurred nothing but what was simple, indifferent, and easy to explain.—"Your master," he said, "sent young soldiers thither, and not enough of them; besides, he was not there; blunders have been committed; he will soon have repaired all that. With some thousands of his old soldiers, one of his good generals, or some days' presence in his own person, he will soon have brought back king Joseph to Madrid, and rendered the Tilsit policy triumphant. For my part, I shall be invariable, and I am about to address Austria in language that will induce her to reflect seriously on her imprudent conduct. I will prove to your master that I am faithful in bad and in good fortune. It is a very slight misfortune this; but, such as it is, it will afford him an opportunity of putting me to the test. Tell him, however, that we must see each other, and as soon as possible, to arrange together and master Europe."—Alexander, moreover, kept his word, imposed silence on the censorious and the alarmists, made the Austrian legation especially hold its peace, and enjoined such a reserve upon his mother's circle, that they spoke of our discomfitures in Spain with as much discretion as of those of the Russian armies in Finland.

Such was the aspect of the court of St. Petersburg after, and as influenced by, the events in Spain. Informed in the most exact manner of what was passing there, by the despatches of M. de Caulaincourt, who transmitted to him scrupulously by way of question and reply his daily dialogues with the emperor Alexander, Napoleon at last resolved to accept an interview. This was the principal one among the determinations taken by him in consequence of his new position. He thought the time was come to realise, not all the wishes of Alexander, which was impossible without jeopardising the safety of Europe, but a part at least of those wishes; and that it was thus expedient to see him, fascinate him again, concede to him something considerable, such as the Danubian provinces for instance, and, for the rest, to disabuse him or make him wait; in one word, to put him in good humour, which was possible, for Wallachia and Moldavia, immediately and really bestowed, were enough to satisfy the vastest ambition. Besides the advantage of conferring directly with the young emperor under circumstances of great moment, ascertaining what was at the bottom of his heart, and securing his good will by some important concessions, a public interview in the face of Europe would be a grand spectacle, which would strike men's imaginations, and bear visible testimony to an alliance which it was necessary to render not only real and solid, but apparent, in order to awe all the enemies of the empire.

Whilst he was pressing Austria with his questions, and according to Prussia the evacuation of her territory, Napoleon despatched a courier to M. de Caulaincourt, authorising him to consent to a solemn interview with the emperor Alexander. The latter had named the end of September, on account of the closing of the navigation which took place at that season. The time was convenient for Napoleon, and he accepted it. Alexander had seemed to desire for the place of rendezvous either Weimar, for the sake of his sister, or Erfurth, on account of the greater freedom that might be enjoyed there. Napoleon accepted Erfurth, one of the territories that remained in his hands since the parcelling of Germany, and of which he had not yet disposed in favour of any of the sovereigns of the Confederation. Having thus generally determined the time and place for the interview, and leaving it to the emperor Alexander to specify the days and hours, he gave orders that the interview should have all desirable éclat.

There were still some detachments of the imperial guard on the Rhine. Napoleon ordered a superb battalion of grenadiers of that guard to Erfurth. He gave orders to select a fine regiment of light infantry, a regiment of hussars, and one of cuirassiers, from among those which were returning from Germany, and to march them likewise to Erfurth, to serve as a guard of honour for the sovereigns who were to be present at the interview. He despatched officers of his household with the richest portions of the crown furniture, in order that the largest houses in the town might be elegantly and sumptuously arranged, and adapted to the wants of the persons about to be assembled—emperors, kings, princes, ministers, and generals. He desired that French literature should contribute to the splendour of the assemblage, and commanded the administration of the theatres to send to Erfurth the first French actors, and the first of all, Talma, to perform there "Cinna," "Andromaque," "Mahomet," and "Œdipe." He excluded comedy, although he held the immortal works of Molière in the esteem they deserve; "but they are not well understood," he said, "in Germany. We must set before the Germans the grandeurs of our tragic stage; they are more capable of seizing them than of penetrating the depth of Molière." Lastly, he gave orders for the display of prodigious sumptuosity, for it was his will that France should command respect by her civilisation as much as by her arms.

These orders being given, he employed the time that remained to him in making his military preparations against two contingencies; that, namely, in which he should have to encounter only Spain aided by the English, and that in which, besides Spain and England, he should have to fight once more, and immediately, with Austria. The state of things had not mended in Spain since the retreat of the French army on the Ebro. Joseph had, between Catalonia, Aragon, Castille, and the Basque provinces, and including some recent reinforcements, more than a hundred thousand men, partly young soldiers already inured to war, partly old soldiers who had arrived successively, regiment by regiment, from the Elbe to the Rhine, and from the Rhine to the Pyrenees. This was more than would have been enough in the hands of an able general to overwhelm the insurgents, who were audaciously advancing from all points of Spain, from Gallicia, from Madrid, from Saragossa. But nothing was done except running to and fro, complaining, and soliciting fresh resources without knowing how to use those at hand. Napoleon tried to inspire the panic-stricken Joseph with courage by the energy of his language. "Be worthy of your brother," he said to him; "try to bear yourself as becomes your position. What care I for a parcel of insurgents whom I shall settle with my dragoons, and who are not likely to defeat armies that neither Austria, Russia, nor Prussia could withstand? *I shall find the Pillars of Hercules in Spain; I shall not find there the limits of my power.*" He promised him immense reinforcements, and added much wise and provident advice, which Joseph and his generals were incapable of understanding, still more of following. Joseph had chosen to have about him his little court of Naples, and in the first place Marshal Jourdan, a very respectable man, as we have said, decent, slow, mediocre, just the sort of man suited to the mediocrity of Joseph, and above all to his love of domineering; for the emperor's brothers indemnified themselves for his domination over them by that which they endeavoured to exercise over others. Next after Marshal Jourdan, Joseph had asked for M. Rœderer to aid him in the political and financial administration of Spain; a request which Napoleon had not yet granted, because he distrusted, not the heart or understanding of M. Rœderer, but his practical capacity in business of state. With the exception of this latter, Joseph had already round him all his Neapolitan household; and in his half-military, half-political court, it was a favourite practice to speak ill of Napoleon, to inveigh against his oddities, his perverse commands, and his want of justice and reason; and without venturing to deny his genius, these critics were fond of observing that he judged of things from a distance, and therefore ill and superficially; in short, that he was mistaken, and they were not so. They were not very far even from believing that, forasmuch as one was his brother, one must possess a share more or less of his genius, and that with a little of his experience in war one would be no less capable than himself of commanding.

Inspirited by Napoleon's energetic language, and emboldened by the reinforcements which were arriving from all parts, Joseph plucked up courage, was often on horseback attended by his trusty Jourdan, and took some pleasure in playing the warrior king, giving orders, directing movements, showing himself to the troops, and holding reviews. But, reassured as he was, he had not ventured to remain in Burgos, or even in Miranda, and he finally established his head-quarters at Vittoria. He had there 2000 men of a royal guard, half Spanish, half Neapolitan, 2000 men of the imperial guard, and 3000 of the Rey brigade, which always accompanied him; in all 7000. On his right he had marshal Bessières, with 20,000 men distributed between Cubo, Briviesca, and Burgos, holding the latter town by cavalry; on his left, from Miranda to Logroño, marshal Moncey, with 18,000; and from Logroño to Tudela, general Verdier's division, still 15 or 16 thousand strong after its losses at Saragossa. In his rear Joseph had the marching depôts and regiments, a disjointed assemblage of soldiers detached from all the corps, but useful for covering the rear, and comprising not fewer than 15 or16 thousand men. The last arrived of the old regiments which Napoleon had successively withdrawn from the Grand Army, namely, the 51st and 43rd of the line, with the 26th regiment of chasseurs, had served to form the Godinot brigade, an excellent body of troops, which, by a sudden attack on Bilbao, had cleared it of the insurgents, and killed 1200 of them. Lastly, the moveable columns of gendarmerie and mountaineers guarding the passes of the Pyrenees, to the number of 3000 or 4000 men, the division of general Reille 6000 or 7000 strong, that of general Duhesme, in Catalonia, 10,000 or 11,000, completed a total of 100,000men, forming the forces that still remained in Spain.

Napoleon wearied himself with sending to Joseph's head-quarters instructions, which, as we have said, were ill understood and worse executed. In the first place, he converted from provisional into regular regiments those from 113 to 120, and gave orders to incorporate with them all the marching detachments in order to the consolidation of the several corps, and to concentrate the imperial guard, one part of which was with marshal Bessières, the other with Joseph, and to form with it and the two old regiments of Godinot's brigade a good reserve, such as was necessary against unforeseen contingencies. His arrangements for the general distribution of the forces were as follows. Considering Aragon and Navarre as a separate theatre of operations, which had its own secured line of retreat on Pampeluna, he gave orders to form there a distinct mass of from 15,000 to 18,000 men, which should serve to cover the left of the army, to guard Tudela, which was the key of Aragon, and to collect there a vast amount of artillery for the purpose of ultimately resuming the siege of Saragossa. Then placing the centre of the principal operations in Burgos, in Old Castille, on the high road to Madrid, he ordered the establishment there of a body of from 40,000 to 50,000 men, to be ready to fall upon any insurgent corps that should present itself on the one hand or the other, and to overwhelm it; for there was no Spanish army whatever that could stand against a combined force of 30,000 or 40,000 Frenchmen. Finally, he gave orders to wait in that imposing attitude for the arrival of the reinforcements, and for his presence, which he hoped to give at no distant time. All this, which was as clearly set forth in Napoleon's instructions as it was sagaciously planned, was not understood by any one in Vittoria, and Joseph and those about him passed their time in taking fright at the least movements of the enemy, and descrying insurgents everywhere by hundreds of thousands. Thus, since the retreat of marshal Bessières, general Blake had reappeared with some 20,000 men in Old Castille, and his force was exaggerated into 40,000 or 50,000. Since the capitulation of Baylen, general Castaños was advancing slowly on Madrid with about 15,000 men, and he was supposed to be on his march to the Ebro with 50,000. Lastly, the Valencians and Aragonese might reckon on 18,000 or 20,000 men, and their force was set down at 40,000. All together, then, the enemy were computed at 130 or 140 thousand men, potent and skilful enough to reduce French armies to capitulate, as at Baylen; and when more precise information had reduced these exaggerations to their true value, the alarmists excused themselves on the plea that it was so difficult to obtain exact information in Spain.—"In war it is at all times and in all places difficult to know the truth," was Napoleon's reply to them; "but it is always possible to collect it if one will be at the pains. You have a numerous cavalry, and the brave Lasalle. Send out your dragoons to sweep the country over a range of ten to fifteen leagues; seize the alcades, the curés, the notable inhabitants, and the postmasters; keep them until they speak, interrogate them judiciously, and you will learn the truth, which you will never learn by going to sleep within your lines."

These grand lessons were thrown away, and Joseph's courtiers continued to people space with imaginary enemies. Towards the end of August, for instance, the Aragonese, Valencians, and Catalonians, under the conde de Montijo, having presented themselves in the environs of Tudela, marshal Moncey, who was much intimidated since his campaign in Valencia, imagined that all the insurgents of Spain were swarming down upon him, and hastened to take up a defensive position, and to cry out loudly for succour. General Lefebvre-Desnoettes, acting in place of general Verdier, who had been wounded at Saragossa, immediately advanced. He crossed the Ebro at Alvaro with his Polish lancers, and put to flight all that came in his way, thus demonstrating what sort of thing was the formidable army of Aragon and Valencia.

This curious adventure covered the alarmists with confusion, and contributed to induce a more correct estimate of the enemy's strength. Emboldened by what he had just seen and by the severe letters he received from Paris, Joseph then took it into his head to imitate his brother's grand manœuvres. Establishing himself in Miranda as a centre, he meditated the plan of rushing from one division of the enemy to another, and beating them in succession, after the manner frequently practised by Napoleon. The Spaniards, it is true, rather facilitated such a system; for general Blake, with the insurgents of Leon, the Asturias, and Gallicia, aimed at introducing himself into Biscay on our right; a detachment under general Castaños intended to arrive at the Ebro on our front; and the Aragonese, Valencians, and others, purposed to enter Navarre so as to turn our left. Their hope was to out-flank and surround us, cut off our communication with France, and thus achieve another Baylen: an absurd chimera, for there was no chance of repeating with sixty thousand Frenchmen, all very resolute in spite of the timidity of some of their leaders, what had been effected for once against eight thousand disheartened Frenchmen. To counteract this ridiculous plan, imitated from the chance affair at Baylen, Joseph proposed to employ the equally ridiculous imitation of his brother's grand style of operations, and to fall *en masse* on each of the insurgent bodies in its turn, so as to crush them one after the other. The intention might be good; but opportune precision is everything in war, and imitation succeeds no better in that art than in any other. Thus, whilst Blake's insurgents were making demonstrations on Bilbao, and those of Aragon on Tudela, Joseph was sending his divisions thither in all haste, sometimes galloping with them himself in breathless speed, arriving when it was too late, or stopping short midway in his manœuvres; he would then march his wearied and exhausted soldiers back to Vittoria, and write to the emperor that he had followed his advice, and hoped soon, with a little experience, to become worthy of him. Pitiable spectacle often given to the world by commonplace men who seek to copy their more gifted brothers, and succeed in equalling them only in their defects or their vices!

Napoleon could not refrain from smiling at these silly displays of his brother's vanity, but anger soon overcame his disposition to laugh when he reflected on the time and the forces which were thus utterly wasted. He thought, therefore, of sending to those who imitated him so badly one of his ablest lieutenants, marshal Ney, that he might put fresh energy into them; and then he ordered them to confine themselves to reorganising the army, repairing their matériel and artillery, keeping good guard on the Ebro, and remaining quiet until his own arrival.

He then made up his mind as to the detachments he should take from Italy and Germany in order to complete the subjugation of Spain. Not less than from 100 to 120 thousand men he thought would be required promptly to terminate the Spanish insurrection and drive the English into the sea. He had been made acquainted with the convention of Cintra, and, finding it honourable for the army which had fought well and which had remained free, he wrote to Junot,—"As a general you might have done better; as a soldier you have done nothing contrary to honour."—At the same time he gave orders at Rochefort to receive and re-equip the troops from Portugal, which, being acclimated, inured to war, and re-armed, might again render great services, and increase by twenty thousand men the succours destined for the Peninsula.

Italy had for some months received back the Italians, now become good soldiers by serving in the North. Napoleon ordered prince Eugene to despatch them, to the number of ten thousand, under general Pino, towards Dauphiné and Roussillon. With two fine French regiments, the 1st light and the 42nd of the line, taken from Piedmont, where their place was supplied by two regiments of the army of Naples, he formed the nucleus of a division, which was given to general Souham, and completed by several battalions belonging to corps already put under contribution for Catalonia. This division, artillery and cavalry included, amounted to nearly seven thousand men. Then there were 16 or 17 thousand men on the march from the Alps to the Pyrenees, and these, with the division under general Duhesme, Reille's column, and a brigade of Neapolitans already on its way to Perpignan under general Chabot, made up a total of about 36 thousand troops destined for Catalonia. That province being separated from the rest of Spain, and forming a distinct theatre of war, Napoleon gave the command-in-chief of the troops there to general St. Cyr, a general of incomparable ability as regarded methodic warfare, and who always operated well when he was alone. He could not have made a better choice.

It was Germany and Poland that were to furnish the most considerable detachments. Napoleon resolved to take thence the 1st division, already transferred to Berlin under the command of marshal Victor; and the 6th, which had belonged to marshal Ney, and was then encamped in Silesia under marshal Mortier. It was his intention subsequently to take thence the 5th, which had belonged successively to marshals Lannes and Masséna, and which, as well as the 6th, was encamped in Silesia under marshal Mortier. For the present Napoleon removed it to Bareuth, one of the Franconianprovinces remaining in his possession, where he intended that it should remain in readiness to act against Austria, if she decided for immediate war; or to be marched to Spain if the court of Vienna desisted from arming. The first and sixth divisions, reinforced by the recruits furnished by the depôts, amounted to not less than fifty thousand men, including the artillery and the light-horse attached to each division. They were all, with the exception of a small contingent of conscripts, tried veterans, combined together in a matchless framework of military organisation. Napoleon thought also of borrowing from Germany a part of the general reserve of cavalry, and made choice of the dragoons, an arm that seemed to him excellently adapted for employment in Spain, because, whereas it could be applied to various services, and was solid enough to be opposed to the Spanish infantry, it was yet less cumbrous than the heavy cavalry. He resolved on the other hand to leave in the plains of the North his numerous and valiant cuirassiers, as useless against the undisciplined troops of the South, but necessary against the martial bands of the northern regions. He gave orders for marching three divisions of dragoons to Spain, postponing the departure of the remaining two until he should have cleared up the mystery of the Austrian policy.

He resolved to make the kings, his allies or brothers, co-operate in this war, which belonged to his system of confederated royalties; and he demanded 3 thousand Dutchmen of the king of Holland, 7 thousand Germans of the princes of the Confederation of the Rhine, and of the king of Saxony 7 thousand Poles whom he had long engaged to take into his service. Finally he sent off about 3500 engineers and artillerymen, with an immense matériel.

This was not the whole force which was marching towards the Pyrenees. Already, as we have said, Napoleon had ordered to Spain eight old regiments comprised in the hundred thousand men then acting on the Ebro. Four others from the banks of the Elbe and from Paris, the 28th, 32nd, 58th, and 75th of the line, were on the roads of France, and were to form with the 5th regiment of dragoons a fine division of seven or eight thousand men, whom Napoleon put under the command of general Sebastiani, who had returned from Constantinople. To these twelve old regiments, taken successively from Germany and France, he had added two others on the news of Joseph's disaster: these were the 36th and 55th of the line, at that moment approaching Bayonne and destined to reinforce Joseph's reserve. Lastly, the guard was to furnish four thousand men more, besides three thousand who were at Joseph's head-quarters. These troops, without the 5th division, the destination of which remained undetermined, and without Junot's troops, which were but just arriving and required to be reorganised, formed altogether a total of between 100 and 115 thousand men, worthy of the Grand Army from which they were drawn. Napoleon was about to take means for further augmenting their numbers by means of a judicious recruitment from the depôts, which were to be kept at their full complement by conscription.

The next consideration was, how to supply the places of the troops withdrawn from the army of Italy, and, above all, from the Grand Army, without too much weakening either. After the regiments successively recalled from Poland and Germany, after the departure of the 1st and 6th divisions, and of the dragoons, and the discharge of the auxiliaries, the force of the Grand Army was very considerably reduced. There remained in Swedish Pomerania and in Prussia marshal Soult's 4th division, consisting of 34 thousand foot, 3 thousand light horse, 8 or 9 thousand heavy horse, 4 thousand artillerymen and engineers—in all about 50 thousand. Marshal Bernadotte, prince of Ponte Corvo, was keeping garrison in the Hanse towns and on the Baltic coast with two French divisions of 12 thousand men (the Boudet and Gency divisions, Molitor's division having been united to that of marshal Soult), 14 thousand Spaniards, and 7 thousand Dutchmen—in all 33 thousand men. Marshal Davoust, with the 3rd division, the finest and most strongly organised of the whole French army, was occupying the duchy of Posen, from the Vistula to the Oder. It numbered 38 thousand foot, 9 thousand horse, chasseurs, dragoons, and cuirassiers. He occupied, moreover, Dantzig, with the Oudinot division of 10 thousand grenadiers and chasseurs *d'élite*. He had 3 thousand artillerymen and engineers, which made a total of 60 thousand Frenchmen. He had 30 thousand Saxons and Poles. The general park for the whole grand army, in Magdeburg and the principal fortresses of Prussia, was served by 7 or 8 thousand men of all kinds. This was a total of 180 thousand men, of whom 130 thousand were French, 50 thousand Poles, Saxons, Spaniards, and Dutch. If to this mass was added the 5th division, established in Silesia, and amounting to about 24 thousand men, the Grand Army might be estimated at 200 thousands of the very best soldiers, quite sufficient, with the army of Italy, to overwhelm Austria, even should the emperor Alexander bring us little or no help. It was not enough, however, to withstand the universal antipathy of the continent, for, though Austria alone manifested her dislike and her wish to shake off our yoke, all Germany was beginning to feel a deep and ill-concealed aversion for us, both in the countries subject to the Confederation of the Rhine and in all the rest.

Napoleon resolved immediately to raise the effective of the armies of Germany and Italy almost to what it had been before the deductions he had made from them. Unfortunately he could render them equal in quantity only, not in quality, to what they had been, for he sent them recruits only in place of old troops. Yet the nuclei of those armies were so excellent, and the number of experienced soldiers in them was still so considerable, that an addition of conscripts could not sensibly weaken them. He began, in conformity with the convention he had entered into with Prussia, by moving the troops he had in Germany towards the Rhine. The 1st and the 6th divisions, destined for Spain, were, by his orders, on the march for Mayence, with an interval of six halts between them, so that they might not impede each other on the route. Marshal Soult's division was moved to Berlin, to take the place of the 1st, which had just left that capital. Marshal Davoust's corps was to take the place left vacant on the Oder and in Silesia by the 6th and 5th divisions, the former of which had gone, as we have seen, to Mayence, and the latter to Bareuth. General Oudinot was to quit Dantzig with his picked battalions and proceed to Central Germany, his place being supplied at Dantzig by the Poles and Saxons. This movement, which began the execution of the convention with Prussia, rendered recruitment easier, by diminishing the distance by one-half.

Napoleon's first step was to put in force the decree passed in the preceding year, which fixed the force of each regiment of infantry at five battalions. Consequently, he resolved to have four complete battalions in all the regiments of the Grand Army, leaving the fifth, that of the depôt, on the Rhine. For Spain, he determined that every regiment should have three battalions of war with the main body, a fourth at Bayonne, as a first depôt, and a fifth in the interior of France, as a second depôt. The armies of Italy and of Naples were likewise to have five battalions per regiment, four in Italy, and the fifth in Piedmont, or in the southern departments of France.

To this end it was necessary to have recourse again to the conscription. There remained to be enrolled, out of the conscriptions of 1807, 1808, and 1809—the latter already decreed in January of the current year—about 60 thousand men. Napoleon resolved to demand, in addition, that of 1810, thus beginning the practice of anticipating the conscription by more than a year. He took the precaution, however, not to dispose for the present of more than a part of these levies. The 60 thousand men for the years 1807, 1808, 1809, and the 80 thousand for 1810, were to form a total of 140 thousand men, to be thus distributed: 40 thousand to the infantry of the Grand Army, 30 thousand to that of the army of Spain, 26 to that of Italy, 10 to the five legions in reserve, 10 to that of the imperial guard, which made in all 116 thousand for the infantry. There remained 14 thousand for the cavalry, and 10 thousand for the artillery, engineers, and baggage department.

It will be remarked, no doubt, that Napoleon levied 10 thousand men for the imperial guard. That choice corps, after its return to France, was reposing in Paris, and was generally less employed than the others. Napoleon resolved to make it a school of war, by sending to it chosen young men, to be trained by it into battalions of fusileers. After having passed a year or two at Paris or Versailles in the imperial guard, these conscripts would naturally have acquired its spirit, its discipline, and its fine soldierly appearance. At the same time he did not neglect to prescribe the ordinary recruitment of the guard, at the rate of twenty picked men from each regiment in the whole army, so as to maintain its excellent composition, and to leave open that career of advancement for the old soldiers who had no other way of rising.

For the present, Napoleon called out only 80 thousand men—

60 thousand upon the conscription already decreed, and 20 thousand only upon that of 1810; and desired that the enrolment should begin with the conscripts of the classes in arrear, and that 20 thousand of them, chiefly from the southern departments, should be marched to Bayonne. He ordered that skeletons of each fourth battalion should be sent to that town, to begin forthwith the training of those conscripts, who were already of a vigorous age, and thus to provide for the future recruitment of the corps entering Spain. In consequence of this provident measure, the Grand Army would soon contain nearly 200 thousand Frenchmen, not including the fifth division, the army of Italy 100 thousand, the army of Spain 250 thousand, of whom 100 thousand were already on the Ebro, 110 were on the march, and 40 thousand were serving their military apprenticeship in the fourth battalions.

Pending the execution of these measures, Napoleon had the depôts cleared immediately of all their disposable inmates, so as to procure more space, and send a first contingent of recruits to all the divisions. Three marching regiments were formed and sent off, one to Berlin, for marshal Soult (4th division); one to Magdeburg, for marshal Davoust (3rd division); one to Dresden, for marshal Mortier (5th division). Two others were sent to Mayence and to Orleans, to recruit the 1st and the 6th divisions. This was an immediate reinforcement of 12 thousand well-trained men for the various corps which were to remain in Germany or to proceed to Spain.

Napoleon directed, at the same time, with a view to facilitate the formation of the regiments left in Germany into four war battalions, that those which had companies of grenadiers and chasseurs in the Oudinot division should immediately recall them; and to indemnify that division for the loss, he sent it companies of grenadiers and chasseurs from the regiments stationed in France which had not yet furnished it with any such companies. There was an extraordinary movement of troops in all directions; young and old soldiers, some with their faces set northwards, others towards the south, from the Vistula to the Ebro; all coming and going, with as little confusion as was possible with regard to such vast distances and such considerable masses of men.

Always attentive to the pleasures of the soldier, and aware that, if he sets little store by his life when he has been well fashioned to his trade, he likes to enjoy that life as long as it is left him, Napoleon bespoke brilliant entertainments for the troops which were traversing France from the Rhine to the Pyrenees. The municipalities of Mayence, Metz, Nancy, Rheims, Orléans, Bordeaux, and Perigueux, were by his order to hold military festivities, the cost of which he secretly promised to defray. He devoted to this purpose more than a million out of the treasury of the army, taking care to leave the municipalities all the merit of this gracious hospitality. Martial songs composed at his desire were sung at banquets where nothing was talked of but the heroic exploits of our armies and the greatness of France, the only allusion to politics allowed at those festivities, where old soldiers, on their way from the Niemen to the Tagus, met lads of eighteen or nineteen who were quitting the banks of the Seine or the Loire for those of the Elbe or the Oder, and who, already for gettingthe pain of quitting the paternal cot, mingled their adieux with cheerful anticipations of good fortune in the adventurous career of battle and glory. In general those who were bound for the South were the more joyous, simply because they had the prospect of good wine before them; so great was the forgetfulness of self in those men devoted to almost certain destruction, as they were well aware.

Besides men, Napoleon sent also immense masses of matériel towards the Pyrenees. There was no need to send any to the Rhine, because since the beginning of the war on that frontier a considerable matériel had been accumulated there, which the fortress of Magdeburg, becoming almost French on becoming Westphalian, could scarcely contain, and which it had been necessary to transport to Erfurth, Mayence, and Strasburg. But at Perpignan, Toulouse, and Bayonne, almost everything was to be created, the war being new in the South, and now assuming such vast proportions. Accordingly Napoleon gave orders for collecting at Bayonne immense quantities of woollen and linen cloths, leather, muskets, cannons, tents, kettles, grain, fodder, and cattle. He desired that every soldier should carry three pairs of shoes in his knapsack, and find two other pairs at the Pyrenees, which were for the most part bestowed upon him gratuitously. He commanded an extraordinary manufacture of shoes, great-coats, and biscuit, persisting in the maxim, that the soldier furnished with shoes, raiment, and biscuit, has what is indispensable, and that with such appliances he may be made capable of anything. He had a great number of oxen and mules purchased for food and transport. Lastly, he took care to apply large sums to the repair of the roads, for they broke down under the enormous trains of waggons that traversed them. These orders were to be executed in the latter half of October, the interview at Erfurth being fixed to take place in the first half. Napoleon calculated on crossing the Ebro at that period, marching to Madrid at the head of formidable armies, and re-establishing his brother on the throne of Philip V.

These vast expenses demanded resources no less vast. Victory and good administration had provided them beforehand; yet it is not the less true that a notable portion of the funds amassed with so much forethought, for the improvement of the soil and the dotation of great families, was about to be diverted from those objects and dissipated. Napoleon thus gathered from his errors in Spain two equally deplorable consequences, namely, the dispersion of his old soldiers of the North in the South, and the dissipation of the wealth created by his able economy. The budget he had taken such pains to confine within the amount of 720 millions (exclusive of the cost of collection, which was 120, and the departmental expenditure of 30 millions) was now to rise to 800 millions, and even higher, without counting all that the foreigner would continue to furnish, for the Grand Army was partly maintained out of the contributions of Prussia. The income, which had gone on continually increasing under a reign so peaceful at home, had fallen short in one of its most important items, the customs. It had been expected that they would yield 80 millions, and it was doubtful that they would yield 50. This was a first effect of the formidable Milan decrees, which had prohibited, by new and more rigorous means, the importation of English colonial produce. The income therefore was diminishing whilst the outgoings were increasing. It is true that the army funds were to supply the deficit.

The last arrangement with Prussia promised considerable resources. About 90 millions, received in kind, had been consumed severally on the spot, and 206 millions had been spent in money from the contributions, which made nearly 300 millions drawn from Germany for the maintenance of the French armies. There remained in the receiving office of the contributions, that is to say in the army treasury, about 160 millions in value, received or to be received soon, besides 140 due by Prussia, in all 300 millions. But these 300 millions were not wholly available; for, independently of the 140 millions payable in bills of exchange or mortgages, there were in the 160 millions reckoned as cash 24 millions already deposited in the treasury for arrears of pay, and 74 deposited in the *caisse de service* out of the 84 due to it for the loan destined to raise the notes of the receivers-general to par. There remained then 62 millions immediately available, besides 20 millions accruing from the contribution of Austria, but absorbed by loans granted to some towns, and to Spain herself. Thus the present resources were very limited, since the 140 millions to be furnished by Prussia in bills of exchange and mortgages were to be paid only by instalments, extending over a space of eighteen months. It is true that the income of the treasury was obtained with extreme facility, and that the *caisse de service* abounded with money, thanks to the credit it enjoyed; that, according to the arrangement concluded with Prussia, the Grand Army was paid entirely for the whole year 1808; and that, although a failure of resources might be foreseen, there was nothing as yet that indicated embarrassment. Napoleon had, nevertheless, by the war in Spain, dealt as heavy a blow to his finances as to his armies, for both were about to be weakened by division.

There resulted from that fatal war a new burthen, which Napoleon chose to take upon himself for political reasons of a very controvertible kind, and very much controverted by his minister of the treasury, M. Mollien. Though he took great pains to conceal from the public all knowledge of the events in Spain, even hiding victories the better to suppress all mention of defeats, yet they came to be known either through the English journals, some of which always found their way into France in spite of the most vigilant police, or by the letters of the officers to their families, written as usual according to the exaggerated impressions of the moment. Thus the public became cognisant at last of the principal events, and it was known that a French army had been unfortunate in Andalusia, that a fleet had capitulated at Cadiz, and that Joseph, after having entered Madrid, was then at Vittoria. Now it is the general results that are important far more than the details, and in substance it was generally known that the attempt made upon the crown of Spain, instead of being, as had at first been supposed, a simple act of entering into possession, was becoming a desperate strife against a whole nation, backed by the entire strength of England. The division of the forces of France being an inevitable consequence of this new war, it was confusedly felt that the Empire was no longer so strong as it had been; that its lately prostrate enemies might raise their heads again, and all that had seemed settled might again become matter of dispute. Self-interest, though often blind, has nevertheless an instinctive perspicacity that often renders it prophetic. Thus, although the mercantile movement of the public funds reveals in general only the unreasonable hopes or fears of the day, yet does it indicate in the long run the prudent and well-grounded opinion of the existing state of things which the commercial classes entertain upon mature reflection. Now, in spite of Napoleon's efforts to disguise the true situation of affairs in Spain, the aroused sagacity of the money-market belied the official language of the government, and the public funds fell considerably. After Tilsit they had been quoted at the price, then unprecedented, of 94 for the five per cent. stock, which was maintained, with some slight variations, until the barbarous expedition against Copenhagen had induced the culpable invasion of the Peninsula, and all hope of peace was gone. The funds then fell from 94 to 80, and even so low as 70 after the Spanish insurrection. This was a judgment spontaneously pronounced on the Emperor's policy by the interests it alarmed; it was a very hard truth obtruded upon him in spite of all his awe-inspiring power. As always happens, the natural movement of the market was complicated with the factitious movement produced by speculation, and the price of the public funds tended to fall even below the level justified by reasonable considerations; for if Napoleon had committed a serious fault, it was still possible for him to repair it, and to save himself, provided he did not add to it others of a still more dangerous nature.

But he was not the man to give way before this new kind of foes, and he resolved to fight against them. "I mean," he said to M. Mollien, "to make a campaign against the *bears*,"—for the stockjobber's slang was as well known in those days as now. It is enough indeed that a country has passed through a revolution to give general currency to that jargon, since revolutions afford the amplest of all fields for the exercise of stockjobbing. In spite then of M. Mollien, who as a man accustomed to the regular course of business, was averse to expedients, Napoleon resolved to make extraordinary purchases of stock in order to raise the public funds. For this purpose he had recourse to the army treasury, which he deemed inexhaustible, just as he deemed invariable in its favours the gale of victory that had filled that treasury. Accordingly he ordered considerable purchases on account of the army treasury, independently of the purchases on account of the sinking fund, which were then infrequent and irregular; and in so doing he thought he acted for the advantage both of the army and of the creditors of the state. For the army he procured investments yielding 6 or 7 per cent. interest; and for the creditors of the state he maintained their security at a sufficient price. Nor, after all, considering the matter in reference to the habits of the time, was there much to blame in this mode of operating; for in those days men had not yet come to understand that the purchases made by the state ought to be constant and daily, as a regular function, not accidental, as a speculation.

Not having the army funds in his hands, Napoleon ordered the *caisse de service* to make advances, and it did so to the amount of 30 millions for purchases of stock. He did not stop there. There was in the bank, since the issue of its new shares, capital which it knew not how to employ, the discount business not proving proportionate to the capital he had thought fit to assign to the bank. The stocks at the current price yielded a return of 7 per cent., which was a better employment for money than that of discounting. Napoleon required the bank to purchase stock to a large amount; which it did without demur, and which was indeed in conformity with its own true interests as well as with those of the state, since no other investment could just then yield it so much profit. By means of these purchases, steadily and resolutely planned and executed for a month or two, the speculators for a fall were beaten, many of them even ruined, and the public funds rose again to 80, a price which Napoleon deemed it a point of honour for his government to maintain. A rise above that point was in his eyes a token of the exuberant prosperity which his victories would soon give back to the Empire; a fall below it was a mark of decline which he would not endure. He resolved that whenever the funds fell below 80 the treasury should renew its purchases; and so, in spite of the efforts of the gamblers for a fall,—the worst of all gamblers, since they speculate on the impoverishment of the public fortune,—the price of stock was upheld by the power of that singular speculator who had at his disposal the combined resources of the treasury and of victory. He exulted at this success as much as at a battle gained over the Russians or the Austrians. "We have beaten the *bears*," said he to M. Mollien. "They will not try the game again; and meanwhile we shall have preserved for the creditors of the state the capital to which they have a right; for 80 per cent. is that on which I will have them enabled to reckon; and besides this, we shall have effected good investments for the army funds." He then bestowed some private revenues on several of the vanquished in this financial warfare. It was, after all, a singular symptom, and worthy of observation, that open conflict waged by speculators against Napoleon's policy, whilst timorous opinion as yet confined itself to whispered rumours. Why did he not hearken to that lesson, ignoble as was the source whence it flowed? for truth is good and wholesome, come whence it may.

These occupations of all kinds consumed the latter part of August and almost the whole month of September. The interview at Erfurth was approaching. In the interval the manifestations of the imperial diplomacy had attained their end. Austria, intimidated since the return of Napoleon to Paris, had considerably lowered her tone. The declarations he had made, confirmed by the call for the German contingents, had shown her the imminence of war and prompted her to serious reflection. Moreover, it suited her to postpone her purposes; for, supposing her bent on again taking the field, it would be better for her to wait until a hundred thousand Frenchmen should have quitted Germany for the Peninsula, and until she should have further improved her preparations. She did not hesitate therefore to offer such explanations as might allay Napoleon's irritation, and postpone the moment of rupture. She attributed her armaments to an alleged reorganisation of the Austrian army, begun, as she stated, by archduke Charles, and steadily continued by him for more than two years past, a fact which no one had a right to think strange or amiss. As for the indulgence with which England had treated the Austrian flag on the Adriatic, she accounted for it, not as the result of a secret connivance, but as a token of lingering forbearance on the part of England towards an ancient ally. Lastly, as regarded the recognition of king Joseph, she eluded the overtures of French diplomacy, by putting off the question from day to day on pretence of not having yet been able to fix the attention of the emperor Francis on that important subject.

Napoleon was not deluded as to the import and the sincerity of the replies made by Austria; but he saw clearly from her language that she would do nothing that year, and that he should have time to make a prompt and vigorous campaign beyond the Pyrenees. Moreover, it was at Erfurth he was finally to make that point certain. Prussia had eagerly ratified the convention of evacuation, and even the secret articles which so strictly limited her military establishment; but she demanded, as a signal favour, longer periods for the payment of the 140 millions remaining due by her. She hoped to obtain this indulgence through the direct personal interference of the emperor Alexander at Erfurth; for everybody hoped or feared something from that famous interview, which had been announced all over Europe, and was now the theme of every conversation. Some denied, others affirmed, it would take place, each according to his own desires. Others talked of sovereigns who were to be present at it, such as the king of Prussia and the emperor of Austria, who had not been invited; for, besides the sovereigns of France and Russia, none had been summoned, or received a favourable answer to their request to be admitted, except the princes whose homages were expected, and who would serve to give more *éclat* to the proceedings.

Whilst rumour was busy with these contradictory surmises, one fact was true, namely, that the interview was about to take place on the 27th of September, at Erfurth, some leagues from Weimar. The emperor Alexander, after having so strongly desired it, could not decline it when it was offered to him. Besides, his affairs allowed, and even commanded, him to accept it; for things were beginning to wear a better aspect in Finland, the English had quitted the Baltic, and events were hurrying onwards in the East. Gladly, therefore, he accepted the opportunity of seeing Napoleon once more, and at last obtaining from him the realisation in whole or in part of his most cherished wishes. M. de Romanzoff, who was, if possible, still more eagerly bent on the consummation of the same desires, approved quite as much as his master of this important interview, and was to accompany him to it. Besides M. de Romanzoff, Alexander resolved to bring with him his brother, the grand duke Constantine, as a military man, and the first officer of his palace, M. de Tolstoy, brother of the Russian ambassador at Paris, and, in addition to these two personages, a few aides-de-camp. In order to facilitate his intercourse with the imperial court of France, he desired that M. de Caulaincourt, whom he had become habituated to see daily, and to converse with in the most unrestricted manner, should be present at Erfurth. He made but one request before setting out on his journey, namely, that he should be enabled, when he passed through Kœnigsberg, again to speak a few words of comfort to the ruined and most unfortunate sovereigns of Prussia. The convention of evacuation, though most welcome to them as regarded the deliverance of their territory, bore very distressingly upon them in its pecuniary stipulations. Now, it was a good-natured weakness of Alexander's to wish always to say to those he saw what it was agreeable to them to hear. His inclination that way was particularly strong with regard to the king and queen of Prussia, whose misfortunes were a continual reproach to him. He insisted therefore on being authorised, as he passed through Kœnigsberg, to promise some further pecuniary remissions, to which M. de Caulaincourt, who had no instructions on the subject, assented with much hesitation and reserve; and this point being carried, he made his arrangements for being at Erfurth on the 27th of September, stopping only one day with the unfortunate court of Prussia.

In St. Petersburg the party hostile to an alliance with France, exulting in the difficulties she was encountering in Spain, arguing from those which were befalling Russia in Finland, and ostentatiously deploring the distresses of the Russian commerce, bitterly censured the interview at Erfurth. After the indignities committed at Bayonne, said this party, to go so far to visit their author, to enter into direct conference with him, with a view no doubt to ratify all he had done and all he should yet do, was not very honourable conduct. The representative of Austria, especially, allowed himself certain liberties of speech on this head which it was necessary to check. The court of the empress-mother had with difficulty held its peace at the express command of Alexander. At the last moment, however, the empress-mother, exasperated by the dangers to which she seemed to think her son exposed, broke out into violent reproaches against M. de Romanzoff, telling him he was leading Alexander to his destruction, and that, perhaps, there would befall the emperor of Russia, at Erfurth, what had befallen the unhappy sovereigns of Spain at Bayonne. Finally, she could not refrain from expressing her apprehensions to the emperor himself, who reassured her rather in the tone of a grateful son, than as an absolute master offended at seeing his conduct and its possible consequences judged so ill. Such strange suppositions proved two things—the infatuation of the old courts, and the strength Napoleon had infused into their prejudices by his conduct at Bayonne.

Alexander paid no heed to these fears, set out from St. Petersburg with his brother and some aides-de-camp (he had sent M. de Romanzoff and M. de Caulaincourt on before him), and travelled post in the simplest and most rapid fashion. It had been agreed that Napoleon, being on his own ground at Erfurth, should take upon himself the task of providing all the accessories of that grand demonstration, and that Alexander should only have to convey thither his own person and those of his officers. He travelled in a plain calêche more rapidly than the most hurried couriers. He stopped on the 18th of September at Kœnigsberg, seemed greatly to commiserate the misfortunes of his old allies, who were almost reduced to a life of indigence in one of the extremities of their kingdom, and immediately set out again for Weimar.

Wherever there were French troops, a most brilliant reception was prepared for the young czar. The military were under arms in their best uniform, shouting *Vive Alexandre! Vive Napoléon!* Alexander reviewed them, complimented them on their military aspect, which corresponded with their valour, and charmed them by his infinite grace. Napoleon had sent marshal Lannes, created duke of Montebello, to receive him at the limits of the Confederation of the Rhine, which extended to Bromberg. Alexander completely won by his gracious condescension the heart of the old soldier, who, though very obstinate in his revolutionary notions, was not the less sensitive to the well-merited marks of approbation bestowed on him by the occupiers of thrones.

Alexander arrived on the 25th of September at Weimar, and remained with that court, to which he was connected by family ties, until the 27th, the day appointed for the meeting at Erfurth.

Napoleon on his part had quitted Paris, preceded, surrounded, and followed by all that was most distinguished in his army and his court. M. de Talleyrand was one of the personages he had dispatched before him, in order to impart such a tone as was fitting to the language and demeanour of everybody. Though already displeased at some expressions uttered by M. de Talleyrand respecting the affairs of Spain, from which the latter endeavoured to hold himself aloof, since they had taken an unfavourable turn, Napoleon chose to have him, that he might employ him in various delicate communications for which M. de Champagny was not adapted. A great number of generals and diplomatists were of the party; Germany was represented by a crowd of crowned princes. On the 26th the king of Saxony made his prompt appearance in Erfurth. That little town formerly belonged to a prince of the church, and accustomed, like Weimar and several other studious capitals of Germany, to invariable quiet, was become a place the most animated, the most brilliant, the most thronged with soldiers, officers, equipages, and servants in livery. Kings, princes, and high and mighty lords of the old and the new régime, were met in the streets in the guise of simple pedestrians. Napoleon dispatched thither beforehand all that was necessary to cover the grave aspect of business under a veil of elegant and magnificent pleasures. He arrived there on the 27th of September, at ten in the forenoon. After having received the civil and military authorities assembled from all the environs, then the diplomatists of Europe, the potentates of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the king of Saxony, he rode out of Erfurth on horseback about midday, surrounded by an immense staff, to go and meet the emperor Alexander, who was approaching from Weimar in an open carriage. Weimar is four or five leagues from Erfurth. Napoleon met his ally at the end of two leagues. On perceiving the carriage in which he rode, he galloped towards him as if to manifest his eagerness for the meeting. On coming together the two emperors alighted and embraced each other cordially and with every sign of extreme pleasure; a pleasure which was real, for, besides that they had great need of conferring together on their affairs, they felt mutually a personal liking. Horses had been provided for Alexander and his suite, and the two emperors rode into Erfurth side by side, talking with friendly animation; asking and hearing news of each other's family, as if those families had sprung from the same spot, and had been old and affectionate acquaintances. In short, the demeanour of the two emperors was such as to delight the crowds that had flocked from all the country round to behold them; for their manifest good understanding was a pledge to the spectators that the latter should not see again those formidable armies, which two years before, at the same season and on the same spot, had laid waste their fine fields.

Arrived at Erfurth, Napoleon presented to the emperor Alexander all the personages admitted to the interview, beginning with the kings and princes; and then he escorted him to the palace prepared for him. They were to dine every day at Napoleon's table, since he was the host, and the sovereign of the North was his guest. In the evening there was a splendid banquet, at which were seated Napoleon, Alexander, the grand duke Constantine, the king of Saxony, the duke of Weimar, prince William of Prussia,—in a word, the whole crowd of reigning princes and titled personages civil and military. The town was illuminated, and the tragedy of *Cinna* was performed before the imperial party by the most accomplished tragic actors France ever possessed. The judicious clemency of the founder of empire, disarming parties and attaching them to his power, was the spectacle chosen by Napoleon to open the series of representations of French tragedy.

It was arranged that in the intervals between these entertainments the two chief personages should find time in the morning and evening, either within-doors or in their promenades, to confer freely on the important matters they had to arrange. Napoleon had come to Erfurth with his mind fully made up as to the essential topics about to be discussed, and his plan was all arranged beforehand. With respect to the East, in the first place, he had renounced all idea of partition, having perceived, after some discussions into which he had entered from complaisance, that it was impossible for him to agree with Russia on that subject. If he did not give Constantinople, he gave nothing, though he should grant the whole Turkish empire; for in the eyes of Alexander and M. de Romanzoff the question consisted solely in the possession of the two straits; and if he gave Constantinople, he gave a hundred times too much—he gave away the future welfare of Europe—he gave away, in fine, a conquest the lustre of which would eclipse all his own. But he had perceived that in paying cash down, if the expression may be allowed, in sacrificing at once a portion of the Turkish territory which Russia passionately coveted, he would afford her a pleasure sufficiently great to attach her completely to him in the present crisis. Now this was enough for Napoleon's purpose.

Thus, instead of a magnificent dream, but one that was dangerous to Europe, to substitute a limited but immediate reality, was for this time his plan for conciliating Russia. All that the emperor Alexander and M. de Romanzoff had been saying for many months proved that in spite of the loftiness of their expectations they would readily enough forego the notion of partitioning the Turkish empire, on account of the difficulty of coming to a common understanding, provided they were forthwith and definitively put in possession of a portion of territory which was convenient for them, that portion of territory being situated on the Danube. This was no doubt a weighty concession to Russian ambition, but the least dangerous of any that could be made; it was one that was particularly disagreeable to Austria, whose inclinations there was no reason to study; and it was become inevitable, in consequence of the great embarrassments Napoleon had brought upon himself in Spain. In the position in which the recent events had placed us, this sacrifice was indispensable, and, when reduced to certain proportions, it assuredly did not exceed—it did not even equal—the advantages which France obtained on her side.

In return Napoleon required of Russia a close alliance for peace and war, and an absolute union of efforts against Austria and England. That union was indeed inevitable; for, in conceding Wallachia and Moldavia to Russia, Napoleon bestowed a gift which could not fail to set Alexander at variance with Austria and England. Since, therefore, a rupture with them was about to be incurred for that important cause, it was necessary to agree together beforehand for resisting them, and the offensive and defensive alliance followed as a matter of course.

In consenting then to the cession of the Danubian provinces Napoleon possessed an almost infallible means of making the conference at Erfurth end in the result he wished for. His plan being well determined, it was not difficult for one who possessed such profound skill in the art of captivating and swaying men's minds, when he so pleased, to bring Alexander over to his views.

The conference having been opened with the usual protestations, the two sovereigns addressed themselves vigorously to the grand topics they had to consider. Alexander repeated his usual language as to the convenience and necessity of a union between the two empires. He again affirmed that all jealousy was extinct in his heart, but that France had just received vast aggrandisements, and that, if he desired some compensations beneficial to Russia, it was less for himself than for his nation, which must be prevailed on to tolerate the great changes effected in the West. As to the strange events of Bayonne, and the sudden harsh occupation of Rome, he scarcely uttered a word; merely observing that the princes of Spain and the Roman pontiff were poor creatures who deserved their fate for their incapacity, and had rendered themselves, through their infatuated blindness, incompatible with the existing state of things in Europe. Nevertheless, said Alexander, it was necessary to have comprehended Napoleon's system as thoroughly as he had done before one could acquiesce so easily in the catastrophes which the world had just witnessed; and it was requisite that notable changes in the East also should attract the attention of the Russians, in order to divert it from those which were taking place in the West. As for the enemies of France, Alexander declared that he took them all for his own; for in compliance with Napoleon's wish he had engaged in war with England; and as regarded Austria, scarcely anything remained for him to do to become her declared adversary, since he was ready to employ the most imposing and decisive manifestations to curb her, and, if those manifestations were not sufficient, to proceed from words to deeds,—that is to say, to war,—supposing the court of Vienna would incur the blame of aggression, which he would not take upon himself.

Napoleon replied to these friendly protestations with all possible fervour, and in terms of exact reciprocity. On his part he expressed his readiness to accede to all reasonable aggrandisements of Russia, but he stood his ground as to the impossibility of agreeing upon certain projects, and as to the embarrassments in which the two empires were involved—embarrassments which forbade them to attempt at that precise moment too vast territorial redistributions; for surely there were enough such of great magnitude before the world without adding others of a prodigious kind, such, for instance, as the partitioning of the Turkish empire, and partitioning it wholly. Examining in detail the projects that had so much busied the minds of Alexander and M. de Romanzoff, Napoleon discussed one after the other the various plans of partition which had been proposed; and the better to bring over the emperor Alexander to his views, he was peremptory, as he had always been, on the subject of Constantinople, that is to say, the possession of the straits, and he left not the least hope of a concession on that point. Next he pointed out how difficult it would be for Russia herself to venture forthwith upon the execution of such a project. Austria would certainly not accede to it, whatever offers might be made to her, and she would prefer a desperate conflict to a partition of the Turkish empire. England, Austria, Turkey aroused from her very foundations, Spain, and part of Germany, would join in a last effort to resist this unsettlement of the whole world. Was the present moment just such as the two empires ought to choose for so gigantic a work? Russia was encountering obstacles in Finland, which, like Spain, had seemed at first so easy of subjugation. She had an army on the Danube sufficient no doubt to make head against the Turks, but not in case of a national rising on their part; and she had very few forces in front of Austria. Napoleon would therefore have to make head alone against Austria, England, Spain, and those portions of Germany which might endeavour to rise. This he could unquestionably do, for he was in a condition to overwhelm all his enemies; but was it wise to undertake so much at once? and wherefore too? For an object rendered chimerical by its vastness, and respecting which the two empires themselves could not agree. Was there no other course more simple, more practical, more certainly satisfactory? Might they not, for instance, agree as to certain acquisitions strongly indicated beforehand, for which it would not be difficult to gain the assent of European diplomacy, even without departing from pacific means, and which would of themselves constitute the most brilliant result for Russia, surpassing even her utmost hopes? If, for instance, in the sequel of current events, she obtained Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia, would not the reign of Alexander have equalled those of his predecessors which were most productive of territorial aggrandisement? As for France, she coveted nothing thenceforth. With Spain secured to Joseph, and the French masters of the temporal power in Rome, she would have nothing more to desire. She did not wish for a single territorial change more. To prove this, she was about to distribute among the sovereigns of the Confederation of the Rhine the German territories which remained to her from the dismemberment of Prussia. Her natural frontiers were enough for her, and Spain even, which she had lately grasped, was not a territorial acquisition, but a complement of her federative system, since, after all, Spain remained separate and independent under a prince of the house of Bonaparte, instead of being so under a prince of the house of Bourbon. Now all these advantages for Russia and for France might, it was not impossible, be obtained by diplomacy, and by a final military effort—of the Russians in Finland, of the French in Spain. Was it not probable, indeed, that Europe, weary of so much agitation, and seeing the two empires strongly united together, would finally choose peace rather than war? And peace—after having secured to Russia Finland, Wallachia, and Moldavia, and to France the completion of her federative system by the subjection of Spain to king Joseph—peace was certainly a very noble and acceptable *dénouement*, which would fill the exhausted world with delight. But if peace was impossible on these conditions, the two empires might, after having finished, the one with Finland, the other with Spain, commit themselves to the vast unknown future opening to them in the East, and they might do so with the more freedom in their movements, and the greater mastery over their means. Besides, Alexander and Napoleon were young; they had time to wait, and postpone their vast projects regarding the East.

The strange situation being once admitted that brought the two sovereigns of the East and West face to face to treat of such subjects, nothing could be more discreet than such a system. To complete what was begun before engaging in fresh enterprises was a lesson of prudence which a first defeat had impressed on Napoleon, and which a little weariness of war contributed also to render agreeable to him. Would to Heaven that he had been more attentive to those first lessons of fortune!

It was not in one conversation, but in several, that Napoleon and Alexander had opportunities of talking of all these things. As for Alexander, once he was refused Constantinople, the partition of the Turkish empire ceased to have any charms for him. To adjourn that vast question, which was pregnant with the fate of the old world—to adjourn it until a time when Russia should be more independent of the West—was all that remained to be done. But instead of those gigantic and far too chimerical projects, to substitute a reality, such as the gift of the Danubian provinces, provided this was not a vain promise, but a sure immediate gift, was also a thing calculated to yield the czar satisfaction; and, on the whole, he himself felt, in his discreeter moments, that it was the arrangement which best suited him, for in that case nothing would have to be given to France along the shores of the East—neither Albania, the Morea, Thessaly, Macedonia, Syria, nor Egypt. The decrepit old empire of the sultans would remain as a prey always at hand whenever the moment should have come for devouring it; and, meanwhile, there was the immediate acquisition of a reality, which, in any other than a time of prodigies, would have been deemed magnificent, and one for which no irksome compensation was to be paid, since, after all, whether Spain belonged to the house of

Bourbon or to the house of Bonaparte was a question in which England was certainly interested, but Russia not at all.

Alexander could, therefore, with great advantage to himself, accede to Napoleon's new views. It is true that the prospect presented to him was no longer one of marvellous grandeur; and, to a man with an imagination like that of Alexander, that was a circumstance much to be regretted. The most positive result, without a little tinge of the marvellous, would want charms for him, and the French alliance was in danger of becoming one of those ardent but short-lived friendships which were common with him. There was one thing, however, which could stand in the young emperor's estimation in lieu of the prestige of any plan of partition—this was, the instantaneous realisation of his desires, which had all the ardour of youthful appetites, that will be satisfied on the instant. His old minister, M. de Romanzoff, who had reached the opposite term of existence, equalled his master in the juvenile ardour of his desires. He, too, panted for the immediate accomplishment of his wishes; he could not brook a day's delay, as though fearing that at his age there was not time enough left him to enjoy his glory—the glory that so well became one of Catherine's disciples—of securing the mouths of the Danube for the Russian empire. Promptitude was then the charm which Napoleon had to substitute for that of the marvellous. What he gave he should give quickly, in order that the gift might be prized at its true worth.

This new system of arrangement having been adopted, Alexander and M. de Romanzoff seized with the most intense and passionate ardour on the idea of acquiring Moldavia and Wallachia, and resolved to carry back with them from Erfurth, not a vain promise, but a reality, which they might proclaim on their return to St. Petersburg.*

Hitherto Napoleon had tolerated the temporary occupation of the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia by the Russians, but not without some remonstrances and hints that the French would be forced in consequence to prolong their occupation of Silesia. Nothing of the sort was now to be thought of. France was to consent by a formal treaty to Russia's permanent possession of the Danubian provinces, and was to engage not only herself to ratify that acquisition, but also to cause it to be ratified by Turkey, Austria, and even England, when the time was come for treating with the latter. Russia would, in consequence, break the armistice with the Turks, advance her armies to the foot of the Balkans, and even beyond them, to Adrianople and Constantinople, if necessary, in order to extort that sacrifice from the Porte. Should Austria attempt to interfere, the two allies would jointly overwhelm her. As for England, being already at war with that power, they had no new course to adopt with regard to her. It was for Napoleon to compel her, by some heavy blow dealt her in the Peninsula, to acquiesce in whatever he and his ally might do in the rest of the continent.

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* There are in the archives of the Secrétairie d'Etat some very curious letters from M. de Champagny to Napoleon, which narrate the writer's interviews with M. de Romanzoff, and give a most singular idea of the impatience of the Russian minister. Further on the reader will meet with various passages from the letters which vividly depict that impatience.

Napoleon had no objection to these views. To give forthwith was his own inclination, for he felt the necessity of exciting a new passion in Alexander's breast. He only wished to observe some prudence in the promulgation of the resolutions which should be adopted at Erfurth, in order not to throw any obstacle in the way of the overtures for peace he intended to make after the interview. He, therefore, admitted the principle that Russia should immediately enter on possession of Moldavia and Wallachia. The manner of publishing the thing could only be a question of composition, the care of which would devolve on the ministers of the two sovereigns.

Their desires being thus gratified, Alexander and M. de Romanzoff felt a delight almost as great as that with which they had dreamed three months before of the conquest of Constantinople. Napoleon had, therefore, attained his purpose of satisfying Alexander by a limited but immediate gift almost as much as by a magnificent but doubtful prospect. It was to the arrangement of these points that the first eight or ten days of the interview were devoted; and, extreme as had been the mutual courtesy of the two emperors, their conduct towards each other from that moment was expressive of more good-will than ever. Alexander especially seemed to blend affection with politics; in the promenade, at table, at the theatre, his demeanour towards his illustrious ally was famaliar, friendly, deferential, and enthusiastic. When he spoke of him it was in a tone of admiration, with which no one could fail to be struck.

Erfurth was become the most extraordinary gathering-place of sovereigns of which history makes mention. Besides the emperors of France and Russia, the grand duke Constantine, prince William of Prussia, and the king of Saxony, there were the kings of Bavaria and Wurtemberg, the king and queen of Westphalia, the prince primate, chancellor of the Confederation, the grand duke and grand duchess of Baden, the dukes of Hesse-Darmstadt, Weimar, Saxe-Gotha, Oldenburg, Mecklenburg-Strelitz, Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and a host of others too long to enumerate, with their chamberlains and their ministers. They dined every day at the emperor's table, seated in the order of their respective ranks. In the evening there was a dramatic performance in a theatre which Napoleon had repaired and decorated for the occasion. The last part of the *soirée* was passed in the palace of the emperor Alexander. Napoleon, having perceived that Alexander laboured under some defect of hearing, had a platform constructed in the place usually occupied by the orchestra in modern theatres, and there the two emperors were seated in chairs so placed as to make them very conspicuous.

Right and left stood seats for the kings. Behind, that is to say, in the pit, were the princes, ministers, and generals; hence the saying, so often repeated, that at Erfurth there was a pitful of kings (*parterre de rois*). After the representation of *Cinna*, followed that of *Andromaque*, *Britannicus*, *Mithridate*, and *Œdipe*. At the performance of the latter a singular incident struck the audience with surprise and satisfaction. It was a mark of exquisite affectionate flattery, bestowed on Napoleon by Alexander in the fulness of the joy with which the former had just contrived to inspire him. When *Œdipe* uttered this sentiment, "*The friendship of a great man is a blessing from the gods*," Alexander grasped Napoleon's hand and pressed it warmly, in a manner to be observed by all the spectators, whom that sudden and opportune gesture struck with surprise and unanimous approbation.

There had arrived in Erfurth a personage whom all these doings tormented, perplexed, and filled with intense anxiety; this was M. de Vincent, representative of the court of Austria. His master had sent him, ostensibly to compliment the two sovereigns who were come so near to his empire, but in reality to observe what was passing, penetrate if possible the secret of the interview, and complain, but in respectful terms, that Austria was neglected; giving it at the same time to be clearly understood that, if the emperor Francis had been invited to attend, he would have complied with alacrity, that his presence would not have impaired the splendour of the interview, and that his adhesion would not have been prejudicial to the accomplishment of whatever resolutions might then be adopted.

Napoleon had arranged beforehand the line of conduct to be pursued with regard to the Austrian envoy. In the first place, that the secrets of the interview might be well kept, they had been confined to the knowledge of but four persons—the two emperors and their two ministers, M. de Romanzoff and M. de Champagny. Alexander and M. de Romanzoff for the sake of their own ambitious hopes, Napoleon for the sake of his whole policy, and M. de Champagny from his tried discretion and fidelity, were incapable of allowing any part of the secret of the negotiations to escape them. Their purport had even been concealed from M. de Talleyrand, whom Napoleon daily distrusted more and more, particularly in matters in which Austria was concerned. He had been made aware, indeed, that the object of the interview was to unite the two empires of France and Russia more closely, and even to fix by treaty the principles of their union; but the positive object of the resolution was carefully concealed from him. Not a word on the subject was breathed to M. de Vincent; and when he complained that his master was left out of that imperial meeting, he was answered roundly enough, that this was the consequence of his master's inexplicable armaments; that in order to be associated in a policy it is before all things necessary to appear favourable to it, and not to have the air of preparing against it all the forces of one's dominions; and that all that Austria would gain by such conduct would be, to be daily held more aloof from the serious affairs of Europe, and that, if she desired great intimacies, nothing would remain for her but to go seek them in England.

M. de Vincent was in a false position, the awkwardness and even humiliation of which Napoleon took pains to augment, though all the while observing an extreme politeness towards him in outward forms; and his sly contrivances to that end were seconded by Alexander to the best of his ability. M. de Vincent's only resource was in M. de Talleyrand, who was more and more attached to the policy of Austria, and who strove to set M. de Vincent's mind at ease by assuring him that nothing serious was at hand, and that the great show of intimacy was affected only to maintain peace, of which all parties had need. There was a distinguished lady, the Princess de la Tour et Taxis, sister of the queen of Prussia, who used to entertain the most eminent persons, and often the emperor Alexander himself. Her drawing-rooms served as a place for insinuating what it was not convenient to say openly in the diplomatic conferences; and this was a species of communication in which M. de Talleyrand was much employed, as we shall see by-and-by. Wit, refinement, and grace reigned in the princess's circle, where Germany's men of genius, Goethe and Wieland, who had come with their august patrons the princes of Weimar, mingled with kings, ministers, and generals. There it was that inquirers sought to guess what could not be known, to detect in a word incautiously uttered some great political or military conception. The unfortunate M. de Vincent was one of the guessers, and exhausted himself in observations and conjectures of all kinds; and his very visible tortures greatly amused the two emperors, who were glad to punish Austria for her imprudent as well as hostile conduct.

Concord with Russia appearing secured in consideration of the formal and not deferred cession of the Danubian provinces, and the co-operation of that power against Austria following as a necessary consequence, Napoleon decided even before quitting Erfurth many questions that had been left open with respect to the distribution of his forces. He ordered the fine Sebastiani division, which was to be composed of some of the old regiments destined for Spain, and which had not yet been put in movement for Bayonne, to march immediately from Paris and from the points where it was assembled. He gave a similar order respecting the Leval division, formed entirely of German auxiliaries, so that these two divisions should arrive at Bayonne at the close of October. He now decided what he should do with the 5th division, and ordered that its march, at first directed to Bareuth, should finally be to the Rhine and the Pyrenees. Lastly, to the three divisions of dragoons already on the move to Spain he added two others, and left in Germany only the cuirassiers with a notable portion of the light horse. These arrangements were the natural result of the security he derived from his compact with Russia, and of his desire at once to overwhelm the Spaniards and the English by an irresistible mass of forces.

The two monarchs had now been ten days together: the task of embodying the conditions of their compact remained to be executed, and this was no easy matter, considering the new passion for immediate possession which had seized on Alexander and M. de Romanzoff. To avoid troubling by discussions on matter of detail the daily increasing cordiality of their union, the two sovereigns agreed to leave to their ministers, M. de Romanzoff and M. de Champagny, the task of committing to paper the convention which was to contain their recent resolutions, and they set out on the 6th of October to pass two days at the court of Weimar, where magnificent fêtes had long been prepared for them. MM. de Romanzoff and de Champagny remained behind to proceed with the important work assigned to them.*

It was Napoleon's wish, as we have stated, that there should result from the interview at Erfurth an accordance with Russia that should be solid, and, above all, conspicuous; one that should awe his enemies and constrain them to peace by depriving them of all hope of success. He conceded to Russia, in consideration of what she allowed him to do in Spain and Italy, that Finland, Wallachia, and Moldavia should belong to her in any case, whether there was peace or war; but with the understanding that, if it was possible to procure these advantages for Russia by peace, that course should be tried before plunging into a new general war that would involve the whole world, especially Turkey and Austria. Napoleon was convinced that, if the union of the two powers, Russia and France, was very complete, very sincere, and very manifest, Austria would be forced to remain quiescent, for she would be crushed between the two empires if she attempted to stir; and that the submission of Austria would compel England also to yield, and agree to a naval peace. He moreover undertook to urge her to that conclusion by various other means. In the first place he desired that overtures of peace should be made to England solemnly, in the name of the two emperors, and in such a manner that they should be well known to the English public; and pending those overtures he proposed, under the security afforded by the Russian alliance, to leave in Germany only a very small portion of the Grand Army, move the rest to the camp at Boulogne, and at head of a reinforcement of 150 thousand veterans, which would raise the French forces beyond the Pyrenees to a total of 250,000, march in person into the Peninsula, overwhelm the insurgents, and inflict some grand disaster on the English troops in that quarter. By these combined means he expected to constrain England to treat for peace. It is true that he should have to bring her to consent to two considerable matters, the establishment of the house of Bonaparte in Spain, and the possession of the Danubian provinces by Russia. But these were matters already consummated, or on the point of being so, for Spain, in his opinion, would be reduced to subjection in two months, and the Danubian provinces were occupied by Russia in a manner that precluded the Turks and their friends from entertaining any hope of effecting their evacuation. England, moreover, had already testified to Russia a sort of inclination to concede to her Moldavia and Wallachia. Napoleon did not therefore regard the proposed arrangements as quite incompatible with peace, particularly should he succeed in the great blows he expected to deal the Spaniards and the English.

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* I have already said that there were letters from M. de Champagny to the Emperor, in which the details of the negociation were related day by day, even when M. de Champagny and Napoleon were together in Erfurth. These letters were of course continued whilst Napoleon was at Weimar. I am not, therefore, reduced to conjectures, and it is from the most authentic documents that I retrace the details of this interview, the resolutions adopted at which were not less interesting than the spectacle exhibited to Europe.

His design, therefore, was to make a proposal to England, in the name, as the manifesto should state, of the two emperors, *united together for peace and war*, and offering to negociate a general arrangement, on the principle of *uti possidetis*. This was a convenient basis for negociation, since, while it left England her maritime conquests, including Malta, it secured to France Spain and Naples, and to Russia Finland and the Danubian provinces. In order to insure Russia's possession of the latter, a declaration was to be addressed to the Porte, to the effect that Russia intended to keep those provinces, and that declaration was to be backed by the presence of the Russian armies and by the advice of France. Should the latter be disregarded, France would abandon the Porte to Russia, in which case there could be no doubt as to the result.

The parties being agreed on all these points, the business of recording that agreement could not be difficult, for there never is difficulty in the expression when there is none in the thought. But there was one important point respecting which agreement seemed difficult. While positively and immediately conceding Moldavia and Wallachia to Russia, it was Napoleon's wish that the latter should postpone for some weeks its communications to the Porte. If that power became aware of what was impending, it would be exasperated, would inform England, and throw itself into her arms;* and England, seeing a new ally arise, would see, in the union of Spain, Austria, and Turkey, chances of success in a fresh struggle that would dispose her to reject peace. On the other hand, by waiting a few weeks only, it would be possible to bring England to negociate. Once engaged in negociation, it would not be so easy for her to desist from it, since the English public must naturally long for the end of the war; and when at length she should be informed of the last condition—that, namely, of leaving to Russia the two provinces which that power possessed *de facto*—it was to be doubted she would forego the ideas of peace she had been led to entertain, and revert to those of war, for a question in which she had personally no great interest. It was in this additional clause that the difficulty consisted—that is to say, in this delay of some weeks to which it was sought to condemn the impatience of Russia.

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* The following is what Napoleon wrote to M. de Champagny on this subject:—

"The whole discussion, therefore, can only turn upon the single phrase added to article VII. It is, nevertheless, an immediate consequence of the step which has been taken; for, if England is disposed to enter into negociation, it is evident that, upon news reaching her that a power of such considerable extent as Turkey is coming over to her interests, that fact will render her more peremptory in the negociation. Why reopen to her without good reason the ports of Syria, Egypt, Africa, and the Morea? The French factories would be pillaged, several thousand men imprisoned and slaughtered, commerce stopped, and all this for no advantage at all to Russia. And, if peace were made between Russia and the Porte whilst the negociations are pending with England, this would be an incident attended with more disadvantages than otherwise, since England would have a clearer insight into the affairs which have been treated at Erfurth; and the treaty made with the Porte would give her to understand that the idea of a partition is postponed, and would alarm her less. There is every motive, therefore, for scrupulously executing the proposed article."

The emperor Alexander had left this matter entirely to the discretion of his old minister, whose impatience was at least equal to his own. On conferring with M. de Romanzoff, M. de Champagny found him ready to assent to everything without the least hesitation, until the question was raised of postponing the communication to the Porte, and then he became intractable. A new delay, after fifteen months of expectation from the date of the meeting at Tilsit, was, in M. de Romanzoff's opinion, not to be endured. For fifteen months France had been making promises to Russia, without realising any one of them, and had thus compelled her to remain in a state of armistice with regard to the Turks. But for the urgent requests of France, said M. de Romanzoff, Russia would already have marched her armies across the Balkan, and compelled Turkey to surrender the provinces she was no longer able either to retain or govern. All that had been got by the compact at Tilsit was this clog upon the action of Russia, and she had suffered too much from it to submit to it again. It was, in fact, for the very purpose of putting an end to an intolerable *status quo* that the emperor had come all the way from St. Petersburg to Erfurth, in spite of opposition, sinister warnings, and great sacrifices.

In vain did M. de Champagny urge that the delay in question would be only of a few weeks' duration, that couriers were about to be dispatched, and that ananswer could not be long wanting; that if England consented to the opening of negociations it would soon be seen whether the principle of *uti possidetis* was accepted or not; that if it was accepted it would have been worth while to have a little patience in order to obtain the valuable acquisitions in question in that way without having recourse to war; that if, on the contrary, it was not accepted, Russia might forthwith prefer her demand at Constantinople, and follow it up by arms or otherwise, for the acquisition of the coveted banks of the Danube. The Russian minister would listen to none of these reasons. "Always delays!" was his dolorous ejaculation. "You do nothing but impose delays on us, whilst you impose none upon yourselves at Madrid or at Rome. If it were even a delay for a definite term, after which all uncertainty should cease, that might be borne; but you require us to have patience until the moment when the negociation shall have assumed an aspect of utter impracticability. Now there have been negociations that lasted for years. Would you have us continue for years in a state of armistice towards the Turks?"

M. de Champagny was struck by the fervid impatience of the old minister, whose whole soul was engrossed by one of those violent passions that sometimes seize upon aged men and take from them all the gravity of their years, without imparting to them the engaging vivacity of youth.* It was plain too that a certain degree of

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* M. de Champagny writes thus on the subject to the Emperor:—

"Erfurth, October 6, 1808.

"Discussing this question with all possible good faith, fully persuaded that the delay required (that, namely, which subordinates to the issue of the negociation with England every step for obtaining the two provinces) is as much for the interests of Russia as of France, I hoped to dissipate the feeling of distrust indicated by M. de Romanzoff's reply; but I could not move him. One who is ready to seize a prey he has long coveted is deaf to all arguments that would retard his enjoyment. For thirty years M. de Romanzoff has set his mind on this acquisition; it is the triumph of his system, the point on which are centered his reputation and his honour. Compared with that, every other interest will seem to him insignificant. The emperor Alexander, who is urged by no personal motive, and to whom all the interests of his empire are equally dear, must be much more accessible to the force of the reasons that enjoin him, for his own sake, to postpone, not an enjoyment, but a mere taking possession of a province which cannot escape him. I have, therefore, concluded nothing with M. de Romanzoff; even had I been authorised, I was not more than himself disposed to yield, and I consider it useless to speak to him again on the matter before the arrival of your majesty. As to the rest, we pretty nearly agreed. (Signed) "CHAMPAGNY.'

"Erfurth, October 8, 1808.

"Sir,—A conference of two hours with M. de Romanzoff has led to no result. His system appears to be irrevocably fixed; he will have the Turkish provinces; he will have them at all costs; he will have them to-day rather than to-morrow. His objections are not so much against article VI., the form of which your majesty is pleased to preserve, as against the addition your majesty proposes to article VII. of the counter-project, and which consists in these words:—

"'No hint shall be given to the Porte as to the intentions of Russia until the effect of the proposals made by the two powers to England shall have been known.'

"These words greatly alarm M. de Romanzoff. No delay appears to him admissible, least of all an indefinite delay.—'When, and how,' he says, 'shall one know the effect of these proposals? Will not a first result give occasion to wait for a second, and this for a third, and thus our arrangement with Turkey be continually adjourned?' He applied this line of argument to everything. If I talked to him of the precautions requisite for the sake of the French who were established in the Levant, he retorted, 'But do you mean to wait until they are come back to France? When can they return thither?' Peace with England appears to him to be difficult, and that is why he does not wish to subordinate to it peace with Turkey. He talked to me also of the necessity of striking the minds of the Russians by the certainty of this important acquisition, and appeared to me to have some apprehensions should such not be the result of the emperor Alexander's journey. He rather let me surmise his fears than declared them; but the feeling manifest in every word was distrust, distrust of events, distrust also of our intentions. Hence it was that he attached less importance to article VI. It matters not to him, in fact, in what manner that article declares the consent of France to the acquisitions of Russia, if the following article allows the latter to act and to go straight to her mark. Hence it is, too, that an indefinite delay alarms him the more: he is afraid of exposing to chances an advantage that seems to him almost secured at this moment. He would rather consent to a delay the limit of which should be specified. He wants to have precision in everything. 'The vagueness of the Tilsit distrust was mingled with the ardour of his desire, and that M. de Romanzoff feared there was an intention to cajole himself and his master by a fresh postponement. M. de Champagny, seeing that he set the honour of his remaining span of life on that acquisition, and that he would be more peremptory than Alexander himself, thought it best to await the return of the two monarchs, and leave the emperor of the French to exercise his personal ascendency over the emperor of Russia, in order to obtain from him the admission into the treaty of a precaution deemed indispensable.

The two emperors with their whole train of kings and princes had gone to Weimar with the intention of remaining there the 6th and 7th of October, and returning on the 8th to their important affairs. Between Erfurth and Weimar is the forest of Ettersburg, where the grand duke of Weimar had caused a line of elegant tents to be pitched for all his crowned visitors. That of the emperors and kings, which was in the centre, was magnificent. Before these tents had to pass an immense mass of game, stags, does, and hares, enclosed within a circle of nets, and compelled, in attempting to fly, to expose themselves to the fire of the archduke's guests. Alexander had never fired a shot, so gentle was the nature of his tastes; nevertheless, he brought down a stag, and a multitude of others fell beneath the fire of those illustrious sportsmen. A sumptuous reception awaited the two emperors at Weimar. A splendid banquet was followed by a ball, at which the most brilliant society of Germany was assembled. Goethe and Wieland were there. Napoleon left the whole company to go and hold a long conversation in a corner of the room with the two celebrated writers of Germany. He talked to them of Christianity, and of Tacitus the historian, the terror of tyrants, whose name he uttered without fear, as he said with a smile. He maintained that Tacitus had somewhat overcharged the gloomy picture of his own times, and that as a painter he was not simple enough to be quite true. He then passed on to the subject of modern literature, which he compared with that of antiquity, and showed himself to be in matters of art, just as in matters of policy, a partisan of regularity and orderly beauty. Speaking of the drama imitated from Shakespeare, in which tragedy and comedy, the terrible and the burlesque, are mingled together, he said to Goethe, "I am astonished that a great intellect like yours does not *prefer the more sharply defined forms!*"—A profound saying, which very few critics of our day are capable of comprehending.

After this long conversation, in which he displayed infinite grace, and let those two eminent men of letters see that he had given

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articles,' he says, 'has done us too much harm; a year has been lost, and that i
as yet the sole result of our alliance with you.'

"This obstinacy on the part of M. de Romanzoff is not an affair of the momen
It results from long meditations exclusively devoted to one end, from the impatien
of hope deferred, and from an opinion that at the present moment nothing can wit
stand the execution of the views of Russia. I despair of overcoming it. I am, &
(Signed) "CHAMPAGNY."

up for them the noblest company, Napoleon left them flattered, as it was natural they should be, by so high a mark of attention. It was to the interview at Erfurth they were indebted for the decoration of the Legion of Honour, a distinction they merited by all means, and which lost nothing of its lustre when bestowed on such personages.

On the following day another fête was given him on the very field of the battle of Jena, between that town and Erfurth. Such was the desire to please Napoleon, that perhaps his entertainers forgot their own dignity in volunteering to recall the memory of one of the most terrible battles gained by France over Germany. A tent was pitched on the Landgrafenberg, a hill where Napoleon had bivouacked on the night of the 18th of October, two years before; for the anniversary of the memorable battle of Jena was almost arrived. After a *déjeûner*, and a thousand commemorations of the day by the crowds of guests who had taken part in it, to which Napoleon replied in terms of due consideration for his German entertainers, the party proceeded to the right, towards the plain of Apoldau, situated between the battle-field of Jena and that of Awerstaedt, and famous for the inaction of marshal Bernadotte. Another battue was prepared there, and occupied some hours of the morning, after which the company returned to Erfurth. Before quitting the heights that command the town of Jena, Napoleon wished to leave there a token of beneficence, the memory of which might mingle with the terrible reminiscences that already connected his name with that spot. The unfortunate city had been set on fire by the bombs. Napoleon gave a sum of three hundred thousand francs to indemnify those who had suffered by his presence on that occasion.

Having returned to Erfurth, he had next day to apply himself again to the weighty matters that had brought him to Germany, and that had made the sovereign of Russia perform so long a journey. He spoke of them to the emperor Alexander, but he particularly imposed on M. de Champagny the duty of insisting peremptorily that some prudence should be observed in the communications to be made to Constantinople, and that England should not, upon the very opening of the negociations, be furnished with alliances that would dispose her to persevere in war. As regarded the acquisition of the Danubian provinces, he authorised M. de Champagny to employ the most positive forms of expression, so as to give the most satisfactory assurance of its certainty, at the same time stipulating such a delay in its accomplishment as should render possible the commencement of the negociations in London.

After frequent conferences Napoleon prevailed on Alexander to abate somewhat of his impatience, and trusted to M. de Champagny to effect as much with M. de Romanzoff. He was anxious, however, that his young ally should have no cause for discontent, for he reckoned on making his whole present policy rest not only on the reality, but also on the notoriety of the Russian alliance both for peace and war. Accordingly, notwithstanding his immediate want of money, he did not refuse to grant a fresh reduction of the burthens imposed on Prussia. By the convention of the 8th of September the final evacuation of the Prussian territory had been stipulated, with the exception of three places of surety, Stettin, Custrin, and Glogau, and in consideration of 140 millions payable in two years. The king of Prussia, while gladly signing that convention, which secured the deliverance of his territory, had said that he nevertheless did not forego the privilege of imploring of his victor's generosity an alleviation of a burthen which his country was wholly unable to support. Himself and the queen had entreated Alexander to take the opportunity of his interview with Napoleon in order to obtain for them a further abatement. Alexander, whose heart was oblivious, but kind, had promised what they required; and it would have pained him to be unsuccessful in his suit on their behalf. The gift of the mouths of the Danube would have lost something of its value in his eyes, if on returning to the North he were again to read reproaches written in the faces of his unfortunate allies. He asked Napoleon to forego 40 of the 140 millions, and to extend the term for the payment of the entire sum from two years to several. He even drew up with his own hand the form of the letter by which Napoleon was to announce to him that concession, and attribute it to his own personal and pressing intervention. Napoleon knew this was one of the modes in which he could most sensibly oblige the emperor Alexander, and after having resisted enough to make the latter appreciate the sacrifice—and a real sacrifice it was, in the state of his finances—he consented to a reduction of 20 millions on the amount, and to a year's prolongation of the term of payment. Thus, instead of 140 millions in two years, Prussia would have to pay only 120 millions in three years, half in money, and half in mortgage bonds. The letter, drawn up by Alexander, after being modified by Napoleon, was written nearly as at first proposed.

The two sovereigns, thus seeking to gratify each other, and every day more and more satisfied with the mutual agreement of their views, some difficulties of detail excepted, had yet a last overture to make each other, wherein Napoleon did not choose to take the initiative. It related to a family alliance, which would have rendered their political alliance, if not more solid, at least more conspicuous,—in short, to a marriage between Napoleon and a sister of the emperor Alexander. Napoleon had often thought of divorcing Josephine in order to marry a princess who could give him an heir, and had always been stopped in that design by the affection that bound him to the wife of his youth, and by the difficulty of fixing his choice. Nevertheless, he was continually recurring to this project, and he had now more than ever reason to do so, since he was in the society of the sovereign on whose alliance he designed to base his policy, a sovereign who had marriageable sisters of excellent endowments, as fame reported. Yet, though he had Alexander by his side morning and evening, and though they already stood towards each other on a footing of the most confidential intimacy, Alexander had never alluded to a subject that interested him so keenly. Thinking in his greatness that he honoured all those with whom he allied himself, Napoleon was too proud to be the first to make overtures without being sure of success. Every day did he and Alexander talk together of their union, which nothing, they said, could disturb, for their might could give umbrage only to England, which they were both pressing upon at sea, or to Austria, which they were pressing upon, the one on the Izonzo, the other on the Danube, and they could find no enemy but one or both of these two. They had, therefore, every political reason for being closely allied. They had personal reasons also, since they had seen, appreciated, and come to like each other; since they suited each other in all points, both in views and in tastes; since they were young, and had still an immense future before them, and would have time one day to resume even the projects they adjourned with regard to the East. "Romanzoff is old," said Napoleon to Alexander; "he is impatient to enjoy; but you are young; you can wait."—"Romanzoff is a Russian of the times gone by," replied Alexander; "he has passions which I do not share. I wish to civilize my empire much rather than to enlarge it. I desire the Danubian provinces for my nation much more than for myself. I can wait for the other territorial arrangements necessary for my empire. But you," he said, continuing to address Napoleon, "it is time that you should enjoy the great things you have accomplished—that you shall cease at last to expose your precious head to cannon-balls. Have you not enough of glory, enough of power? Had Alexander or Cæsar more? Enjoy them, be happy, and let us put off the rest of our projects to the future." To these professions of disinterestedness Napoleon responded by protestations of love for peace and quiet. Alexander seemed to care no more for Constantinople, and Napoleon to have conceived a disgust for war, battles, and conquests. Riding and walking about Erfurth, at some distance from their officers, the two monarchs thus held confidential converse, in which Alexander went so far as to talk of his most secret affections. More than once the remark had been made that it was greatly to be regretted that Napoleon had no son; but though Alexander thus closely approached the point to which Napoleon would fain have led him, he never actually touched it. The young czar stopped short of it, though he could not be unaware of the talk there had been after Tilsit, both in Paris and St. Petersburg, about a marriage between Napoleon and the grand duchess Catherine, Alexander's eldest sister. If Alexander was so reserved on this point, it was not that, in his present prepossession in favour of the French alliance, he would have refused to give his sister to Napoleon, or regarded as a *mésalliance* her union with the vanquisher of Europe; but he foresaw and dreaded a dispute with his mother, and durst not offer what he feared he could not bestow.

Not knowing the secret of Alexander's reserve, Napoleon was near feeling pique, and even manifesting it, notwithstanding the immense interest he had in appearing perfectly agreed with the emperor Alexander. It was for such a contingency, and for that only, that M. de Talleyrand became useful at Erfurth; for if he was capable of betraying the secrets of the cabinet to M. de Vincent, and if for that reason Napoleon let him know but a part of them,[*] on the other hand, he alone was capable of adroitly insinuating what it was not wished to say plainly; and when marriage was to be talked of with the dignity becoming the two greatest potentates in the world, a more skilful matchmaker could certainly not have been found.

The emperor, therefore, had recourse to him, in order to bring Alexander to an overture which he did not choose himself to make. M. de Talleyrand, who was shy of playing a part in the concerns of the imperial family, for fear of offending the one party or the other, had no inclination to meddle with a divorce which was more or less foreseen by everybody, and was become a frequent subject of conversation among politicians. Napoleon took a curious course in order to bring him to the subject in spite of himself. "You know," said he to him, "that Josephine accuses you of busying yourself about a divorce, and has vowed implacable hatred against you in consequence?" M. de Talleyrand exclaimed vehemently against such a calumny. Napoleon replied that he had no need to defend himself against it, for it must come to that some time or other; that, notwithstanding his affection for the empress, he should be obliged to contract a new marriage, which might give him an heir, and connect him with one of the great reigning families of Europe; that nothing would be stable in France so long as there was not an assured prospect for the future, which was not the case at that moment, for everything rested on his own head; and that it was time for him, before he grew old, to take a wife and have a son by her. Such a conversation could not fail to lead directly to some mention of the reigning family of Russia, and of a conjugal alliance with them. M. de Talleyrand complimented Napoleon greatly on his personal success with Alexander, which was at least equal to that which he had obtained at Tilsit. The young emperor was a frequent visitor at the house of the princess de la Tour et Taxis, and was never tired of expressing there his admiration of Napoleon, not only as regarded his genius, but also his grace, *esprit*, and good-nature. "He is not only the greatest man living," he would often say, "but also the best and most agreeable. People think him ambitious and fond of war. He is no such thing; he makes war only from a political necessity, from the compulsion of circumstances." Such were his frequent remarks, which M. de Talleyrand took care to report to Napoleon. "If he likes me," said the latter, after having listened to M. de Talleyrand, "let him give me proof of the fact, by uniting himself with me more closely, and bestowing on me one of his sisters. Why has he never said a word to me of this in our daily confidential intercourse? Why does he affect thus to avoid the subject?" It was easy to see that Napoleon wished M. de Talleyrand to undertake the commission, and employ on it the art with which nature had endowed him of saying things or making others say them. M. de Talleyrand undertook it accordingly, and lost no time in bringing the emperor Alexander to the subject in one of the frequent opportunities he had of seeing him; for, as it was that monarch's vanity to wish to please everybody, men of wit especially, and M. de Talleyrand above all others, he took great pleasure in often conversing with him.

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[*] M. de Talleyrand, as we have said, knew in a general way that a convention was under consideration, which should determine the fundamental principles of the alliance; but he was not aware that the main point was the cession of Moldavia and Wallachia, and, above all, that the point in dispute was the delay of a few weeks, required of Russia, before she took open proceedings with reference to the ceded provinces.

M. de Talleyrand did not wait for a pretext for speaking, but made one, for the days were numbered, and he had the desired conversation with Alexander. After expatiating on the alliance, which formed the leading topic of every conversation in Erfurth, M. de Talleyrand proceeded to talk of the means for rendering it more solid and conspicuous, for it was requisite that it should be both in order to be really efficacious. The means seemed obvious, namely, to add family ties to the ties of policy; and this was an easy thing, since Napoleon was obliged, for the sake of his empire, to contract a new marriage in order to have a direct heir. Now, if he were to contract a new marriage, to what great family could he more properly unite himself than to that which reigned over Russia, and the head of which was become his intimate ally? Alexander received this overture with the most flattering expressions of regard for Napoleon, and protested how much he would have desired personally to be still more closely allied to him; for since he made him his personal friend, he could not feel reluctant to make him his brother-in-law. But here he touched the limits of his power. Whatever might be said in St. Petersburg of his mother's influence, said he to M. de Talleyrand, he was master and sole master, but he was so in the affairs of the empire, and not in those of his family. The empress-mother, who was a princess of grave habits and worthy of all respect, exercised an absolute control over her daughters, and suffered no one to interfere with her in that particular. Now, if she held her peace respecting the present policy from deference for her son, she did not go the length of approbation. To give that policy such a pledge of adhesion as the bestowal of one of her daughters, to send that daughter to fill the throne which had been occupied by Marie Antoinette, a throne, indeed, which had been again raised to a loftiness surpassing that of the throne of Louis XIV., would infer a degree of condescension on his mother's part which he durst not expect. Alexander added, that he should no doubt succeed in favourably disposing his sister, the grand-duchess Catherine, but that he could not flatter himself with the hope of subduing his mother's prejudices, and that he could never bring himself to constrain her by an exertion of his imperial authority; that such had been his sole motive for maintaining so much reserve on this subject; and finally, that if it were Napoleon's wish that he should make such an attempt he would do so, but without answering for its success. Very well satisfied with having brought things to that point, M. de Talleyrand thought it was for the two sovereigns to complete the work he had begun, and he hinted to Alexander that in such a matter it was fitting he should speak first. The latter, having made known the real difficulty, could no longer feel any repugnance to speak, since he ran no risk of incurring an engagement he should be quite unable to fulfil. Accordingly, he promised to talk with Napoleon on the subject at their next meeting.

The two monarchs saw each other daily, and several times a-day, at Erfurth, and made haste to say all that was on their minds, for the termination of the interview was at hand. Alexander explained to Napoleon his views of the delicate subject on which M. de Talleyrand had talked to him, and signified how much he should desire to add a new tie to that which already united the two empires, and how happy he should be to have a member of his family in Paris, so that he might embrace a sister when he arrived there to treat of the affairs of the two empires. But he repeated to Napoleon what he had stated to M. de Talleyrand as to the nature of the obstacles he should have to overcome, and his respect and forbearance towards his mother, whom he could never think of constraining. Nevertheless he promised that he would strive to overcome her repugnance, and hinted that everything might be obtained from the court of Russia, if contented, and that it would be contented if the nation were so. This was welcome language, and Napoleon replied to it in the most affectionate terms. The two emperors anticipated the day when they should be more than friends, when they should be brothers. Their countenances beamed with new satisfaction, and they seemed more than ever delighted with each other.*

It was now the 12th of October, and time to resolve the last difficulties as to the terms of the convention. The two emperors had given their ministers, M. de Romanzoff and M. de Champagny, authority to conclude the matter, and on the 12th they agreed upon the following convention, which was to remain a profound secret.

The emperors of France and Russia solemnly renewed their alliance, and engaged to make peace or war in common.

Every overture made to the one was instantly to be communicated to the other, and receive only a joint and concerted reply.

The two emperors agreed to make a formal proposal for peace to England, and to do so immediately, publicly, and as conspicuously as possible, so as to render refusal the more difficult on the part of the British cabinet.

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* I have often heard this affair related by M. de Talleyrand himself, and I have been able to prove the truth of his account by comparing it with the official documents.

The basis of the negociations was to be *uti possidetis*.

France was to consent only to such a peace as should insure to Russia Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia.

Russia was to consent to such a peace only as should secure to France, independently of all she possessed, the crown of Spain on the head of Joseph.

Immediately after the signing of the convention Russia might begin such steps towards the Porte as were necessary to obtain by peace or war the two provinces of the Danube; but (here was the compromise agreed to respecting the principal point) *the plenipotentiaries and agents of the two powers were to agree between them as to the language to be held, so as not to compromise the friendship existing between France and the Porte.*

Moreover, if, for the acquisition of the Danubian provinces, Russia encountered Austria as an enemy in arms, or if on account of what France was doing in Italy or Spain she was exposed to a rupture with Austria, France and Russia should furnish their respective contingents, and make war in common against that power.

Lastly, if war, and not peace, should result from the conference of Erfurth, the two emperors promised to meet each other again within a year.

Such was the substance of the treaty as agreed on between MM. de Champagny and de Romanzoff on the morning of the 12th of October. The ambiguous phrase respecting the precautions to be observed in order to avoid disturbing the union between France and the Porte was a manner of freeing Russia from all delay, and yet preventing too abrupt proceedings at Constantinople, such as might render impracticable from their outset the negociations about to be undertaken at London.

No sooner had M. de Romanzoff snatched from the hands of the French minister the booty he so coveted, than he would have its possession secured to him by the immediate apposition of the signatures. It was necessary, however, to make two copies of the new secret treaty; he had not patience enough to wait until they were written out in M. de Champagny's office, but had one made under his own eye for the greater speed. Immediately on the completion of the copies he hurried in the afternoon to have them signed by M. de Champagny, and then bore them off to his master in an intoxication of joy.

The interview of Erfurth had attained its end; the two emperors were agreed; and, above all, they appeared to be so. Alexander thought he already possessed Wallachia and Moldavia; Napoleon thought he had hold of the young emperor, enough at least to render any coalition impossible, enough to make him have nothing to fear from Austria before the following spring. He hoped even that peace might result from that close and publicly proclaimed alliance between the two greatest powers of the world.

Instead of the unhappy story of Baylen, he had made the marvellous story of the assembly of kings at Erfurth the subject of conversation in Europe. The two monarchs were perfectly satisfied with each other, and it seemed likely that a tenderer union would one day be added to the political union in which they were joined thenceforth. It was decided that the 13th should be given to intimacy, and the 14th to separation, and that those last days should be employed in lavishing honours and presents on the servants of either court. Seeing clearly that M. de Tolstoy had too much the attitude of a soldier in Paris, Alexander had agreed to send in his stead the old prince Kourakin, an obsequious courtier, incapable of setting his master at variance with Napoleon, and who was then ambassador at Vienna. But it was agreed also that, in order to follow up more closely the negociations with England, and delay as little as possible the steps to be taken with regard to the Porte, M. de Romanzoff should repair in person to Paris, to receive the replies and make the rejoinders, without more loss of time than was necessary to pass from London to Paris. Napoleon drew up at Erfurth, with his own hand, the joint letter to the king of England, which was to be signed by the two emperors, and the notes in corroboration, so as to prevent all delay.

M. de Tolstoy was at Erfurth. Napoleon desired to receive there his letters of recall, and to give him such marks of favour as should take away all appearance of disgrace from his removal. He made him a present of the Sèvres porcelain and Gobelins tapestry that had adorned his residence in Erfurth. He lavished presents and decorations on all Alexander's suite. Alexander, not less magnificent in his bounty, conferred the order of St. Andrew on the principal persons of Napoleon's court, and was prodigal of portraits, snuff-boxes, and diamonds.

The only person who had no share in these favours was M. de Vincent, the representative of Austria. In spite of his prodigious efforts to discover the secret of what had been done at Erfurth, he had not been successful. He knew that marks of amity of all kinds had been interchanged, and that the principles of the alliance had been laid down in a formal convention; but the true secret of the acquisitions mutually conceded by the contracting parties, and of the negociations about to be undertaken, was unknown to him, and he even supposed more than really existed. On granting him his audience of leave, the Emperor renewed his remonstrances, and repeated to him that Austria should for ever be excluded from all share in the affairs of Europe, so long as she should seem disposed to have recourse to arms. He gave him the following letter for the emperor, which contained the full expression of his thoughts:—

"Erfurth, October 14, 1808.

"Sir and Brother,—I thank your imperial majesty for the letter you have been pleased to write to me, and which the baron de Vincent has delivered to me. I have never doubted your majesty's upright intentions; but I have, notwithstanding, had fears for a while of seeing hostilities renewed between us. There is a faction in Vienna which affects alarm in order to hurry your cabinet into violent measures, which would prove to be the origin of greater calamities than those which have preceded. I have had it in my power to dismember your majesty's monarchy, or at least to leave it less potent; I did not choose to do so. What it is it is by my consent. This is the most evident proof that our accounts are liquidated, and that I desire nothing of your majesty. I am always ready to guarantee the integrity of your majesty's monarchy; I will never do anything contrary to the main interests of your dominions; but your majesty must not reopen questions which fifteen years of war have settled. Your majesty must prohibit every proclamation or proceeding provocative of war. The last levy *en masse* would have produced war, could I have feared that that levy and those preparations were made in concert with Russia. I have just broken up the camps of the Confederation. A hundred thousand of my troops are proceeding to Boulogne to renew my projects against England. Let your majesty abstain from every armament which could give me uneasiness and cause a diversion in favour of England. I had reason to believe, when I had the pleasure to see your majesty, and when I concluded the treaty of Presburg, that our affairs were terminated for ever, and that I could devote myself to the naval war without being troubled or distracted. Let your majesty mistrust those who talk to you of the dangers of your monarchy, and thus trouble your welfare and that of your family and your peoples. Those men are dangerous; those men alone invite the dangers they pretend to fear. Pursuing a straightforward, frank, and plain line of conduct, your majesty will render your peoples happy, will yourself enjoy the happiness for which you must long after so many troubles, and will be sure of having in me a man resolved never to do anything contrary to your main interests. Let your majesty's proceedings display confidence, and they will inspire it. The best policy in these days is simplicity and truth. Let your majesty make known to me your apprehensions whenever any one succeeds in filling you with them, and I will instantly disperse them. Let your majesty permit me one word more: hearken to your own opinion, your own sentiments; they are very superior to those of your counsellors.

"I entreat your majesty to read my letter in a good sense, and to see in it nothing that is not for the good and the tranquillity of Europe and of your majesty."

To this letter, so lofty and so polished, Napoleon again added a formal demand for the recognition of king Joseph, as the surest means of eliciting the true disposition of Austria, and implicating her in his system, or placing her in a dilemma from which he would compel her to extricate herself by peace or by war, whenever he should please to push things to extremity.

The sovereigns assembled at Erfurth, having taken leave of the two emperors, had departed one after the other. On the morning of the 14th Alexander and Napoleon rode out of Erfurth on horseback, side by side, as they had entered it, amidst the population that thronged around them from all quarters, and in presence of the troops under arms. They rode a certain distance together, then dismounted; their horses were taken by grooms, and they walked a few minutes, briefly reiterating what they had so often said to each other about the utility, fecundity, and greatness of their alliance, their mutual liking, and their desire and hope to strengthen the ties that united them; and then they embraced with a sort of emotion. Though there was policy, ambition, and interest in their friendship, all was not selfish calculation in that sentiment. Men even the most constrained to practise dissimulation are never so false, so destitute of sensibility, as is imagined in their cunning by the vulgar, who think themselves profound when they assume the existence of evil in everything. Alexander and Napoleon parted with emotion, and there was good faith in the grasp of the hand they exchanged, the one seated in his carriage, the other in his saddle. Alexander departed for Weimar and St. Petersburg, Napoleon for Erfurth and Paris. They were never to meet more, and of their projects of that hour not one was destined to be accomplished!

On his return to Erfurth, Napoleon dismissed the personages, princes and others, who still remained, and some hours afterwards his carriage bore him away, leaving the little town to the silence and solitude from which he had roused it for a while, to fill it with bustle, pomp, and movement, and then let it relapse into its peaceful obscurity. It will nevertheless remain celebrated as the theatre in which was given that prodigious representation of the grandeurs of this world.

Napoleon left Erfurth on the 14th of October, and arrived, on the morning of the 18th, at St. Cloud. Through the interview he had had with the emperor Alexander he had attained his object, for Austria was held in check—at least for the moment; he had time to make a short and decisive campaign in the Peninsula; for the impressions caused by the affairs of Spain others of a less painful kind were substituted; the event of Baylen, very well known to Europe, very little known to France, was effaced by the event of Erfurth, which was known to all; and, lastly, it was possible that England, intimidated before the united forces of France and Russia, might consent to listen to words of peace.

Immediately on his arrival at Saint Cloud Napoleon set about realising the design of a negociation with Great Britain. He ordered the commander of the naval forces at Boulogne to embark, in the most public manner, the two messengers sent from Erfurth, and respectively designated as couriers from the emperor of Russia and from the emperor of the French. The dispatch which they bore to Mr. Canning, and which contained a letter from the two emperors to the king of England, offering him peace in dignified but formal terms, was enclosed in an envelope, the superscription of which signified that it was addressed by their majesties the emperor of the French and the emperor of Russia to his majesty the king of Great Britain. The couriers were ordered to say everywhere, and particularly in England, that they were come from Erfurth, where they had left the two emperors together, and that they had passed on their road numerous bodies of troops marching to the camp at Boulogne. In this way Napoleon thought to make the responsibility of rejecting peace lie heavily upon the cabinet of London, and also to strike the imagination of the English by the possibility of a new Boulogne expedition.

He proposed to remain in Paris the number of days requisite for the execution of his last orders, and then to set out for Spain, personally to direct the military operations with the activity and vigour peculiar to himself, and then more than ever necessary in order to take from England the aid afforded her by the Spanish insurrection, and to render his armies sooner available in case of a renewal of hostilities with Austria, which he still regarded as possible, in the ensuing spring. To postpone that new crisis, nevertheless, was his whole desire. To alarm England and tranquillise Austria, so as to prompt the one to peace and take away from the other the thought of war, was the twofold object of his last arrangements.

Accordingly, he made an entirely new distribution of the forces he had left in Germany. In the first place, he took from them the title of *Grand Army*, for which he substituted the less imposing appellation of *Army of the Rhine*, the command of which was to be given to marshal Davout, of all his marshals the most capable of keeping and disciplining an army. Marshal Soult's division was broken up, and he himself was ordered to Spain Of the three corps which formed his division, one, the St. Hilaire, was added to marshal Davout's division, which became the army of the Rhine; the other two, those of Carra St. Cyr and Legrand, were marched towards France, and ostensibly towards the camp of Boulogne, but very slowly, so that, if need were, they might fall back upon the Upper Danube. The Boudet and Molitor corps were ordered to Strasburg and Lyons, as if destined ultimately for Italy, but so as to retain the possibility of returning into Swabia and Bavaria. Marshal Davout, with his three old corps, Morant, Friant, and Gudin, the St. Hilaire corps newly detached from marshal Soult's command, the fine Oudinot *corps d'élite*, all the cuirassiers, a large portion of light cavalry, and a magnificent artillery, was to occupy the left bank of the Elbe, having his cavalry cantoned in Hanover and Westphalia, and his infantry in the old Franconian and Saxon provinces of Prussia. His force would consist of about 60,000 foot, 12,000 cuirassiers, 8000 hussars and chasseurs, 10,000 artillerymen and engineers, in all 90,000 fighting men, the best in all the French armies. There remained on the shores of the Baltic 6000

French and 6000 Dutchmen, commanded by the prince de Ponte Corvo. The four corps on their way back to France might by a movement to the left reinforce the troops left in Germany by 40,000 men. In consequence of the plan for adding a fifth battalion to every regiment, and sending the fourth battalion to join the body, by employing the new conscription, these forces would be further augmented to nearly 180,000 men.

In consequence of the same plan, all the Italian regiments, having four battalions with the main body, would form a total of 100,000 men, being 80,000 foot, 12,000 horse, the rest artillerymen and engineers. Napoleon ordered that the close of October should be profitably employed, so that the conscripts should be on their march before the winter. He desired that everything should be ready in Italy by the month of March. The army of Dalmatia, which had continued to be called the second division of the Grand Army, from the time it had been detached, after the battle of Austerlitz, to occupy that province under marshal Marmont, took the name of first division of the army of Italy, which was thus raised to 120,000 men.

Thus, whilst allaying the fears of Austria by the distribution and direction of his forces, Napoleon kept himself in readiness with regard to her. At the same time, to alarm England, he made a great parade of the movement of the Carra St. Cyr and Legrand corps towards the camp at Boulogne.

Napoleon gave at the same time his final orders as to the composition of the army of Spain. He formed it into eight divisions, of which he purposed to be himself the commander-in-chief, prince Berthier being as usual his major-general. The first division of the Grand Army, marched from Berlin to Bayonne towards the end of October, preserved under marshal Victor the title of first division of the army of Spain. The Bessières division became the 2nd, and was destined for marshal Soult. Marshal Moncey's division was styled the 3rd of the army of Spain. The Sebastiani division, combined with the Poles and Germans under marshal Lefebvre, was designated as the 4th. The 5th division of the Grand Army, under marshal Mortier, had been moved, by an order issued at Erfurth, from the Rhine to the Pyrenees. It retained its numerical rank as the 5th division of the army of Spain. The 6th division of the Grand Army, recently arrived from Germany, and still composed of the Marchand and Bisson corps, and commanded by marshal Ney, was to be called the 6th division of the army of Spain. Its numerical force was raised higher than it had ever been, by the addition of a third corps, a fine body under general Dessoles, and newly formed out of some old regiments transferred to the Peninsula. General Gouvion Saint Cyr, with the troops of general Duhesme shut up in Barcelona, the Reille column remaining before Figueras, and the Pino and Souham corps, arrived in Roussillon from Piedmont, was to form the 7th division of the army of Spain. Junot, with the troops that had returned by sea from Portugal, rearmed, recruited, and provided with artillery and cavalry horses, formed the 8th. Marshal Bessières was put at the head of the reserve of cavalry, composed of 14,000 dragoons and 2000 chasseurs. General Walther took the command of the imperial guard of 10,000 men. This was a mass of 150,000 old troops, which, added to the 100,000 already beyond the Pyrenees, presented the enormous total of 250,000 fighting men. Such were the efforts to which Napoleon was driven for having in the beginning undertaken to invade Spain with too small and too raw an army.

Of this reinforcement of 150,000 men, at least 100,000 that had left Germany or Italy at the end of August had reached the Pyrenees at the end of October; these were the 1st, 4th, 6th, and 7th divisions, the guards, and the dragoons. The 5th, under marshal Mortier, having set out later than the others, and the 8th, under general Junot, recently landed by the English at Rochelle, were still on the march.

Joseph, as we have stated, had never ceased devising and executing false movements, sometimes to the right, sometimes to the left, the only result obtained by this imitation of the Emperor's manœuvres being to fatigue his troops to no purpose, and deprive them of all confidence in the authority that commanded them. To crown his miserable autumn campaign on the Ebro, he had projected, or some one had projected for him, an offensive movement upon Madrid, abandoning the communications of the army with France to the mercy of chance, and leaving to Napoleon the task of re-establishing them with the help of the 150,000 men he was bringing from Germany and Italy. Napoleon looked with pity on this silly conception, wrote his brother the most admirable and instructive letters on the art of which he was the great master, and enjoined him to stay quiet at Vittoria, attempt no operation, allow the insurgents of the right under general Blake to advance as far as Bilbao, and the insurgents of the left under generals Palafox and Castaños to advance to Sanguesa, or even farther if they pleased; because he himself, arriving soon at the centre, about Vittoria, with an overwhelming force, would be able to fall upon them in the rear, cut them to pieces, and finish the war at a blow. Major-general Berthier set out before his master for Bayonne, in order to organise head-quarters, and put everything in place, so that when Napoleon arrived he should have nothing to do but order the movements to be made. After having opened the Legislative Body with little pomp, having commissioned M. de Talleyrand to receive the members of the two assemblies, keep up a continual intercourse with them, and direct them in the peaceable and laborious way they were then pursuing, and having committed to M. de Romanzoff and M. de Champagny the task of conducting the great negociation begun with England, Napoleon quitted Paris on the 29th of October for Bayonne. It was with some apprehension his kindred, and those to whom his precious existence was dear, saw him about to expose himself in that land of fanatics, where general Gobert had died by a ball fired from a bush. As for him, calm and serene, thinking no more of a bullet fired from a bush than of the hundreds of cannon-balls that traversed the battle-field of Eylau, he departed full of confidence, and cherishing the hope of inflicting some humiliating disaster.

Before his departure he had given orders to the fleet. Obliged to renounce the vast maritime projects he had conceived when he thought he could easily control Spain, and make her co-operate in his gigantic expeditions, he was again reduced to mere cruises. He had dispatched several frigates with soldiers and supplies for the colonies, whence they were to bring back sugar and coffee on commercial account, and to make what prizes they could by the way. He had, morever, given orders for fitting out two strong cruising expeditions, the one, consisting of three ships and several frigates, sailing from Rochefort under rear-admiral Lhermite,—the other, also of three ships and several frigates, from Lorient, under captain Troude, both under orders to touch at Guadeloupe and Martinique, land troops and supplies there, bring back colonial produce, and make their way back to Toulon. Lastly, he ordered his fleet at Flushing to leave port on the first favourable occasion, and to proceed to the Mediterranean, either through the British Channel, or by circumnavigating the British islands. It was always his intention, previously to the conclusion of peace, to attempt a grand enterprise against Sicily, in order to unite it to the kingdom of Naples. Murat had just seized the island of Capri, and Napoleon did not despair of seeing the kingdom of the Two Sicilies entirely reconstituted under that warlike prince, aided by the French marine.

Whilst he was on his way to Spain the negociations were to be continued, as we have said, in his absence, by M. de Champagny and M. de Romanzoff, acting under the advice of M. de Talleyrand. The couriers dispatched from Boulogne had some difficulty in reaching England, for the most precise orders had been given to all the British cruisers not to let any vessel pass under a flag of truce. Nevertheless, a very able officer who commanded the brig they were on board of succeeded in passing through the line of English cruisers without being captured, and moored in the Downs. Some objection was at first made to admitting the two couriers; at last the Russian was sent on to London, and the French courier was detained in the Downs, until, by an order from Mr. Canning, he was soon after allowed to repair to London. The two couriers were very well treated, but placed under the guardianship of an English courier, who never quitted them for a moment; and they were sent back again after a lapse of forty-eight hours, and made bearers to MM. de Champagny and Romanzoff of a mere acknowledgment of the receipt of the dispatch, and an intimation that an answer would be subsequently sent to the message of the two emperors.

This cold response, coupled with the many precautions taken with regard to the two couriers, indicated no great desire to establish communications with the continent. The public, in fact, were not disposed for peace on the other side of the channel. Though in general the English nation was always inclined to accept proposals for peace when any were made to its government, and though it was much given to blame the obstinacy of the cabinet in continuing the war, on this occasion it manifested quite a different temper. This change of sentiment was the result of various causes. In the first place, if after Tilsit the prospect of war with the whole continent, particularly with Russia, had alarmed England as in 1801, she had soon recovered confidence on seeing that the consequences of that general war were not in reality very serious. It had given her one effective enemy the more; and, being still mistress of the seas, she might laugh at the efforts of all her adversaries. She was proud in her conviction of their impotence, and quite free in her movements, for she had none to care for, and she believed herself in a condition to attempt more enterprises by directing them solely to her own profit. If the continent indeed seemed closed against her from one end to the other, it was not closed so effectually as to prevent her from still introducing large quantities of goods, both by the North and by the South, and especially by way of Trieste. And then the late events in Spain promised her immense commercial advantages, by opening to her the ports of the Peninsula, and securing to her an exclusive trade with the Spanish colonies, which were all in insurrection against king Joseph. England suddenly found a vast market in those quarters, and an opportunity for seizing the magnificent Spanish colonies, or urging them to independence,—a brilliant revenge for the insurrection of the United States. So that, after all, when, after the war in Spain, Napoleon forced Russia to declare against England, he did not thereby raise up a new enemy against her, and by imperfectly closing the northern ports against her he opened to her those of the south of Europe, and all those of South America. Moreover, the Spanish insurrection had just given England a new ally on the continent, the only one that since 1802 had gained advantages over the French troops. There is no people more prone to conceive extravagant predilections than are the sober inhabitants of Great Britain, and they were then possessed with a violent liking for Spanish insurgents, just as we have seen them in our day seized with a liking for the insurgents of every country. The English nation admired their generous devotedness, their incomparable courage; and, beholding in the victory only the naked fact without inquiring into its cause, it was quite ready to declare those men to be the equals at least of the French. Austria, though ostensibly she had broken off her intercourse with the British government, still held out to her furtive signs of intelligence, continued to arm without intermission, and was probably about to recommence war with France. Prognostics of a new and perhaps a successful struggle were, therefore, in the opinion of the English, springing up in all directions, and it was no time to think of a peace, the first condition of which would have been to leave Napoleon master of the second of the maritime powers of the continent,—that is to say, of Spain. Lastly, an accident, a pure accident, set all the English heads in a ferment at that moment. The convention of Cintra appeared to them an unworthy act of weakness on the part of the British generals. Comparing it with that of Baylen, jealous of not having obtained such an advantage over the French as that obtained by the Spaniards, alleging that general Junot had been in as bad a position after the battle of Vimeiro as general Dupont after that of Baylen, which was false, the English were enraged that there had been granted to general Junot's army conditions a hundred times more advantageous than those obtained by general Dupont, and they intensely regretted the pleasure of which they had been deprived,—a pleasure for them beyond compare,—that of seeing a French army defile as prisoners through the streets of London.

The exasperation against the ministry on this subject amounted to frenzy, and the public had insisted on the formation of a high court to try the victorious generals. Sir Arthur Wellesley himself was compromised with sir Hew Dalrymple in this affair, although his military operations were applauded. Certainly, when, instead of blaming as formerly the pertinacity against the French, public opinion inveighed against an excessive complaisance towards them, the moment was ill adapted for overtures of peace. The Canning-Castlereagh ministry, extravagant imitators of Mr. Pitt's policy, would have been afraid of incurring still more violent accusations had it listened to pacific proposals under such circumstances. Thus, from one cause and another, every opportunity of reconciliation with Great Britain was successively frustrated: that of lord Lauderdale in 1806 because France was bent on pursuing and completing the conquest of the continent; that of 1807 after Tilsit, and that of 1808 after Erfurth, because England was bent on pursuing and completing the conquest of the seas. Nevertheless, though England was at the moment averse to treat for peace, the British cabinet would not have dared to refuse preremptorily in the face of Europe and of its nation to listen to pacific overtures; accordingly, it replied to MM. de Champagny and de Romanzoff, some days afterwards, on the 28th of October, by a message which was conveyed to Paris by an English messenger.

The message stated that England, although she had often received proposals for peace which she had strong reasons for not believing to be sincere, would never refuse to give ear to proposals of that kind, but that they must be such as were honourable for her. And now, avoiding all discussion on the basis of the negociations, that of *uti possidetis*, which could hardly be gainsaid, since it was the basis which the British government itself had proposed on all former occasions, the message made it a point of honour and duty for England to insist that all her allies should be included in the negociation, the Spanish insurgents as well as the others, though

England was not bound to them by any formal act. But though such a bond was wanting, a community of interests, a sentiment of generosity, and numerous relations already established, forbade her to abandon them. On this condition Mr. Canning said he was ready to name plenipotentiaries, and to send them wherever their presence might be desired.

The British cabinet well knew that to demand the admission of the Spanish insurgents to the conferences which should be opened to treat of peace was to make all negociation impossible; for between kings Joseph and Ferdinand VII. there could be no compromise imaginable. It was all or nothing, Madrid or Valençay, for the one as for the other.

When M. de Romanzoff and M. de Champagny received this reply, which was accompanied with excuses to M. de Romanzoff for not replying to the sovereigns themselves but to their ministers, by reason that one of the two emperors was not recognised by England, they were not a little embarrassed. To take upon themselves to make any explicit declaration, one way or the other, respecting the essential condition, that, namely, of the admission of the insurgents, seemed to them too bold a step, even though it were sanctioned by the advice of M. de Talleyrand. They resolved, therefore, to refer the matter to Napoleon, and meanwhile they acted towards Mr. Canning just as he himself had acted, merely acknowledging the receipt of his communication, and promising him a reply at a future day.

M. de Romanzoff had been from the first very eager to bring the negociations with London to a conclusion, in order to be able the sooner to appropriate the Danubian provinces; and now that he was in Paris publicly engaged in efforts for peace with England, it was a point of personal vanity with him to consummate the business, especially as the convention of Erfurth had clearly stipulated that in any case Finland, Moldavia, and Wallachia should be secured to Russia. He was therefore of opinion, with MM. de Talleyrand and de Champagny, that the English message, in requiring the presence at the negociation of all the allies of England, including the Spanish insurgents, nevertheless presented in its form nothing so absolute as to preclude all possibility of agreement. For this reason they all three wrote to the emperor, praying him to make a reply which should allow of continuing the preliminaries, and arriving at a meeting of plenipotentiaries.

Napoleon was at that moment on the Ebro, wholly engrossed with war and with the hope of overwhelming the Spaniards and the English, and under that new phase of mind no longer attaching so much importance as at first to the preliminaries with England. Mr. Canning's message left scarcely any uncertainty in his mind, and he counted on nothing but a great disaster inflicted on the British army to bend the obstinacy of the cabinet of London. That being the case, he was the more disposed to leave to others the conduct of this affair, and he permitted the three diplomatists in

Paris to reply as they thought proper, provided the insurgents were formally excluded from the negociation. He sent a sketch of the reply, which MM. de Champagny, de Romanzoff, and de Talleyrand were authorised to modify as they pleased, and which they took care, indeed, to modify considerably.

This new message, conveyed to London by the same couriers, noticed some offensive allusions in the English message, and then admitted, without difficulty, all the allies of England to participate in the negociation, except the Spanish insurgents, who were but rebels, and could not represent Ferdinand VII., since he was at Valençay, where he disavowed them, and confirmed the abdication of the crown of Spain.

On receipt of this note the British cabinet, fearing to discourage its new allies in Spain and Austria by rumours of peace, to chill the fanaticism of the one nation, and to retard the military preparations of the other, resolved to break off at once a negociation that seemed to it neither useful nor made in earnest. Having documents in their hands which proved that France would make no concession to the Spanish insurgents, who were immensely popular in England, it had nothing to fear from parliament. Accordingly, it made a peremptory declaration, offensive both to Russia and France, to the effect that no peace was possible with two courts, one of which dethroned and kept as prisoners the most legitimate kings, and the other of which suffered them to be treated unworthily for interested motives; that, moreover, the pacific proposals addressed to England were illusory, and devised for the purpose of disheartening the generous nations that had shaken off the oppressive yoke of France, and those which were yet preparing to do so; that the negociations were therefore to be considered as finally broken off, and that war should be continued with all the energy which was called for by the circumstances.

It was evident that, calculating on a speedy renewal of the struggle, England had been afraid of chilling the ardour of the Spaniards and the Austrians if she continued the negociation. M. de Talleyrand felt the natural and honourable regret he always experienced upon the failure of an attempt for peace. M. de Romanzoff was piqued at the offensive allusions to his court, and vexed at his own failure, but comforted by the freedom thenceforth possessed for acting immediately in the East. M. de Champagny, in his thorough devotion to the Emperor's person, ideas, and fortune, looked upon this refusal only as an opportunity for new triumphant wars to be waged by a master he deemed invincible. The public knew and cared little about the matter, and looked for a decisive result only to Napoleon's presence in Spain.

Whilst such was the reply of England, that of Austria to the declarations of France and Russia was scarcely better. She protested her intention to preserve peace, and, in fact, she made less display of her preparations, without however discontinuing them;

but she received with bitterness the joint proposal that she should recognise king Joseph, and declared that when she should have been made acquainted with what had taken place at Erfurth she would explain her views regarding the new royalty constituted in Spain, adding, that a knowledge of what had been settled between the two emperors was indispensable towards enabling her to see her way to a definite conclusion. The form of this declaration, no less than its substance, revealed the deep irritation with which Austria was filled. It was evident that Napoleon would have time to make a campaign in the Peninsula, but only one. It was expected, from his genius and his troops, that it would be decisive. The public, habituated to war, accustomed under that invincible master to sleep amidst the sound of cannon, whose distant echoes were but presages of victory, remained calm and confident, notwithstanding the melancholy and even ominous character of the war waged beyond the Pyrenees against the fanaticism of a whole nation. The brilliant spectacle exhibited at Erfurth still dazzled their eyes, and blinded them to the too real perils of the moment.

BOOK XXXIII.

SOMO-SIERRA.

Arrival of Napoleon at Bayonne—Non-performance of part of his orders—Manner in which he made amends for it—His departure for Vittoria—Ardour of the Spaniards in maintaining a war begun with successes—Project for arming five hundred thousand men—Rivalry of the provincial Juntas, and creation of a central Junta at Aranjuez—Direction of the military operations—Plan of campaign—Division of the forces of the insurrection into armies of the left, of the centre, and of the right—Premature meeting of the corps of marshal Lefebvre with the army of general Blake, in advance of Durango—Battle of Zornoza—The Spaniards defeated—Napoleon, having arrived at Vittoria, rectifies the position of his *corps d'armée*, forms the plan of suffering himself to be turned on his two wings, then to push briskly forward to Burgos, with a view to fall upon Blake and Castaños, and to take them in rear—Execution of this plan—March of the 2nd corps, commanded by marshal Soult, upon Burgos—Battle of Burgos, and capture of that city—Marshals Victor and Lefebvre, opposed to general Blake, pursue him unremittingly—Victor meets with him at Espinosa, and disperses his army—Movement of the 3rd corps, commanded by marshal Lannes, upon the army of Castaños—Manœuvre on the rear of that corps, by the sending of marshal Ney across the mountains of Soria—Battle of Tudela, and defeat of the armies of the centre and the right—Napoleon, having got rid of the masses of the Spanish insurrection, advances upon Madrid, regardless of the English, whom he is desirous of drawing into the interior of the Peninsula—March towards the Guadarrama—Brilliant battle of Somo-Sierra—Appearance of the French army under the walls of Madrid—Efforts to spare the capital of Spain the horrors of capture by assault—Attack and surrender of Madrid—Napoleon will not allow his brother to enter the city, neither does he enter himself—His political and military measures—Abolition of the Inquisition, of feudal rights, and of part of the convents—Marshals Lefebvre and Ney moved upon Madrid, marshal Soult directed upon Old Castille, with a view to ulterior operations against the English—Operations in Aragon and in Catalonia—Compulsory tardiness of the siege of Saragossa—Campaign of general St. Cyr in Catalonia—Crossing of the frontier—Siege of Roses—Skilful march to avoid the fortresses of Girona and Hostalrich—Meeting with the Spanish army, and battle of Cardedeu—Triumphant entry into Barcelona—Immediate departure to take the camp of the Llobregat, and victory of Molina del Rey—Continuation of the occurrences in the centre of Spain—Arrival of marshal Lefebvre at Toledo, of marshal Ney at Madrid—Intelligence of the English army brought by deserters—General Moore, joined near Benavente by the division of general

Baird, marches to meet marshal Soult—Manœuvre of Napoleon's to throw himself on the flank of the English, and to envelop them—Departure of marshal Ney, with Marchand's and Maurice Mathieu's divisions, of Napoleon with Lapisse's and Dessoles' divisions, and with the imperial guard—Passage of the Guadarrama—Tempest, deep mud, inevitable delays—General Moore, apprised of the movement of the French, beats a retreat—Napoleon advances to Astorga—Couriers from Paris decide him to establish himself at Valladolid—He consigns the pursuit of the English army to marshal Soult—Retreat of general Moore, pursued by marshal Soult—Disorder and devastations of that retreat—Meeting at Lugo—Hesitation of marshal Soult—Arrival of the English at Coruña—Battle of Coruña—Death of general Moore, and embarkation of the English—Their losses in this campaign—Last instructions of Napoleon's before leaving Spain, and his departure for Paris—Plan for conquering the south of Spain after giving the army a month's rest—Movement of marshal Victor upon Cuença, for the purpose of definitively ridding the centre of Spain of the presence of the insurgents—Battle of Uclès, and capture of the greater part of the army of the duke de l'Infantado, formerly the army of Castaños—Under the influence of these successes, Joseph at length enters Madrid, with the consent of Napoleon, and is well received there—Spain seems disposed to submit—Saragossa is the only point in the north and the centre of Spain that continues to resist—Nature of the difficulties to be encountered before that important city—Marshal Lannes sent to accelerate the operations of the siege—Vicissitudes and horrors of that memorable siege—Heroism of the Spaniards and of the French—Surrender of Saragossa—Character and conclusion of this second campaign of the French in Spain—Chances for the establishment of the new royalty.

BOOK XXXIII.

NAPOLEON, setting out in all haste for Bayonne, finding the roads entirely ruined by the weather and the great quantity of military carriages, the post-horses knocked up by the numerous passages, was highly irritated against the administrations charged with these different services, and, on reaching Mont de Marsan, mounted a horse to ride post through the Landes. He arrived at Bayonne at two in the morning of the 3rd of November. He sent immediately for prince Berthier, to learn how things stood, and how his orders had been executed. Nothing had been done as he directed; in particular, not so speedily, though he was the most far-sighted, the most absolute, and the most obeyed of administrators.

He had required that 20,000 conscripts of the classes in arrear, taken from the South, and destined to form the basis of the fourth battalions in the regiments serving in Spain,* should be collected at Bayonne. Five thousand of them at most had arrived. He reckoned upon 50,000 great-coats, 129,000 pair of shoes, and on a proportionable quantity of clothing, the rest to be furnished as wanted. He found but 7000 great-coats and 15,000 pair of shoes. Now, on these two articles he laid the greatest stress, as we have elsewhere observed, in winter campaigns; he was therefore excessively displeased. While the supply of clothing was so backward, that of provisions was considerable; and this was absolutely according to the rule of contraries; for the Castilles abounded in articles of subsistence, in grain and cattle. It is superfluous to mention wine, which forms the chief produce of the hills of the Peninsula. The mules, of which Napoleon had ordered a large purchase, chosen, for want of others, at four years and a half old, were too young to do good service; which was as much to be regretted as all the rest, for means of conveyance were precisely what they ran most short of in Spain, on account of the state of the roads and the mode of transport, performed almost exclusively on the backs of mules.

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* We have seen in the preceding Book that Napoleon had increased all the regiments to five battalions; that, of those which were in Germany, he resolved to have four with the army, and the fifth at the depôt on the Rhine; that, of those serving in Spain, he purposed that three should be beyond the Pyrenees, the fourth at Bayonne as a first depôt, and the fifth in the interior of France as second depôt.

Napoleon had, besides, prescribed that the troops coming from Germany should be concentrated between Bayonne and Vittoria; that no operation should be commenced; that the insurgents should even be permitted to turn us on the right and the left; for it consisted with his plan to let the Spanish generals, in their ridiculous pretension to envelop him, advance very far upon his wings. Now, the fine troops drawn from the grand army had been hastily dispersed on all the points where the timidity of Joseph's staff had led it to imagine that danger was to be perceived. Lastly, marshal Lefebvre, commanding the 1st corps, enticed by the opportunity of fighting the Spaniards at Durango, had defeated them—an advantage of no value to Napoleon, who had a liking, and in his position an actual need, for extraordinary results.

Great as were the disappointments he experienced, Napoleon could not find fault either with himself for want of foresight, or with his agents for want of docility, but solely with the nature of things, which began to be forced in all that he had undertaken for some time past. He had, in fact, devoted two months at most to making on the Pyrenees preparations for an immense war. Now, if two months might have been sufficient perhaps upon the Rhine and upon the Alps, whither all the military resources of the Empire had not ceased to flow for several years, those two months were far from sufficient on the Pyrenees, whither, since 1795, that is to say for thirteen years, no part of our military resources had been directed, France having from that period been always at peace with Spain. The agents of the administration, moreover, being yet unacquainted with the nature and wants of this new theatre of war, sent provisions, for example, when clothing was most needed. Besides, the quantities of all articles changed so suddenly, since the augmentation from 60 or 80 thousand conscripts to 250,000 men, as to outstrip all anticipations. On the other hand, if the troops, instead of being concentrated at Vittoria, were dispersed in various directions, the reason was that a staff, in which as yet figured none of the energetic lieutenants whom Napoleon had trained in his school, was uneasy at the first appearance of danger, and sent off the corps, at the very moment of their arrival, to any quarter where the enemy showed himself. Lastly, marshal Lefebvre himself had indulged the unseasonable desire of fighting only because, wherever Napoleon was not, the command was relaxed and became weak and uncertain.*

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* On this point I quote a curious letter of marshal Jourdan's, chief of Joseph's staff, and charged to command when Napoleon and Berthier were not there:—

Marshal Jourdan to General Belliard.

"Vittoria, October 30, 1808.

"My dear General,—Notwithstanding the want of good-will manifested by everybody, general Morlot is at Lodoza, marshal Ney at Logroño. The enemy has given us time to go backward and forward, and allowed us to take our positions.

"General Sebastiani had received orders to leave the 5th regiment of dragoons at Murquia; but as every one does just what suits him, he has brought with him, as I am told, half of the regiment with the colonel, so that he is going to shut up

Napoleon passed the 3rd in expressing, orally or in writing, his extreme dissatisfaction to those agents who had ill comprehended and ill executed his orders, and, what was still better, in repairing the inaccuracies or tardiness, more or less inevitable, of which he had to complain.* He ordered all contracts which the contractors

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half a regiment of dragoons in a country where it is almost impossible to ride on horseback. Ah! my dear general, if you could assist me to get out of this cursed situation, you would do me a great service. How happy should I be to go and plant cabbages, if things are to remain in the same state as at present!

"The king received last night a letter from marshal Victor, dated from Mondragon. Monsieur le maréchal complains rather warmly that one of his divisions has been detained at Durango. He would, perhaps, have preferred finding the enemy at Mondragon and at Salinas. Every one has his taste and his manner of viewing things.

"The king had a strong desire to have the enemy attacked at Durango, but, I imagine, he was fearful that this attack might be disapproved by the Emperor. I know not yet what his majesty will decide upon, but assuredly success is certain. It is true that if he waits a few days, and Monsieur Blake has the kindness to remain where he is, he will have some difficulty to get off. The obstinacy of that general appears to me very extraordinary. Is he expecting reinforcements by sea? If so, it would be well to overturn him immediately. But how can one take any resolution when one is not master?

"I write to you, my dear general, all that I know, all that I think, and all that passes. I have no other desire, no other interest, but to see the Emperor's arms triumphant, and the king seated on the throne of Spain. If what I write to you can be of any utility, make whatever use of it you think proper."

* I quote two letters of Napoleon's to Dejean the minister, remarkable for his views respecting matters of administration and contracts:—

To the minister Dejean, director of the administration of war.

"Bayonne, November 4, 1808.

"You will find annexed a report of the ordonnateur's. You will there see how unworthily I am served. I have yet but 1400 coats, only 7000 great-coats instead of 50,000, 15,000 pair of shoes instead of 120,000. I am in want of everything; the clothing proceeds in the worst possible manner: my army, which is about to take the field, is naked; it has nothing. The conscripts are not clothed; your reports are mere paper. It is convoys that I need; they ought to be sent off regularly, and an officer or a clerk put at the head of them, and then one might be sure of their arrival.

"You will find herewith letters from the prefect of the Gironde, and a report from Dufresne, the inspector of reviews; you will there see that all is robbery and waste. My army is naked, though it is taking the field. I have nevertheless spent a great deal of money; but it is so much thrown into the sea."

To the minister Dejean, director of the administration of war.

"Tolosa, November 5, 1808.

"The provisions which are at Bayonne shall not be consumed. There is no want of provisions in Spain, particularly in cattle and wine. I have given orders for the reserve of bullocks to be countermanded, it is useless; this will be a saving of two millions.

"What I want are great-coats and shoes. I should not be in want of anything if my orders had been executed. None of my orders have been executed, because the *ordonnateur* is not to be depended upon, and because people deal with none but rogues. An *ordonnateur* above suspicion must be sent to Bayonne. I want no bargaining. Bargaining, you know, produces nothing but roguery.

"I have cancelled the contract for clothing at Bordeaux. Send a director, to get making done on my account, who shall be assisted by the prefect, who shall make a requisition for a building and workpeople. Set out upon the principle that people make contracts only to rob, that when one pays there is no need of contracts, and that the system of administration is always better.

"How are we to manage, then, for this workshop? As we do in the regiments: put an honest commissary of war at the head of that establishment, add three or had not executed to be thrown up, the immediate creation at Bordeaux of workshops in which the cloths of the South should be used for making clothes, countermanded all the commissions for corn and cattle in order to devote his resources to clothing only, had barracks erected at Bayonne for lodging the fourth battalions, hastened the march of the conscripts to fill the skeletons, reviewed the troops that were arriving, sent to the administrations of the posts, and of bridges and roads, a great number of luminous and imperative intimations; then, in the evening, crossed the frontier, and went to pass the night at Tolosa, and on the following day, the 5th, he proceeded to Vittoria, where were the head-quarters of his brother Joseph. He travelled on horseback, escorted by the cavalry of the imperial guard, and entered Vittoria in the night, wishing not to receive any homage, and to lodge out of the town, in order to gratify his taste, which was to live in the open air, and to be with his brother as little as possible. This was neither from coldness nor estrangement towards the latter, but from calculation. He felt that by his side the position of Joseph would be secondary, as he had already remarked during their joint residence at Bayonne; and he wished, on the contrary, to leave him the first place in the eyes of the Spaniards. In Spain he wished, moreover, to be nothing but general, invested with all the rights of war, and exercising them without mercy, until Spain should submit. He consented, therefore, to reserve for himself the part of severity, even of cruelty, in order to leave to Joseph that of majesty and clemency. In this view, it was his wisest course not to lodge with Joseph.

No sooner had he arrived at Vittoria, and released himself from the embraces of his brother, who was much attached to him, than he summoned around him his staff, particularly those French and Spanish officers who were best acquainted with the roads of the country, in order to commence immediately the decisive operations which he had projected.

To comprehend the remarkable operations which he ordered on this occasion, and which were not among the least remarkable of his military life, it is necessary to know what had occurred in Spain

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four master-tailors, under his orders, as *employés* of the workshop, and charge three superior officers of those who are at Bordeaux with the superintendence of the reception, so as not to receive any but good clothes. There is no need of contract for all this, if money be placed at the disposal of the said commissary.

"By the decree you will see that the only question is about having a good assistant to the commissary of war, who will stake his reputation on making the workshop answer, and of having two good storekeepers, honest and clever, and two master-tailors, taken out of the army. By means of these five persons the workshop will go on perfectly well, and I shall have clothes as well made as those of the guard.

"As for activity, if you wish to get 10,000 coats made in a day, they will be made, because you will have nothing to do but to make requisitions of workmen throughout all France. If you had acted upon these principles, all would have gone on smoothly. But better late than never. For your rule, I will have no more contracts; and when I shall not have the making done by the corps, this method must be followed."

during the months of September and October, months spent, as well in Paris as at Erfurth, in negociations, in preparations for war, in movements of troops.

The Spaniards, doubly excited by the unhoped-for triumph of Baylen and the retreat of king Joseph to the Ebro, were intoxicated with joy and pride. It was not a body of conscripts oppressed by the heat and led by an unfortunate general that they fancied they had conquered, but the grand army of Napoleon himself. They supposed themselves invincible, and thought of nothing less than collecting a mass of 500,000 men, and pushing these 500,000 men beyond the Pyrenees, that is to say, of invading France. In the negociations with the English, whom they knew to be conquerors also in Portugal, but whose convention of Cintra they disdained in comparison with that of Baylen, they talked of nothing but enterprises directed against the south of France. They accepted and even desired the aid of an English army; but they asked this without attaching to it the salvation of Spain, which they undertook to accomplish without any foreign aid. Let us figure to ourselves Spanish boasting, so great at all times, heightened by an unparalleled triumph, and we shall scarcely have a just idea of the silly exaggerations of the insurgents.

What was most urgent, and at the same time most difficult, was to constitute a government; for, since the departure of the royal family for Compiegne and Valençay, since the retreat of Joseph to the Ebro, there was no other authority than that of the insurrectional Juntas formed in each province, an extravagant authority, divided among twelve or fifteen centres hostile to each other. In Madrid, formerly the sole centre of the royal administration, there was left only the council of Castille, equally despised and hated for having opposed no other resistance to foreign usurpation than a little ill-will and abundance of tergiversations. This body was then in the same situation in Spain in which the ancient parliaments had been in France at the commencement of the Revolution, which had been made use of before 1789, and which after 1789 were held of no account, because they had remained far below the desires of the moment. Endowed, however, like all old bodies, with a patient and tenacious ambition, it despaired not of possessing itself of the supreme power, and conceived that it had found occasion to do so in the murder of an old man, Don Luis Viguri, formerly intendent of the Havannah and a favourite of the prince of the Peace, long forgotten, but unluckily recalled to the attention of the people by an old servant who turned traitor to his master. The unfortunate Don Luis having been slaughtered and dragged about the streets, the need of a public authority was universally felt, and the council called to Madrid the Spanish generals victorious over the French, to lend a strong hand to the law. It proposed, at the same time, to the insurrectional Juntas, to depute one representative each, for the purpose of composing, with the council itself, a central government at Madrid.

The Spanish generals, accordingly, were not backward in going to triumph at Madrid; and Don Gonzalez de Llamas, with the Valencians and the Murcians, the pretended conquerors of marshal Moncey, and Castaños, with the Andalusians, the too real conquerors of general Dupont, successively arrived. The enthusiasm for the latter was extreme, and it was deserved, if success can be accounted equal to genius. But the Juntas were not in a humour to submit to the preponderance of the council of Castille, and to content themselves with a mere participation in power, under the supreme direction of that body. The only answers returned to it by all of them, with the single exception of that of Valencia, were the most vehement reproaches; that they would not acknowledge any authority which had formerly been a purely administrative and judiciary authority only, and which had recently not conducted itself in a manner to obtain from the confidence of the nation a power which it did not derive from the Spanish institutions. They discussed among themselves by deputies the form of the central government which they should constitute. On this point they were as much divided in views as in pretensions. In the first place, all were jealous of their neighbours. That of Seville was at variance with that of Grenada, each attributing to itself the honour of the triumph of Baylen, and carrying their violence so far as to be ready to make war against one another, and which they would have begun but for the prudent Castaños. Moreover, this same Junta of Seville insisted upon being the centre of the government, as well on account of its services as its geographical situation, which placed it at a distance from the French; and it purposed by means of successive adhesions to draw all the others to itself. The Juntas of the North, forming two by no means amicable groups, on the one hand, those of Gallicia, Leon, and Castille, on the other that of the Asturias, tended, however, to coalesce, and, once united, to fix the government of Spain in the North. The Juntas of Estremadura, Valencia, Grenada, and Saragossa, less ambitious, more discreet, and not less meritorious, advanced none of these exclusive pretensions, and declared in favour of the formation of a single government placed in the centre of Spain, but not at Madrid, to avoid the domination of the council of Castille.

All these Juntas were at length brought to agree through the medium of deputies, and it was settled that they should each send two representatives to some place specified, Ciudad Real, Aranjuez, or Madrid, in order to compose a central Junta of government. This plan was adopted, and the two representatives nominated, after much agitation, repaired, some to Madrid, others to Aranjuez. Those of Seville, always the most jealous, because they were the most ambitious, would not go further than Aranjuez, and finally drew to them all the others. It gratified the pride of these substitutes of absent royalty to meet in its ancient residence, and to usurp even its forms.

Constituted at Aranjuez, under the presidency of M. de Florida-

Blanca, formerly minister of Charles III., illustrious, enlightened, able, but unfortunately old, and a stranger to the present time, the central Junta declared itself invested with the entire royal authority, assumed the title of majesty, decreed that of highness to its president, that of excellence to its members, and to each of them a salary of 120,000 reals. Amounting at first to twenty-four members, it was soon increased to thirty-five; and its first act was to enjoin the council of Castille, as well as all the other Spanish authorities, to acknowledge its supreme power. The council of Castille, finding the creation of such a power not at all to its taste, thought at first of resisting. It objected by a formal declaration that, according to the laws of the kingdom, the Junta, if claiming to be a council of regency, was far too numerous, and, as a national assembly, it could not in any way supply the place of the Cortes. In consequence, it demanded the convocation of the Cortes themselves. We have already had occasion to remark, that in this rising of Spain for royalty there was an explosion of all the democratic sentiments; and that, in the name of Ferdinand VII., the people were in reality indulging the passions of 1793. Thus nothing sounded better in Spanish ears than the word Cortes. But from the council of Castille everything was taken ill. In all that it proposed they perceived a snare for annulling the Junta and substituting itself in its stead, and, without renouncing the Cortes, the Juntas answered its declaration only by a universal murmur of hatred and contempt. The support of the generals was then the only efficacious force. Now, all of them belonged to that central Junta, composed of the provincial Juntas, by which they were appointed, with which they had an understanding, and they adhered to the Junta, save one only, old Gregorio de la Cuesta, always sour, always unsociable, detesting the insurrectional and tumultuous authorities which had recently sprung up, and far preferring the council of Castille, of which he had formerly been president. He even thought for a moment of concerting with Castaños to attribute the military government to those two, leaving the civil government to the council of Castille. Events soon proved that such a combination would have been better; but Castaños was not enterprising enough to accept the offers of his colleague, and, besides, raised by the Junta of Seville, he was on the side of the Juntas. Don Gregorio de la Cuesta was therefore obliged to submit; and the council of Castille, destitute of all support, was forced to follow his example.

The central Junta of Aranjuez, in the full exercise of the supreme power ever since the first days of September, began to govern unfortunate Spain after its fashion.

Its first and its sole care ought to have been the levy of troops, their organisation, and their direction. But, in a country in which there had always been but very little administration, where a sudden revolution had just destroyed the little that there was, the central government could do nothing, or next to nothing, in regard to the most essential point, that is to say, the organisation of the forces, and possessed at most some influence over their general direction. The enthusiasm was assuredly very boisterous in Spain, as boisterous as it is possible to imagine; but we have just seen how feeble an effective resource enthusiasm is, how inferior in results to a regular law, which calls men, whether willing or not, to serve the country. Spain, which could and ought to have furnished, under such circumstances, four or five hundred thousand men, highly courageous by nature, gave scarcely one hundred thousand, ill-equipped, worse disciplined, incapable of making head even in the proportion of four to one against our most indifferent troops. After a great deal of noise and agitation, the only persons who enrolled themselves were the youth of the universities, some peasants urged by the monks, and a very small number of hot-headed individuals in the towns. In some of the provinces these recruits went to swell the ranks of the troops of the line; in others they formed, under the name of *Tercios*, a name borrowed from the ancient Spanish armies, special battalions serving along with troops of the line. Andalusia, so proud of its successes, had its army composed of four divisions, under generals Castaños, de la Peña, Coupigny, &c. That of Grenada was under major de Reding. Valencia and Murcia sent, under Llamas, part of the volunteers who had resisted Marshal Moncey. Estremadura, which had not yet figured in the ranks of the armed insurrection, formed, under general Galuzzo and the young marquis de Belveder, a division into which entered, besides the volunteers, many deserters from the Spanish troops in Portugal. With this division were joined the men enrolled in La Mancha and New Castille. Catalonia continued to raise bands of Miquelets, who closely pressed general Duhesme in Barcelona. Aragon, responding to the voice of Palafox, and encouraged by the resistance of Saragossa, organised a tolerably regular army, composed of troops of the line and Aragonese peasants, the finest and boldest men in Spain. The northern provinces, Gallicia, Leon, Old Castille, the Asturias, taking advantage of a considerable nucleus of troops of the line, some returned from Portugal, others in garrison at Ferrol, rallied under generals Blake and Gregorio de la Cuesta, compensated for their defeat at Rio-Seco by the success of the insurrection in the rest of the Peninsula. They received also an unexpected reinforcement, that of the troops of the marquis de la Romana, escaped, with his corps, from the shores of the Baltic, by a sort of miracle which deserves to be recorded.

It will be recollected that the Spanish troops sent by Napoleon to concur in guarding the shores of the Baltic had been spread over the Danish provinces, where they were destined to make head against the English and the Swedes. These troops, summoned to take the oath to Joseph, began to murmur. Those who were in the island of Seeland, around Copenhagen, rose, and would have murdered general Fririon, who commanded them, but could only get at his aide-de-camp, whom they put to death, and declared that they would not have any usurper-king. The king of Denmark caused them to be disarmed. But the greater part of the Spanish corps was in the island of Führen and in Jutland. The troops who were in these two localities, long excited by Spanish agents, brought over in English vessels, had resolved to escape from the ruler of the Continent, and for this purpose to proceed suddenly to a point of the shore where English ships would be ready to receive them. The marquis de la Romana, a man of ardent and singular mind, filled with the reading of ancient authors, more learned than discreet, more boiling than energetic, was at the head of this noble plot. At a given signal, all the Spanish detachments hastened to the port of Nyborg, where you embark to cross the Great Belt, where they found about a hundred small craft, which they seized, and proceeded to the isle of Langeland. There, under the protection of English ships of war, they had nothing to fear. The other detachments scattered in Jutland, on their part, hurried to Fredericia, passed the Little Belt in barks seized by them, crossed the island of Führen to get to Nyborg, and from Nyborg gained the isle of Langeland, the general rendezvous of these fugitives. The cavalry, leaving their horses in the fields, followed the infantry on foot, and arrived with it at the general rendezvous. The English, forewarned, having collected the vessels necessary for a short passage, had soon conveyed the fugitives to the coast of Sweden, and placed them out of danger; and, sufficient means having been at length collected, they carried them from Sweden to Spain in the first days of October, after three months' marvellous adventures. Of the 14,000 Spaniards placed on the shore of the Baltic, from nine to ten thousand returned to Spain, and four to five thousand were left in Denmark, disarmed and prisoners.

At a moment when the Spaniards regarded the slightest success as a triumph, the least sign of courage and intelligence as certain proofs of heroism and genius, the marquis de la Romana could not fail to appear an accomplished hero, a great man worthy of Plutarch. But, if they were so prompt in respect to admiration, they were not less so in respect to jealousy; and Castaños, for example, who, though frequently irresolute, was, nevertheless, the most intelligent and the most discreet of their generals, and for that reason ought to have been invested with the general direction of the war, did not obtain that command. Every Junta had its hero, whom it would not place below the hero of any neighbouring Junta; all that could be done, therefore, was to form a council of war, placed beside the Junta of Aranjuez, and composed of the principal generals or their representatives. It is impossible to recapitulate all the ridiculous plans proposed in this council; but the one which was preferred as an imitation of Baylen was that which consisted in enveloping the French army, which had retired upon the Ebro and was concentrated around Vittoria, by turning both its wings, by Bilbao on one side, by Pampeluna on the other. It is true that, in consequence of the usually odd configuration of the valleys, which among high mountains are entwined in one another, the French army, holding the road from Bayonne to Vittoria, which passes through Tolosa and Mondragon, had on its right the valley of which Bilbao occupies the centre, and which is called Biscay; on its left the valley, the entrance of which is occupied by the fortress of Pampeluna, and which is called Navarre. From Bilbao, by Durango, one might fall at Mondragon upon the rear of Vittoria, and cut off the high road which formed the principal communication of the French army. From Pampeluna one might also fall upon Tolosa and cut off the road to France, or even debouch upon Bayonne by St.-Jean-Pied-de-Port. Granting that they had met with French troops cowardly enough to flinch from undisciplined bands, led by incapable generals, it is certain that they might entertain well-founded hopes of enveloping the French army, of taking Joseph, his court, and the fifty or sixty thousand men who were left him on the Ebro, and carrying the brother of Napoleon prisoner to Madrid. This would assuredly have been a signal vengeance, and a very legitimate one, since Ferdinand VII. was at Valençay. But chances are not to be reckoned upon, and Baylen was a chance not destined to recur; for all the Spanish armies united would not have been a match for the soldiers and generals who had retired upon the Ebro, much less for the soldiers whom Napoleon was bringing with him. To force the passes of Bilbao at Mondragon, of Pampeluna at Tolosa, the Spaniards must have cleared their way, on the one hand, through the corps of marshals Victor and Lefebvre; on the other, through those of marshals Ney and Lannes, of generals Mouton, Lasalle, and Lefebvre-Desnoettes, marching at the head of old soldiers of the grand army, and no troops in Europe would have found out how to do that. Thus, without any chance of turning the French, they were left the faculty of debouching from Vittoria as from a centre, to throw themselves in mass, either to right or left, upon one or other of the Spanish armies, which were separated by great distances, which could not succour one another, and thus inflict on them the disaster which they purposed to make the French army undergo. But it was not given to the inexperienced generals of Spain to form these rational conclusions. To envelop a French army, to take it, was, ever since Baylen, a military process surrounded with an irresistible spell. The plan in question, then, prevailed in this council, in which it was a prodigy that anything should prevail, so numerous and so vehement were the contradictions there. In consequence, it was agreed that they should advance at once by the mountains of Biscay and Navarre upon Bilbao on the one hand, upon Pampeluna on the other, to cut off Joseph from Vittoria and treat him in the same manner as they had treated general Dupont. They then made the distribution of the forces at their disposal, and which, in the hopes of the Spaniards, were to have amounted to at least 400,000 men.

There were formed four corps, one, of the left, at first under general Blake, comprehending a considerable mass of troops of the line, those of Taranco's division, of the maritime arrondissement of Ferrol, of the marquis de la Romana, and, with these troops of the line, the volunteers of Gallicia, Leon, Castille, and the Asturias, among whom were to be seen in particular students of Salamanca and mountaineers of the Asturias. This army of the left might be computed at 36,000 men exclusively of de la Romana's division, at 45,000 with that division, the cavalry of which, returned from the North, was dismounted and incapable of serving. The army of general Blake was to advance along the southern slope of the Asturias and of Leon to Villareayo, then to endeavour to cross those mountains to Espinosa, in order to penetrate into the valley of Biscay, and descend upon Bilbao. In communication with this army of the left was to be formed an army of the centre, under general Castaños, which was to comprehend the troops of Castille, organized by La Cuesta, and led by Pignatelli, the troops of Estremadura, commanded by Galuzzo and the young marquis de Belveder, the two divisions of Andalusia, placed under the orders of de la Peña, and, lastly, the troops of Valencia and Murcia, which Llamas had led to Madrid. These troops, deducting those of Estremadura still behindhand, might amount to about 30,000 men. They were to line the Ebro, from Logroño to Calahorra. Those of Estremadura were to come and occupy Burgos, with the remnant of the Walloon and Spanish guards, the best troops of Spain, to the number of 12,000 men. The army of the right, formed in Aragon under Palafox, composed of Valencians, of some troops of Grenada, and of Aragonese, nearly 18,000 strong, was to cross the Ebro at Tudela, and, following the bank of the river of Aragon, to march by Sanguesa upon Pampeluna. The army of the centre, under Castaños, was to join the army of the right, in order to act in mass by Sanguesa, when the plan for enveloping the French army was to be definitively put into execution. Behind these three armies it was resolved to form a fourth, destined to play the part of reserve, and composed of Aragonese, Valencians, and Andalusians, who never appeared in line, and of an effective wholly unknown. Lastly, on the extreme right, that is to say, in Catalonia, there were, unconnected with the general plan, without any possible estimate of number, and secluded, like that province itself, bands of Miquelets, who, with regiments brought from the Balearic Islands, and Spanish soldiers from Lisbon, undertook to dispute that part of Spain with general Duhesme, and blockaded him in Barcelona. But, if we confine ourselves to the enumeration of the forces acting upon the real theatre of the war, those of the left under Blake, those of the centre under Castaños (including the division of Estremadura), lastly, those of Aragon under Palafox, we find their total number to be scarcely 100,000 men, comprising all the disciplined soldiers and ardent volunteers that Spain possessed, exhibiting a confused medley of troops of the line, sufficiently instructed to be aware of the defectiveness of their organisation and to be discouraged by it, peasants and students, wholly untrained, without any idea of war, ready to run away on the first serious rencounter, ill-equipped, ill-fed, commanded by generals incapable, or suspected because they were prudent, jealous of each other, and thoroughly divided. The great courage of the Spanish nation could not make amends for so many insufficiencies; and if the climate, a foreign army, the general circumstances of Europe, and the political faults of Napoleon, did not come in aid of the old dynasty, it was not from the defenders armed for it that it had to expect its re-establishment.

However, the principal of the means of salvation was preparing for Spain—that was the assistance of England. That power, after delivering Portugal from the presence of the French, had no intention of stopping at this first effort. Beset by Spanish agents sent by the Juntas, perceiving in the rising of the Peninsula a powerful diversion which would absorb part of the French forces, not despairing of raising up a new coalition on the Continent, and of throwing it upon Napoleon thus weakened, she was determined to afford the Spaniards all possible succour. She had dispatched to Santander, Coruña, and other ports of the Peninsula, arms, stores, provisions for war, and was even preparing an aid in money. No more neglecting her commercial interests than her political interests, she had besides inundated the Peninsula with her merchandise. A last reason, if all those which we have just enumerated had not been decisive enough to determine her to act energetically, was the sensation produced by the convention of Cintra, the object at this moment of the profound anger of the British public. Thus, though the expedition to Portugal, such as it was, was one of the best conducted and most successful expeditions that England had yet executed on *terra firma,* it was nevertheless requisite to repair the effect of it, as it would have been requisite to repair that of a disaster. Whether from this necessity, or the enthusiasm of the English for the Spanish cause, the British cabinet was therefore obliged to make the greatest efforts. In consequence, it resolved to send a considerable army to Spain. The south of the Peninsula, as safer, further from the French, nearer to Portugal, would have been preferred for the theatre of its military enterprises; but, when the general rendezvous was on the Ebro, when it flattered itself with the prospect of crushing definitively, at the very gates of France, king Joseph's dispirited armies—destroyed, it was said—it would have been a new disgrace, worse than that of Cintra, to land timidly at Cadiz, or to advance from Lisbon by Elvas upon Seville. The assemblage of an English army in Old Castille was, from these motives, decided upon; and its formation was set about in the following manner.

There were left about Lisbon nearly 18,000 men of the expedition to Portugal, terminated at Vimeiro. Sir John Moore, who had come from the North with 10,000 men, after a fruitless attempt to employ them in Sweden, had landed at Lisbon a few days after the convention of Cintra, and increased the British forces in Portugal to about 28,000. He was a prudent, clear-sighted officer, irresolute in council, though extremely brave in the field of battle, full of integrity and honour, and well worthy to command an English army. Participating neither in the glory of the late expedition, nor in the prejudices which it had excited, since he had arrived after all was over, he was invested with the chief command, which assuredly he deserved more than any other, if the English had not had sir Arthur Wellesley at their disposal. But the latter had a sort of account to settle with the public opinion, and his part in Spain was deferred. Sir John Moore, therefore, had the command. Twenty thousand men, of the twenty-eight already assembled in Portugal, were to concur in the new expedition to the north of Spain. Twelve or fifteen thousand, partly cavalry, were to be landed at Coruña, under sir David Baird, an old officer of the Indian army. This addition would form a total of 35 or 36 thousand excellent troops, worth, of themselves, all the troops that Spain had on foot. An immense fleet of transports was placed under the orders of sir John Moore, to follow the movement of his troops, to convey them to the place of rendezvous, if he preferred going by sea, and to supply him, whichever route he adopted, with provisions, stores, and artillery and cavalry horses. It was left to his own judgment to conduct himself as he pleased, provided that he acted in the north of the Peninsula, and concerted with the Spanish generals for the greater success of the campaign.

Sir Charles Stuart and lord William Bentinck had been sent to Madrid, to give some good advice to the Junta of Aranjuez, and to bring about somewhat of unity in the military operations of the two nations.

Sir John Moore, left free in his action, could transport by sea from Lisbon to Coruña the 20,000 men whom he was to draw from the army in Portugal, and join them in that port to sir David Baird's 15,000 men; or he could cross all Portugal by the roads which the French had followed on entering that country. After mature reflection, he decided on the latter course. On the one hand, almost all the transports were engaged at this moment in carrying Junot's army back to France; on the other, a new embarkation could not fail to prove very detrimental to the organisation of the English army. The route from Coruña to Leon was, moreover, exhausted by Blake's army; and it would at most supply sir David Baird's division. By setting out before the rainy season, and by advancing slowly in small detachments, sir John Moore hoped to arrive in Old Castille in good condition, and to give his troops by this trip, what English troops are deficient in, patience and strength for marching. In consequence, he resolved to direct his infantry by the two mountainous routes which debouch upon Salamanca, that of Coimbra to Almeida, and that of Abrantes to Alcantara; and his artillery, with the cavalry, through the level country from Lisbon to Elvas, from Elvas to Badajoz, from Badajoz to Talavera, from Talavera to Valladolid. He flattered himself that he should thus have reunited, in the course of October, his infantry and his cavalry in the centre of Old Castille. Sir David Baird's corps, which had a larger proportion of cavalry, was to land at Coruña, to proceed from Coruña by Lugo to Astorga, and to join the principal army by the Duero. This plan being decided on, sir John Moore commenced his march about the end of September, and sir David Baird, leaving the shores of England, sailed for Coruña.

We must do this justice to the Spaniards, that, whether from presumption or patriotism, probably from both these sentiments together, they treated proudly with the English, not accepting their succour without certain reservations, and on condition of not delivering up to them their great naval establishments. They would never consent to admit into Cadiz the 5000 men offered them by sir Hew Dalrymple; and, when sir David Baird appeared off Coruña, they refused to allow him to enter the great harbour. He was obliged to write to Madrid to obtain an order for permission to land, which order was at length granted on the urgent application of sir Charles Stuart and lord William Bentinck.

But, while the English had difficulty to procure a reception for the land troops that had been solicited from them, and the Spanish generals, engaged in intrigue with the Junta or against it, in rivalry with one another, were opposing further difficulties of execution to a plan which had been most cordially adopted, and were wasting time in an incredible confusion, a letter from the French staff, intercepted by the numerous scouts who infested the roads, acquainted them that, in the course of October and November, reinforcements to the amount of 100,000 men would enter Spain, in addition to those which had already arrived; and that, while they were busy in doing nothing, they were letting slip the occasion for surprising the French army, such as they figured it to themselves, exhausted, decimated, and dispirited by Baylen. In this government, which, like all tumultuous and feeble governments, acted only by fits and starts, such a revelation could not fail to give an impulsion for a moment. Its members ceased disputing; they ordered the generals to set off, whether agreeing among themselves or not; they sent Castaños to the Ebro; they urged the arrival of the men of Estremadura at Madrid, and their departure from Madrid for Burgos; lastly, they set in motion all they could and how they could.

It was important not to lose any more time, and yet they did lose a great deal more: so that they were not in a condition to act seriously before the end of October. General Blake, though he had not collected all his forces, had been the first in line; having marched along the foot of the mountains of the Asturias, without penetrating into them, he had crossed them at Espinosa, and had made several demonstrations upon Bilbao. The Castilians, under Pignatelli, kept along the banks of the Ebro to the environs of

Logroño. The Murcians and the Valencians under Llamas, and the two divisions of Andalusia under la Peña, extended themselves along the river, from Tolosa to Calahorra and Alfaro. Palafox's Aragonese and Valencians, crossing the Ebro and lining the little river of Aragon, had their head-quarters at Caparrosa.

According to the plan agreed upon, Castaños and Palafox were to concert for the purpose of uniting on the extreme left of the French, towards Pampeluna, and it was urgently necessary that they should; for general Blake, already far advanced upon their right, was liable to be compromised, unless some one hastened to occupy part of the enemy's forces: but it was not easy for Castanos and Palafox to agree, each wishing to draw the other to himself. Castanos was fearful of disgarnishing the Ebro too much; Palafox was desirous to be enabled to overrun Navarre with superior forces. At length, making a movement in advance, they had crossed the Ebro and the river of Aragon, and established themselves at Logrono on the one hand and Lerin on the other.

But it was too late: the French, before they were reinforced, would not have put up any longer with the inconsiderate audacity of their adversaries, still less since the finest troops in the world were joining them every day. It will be recollected that, even before setting in motion four corps of the grand army, Napoleon had successively detached a number of old regiments from France and Germany, and that, with those last arrived, there had been composed in the first place Godinot's division, and next Dessoles' division, which was to be the third of marshal Ney's corps. The intrepid marshal himself was with the latter on the Ebro, awaiting the arrival of his *corps d'armée*.

Though Napoleon had interdicted any operation before he was present, from a desire to allow the Spaniards to gain ground upon his wings, and to induce them to advance so far that they could not retreat, Joseph's staff, unable to endure the sight of their movements, resolved to repulse them. It therefore ordered marshals Ney and Moncey to retake the line of the Ebro and of the Aragon. In consequence, on the 25th of October, Ney had marched to Logrono, and entered it at the point of the bayonet, driving Pignatelli's Castilians before him. He had even crossed the Ebro and forced the insurgents to fall back to Nalda, at the foot of the mountains which separate the district of Logrono from that of Soria. Marshal Moncey, on his part, had sent generals Wathier and Maurice Mathieu, with a regiment of the Vistula and the 44th of the line, upon Lerin. These generals had driven back the Spaniards at first into the town and castle of Lerin, then, by cutting them off from all relief, had taken them prisoners, to the number of about a thousand men. The Spaniards had everywhere been overthrown, with a vigour and a promptness which proved that, before the French army, conducted as it was accustomed to be, the insurrectional levies of Spain could not oppose any serious resistance.

At this very moment arrived the 1st corps, under marshal Victor, the 4th, under marshal Lefebvre, and the 6th, destined for marshal Ney, comprehending his two divisions of Bisson and Marchand, with which he had so eminently signalized himself in every country.

Joseph had scarcely reviewed Sebastiani's fine division, belonging to Lefebvre's corps, in the plains of Vittoria, when, forgetting his brother's instructions, he had directed it upon his right, by the Durango road, into the valley of Biscay, in order to repress general Blake, who gave him uneasiness about Bilbao. He did not stop there. Believing the report of the Spanish peasants, who, when there were 20,000 men, gave out, either from braggadocio or from credulity, that there were 80,000, he had judged that Lefebvre's corps would not be sufficient, and, in order the better to protect his rear, had sent one of marshal Victor's divisions, that of general Villatte, by Mondragon, upon Durango. Lastly, the head of the 6th corps having appeared at Bayonne, he had lost no time in directing Bisson's division, by St.-Jean-Pied-de-Port, upon Pampeluna, to secure his left, as he had just secured his right by the position which he had caused marshal Lefebvre to take. At the same instant the guard, having arrived to the number of 10,000 men, placed itself *en échellon* between Bayonne and Vittoria.

These unseasonable dispositions brought on a new and unforeseen engagement on the right between general Blake and marshal Lefebvre, as there had been one on the left between Pignatelli and marshals Ney and Moncey. General Blake, as we have said, after crossing the mountains of the Asturias at Espinosa, and occupying Bilbao, had posted himself in advance of Zornoza, upon the heights that face Durango. Having not yet been joined by La Romana's division, he was there with about 20 or 22 thousand men, half troops of the line, half peasants and students. He had left in rear, on his right, about 15,000 men in the adjacent valleys, between Villaro, Orozco, Amurrio, and Balmaseda, to guard the *débouchés* communicating with the plains of Vittoria, by which other French columns might have made their appearance.

Having arrived in presence of marshal Lefebvre, not far from Durango, on the Mondragon road, and thus finding himself near the goal which he had been ordered to reach, for the purpose of turning the French army, he hesitated, as a man hesitates at the decisive moment, when he has undertaken a task beyond his strength.

His soldiers, more daring than he, because they were more ignorant, displayed an assurance which he himself had not, and, on their lofty position, raised loud shouts, insulted our troops, and threatened them by gestures. The impatience of our soldiers, unaccustomed to take insult from the enemy, had excited that of old Lefebvre, who was not sorry, in his coarse wiliness, to make a bold dash upon the Spanish army before the arrival of the Emperor. The marshal had with him Sebastiani's division, composed of four old regiments of infantry (the 32nd, 58th, 28th, and 75th of the line) and one regiment of dragoons, forming an effective of about 6000 men; Leval's division, composed of 7000 Hessians, Badeners, Dutch; and lastly, but as merely auxiliary, Villatte's division, consisting of four old regiments, with an effective of nearly 8000 men, some of the best in the French army. These were more than he needed to beat the Spanish army, though part of the men, after a long march, had not yet rejoined.

The Spaniards were in advance of Durango, on a line of heights, the right of which, less strongly appuyed, might be turned. Marshal Lefebvre placed Sebastiani's division in the centre of his line, and on his two wings the Germans, intermixed with Villatte's division, to set them an example. He commenced the attack on his left, in order to turn the right of the Spaniards, which, as we have observed, was less solidly established. On the morning of the 31st of October, in a thick fog, general Villatte, with two of his regiments, the 94th and 95th of the line, and part of the Germans, advanced so vigorously upon the position, that the Spaniards, surprised, could scarcely hold out. Though they had many obstacles of ground to oppose to the French, they suffered themselves to be precipitated from post to post into the bottom of the valley. A fire kindled by general Villatte was to serve as a signal to the centre and the right, which marched with not less vigour than the left. A shower of howitzer shot, fired through the fog, had already much shaken the Spaniards. They were then briskly attacked, and driven so speedily down the back of the heights which they occupied, that the French had scarcely time to overtake them. Their way of fighting consisted in firing upon our columns in march, and then throwing themselves in confusion into the bottom of the valleys. In the plain our cavalry would have cut them down by thousands. All that our infantry could do in these steep mountains was to fire at them in their flight, taking much better aim than they were capable of doing. In this manner we killed or wounded from fifteen to eighteen hundred men, while they put two hundred of ours *hors de combat*. But several thousand of them, seized with terror, dispersed on this first rencounter, beginning to comprehend and to have less relish for war with the French. It was assuredly not that they were deficient in natural courage, but, without discipline, men never retain in danger the requisite firmness, without which, in war, every operation is impossible.

Marshal Lefebvre following up his victory, on the next day entered Bilbao, which the Spaniards made no effort to defend, and where some soldiers of the enemy's, some wounded, and a great quantity of stores brought by the English, were taken. The trembling inhabitants had fled, some into the mountains, others to the shipping of all sorts lying in the waters of Bilbao. Marshal Lefebvre, then pushing on to Balmaseda, durst not go much further, for beyond it was the pass leading by Espinosa into the plains of Castille; and having already fought without order, it would have been too bad to extend his operations still more. He established Villatte's division, which was not his but marshal Victor's, at Balmaseda, and fell back with his corps upon Bilbao, to seek there for provisions, which were not abundant in these mountains, where people live upon maize, milk, and preparations from it.

Such was the state of things at the moment of Napoleon's arrival. His intentions had been entirely misconceived, since he meant that his officers should allow themselves to be nearly turned both on the right and on the left, in order to be more sure, when debouching from Vittoria, of taking the two principal Spanish armies in rear. The movement executed by marshals Ney and Moncey on the Ebro had, in fact, produced no other result than to place Castaños and Palafox rather further apart, and to do these latter the service of disengaging them. The movement which marshal Lefebvre had taken the liberty of making, in driving Blake back from Bilbao upon Balmaseda, had extricated the Spanish general from a situation from which he never could have escaped, if he had been allowed time to entangle himself in it completely. Moreover, the French troops were scattered in various directions, which were not the best chosen. The 1st and 6th corps, which Napoleon would fain have had at hand in the plains of Vittoria, were dispersed in various places very distant from one another. The 1st corps had one of its three divisions, that of general Villatte, in Biscay. The 6th had Bisson's division at Pampeluna, and another, Marchand's division, on the Vittoria road, with all its artillery.

Napoleon, arriving at Vittoria on the 5th of November, after expressing there, as at Bayonne, his displeasure at being so ill obeyed, gave, on the 6th, all the orders necessary for repairing the faults committed in his absence. Had he not been disappointed in the execution of his plans by unseasonable operations, he would have opposed to general Blake, merely as a check upon him, the corps of marshal Lefebvre (4th corps); he would have opposed to Palafox and Castaños, still solely for a check, the corps of marshal Moncey (3rd corps); then, collecting under his hand the corps of marshal Soult, formerly Bessières' corps (2nd corps), the imperial guard, and the 14,000 dragoons, and debouching with 80,000 men upon Burgos, he would have cut the Spanish armies in two at the centre; he would then have fallen upon them, have taken them alternately in rear, enveloped, and destroyed them. Unluckily, this plan, without being absolutely thwarted, could not be executed in so certain and complete a manner; in the first place, because the action, commenced too soon, had somewhat kept back the Spanish generals, and prevented them from thoroughly entangling themselves, some in Biscay, others in Navarre; secondly, because the various corps of the French army, employed at the very moment of their arrival, were widely dispersed. Still, neither Blake, who had fallen back to Balmaseda, nor Castaños and Palafox, obliged to retire again to the Ebro, were yet aware of the danger of their position, and they did nothing to extricate themselves from it. Napoleon's plan could therefore be still put into execution. Accordingly, he made his dispositions upon the same principle, that of cutting the Spanish line into two parts, in order to fall first upon one and then upon the other. He ordered marshal Victor (1st corps), one of whose divisions, that of general Villatte, had already been diverted from its course to reinforce marshal Lefebvre, to support the latter, if he needed it, by the road from Vittoria to Orduna, and then to return by Orduna to Vittoria, and join the centre of the French army. Such reports of the strength of the Spaniards were circulated in the country, that Napoleon thought it would not be too much to oppose two corps (the 1st and 4th) to Blake's army, amounting by the lowest estimate to 50,000 men, and by the highest to 70,000. These two marshals, however, agreeably to the plan of Napoleon, were rather to check Blake than to repulse him, till the moment when the signal to fall upon him should be given from the centre of the army.

Having thus regulated the operations of his right, Napoleon, turning his attention to his left, directed marshal Moncey to hold himself in readiness to act when he should receive orders to that effect; but till then to confine himself to covering the Ebro, from Logroño to Calahorra. He returned him Morlot's division, detached for a moment from his corps; he added to it a reinforcement of dragoons; and, lastly, one of the two divisions of the 6th corps (marshal Ney's). Bisson's division, having by a false movement taken the Pampeluna road, he ordered him to allow it to rest in that place, then to direct it upon Logrono, to support there the right of marshal Moncey, and to remain there provisionally. This division changed commander, and was called Lagrange's division, after its new chief. It was destined subsequently to rejoin marshal Ney, and to contribute meanwhile to keep the Spaniards in check on the Ebro.

His right and left being thus secured, but without being moved forward, Napoleon resolved to debouch by the centre, with the corps of marshals Soult and Ney (2nd and 6th), with the imperial guard, and the greater part of the dragoons. The corps of marshal Soult, formerly Bessières', though it numbered many young soldiers, comprehended likewise Mouton's division, composed of four old regiments, which nothing in Spain could withstand, as they had proved at Rio-Seco. Ney's corps, though deprived of Bisson's division, directed by mistake upon Pampeluna, and placed temporarily on the Ebro, included Marchand's division, which had always belonged to it, and Dessoles' division, which had recently been formed of old regiments, called successively into Spain. These troops had not their match in the world. With these two corps, the guard, and the reserve of cavalry, Napoleon had about 50,000 men to push upon Burgos. These were more than he needed to crush the centre of the Spanish army.

His dispositions adopted on the 6th and 7th of November were suspended by a new incident. The Spanish generals, though much disconcerted by the vigour of the attacks which they had sustained, some at Zornoza, others at Logroño and Lerin, did not renounce their plan, but differed more than ever about the execution of this plan, and applied to one another for reinforcements. Blake in particular, the most roughly treated, seeing on his flanks the corps of Lefebvre and Victor, had solicited succour of the centre and the right. But there was a circuit of fifty or sixty leagues to traverse, in order to communicate from one end to the other of the Spanish line; and, after holding a council of war at Tudela, Castaños and Palafox had replied, that it was impossible for them to go to the aid of the army of the Asturias, and had merely enjoined the corps of Estremadura to hasten its arrival in line, that it might go and cover Blake's right by taking position at Frias. They had also promised to enter into action as soon as they could, in order to draw upon them part of the forces of the French.

Meanwhile Blake, driven from Bilbao and Balmaseda towards the gorges which form the entrance of Biscay, had stopped there, and been rejoined by the twelve or fifteen thousand men placed at Villaro and Orozco, while he was fighting at Zornoza and by the corps of La Romana. With what he had lost in dead and wounded, and particularly by dispersion, which loss amounted to six or seven thousand men, he had about 36,000 left to place in line. He moved forward, therefore, on the 5th of November, upon Balmaseda, where marshal Lefebvre had left Villatte's division, that it might itself fall back on Bilbao, in order to live there more at its ease.

After the fault of having moved forward too soon, marshal Lefebvre could not commit a greater than to fall back all at once on Bilbao, leaving Villatte's division at Balmaseda. There needed soldiers as firm as ours, and a foe as far from formidable as the Spanish insurgents, to cause no calamity to result from such false dispositions.

Marshal Victor, on his part, had acted no better. Sent by Orduña to Amurrio, in order to flank marshal Lefebvre, he had dispatched general Labruyère with a brigade to Oquendo, and had kept him in that position without ever conceiving the idea of repairing thither himself to direct him. General Labruyère, among those steep mountains, where it is difficult to find out where you are, where the winter fogs add to the dreariness of the places, left without any directions, not knowing what enemies he might have in presence, had abstained from engaging, and had suffered the corps which flanked Blake during the battle of Zornoza to pass before him, not daring to do anything to stop their retreat. On the following days he had remained in position, seeing Balmaseda in the distance, perceiving Villatte's division without thinking of rejoining it, perceiving also Sebastiani's division, which was making reconnaissances from Bilbao on the Orduña road; so that our troops, instead of uniting to overwhelm Blake, the only operation that was reasonable after committing the fault of fighting before orders arrived from head-quarters, were dispersed between Bilbao, Balmaseda, and Oquendo, exposed in their solitary situation to serious checks.

The faults of marshal Victor had not stopped there. Impatient to return to head-quarters, in order to serve before the eyes of the Emperor himself, and finding in his instructions that he might take the road to Vittoria as soon as his presence should be no longer necessary in Biscay, he had recalled general Labruyère, in order to recross the mountains and again descend into the plain of Vittoria, abandoning Villatte's division, which was left quite alone at Balmaseda. Thus commenced that series of faults, owing to the egotism and the rivalry of our generals, and which, by ruining the cause of France in Spain, ruined it in all Europe.

While marshal Victor was executing this retrograde movement, general Blake, reinforced, as we have said, by the troops of his left, and by those of La Romana, had resolved to move forward, and to dispute Balmaseda with Villatte's division, which he knew to be there quite alone. The stay of marshal Lefebvre at Bilbao, and the retreat of marshal Victor upon Vittoria, offered every facility for an attempt of this nature. Accordingly, on the 5th of November, he advanced at the head of thirty and some thousand men, and crowned the heights around Balmaseda, to surround the town before he attacked it, and to make prisoners of the French by whom it was guarded. But general Villatte, at the head of a superb division of four old regiments, had beheld other foes and other dangers than those which threatened him in Biscay. He possessed equal presence of mind and intelligence. Desirous of securing the heights of Gueñes, which are in rear of Balmaseda, and which command the communication with Bilbao, he placed three of his regiments there *en échellon*, and then left the 27th light in Balmaseda itself, to hold the town as long as possible. Having taken these dispositions, he allowed the Spaniards to approach, and received them with a fire to which they were not accustomed. Those who attempted to enter Balmaseda were most horribly maltreated by the 27th, and strewed the environs of the town with dead and wounded. Meanwhile the neighbouring heights were crowned with enemies, and, marshal Lefebvre not arriving from Bilbao, general Villatte deemed it his duty to retire. He brought the 27th from Balmaseda over the heights of Gueñes, and fell back in mass, with his four entire regiments, on the Bilbao road. The Spaniards who attempted to approach him were vigorously attacked, and paid dearly for their imprudent boldness. Villatte's division had nevertheless 200 men *hors de combat*, after bringing down seven or eight hundred of the enemy. If marshal Lefebvre had been at hand, and if marshal Victor, instead of withdrawing Labruyère's brigade from the position which it occupied, and from which it should have dashed upon Balmaseda, had acted with his whole corps upon that point, Blake's army might have been enveloped and taken that same day.

Accounts of the affair of Balmaseda, which had no other importance than that of a danger uselessly incurred, being transmitted one after another to the head-quarters, with the usual exaggerations of reports so communicated, produced an aggravation of Napoleon's ill-humour with generals who so wrongly comprehended and executed his conceptions.* He directed general Berthier to address

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* I quote dispatches which clearly explain the situation, and prove what was thought of the conduct, of these two marshals by an infallible judge, Napoleon himself, who generally showed rather weakness than severity towards the two lieutenants in question.

The major-general to marshal Lefebvre.

"Vittoria, November 6, 1808, noon.

"The Emperor is extremely angry at the false movement of retreat from Bilbao. His Majesty did not expect this capital fault on the part of a marshal so zealous for his service. His Majesty has no doubt that, if you had placed your head-quarters at Balmaseda, and encamped with your three divisions to act according to circumstances, you would already have taken more than eight or ten thousand prisoners from the enemy, but the conduct lately held is the more extraordinary, since, in speaking of the inconveniences of retrograde movements, you have begun with one of five leagues.

"The Emperor orders you to unite yourself with Villatte's division, in order to push the enemy briskly. If, on the 31st, Monsieur le Maréchal, you had not attacked, and had left time for making the necessary dispositions, the campaign in Spain would at this moment be far advanced. The Emperor finds in your conduct that too much zeal has caused you to infringe the military regulations in attacking without orders; but his Majesty does not conceive that the enemy can remain entire when a success has been gained over him. The Emperor may have need of his troops, and, when they are engaged, one cannot leave a single division by itself before the enemy, or when, on the other hand, one makes a retrograde movement. His Majesty finds that it is with such dispositions that one loses the advantage of one's successes. The Emperor thinks that the time when the troops of generals Villatte, Labruyère, and Ruffin were before the enemy, and manœuvring to cut him off, was not the moment for you to retire, and, under such circumstances, his Majesty thinks it improper that the troops of the 4th corps should remain inactive at Bilbao.

"Marshal Soult marches to-morrow upon Burgos, whence he will proceed to Reinosa and Santander. March briskly, then, Monsieur le Maréchal. The intention of the Emperor is, that there should not be a moment's rest till Blake's corps is destroyed, and till he is driven back into the Asturias.

"The enemy, having retreated upon Balmaseda, Villarcayo, and Santander, you must kick him upon the corps that are coming to stop him at Reinosa.

"Alexandre."

The major-general to marshal Victor.

"Vittoria, November 6, 1808, midnight.

"I have laid before the Emperor your letter of the 6th, which your aide-de-camp says was written at noon. His Majesty has been extremely displeased that, instead of having supported general Villatte, you have left him engaged with the enemy—a fault the more serious, since you know that marshal Lefebvre has committed that of leaving one division of your *corps d'armée* exposed by making his two other divisions fall back upon Bilbao. You knew that this division was exposed at Balmaseda, as general Labruyère had communicated with it on the morning of the 5th. How, instead of proceeding in person at the head of your troops, to succour one of your divisions, could you leave that important operation to a general of brigade, who had not your confidence, and who had with him only one-third of your force? How, after receiving intelligence that, on the 5th, Villatte's division was in action with the Spaniards, could you, instead of marching to its assistance, suppose gratuitously that this general was victorious? His Majesty asks how long the fire of musketry and attack have been signs of the retreat of an enemy. Nevertheless the instructions of marshal Jourdan were precise that you should not proceed for Miranda till you had ascertained that the enemy was retreating; and instead of this, Monsieur le Maréchal, you set off when you had positive proof that the enemy was fighting. You know that the first principle of war dictates that, in the doubt of success, we must go to the aid of one of our corps that is attacked, since upon to them a severe reprimand, ordered marshal Lefebvre to return to Balmaseda, marshal Victor to march back to Biscay, and to push Blake with the greatest vigour, to crush him even, if he found an occasion to do so. Notwithstanding his plan for cutting the centre of the enemy's line before acting against his extremities, he would not put himself in motion till he had ascertained that a fault upon his wings would not come to compromise the base of his operations.

On receiving these remonstrances of the Emperor's, marshal Lefebvre lost no time in marching upon Balmaseda. He passed the 6th in collecting the detachments sent to the environs of Bilbao to drive the English from the coast, and, on the morning of the 7th, he directed his course towards Balmaseda by Sodupe and Guenes, with Sebastiani's, Villatte's, and Leval's divisions, the first two French, the third German, the three forming a mass of about 18,000 men, almost without artillery and cavalry, which could not be brought into those narrow valleys, where means of transport for the ammunition of the infantry were scarcely to be found.

The road followed the bottom of the valley. Marshal Lefebvre advanced, having Villatte's division on the left of that road, Leval's division on the road itself, Sebastiani's division on the right, a little in advance of the two others. Sebastiani's division first stormed the village of Sodupe, then, proceeding beyond it, encountered Blake on the heights of Guenes, with twenty odd thousand men and three pieces of cannon. The troops of Sebastiani's division immediately climbed the heights, in spite of the not very annoying fire of the Spaniards, who discharged their pieces at a distance, that they might run away the sooner. On reaching the summit they could not take any prisoners; for the Spaniards, much nimbler than our soldiers, though they were extremely nimble, ran at full speed down the back slopes of their mountains. While our troops were thus taking those positions on the right, the obstacles upon the road itself were all removed, and ten thousand Spaniards, turned by this rapid movement, were left in rear upon the heights on the left, cut off from their main body. The marshal ordered one of the regiments of Sebastiani's division, the 28th of the line, to cross the river which forms the bottom of the valley; thus it found itself on the rear of the Spanish corps, while general

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this may depend its salvation. In the other supposition your movement could not have any inconvenience, as your instruction to proceed for Miranda was but hypothetical, and consequently its non-execution could not have an influence over any of the plans of the general-in-chief.

"What has happened, Monsieur le Maréchal, is this: the column before which general Labruyère fell back met with general Villatte, who, attacked in front and rear, owed his safety to his intrepidity alone, after making a great carnage among the enemy: his loss has been but small; and he retired upon Bilbao, two leagues in advance of that town, on the evening of the 5th.

"The pleasure of the Emperor is that you set out without delay to proceed for Orduña, that you march at the head of your troops, that you keep your corps together, and that you manœuvre so as to put yourself in communication with marshal Lefebvre, who will be at Bilbao.

"ALEXANDRE."

Villatte went to attack it in front. But our troops, always finding the insurgents ready to fire before they came within musket-shot, could not overtake them, and of course sustained little injury from them. The enemy, however, had some hundred men killed or wounded. A much greater number were dispersed, and filled with a distaste for the profession of arms.

Having returned with about 36,000 men to Balmaseda, Blake did not carry away so many when he again retired towards the gorges. But if he had met with the corps of marshal Victor on his rear, all the agility of his soldiers would not have prevented his being enveloped and the greater part of his troops being taken. The next day, the 8th, marshal Victor, on his part, started for the goal which he ought never to have lost sight of, while marshal Lefebvre entered Balmaseda. They were henceforward united, and capable of undertaking anything against the Spanish army. The only difficulty was how to subsist. Amidst these steep mountains, where cultivation is rare, our soldiers were in want of everything. The Spaniards were equally destitute. Under these reciprocal privations, the country was plundered and ravaged. Balmaseda and all the villages had been laid waste, and sometimes burned, to supply the two armies with fuel.

On the morning of the 9th Napoleon knew that his troops, having resumed the offensive, had only to show themselves to make the enemy vanish before them. Though he had a very mean idea of the insurgents, still, before he had acquired complete experience of what they were, he had introduced into his movements greater caution than was needed. But on the morning of the 9th he no longer hesitated to order marshal Soult to break up for Burgos with the second corps and a strong body of cavalry. The brilliant Lasalle commanded the light cavalry of that corps, composed of chasseurs and Poles of the guard. To these was added Milhaud's division, consisting of four fine regiments of dragoons. There was a total of about 17 or 18 thousand infantry, and 4000 horse. Napoleon had just learned that the troops of Estremadura had arrived at Burgos. He enjoined marshal Soult to push forward, without waiting for either marshal Ney or the guard, to break through these Spanish troops if they were bold enough to place themselves so near him, and to take Burgos from them.

Marshal Soult, who had returned on the preceding day to Briviesca, had immediately given orders to the three divisions of Mouton, Merle, and Bonnet, to unite on the road from Briviesca to Burgos, in the environs of Monasterio. He had Lasalle's cavalry in advance, and that of Milhaud with his main body. It is beyond Burgos that the plains of Castille commence, and it was to gallop over them in pursuit of the fugitive Spaniards that Napoleon had brought with him so large a mass of dragoons.

On the 10th, at four in the morning, marshal Soult moved off his *corps d'armée* on the road from Monasterio to Burgos, Lasalle's light cavalry and Mouton's gallant division at the head, Bonnet's division and Milhaud's dragoons in second line, Merle's division, the most distant of the three, as rear-guard. About 12,000 men of the corps of Estremadura had left Burgos for the upper Ebro, to proceed to Frias and cover the right of general Blake, conformably to the decisions of the council of war held at Tudela. Six thousand men of this corps remained in mass at Aranda, on the Madrid road. The twelve thousand, carried in advance of Burgos, were composed, like all the Spanish troops, of old troops of the line, and volunteers, peasants, students, and others. This corps, it is true, included in its ranks some battalions of the Walloon and Spanish guards, who were the best soldiers of Spain. It possessed a numerous artillery, well horsed and well served, but it was commanded, in the absence of the captain-general, Galuzzo, by the marquis de Belveder, a young man without experience, who had advanced against the French with the most silly presumption.

At daybreak, Lasalle's cavalry, marching at the head of the *corps d'armée*, fell in with the Spanish advanced posts, exchanged some carbine-shots with them, and fell back on Mouton's division, for they were in presence of obstacles which infantry alone could overcome. In following the high road, and in approaching Burgos itself, they had on the left the little stream called the Arlanzon, which waters the foot of the wooded heights of the Carthusian convent; in the centre, the wood of Gamonal, with the high road running through it; and on the right, the heights of the park of Villimar, on the summit of which is seated the fortified castle of Burgos, and at the foot the city of Burgos itself. The Spaniards had tirailleurs on the heights, on right and left of this position, their principal infantry in the wood of Gamonal, barring the high road, their cavalry on the skirt of that wood, their artillery in advance. No sooner had marshal Soult arrived on the ground than he set in motion Mouton's division, to attack the most serious obstacle, that of the wood of Gamonal. He ranged his cavalry in rear, to dash upon the Spaniards when the obstacle of the wood should be overcome, and a little further in rear Bonnet's division, to storm the heights crowned by the enemy, if they offered any resistance. The illustrious general Mouton advanced without hesitation, with his four veteran regiments, the 2nd and 4th light, and the 13th and 36th of the line, upon the wood of Gamonal. The Spanish artillery, firing briskly, at first swept away a few files; but our soldiers, marching, with bayonet fixed, upon the wood of Gamonal, broke into it, in spite of the Walloon and Spanish guards, and cleared it in the twinkling of an eye. At this sight the whole Spanish army disbanded with unparalleled alacrity. Colours, cannon, and all, were abandoned. The troops which followed picked up in the wood more than twenty pieces of cannon. All the surrounding heights were in like manner deserted by the Spaniards, and the mass of their fugitives threw themselves either into Burgos or across the Arlanzon to escape more speedily. Lasalle and Milhaud then passed the Arlanzon, partly by fording, partly by bridges that cross the stream, rushed at a gallop upon the dispersed soldiers of Estremadura, and cut down a considerable number. General Mouton's infantry entered Burgos at the heels of the Spaniards, received a few musket-shots from several convents which it sacked, and made itself master both of the city and of the castle itself, which the enemy had not taken the precaution to put into a state of defence. This feat, accomplished by a single charge of Mouton's division, put into our hands not only Burgos and its castle, but also twelve colours, 30 pieces of cannon, about 900 prisoners, exclusively of all the fugitives who were killed or taken in the plain. Those who fell or were wounded by the swords of our cavalry beyond Burgos were computed at 2000. With soldiers so nimble in flight, there was no other way of diminishing the force of the enemy than to cut down the fugitives, for it was impossible to make prisoners in a different manner. Marshal Soult exerted himself to re-establish order in Burgos, where, in the first moment, very great confusion prevailed, from the concourse of the vanquished and the victors, and the disappearance of nearly all the inhabitants. In a few days, however, that important city had assumed its usual aspect.

Napoleon, impatient to make the central point of Burgos the pivot of his operations, had hastened on the 10th to move forward his head-quarters. He had passed the night of the 10th at Cubo, and on the 11th he entered Burgos. During his stay at Vittoria, he had taken care to order the construction at Miranda, Pancorvo, and Briviesca, of posts, which were demi-fortresses, capable of containing an hospital, a magazine, a storehouse, and in which columns on march might rest and re-victual themselves, and leave their fatigued or sick men out of the reach of the guerillas. He had perceived, in fact, with his habitual promptness, that in a country where the regular force was so far from formidable, and where the irregular force did so much mischief, there would be much to apprehend for his communications. He took, therefore, not a single step in advance without labouring to secure them.

Napoleon entered Burgos in the night, and *incognito*, persisting in leaving the royal honours to Joseph, and in reserving for himself the odium of the rigours of war.* He gave orders for burning the

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* On this subject, here is another letter of Napoleon's, which seems worthy of being transcribed:—

The Emperor to the King of Spain.

"Cubo, 10th November, 1808.

"I shall set out at one in the morning, to be before daylight to-morrow *incognito* at Burgos, where I shall make my dispositions for the fight: for 'tis of no use to conquer if one does not profit by success.

"I think you ought to go to Briviesca to-morrow.

"As much as I think it behoves me to make little ceremony for myself, so much I think that it ought to be made for you. As for myself, that does not harmonize with the profession of war: besides, I will not have it.

"I should think that deputations ought to be sent to meet you, and to give you the best reception. On my arrival I shall order everything for the disarming, and standard used at the proclamation of the royalty of Ferdinand, received the clergy and the authorities with extreme sternness, assumed the attitude of an irritated conqueror who has acquired all the rights of war, is determined to exercise them all, and not disposed to forego any but what the clemency of king Joseph might be able to obtain from him.

In the warehouses of Burgos, or in the environs, there were considerable quantities of wool, belonging to the great land proprietors of Spain—such as the dukes of Medina-Cœli, Ossuna, Infantado, Castel-Franco, and others, on whom Napoleon purposed to inflict a heavy stroke, by favouring all who were below them. He ordered the confiscation of those wools, which amounted in value to 12 or 15 millions of francs. His plan was to sell them to the merchants of Bayonne at very low prices, with a view to favour the woollen manufactures of France, and afterwards to devote the produce, either to the compensation of the French who had suffered in Valencia, Cadiz, and the different cities of Spain, or to the augmentation of the funds of the army. Hitherto he had given to the Senate all the colours taken from hostile armies. He resolved that the Legislative Body should also have a share of these trophies, and made it a present of the twelve colours taken from the Spanish and Walloon guards, wishing to remove as much as possible the dislike attached in France to the war in Spain.

But these were mere accessory concerns for him. The conduct of the military operations was at this moment the principal and the most urgent. Having arrived on the 11th at Burgos, he dispatched, on the very same day, general Lasalle, with his light cavalry, upon Lerma and Aranda, to push the Spaniards to the foot of the Guadarrama, to clear the country, and to prepare the ways for the columns which were to take the Spanish armies in rear. While he sent off Lasalle straight before him, he directed Milhaud's 2000 dragoons to the right upon Valladolid, with injunctions to cut down the fugitives, to make prisoners, to displace everywhere the authorities instituted in the name of Ferdinand VII., and to create others in the name of Joseph. But what was most urgent for him, and what he executed immediately, allowing but a single day's rest to the troops, was to send marshal Soult from Burgos towards Reinosa, with the 2nd corps, in order to throw it upon the rear of Blake. Once arrived at Burgos, in fact, the moment was come for him to fall to the right and left upon the rear of the Spanish armies, and to begin with that commanded by

for burning the standard which was used at the proclamation of Ferdinand. Seek to produce an impression that this is no laughing matter.

"Word is sent me that the army of Estremadura is destroyed. It is, however, only an infamous swaggering rabble, which did not stand the charge of one brigade of general Mouton's. If you know of anything towards Orduña, or of marshals Lefebvre or Victor, inform me of it. The hope of having some news from that quarter has made me stop here.

"General Dejean, who commands a thousand horse at Miranda, has orders to protect the passage of the Spaniards who are with you, of the parks proceeding to Burgos, of the treasure, &c. "Napoleon."

general Blake, because it was that which was engaged at the moment with the French generals, and against which it was of importance to march, if one wished to be in time to take it in rear. Napoleon, therefore, ordered marshal Soult to set out from Burgos on the morning of the 12th, by forced marches, and, by a backward movement to the right, to proceed by Huermèce and Canduela upon Reinosa. It was probable that, if Blake's Spanish army had been beaten, and if, instead of retreating in order, like regular armies, it was broken up into bands of fugitives, he might at least pick up some of the wrecks. From Reinosa, marshal Soult was to march upon Santander, to reduce the Asturias. In this march of marshal Soult's Napoleon found a twofold advantage—in the first place, that of turning Blake; secondly, that of restoring the 2nd corps, which was the former corps of Bessières, to its first destination, namely, to occupy Old Castille and Leon, countries with which it was acquainted, and in which it had been accustomed to act. His design was, at the same time, as soon as marshals Lefebvre and Victor should have finished their operation in Biscay, to recall them to him by Vittoria, where their artillery, which they could not take with them into the mountains, would be waiting for them, and to draw them by Miranda and Burgos upon the Madrid road. Marshal Soult, setting out with all his artillery, which he had not been obliged to leave behind, because he had followed the high road, had all that was necessary for the operations with which he was charged.

Napoleon bethought him on the same day of the means of preparing a considerable reinforcement for himself. Vague reports of the English were current at Burgos, and several prisoners, closely questioned, had announced their presence on the roads leading from Portugal into Spain. Others had spoken of English landed at Coruña, and proceeding by Astorga upon Leon. Letters intercepted at the post contained the same indications. It was evident that, without knowing the period at which they might be expected, we should have to do with them in the plains of Old Castille, whether, established in Portugal, they came from Lisbon upon Salamanca, or, disembarking in Gallicia, they came from Coruña to Astorga. Napoleon did not imagine them to be so near him as they really were, for the English plan was punctually executed. The detachments of sir John Moore had already passed Badajoz and Almeida; and the corps of sir David Baird, admitted at length into Coruña, was advancing upon Lugo and Astorga. But whether the English were more or less near was of little consequence to Napoleon, who wished, on the contrary, to see them venture so far into the interior of the Peninsula that they would not be able to get back again, and, in anticipation of such a case, made all dispositions for crushing them. He had resolved to join with marshal Soult general Junot's corps, brought from Portugal by sea, conformably to the convention of Cintra, which, though censured by the English, they had punctually executed. He had already given orders that this corps should be re-formed, re-organised, and put without delay into such a state as to be fit to appear again in line. He dispatched fresh orders from Burgos that the first division, that of general Delaborde, should pass the Bidassoa on the 1st of December; that the second, general Loison's, should march immediately afterwards; and that the third, to which he had just appointed general Heudelet, but which was not in so forward a state of preparation as the other two, should follow them with the least possible delay. Napoleon had no doubt that this corps, already well seasoned, would show an anxiety to revenge the disaster of Vimeiro, and that it was very capable of doing so. The corps of marshal Soult and general Junot resisting the English in front, he might, from Madrid, where he purposed to be soon, make some manœuvre on their flanks or their rear, the more decisive the further they should be suffered to advance. At this moment, therefore, he did not concern himself about the English, whose appearance it was easy to foresee, unless to prepare the means of stopping them subsequently on their march.

After the departure of marshal Soult, Napoleon, left alone at Burgos, with the imperial guard and part of the dragoons, hastened the movement of marshal Ney's two divisions upon that city, having destined them to operate by-and-by on the rear of Castaños, when he should have done with general Blake, and could weaken his centre for the benefit of his left. He had traced the route of marshal Ney upon Burgos, by Haro, Pancorbo, and Briviesca.

While he was sending marshal Soult into the Asturias, upon the rear of general Blake, marshals Lefebvre and Victor continued to pursue the Spanish general through Biscay. Marshal Lefebvre had met with no serious resistance at Gueñes on the 7th, had entered Balmaseda on the 8th, and had pushed forward Villatte's division, which had been lent him for a few days, to the environs of Barcena. On his part, marshal Victor, reprimanded for having thought of leaving Biscay, had returned by Orduña, Amurrio, and Oquendo to Balmaseda, and on the 9th had made his junction near that town with the corps of marshal Lefebvre, indemnified for the new direction which was given him by the advantage of recovering Villatte's division, and of being enabled to meet and beat an enemy already demoralised. He saw marshal Lefebvre on the 9th, and promised to concert his own march with his. But, on the next day, the 10th, fearful of a proximity which might further deprive him of Villatte's division, he hastened to push Blake's army with the greatest vigour to the entrance of the gorges of Biscay, passed them at its heels without losing a moment, and about the second half of the day arrived on the other side of the mountains, near Espinosa, a little town, which was important for its position, for it was situated at the point of intersection of all the roads of the plain and of the mountains. From Espinosa, in fact, you may proceed by a high road either to Bilbao or to Santander, if you choose to go from the plain to the mountains; and if, on the contrary, you choose to descend from the mountains into the plain, you may again go by a high road either to Villarcayo or to Reinosa, and thus reach either Burgos or Leon. It was, therefore, worth while for general Blake to halt at this point and to contest it obstinately. It was also worth while for marshal Victor to fight in order to gain possession of it; he depended, moreover, on being rejoined, in case of emergency, by marshal Lefebvre, though he had left him without seeing or speaking to him on the subject. Marshal Lefebvre had followed him into the same valley, pursuing a parallel route, but a little to the left and in rear, and much hurt at his colleague leaving him unawares, and having neither spoken to him nor sent him word concerning the operations to be jointly executed by them. Fortunately, one only of the two French corps dispatched against Blake proved sufficient to crush him, so wretchedly organised were the Spanish troops, and so irresistible those which Napoleon had just brought into Spain.

Marshal Victor, having arrived before Espinosa de los Monteros on the 10th about noon, found there general Blake in position, on heights of difficult access, and which he had occupied with considerable intelligence. There were left about 30 or 32 thousand men of the 36,000 which he had when he marched back to Balmaseda, and 6 pieces of cannon, which he had not brought with him, but received from Reinosa, for it was impossible to drag them along in these mountains. Neither of the two armies had any with it, but fought without artillery and without cavalry, with musket and bayonet. Scarcely could they bring with them a few mules to carry the biscuit and the cartridges.

General Blake had on his left steep and wooded heights, towards his centre an accessible ground, but covered with fences, towards his right a tolerably elevated plateau, but not so much so as the heights on the left, likewise wooded, and backed upon a small river, that of La Trueba, which, issuing from the mountains, ran all along the rear of that position. The town of Espinosa, traversed by the Trueba, was placed precisely behind the centre of the Spanish army. The object to be attained, therefore, was to force one or other of the wings of the Spanish army, to push it upon its centre, and to throw the whole into Espinosa, where a single bridge would not be sufficient for the passage of an army in flight. The advanced hour and the short days of November afforded little hope of performing all this in one day.

General Villatte, who was at the head of marshal Victor's corps, debouching by the Edesa road, perceived the Spanish army in this formidable position, with its six pieces of cannon in the centre of its line. That army appeared to be not destitute of assurance, though always vanquished since the commencement of the operations. The general sent forward Pacthod's brigade, composed of the 27th light and the 63rd of the line, ordered the 27th light to make the Spaniards fall back upon the heights on which they appuyed their left, and enjoined the 93rd of the line to place itself in order of battle before their centre, to keep it in check. With the second brigade, composed of the 94th and 95th of the line, commanded by general Puthod, he attacked the wooded plateau upon which the right of the Spaniards was appuyed. The assailants were obliged to advance without artillery, against an army provided with it, though it had but little, and to carry all the positions by the fire of musketry or by the bayonet. Luckily the wooded ground which they had before them scarcely admitted of the use of any other arms than what the French had at the moment at their disposal. The soldiers of La Romana, placed on this plateau, defended themselves very valiantly, and under favour of the wood kept up a destructive fire on our troops. But general Puthod, with the 94th and 95th, surmounted all obstacles, carried the plateau, penetrated into the wood, dislodged the Spaniards from it, and precipitated some of them into the Trueba. The others fell back, in not very great disorder, upon their centre, backed upon the town of Espinosa. While our left brigade was maintaining this very sharp combat with the enemy's right, the 27th light of the right brigade had kept up all day a tirailleur fire with the Spaniards at the foot of the heights on their left, and the 63rd had been obliged to charge several times with the bayonet, to curb their centre. The combat began to be difficult, and might have proved hazardous with other troops, for six or seven thousand men were engaged with more than thirty thousand. But marshal Victor, having arrived with Ruffin's and Lapisse's divisions, lost no time in supporting the right and left of Villatte's division, and would have entered completely into action, had not a fog, coming on about five o'clock, prevented the two armies from seeing, and obliged them to defer the conclusion of the contest till the following day. The Spaniards, according to custom, concluding that they were victorious because they were not entirely conquered, kindled fires, shouting for joy and proclaiming their victory; but their triumph was destined to be of short duration.

Next morning, the 11th, at dawn of day, marshal Victor renewed the action, determined to render it this time decisive. He numbered in his three divisions 17 or 18 thousand infantry, present under arms, and it was more than he needed against the thirty odd thousand Spaniards opposed to him. Already on the preceding evening he had changed the 94th and 95th of the line, which had been fighting all day, for the 9th light and the 24th of the line of Ruffin's division, supported in rear by the 96th of the line. These three regiments of general Ruffin's, substituted for Puthod's brigade, were destined to complete the victory on our left, upon the plateau backed on the Trueba. The general-in-chief had charged the first brigade of Lapisse's division, commanded by general Maison, one of the most intrepid and intelligent officers of the French army, to support the 27th on our right, to dislodge the Spaniards from the steep and wooded heights on which their left was established, and to throw them upon Espinosa, where there was nothing to favour their flight but the bridge of that town. At the centre he had placed the 8th of the line, of Lapisse's division, to support general

Villatte's 63rd. He had kept in reserve the 54th, the last regiment of Lapisse's division, to direct it to any point where it might be needed.

At dawn of day, general Maison, marching at the head of the 16th light, which rivalled in ardour general Villatte's 27th light, climbed under a plunging fire the heights which were on our right, carried them with the bayonet, killed several Spanish generals, a great number of officers and soldiers, and, seconded by the 45th, had soon thrust them upon their centre, that is to say, upon Espinosa. At the same instant, the 63rd, commanded by the brave general Mouton-Duvernet, and the 8th, pushed the Spaniards from inclosure to inclosure on the spacious and somewhat lower ground which formed the centre of the position. Our soldiers, carrying one garden-wall after another, at length drove back the Spaniards upon Espinosa, at the moment when general Maison had already pushed them to the same point and taken their six pieces of cannon. The left brigade, led by general Labruyère, had likewise accomplished its task, and crowded the right of the Spaniards into an elbow of the Trueba, where they had accumulated into a dense mass, which exhibited the form of a full square, apparently for the better resisting the shock of our troops. The enemy, repelled from all points at once upon Espinosa, at length fell into frightful confusion, and fled in disorder in all directions, here thronging to the bridge of Espinosa for the purpose of crossing it, there throwing themselves into the bed of the Trueba to ford the river. Then was to be seen, instead of a retreat, the unparalleled rout of 30,000 affrighted men, running away in the delirium of terror. In a plain, and with cavalry, almost all of them would have been cut in pieces. Our soldiers firing from above down upon these dense masses, or thrusting them forward with the point of the bayonet, killed or wounded nearly 3000 men, but took only a few hundred prisoners, for they could not come up to such nimble mountaineers in running. We lost in killed and wounded about 1100 men, a much larger proportion than usual in fighting the Spaniards, and which was owing to the nature of the ground which we were obliged to take from them. But we had done better than take prisoners; we had completely disorganized Blake's army. Its commander, plunged into despair, deprived of his best generals, who were wounded or slain, had no longer an army around him. The Asturians had dispersed confusedly on the road to Santander. The wrecks of La Romana's troops of the line and those of Gallicia escaped by Reinosa to the road to Leon. Another detachment fled by the Villarcayo road in the hope of not finding the French there. Most of them, having thrown away their muskets, ran across the country, with the resolution of not resuming arms. It is true that courage might return as speedily as it forsook them; but we had done, if not for ever, at least for a long time, with that army of Leon and Gallicia, which was to have come by Mondragon to cut the line of operation of the French army.

Meanwhile, marshal Lefebvre, having debouched on his part from the mountains into the plain by a different route from that which marshal Victor had followed, had approached, at the noise of the musketry, to assist his colleague, from whom he received no communication. He had come in time to cover his left; but, seeing that his support was not necessary, he had taken the road to Villarcayo, which was recommended to him as the easiest for reaching Reinosa. By the way, he came up with a detachment of Blake's, which was retreating in that direction, ordered Sebastiani's division to charge and disperse it, took a great quantity of arms and wounded, besides a certain number of unhurt prisoners, and arrived in the evening of the 11th at Villarcayo.

Marshal Victor passed the remainder of the 11th and the whole of the 12th at Espinosa, as he could not lead any further soldiers who were exhausted by the marches which they had made in the mountains, whose shoes were worn out, almost all their cartridges spent, and the biscuit carried on their backs entirely consumed. Besides, there was little hope of overtaking the five or six thousand men left with general Blake, on account of their celerity in marching, and their promptness in dispersing and dissolving. It was for the French cavalry, already dispatched to the plains of Castille, it was for marshal Soult, if he did not arrive too late, to stop and to take them. General Blake, arriving on the 12th at Reinosa, where all the depôts of the Spanish army were established, made no stay there, and endeavoured by a mountain track to reach the road to Leon.

Marshal Soult, having left Burgos on the 13th, and marched by Huermèce for Canduela, fell in with a fugitive band of 2000 men, escorting 42 carriages laden with muskets, a great quantity of baggage and wounded, left the business of destroying them to the dragoons, who made a very great carnage among that band, and went to pass the night midway to Reinosa. He entered the town the next day, and there found all the *matériel* of Blake's army, 35 pieces of cannon, 15,000 muskets, and a great quantity of provisions for war supplied by the English. He was there joined by marshal Lefebvre, and, after concerting with him, took the road to Santander, with a view to go, agreeably to his orders, and effect the submission of the Asturias.

Napoleon, so difficult were the communications, was not informed till the night between the 13th and 14th of the decisive battle fought on the 11th at Espinosa with Blake's army. He had not doubted for a moment of success, but he began to perceive, and with great regret, that victory, always certain with the Spaniards, did not produce, owing to the difficulty of overtaking them, the results which were obtained with others. He was persuaded that marshal Soult, if he arrived in time at Reinosa, would have nothing to do but to finish a dispersion nearly complete already, and to pick up a few prisoners. Nothing more was to be expected but from the swords of the cavalry. Napoleon, therefore, sent orders to general Milhaud to sweep with his dragoons all the roads of Old Castille, and enjoined all the other divisions of that arm to join general Milhaud, and to pursue in all directions, and to cut down without mercy, all the fugitives of Blake's army that they could come up with.

The left of the Spaniards being thus destroyed, it was necessary to think of falling upon their right, and treating this as that had been treated. Napoleon ordered marshal Victor, after allowing the 1st corps to rest at Espinosa, and ascertaining that marshal Soult would afterwards have nothing to do but with fugitives, to take the road to Burgos, and, in fulfilment of his first destination, to join the head-quarters. He directed marshal Lefebvre, who was incessantly complaining that he was deficient in number, since he had left 2000 Germans at Bilbao, since he had no longer Villatte's division, and since the Poles had not yet arrived, to establish himself at Carrion with the nine or ten thousand infantry that he had left there, to rest himself, to collect his artillery and his stragglers, and thus form a link between marshal Soult, who was going to scour the Asturias, the cavalry of general Milhaud, which was to sweep the plain of Castille, and head-quarters, where preparations were making for operating from Burgos upon Aranda. At Carrion, in fact, marshal Lefebvre would be at nearly an equal distance from Reinosa, Leon, Valladolid, and Burgos. When Junot's corps should arrive to take his place on marshal Soult's flanks, Napoleon purposed to bring him nearer to the Madrid road, either by Miranda or Segovia.

As he was to be soon joined by marshal Victor, and should retain marshal Lefebvre, to connect him with the corps of marshal Soult, Napoleon had no further hesitation to part with marshal Ney, that he might manœuvre on the rear of Castanos. Remaining at Burgos with the guard only and part of the cavalry, he sent off the gallant marshal on the morning of the 14th, at the head of Marchand's and Dessoles' divisions, for Lerma and Aranda. His plan was, as soon as marshal Ney had reached Aranda, to move him to the left upon Osma, Soria, and Agreda, which would place him on the rear of Castaños, whose head-quarters were at Cintruenigo, between Calahorra and Tudela. Marshal Ney was to march upon Aranda without loss of time, but without precipitation, so as to arrive in good condition behind an immense curtain of cavalry, which was to extend into the plain, to the foot of the Guadarrama, a great chain of mountains in advance of Madrid, and separating Old from New Castille.

Napoleon recommended to marshal Moncey not to make any movement upon the Ebro, to avoid giving umbrage to Castanos, but to hold himself in readiness to act on the first signal. He had collected at Logrono, as we have seen, that division of Ney's which had been left behind, late Bisson's division, now that of Lagrange. After returning its artillery to it, he had left it Colbert's light cavalry, formerly attached to the 6th corps, and joined to it general

Dijeon's brigade of dragoons. That division, completely collected at Logrono, where it had rested, had but a step to go to join marshal Moncey, and would form with him a mass of 30,000 combatants, partly veteran troops, a mass quite sufficient to push Castanos and Palafox upon Ney, who would come to Soria, to place them between two fires, and to crush them. If this fine manœuvre proved successful, the entire corps of Castanos must be taken, that is to say, as far as it is possible to take a corps in Spain, where the soldiers always contrive to escape by deserting their ranks. But, in order to its success, it was requisite that marshal Moncey, holding himself in readiness to act, should not act, and that marshal Ney should so accelerate his march as to be upon the rear of Castaños before the latter should be aware of it. Napoleon, though he esteemed marshal Moncey, did not sufficiently depend on the firmness of his character to entrust him with a high command. He had with him the illustrious Lannes, beginning to recover from a very dangerous fall from his horse, and he destined for him the command of all the troops collected on the Ebro. It was therefore between Lannes and Ney, between those two iron hands, that the Spanish army of the right was about to find itself grasped, and probably crushed. Before he gave his last orders, Napoleon waited till marshal Ney, having left Burgos, should have reached Lerma and Aranda, whence he was enjoined to turn off to the right by the Soria road.

While Napoleon was displaying so much activity—for no sooner had he arrived at Vittoria, and satisfied himself respecting the incident of Villatte's division at Balmaseda, than he had sent off marshal Soult to Burgos; no sooner was he master of Burgos, than he had dispatched that same marshal against Blake; no sooner was Blake destroyed than he threw marshal Ney upon Castaños—while Napoleon, we say, was displaying so much activity, so much manœuvring science, against armies which it was sufficient to attack in front in order to conquer, the central Junta of Aranjuez, and the court of generals, of demagogue royalists, around it, learned the destruction of the army of Blake and the marquis of Belveder with extraordinary astonishment and emotion, as if these events were not to be foreseen. It did not absolutely imitate those cowardly soldiers, who, when running away, murder their officers, whom they accuse of treachery (of which we shall soon see some new and atrocious examples), but it obeyed a sentiment somewhat similar, in displacing without pity the vanquished generals. Amidst the habitual confusion of its counsels, it declared Blake, though the best of the officers of the army of Gallicia, unworthy of the command, and it repaid his devotedness by stripping him of it. It pursued the same course towards the fortunate conqueror of Baylen, towards Castanos, the most intelligent of the Spanish generals, because he resisted all the silly proposals of the brothers Palafox. Certainly Castanos was not the boldest of the Spanish generals, but he had an enlightened sense of the situation, and thought that by advancing upon the Ebro they should reap nothing but disasters. Having perceived how strong the French were on the Ebro, though weak on the Guadalquivir, he desired that an attempt should be made to oppose to them, either in the southern provinces or in the maritime provinces, the obstacle of the climate, of distances, of British assistance; and he highly censured the war which he was obliged to wage with two divisions of Andalusia, tolerably good ones by-the-by, and an assemblage of untrained peasants and students, against the best armies in Europe. To all the plans of the central Junta, founded on the blindest presumption, he had perfectly reasonable objections to make, and this annoying censor, who pretended to be wiser than his fellow-citizens, had already lost his glory and their favour. It was said in the army, and repeated at Aranjuez, that the Spanish ranks contained a great number of traitors, and that Castanos was the one who most deserved to be narrowly watched. Letters intercepted by our advanced corps were full of these absurd notions.

Accordingly, the command was taken at once from generals Blake and Castanos, and given to a single individual, to the fortunate favourite of Spanish mob-rule, to the marquis de la Romana, the runaway from Denmark. A single command would have been an excellent institution had there been a Spanish officer competent to that part, and at any rate, in the then state of the insurgent armies, Castaños would have been the only one to attempt it. But a jealousy had been excited against him on account of Baylen—he was detested for his good sense; and the eccentric marquis of La Romana, forming every day extravagant plans, pleasing by a sort of romantic enthusiasm, recommended by an escape which had something marvellous, agreeable to all the envious because he had not yet won any victory, a stranger to all animosities because he had lived at a distance—the marquis of La Romana was elected commander of the armies both of Blake and Castanos. It was, however, an utter impossibility to assume both these commands, because he would have been obliged, by the longest and the most arduous of marches, across mountains covered with snow, to retreat to Leon, with seven or eight thousand fugitives, whom he hoped to rally, and to increase to fifteen or twenty thousand. Being at Leon, more than one hundred leagues from Tudela, he would be incapable of commanding the centre and the right. Castanos, meanwhile, was to retain the command. Thomas de Morla, the perfidious and arrogant captain-general of Cadiz, of whom the French had so much reason to complain after Baylen, had been appointed director of military affairs with the Junta. He was called to introduce harmony among the Spanish generals, and especially between the Spanish generals and the English, who were about to enter into line.

Napoleon, having spent the 15th, 16th, and 17th of November in collecting information concerning his different corps, and certain, from this information, that marshal Soult had entered Santander without difficulty, that marshal Lefebvre had established himself at Carrion, that marshal Victor was on march for Burgos, and, lastly, that marshal Ney had just arrived at Aranda, behind the curtain of French cavalry—Napoleon gave orders to the latter to leave Aranda on the 18th, and to proceed to San Estevan, and from San Estevan to Almazan. He enjoined him, when once arrived there, to have an eye and an ear upon Soria and Calatayud, to learn if Castaños was falling back; and, if it was upon the road from Pampeluna to Madrid, which passes through Soria, or that from Saragossa to Madrid, which passes through Calatayud, he was to place himself so as to be on the 22nd or the 23rd on the rear of the Spanish army; Lannes, with 30,000 men, was to push it violently, as he was accustomed to push an enemy, in one or the other of these directions. Considering places and circumstances, these instructions were as precise as possible. On the same day Napoleon sent off Lannes, who could scarcely sit his horse, with orders to proceed to Logroño, there to unite the infantry division of Lagrange and the cavalry of generals Colbert and Dijeon with the troops of marshal Moncey, to throw himself with 24,000 foot, 2000 artillerymen, 4000 horse, upon Castaños and Palafox, and to thrust them back upon the bayonets of marshal Ney.

The two marshals immediately set about the execution of the movement prescribed to them. Marshal Ney, leaving Aranda on the 19th, arrived in the evening of the same day at San Estevan, and on the 20th at Berlanga. If he had always found it difficult to obtain intelligence on a march in Spain, that difficulty was increased on leaving the high road of Madrid and penetrating into the mountainous country of Soria, across that chain which rises intermediately between the Pyrenees and the Guadarrama. He was forced to go to the back of these mountains, in order to fall upon the Ebro and to seize Castaños in rear. On advancing into this less frequented tract, where of course the ancient manners of Spain prevailed in greater force, marshal Ney was fated to meet with a population more hostile, less communicative, and to be exposed more than anywhere else to false intelligence. The inhabitants fled at his approach, and left the French army to live upon what it could get, without thinking of staying on the spot, to diminish damage by supplying it with what it needed. Those who did remain spoke with emphasis of the armies of Castanos and Palafox, which some represented as amounting to 60, others to 80 thousand men. Each of these accounts assigned to them different head-quarters. Nobody could tell whether Castanos was retiring upon Madrid, or whether, in case of his retiring upon that capital, he would pass through Soria or Calatayud. Napoleon, in his instructions, had admitted one or the other hypothesis as possible, and marshal Ney found himself under great uncertainty. With Marchand's and Dessoles' divisions he numbered scarcely 13 or 14 thousand men, and, intrepid as he was, and having at Guttstädt made head against 60,000 Russians with 15,000 French, he first asked himself whether he was upon the real track of Castanos' retreat; and secondly, if it was not to be feared that Castanos and Palafox, falling back before they were beaten, might appear before him with 60 or 80 thousand men, which would render his position serious. He marched, therefore, with cautious steps, observing, listening to everything around him, and applying to head-quarters for information which he could not obtain on the spot. On the 21st he was at Soria with one of his divisions, waiting till next day for the second, which he had directed to make a circuit to the right, in order to obtain intelligence from Calatayud. This intrepid marshal hesitated for the first time in his life, surprised, embarrassed at the diverse reports which he picked up in this country of ignorance, exaggeration, and adventures. Meanwhile, time pressed, for it was on the 22nd or the 23rd that the French troops on the Ebro were to be engaged with Castanos and Palafox.

Marshal Lannes, on his part, having mounted on horseback before he was completely recovered, had left Burgos on the 19th, and was at Logrono in the evening of the same day. He had ordered Lagrange's division, general Colbert's cavalry, and general Dijeon's brigade of dragoons, to employ the 20th in concentrating themselves around Logrono, to cross the Ebro on the morning of the 21st, and to descend along the right bank of that river, till opposite to Lodosa, where marshal Moncey was to debouch. Setting out again on the 20th for Lodosa, he had seen marshal Moncey, who was temporarily placed under his orders, and had enjoined him to hold himself in readiness to cross the bridge of Lodosa in the evening of the 21st, in order to effect his junction with the troops of general Lagrange.

The instructions of marshal Lannes were punctually executed, and, in the evening of the 21st, general Lagrange, having descended the right bank of the Ebro, arrived before Lodosa, whence the corps of marshal Moncey was debouching. There was a total mass of 28 or 29 thousand men, infantry and cavalry. Marshal Lannes had placed under the command of the brave Lefebvre-Desnoettes all his cavalry, composed of Polish lancers, provisional cuirassiers, and dragoons, and light horse, which general Colbert had brought, and old dragoons brought from the extremity of Germany by general Dijeon. The infantry was composed of Lagrange's division, late Bisson's division, young troops of marshal Moncey's corps, to which had been subsequently joined the 14th and 44th of the line, as well as the legions of the Vistula. The young soldiers had become almost worthy of the old, excepting that they were deficient of good officers, like all corps of recent creation, the skeletons of which have been formed with retired officers. Lannes made them all bivouac, in order to start the next morning. Every soldier had bread for four days in his knapsack.

Accordingly, next day, the 22nd of November, the troops set out, descending the right bank of the Ebro towards Calahorra.

Lannes marched at the head with Lefebvre-Desnoettes, followed by the Polish lancers, who had rendered themselves the terror of the Spaniards. On coming in sight of Calahorra, they perceived the Spaniards retiring upon Alfaro and Tudela, where they naturally expected to find them in position on the following day. Lannes hastened the pace of the troops, and went to pass the night at Alfaro. It was impossible to proceed further that day. For the rest, if they started from Alfaro next morning by daybreak, they might reach Tudela early enough for a battle. The divisions of Maurice Mathieu, Musnier, and Grandjean, kept along the left of the Ebro. Morlot's and Lagrange's divisions followed the right bank, and passed the night at Coralla. In this march the cavalry preceded the infantry.

Next day, the 23rd, Lannes gave orders for starting at three in the morning for Tudela. With a view to lose no time, he set off at a gallop with Lefebvre and the Polish lancers, being desirous to arrive before the troops, and to reconnoitre the position, in case the enemy should be waiting to fight.

The Spanish generals had been long disputing about the best course to be pursued, Palafox being desirous to act offensively in Navarre, Castaños, on the contrary, unwilling to cross the Ebro, and going so far as to say that it would be better to fall back ever so far into Spain, and to avoid general engagements with the French. Amidst this controversy they had been surprised by the presence of Lannes, and forced to accept battle by the outcry of the Spanish populace, who called them traitors. Things were in such a state that the Aragonese, under O'Neil, had not yet recrossed the Ebro at Tudela on the morning of the 23rd, and that, between the left wing, formed by them, and the extremity of the right wing, formed by the Andalusians, there was a distance of nearly three leagues. Castanos hastened to range both in order of battle on the heights which rise in advance of Tudela, and which, gradually subsiding, extend to the environs of Cascante, amidst spacious plains of olive plantations.

Lannes, having come facing this position, perceived on his left, upon the heights preceding Tudela, and near the Ebro, a large mass of Spaniards. These were precisely the Aragonese, finishing their passage, and covered by a numerous artillery. In the centre he discovered, on somewhat less elevated heights, and protected by an olive wood, another mass: these were the Valencians, the Murcians, and the Castilians. Further to the right, but at a very great distance towards Cascante, was discernible a third assemblage: these were the divisions of Andalusia, under la Pena and Grimarest, which had not yet come into line. The whole might amount to 40,000 men.

Lannes immediately resolved to storm the heights on the left, and, when he should have nearly accomplished this, to break the centre of the enemy, then to fall upon that portion of the Spanish army which was perceived on the right towards Cascante, and against which he purposed to direct his rear-guard, formed by

Lagrange's division, which had been left at some distance behind.

He dispatched forthwith Maurice Mathieu's division, one of the best composed and best commanded, to the heights on the left, appuyed on the Ebro, and kept in reserve Musnier's, Morlot's, and Grandjean's divisions, to act against the centre at the proper time. The cavalry was deployed in the plain, one part facing the right, for the purpose of keeping the enemy in check towards Cascante, and to give Lagrange's division time to rejoin.

Generals Maurice Mathieu and Habert, preceded by a battalion of tirailleurs, advanced at the head of a regiment of the Vistula and of the 14th of the line, an old Eylau regiment, for which battles with the Spaniards were not formidable affairs. Lannes had given orders not to be prodigal of musketry fire against an enemy superior in number and advantageously posted. Accordingly, when the tirailleurs had made the Spaniards upon the heights on the left fall back, generals Maurice Mathieu and Habert formed into columns of attack, and began to climb the acclivity. The Aragonese, more brave, more enthusiastic, than the rest of the nation, and more committed by their anterior demonstrations, were obliged to stand their ground, and most obstinately did they maintain it. After making good use of their artillery against the French, they disputed with them one hillock after another, and killed a considerable number of their men. But Maurice Mathieu's division, vigorously supported, compelled them, after a fight of two hours, to fall back upon Tudela. As soon as Lannes perceived that the issue of the combat in this quarter was not doubtful, he dispatched Morlot's division, which had just arrived, to support Grandjean's division, and pushed both of them upon the centre of the Spaniards, composed, as we have said, of Valencians, Murcians, and Castilians. The obstacles of the ground, which were numerous, presented more than one difficulty for Morlot's division to overcome. Filled with young and ardent troops, they surmounted them, with the loss, it is true, of three or four hundred men, and drove back the Spaniards upon Tudela, into which Maurice Mathieu, on his part, was ordered to penetrate.

A general rout ensued; for the Spaniards, precipitated by Maurice Mathieu's and Morlot's divisions from the heights that surround Tudela upon the town itself, and into an extensive plain of olive plantations situated beyond it, fled in tremendous confusion, leaving many dead and wounded, a greater number of prisoners than usual, all their artillery, and an immense quantity of stores and baggage-waggons.

It was now three in the afternoon. Lannes ordered marshal Moncey to pursue them upon the Saragossa road, with Maurice Mathieu's, Morlot's, and Grandjean's divisions, Colbert's light cavalry, and the Polish lancers, under the command of general Lefebvre-Desnoettes. This cavalry, passing through the gap in the centre, entered Tudela and Cascante, and dashed at a gallop upon the fugitives, by all the beaten tracks through the olive-plantations that surround Saragossa. Lannes remained, with Musnier's division and the dragoons, to make head against the left of the Spaniards, composed of la Pena's troops, who were seen in the distance towards Cascante.

Castaños, hurried away in the rout, could not rejoin his left. La Pena was there alone, with a formidable mass of infantry, that which had taken Dupont in rear at Baylen, and which had all the pride of that day, without having the merit of it. La Pena led it in line from Cascante towards Tudela, into a plain where the cavalry could deploy. Lannes let slip upon it the dragoons of Dijeon's brigade, which by several repeated charges kept it in check, while waiting for Lagrange's division, which had not yet come into action. It arrived at length, at a very advanced hour. General Lagrange, placing it in *échellons* very close to one another, proceeded immediately to the attack of Cascante. He led himself the 25th light, forming the first *échellon*. These were old Friedland regiments, which considered it as no difficulty to have to deal with the pretended conquerors of Baylen. The 25th marched with bayonets fixed upon Cascante, overthrew la Pena's division, and hurled it back upon Borja, to the right of the Saragossa road. General Lagrange, charging at the head of his division, received a ball in the arm.

Night put an end to the battle, which, on the right as on the left, exhibited but one immense rout. The Aragonese were thrown back upon Saragossa, and the Andalusians upon Borja, and from Borja upon the Calatayud road. The retreat could not but be divergent, even if the sentiments of the generals had not disposed them to separate after a common disaster. This day put into our hands about forty pieces of cannon, three thousand prisoners, almost all wounded, because the cavalry had no means of stopping them but by cutting them down, besides two thousand dead or dying left on the field of battle. The dispersion here, as at Espinosa, was, after all, the principal result. The following days gave us a great many more prisoners, taken, like the others, by the swords of our horse.

On the following morning Lannes was unable to bear the fatigue of riding, from having exposed himself to it too soon. He charged marshal Moncey to continue the pursuit of the Aragonese upon Saragossa, with Maurice Mathieu's, Morlot's, and Grandjean's divisions, and part of the cavalry. He consigned Lagrange's division, whose commander had been wounded, to the brave Maurice Mathieu, added to it Musnier's division, the dragoons, and the Polish lancers, and ordered these troops, placed under the chief command of general Maurice Mathieu, to pursue Castaños, with the sword at his loins, upon Calatayud and Siguenza, on the road from Saragossa to Madrid. He hoped, though he had not heard anything of the march of marshal Ney, that the Andalusians might meet with him on their way, and have to atone under his strokes for the day of Baylen.

Unfortunately, amidst the uncertainty in which he was, marshal Ney, not knowing by which road to advance, that of Soria to Tudela, or that of Soria to Calatayud, awaiting ulterior orders from head-quarters, which orders did not arrive, had passed not only the 22nd at Soria, for the purpose of rallying his two divisions, but also the 23rd and 24th, looking for intelligence; and it was not till the 25th that he decided to march for Agreda, at which point he would be but a day's march from Cascante. Had he only started on the morning of the 23rd, he might have been by evening, or the next day, on the rear of Castaños. But the instructions of the head-quarters, though very clear, had left the marshal too much latitude. The last particulars collected at Soria respecting the force of Castaños had thrown him into a real perplexity of mind. He had been told* that Castaños had 80 thousand men, that

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* Respecting this important fact in the career of the illustrious marshal, we here quote several letters from the head-quarters, which prove how highly Napoleon valued this great officer, and what he thought of the motives for his hesitation. We shall there see, in the first place, that the instructions were very clear, very positive; that the dates were specified with great precision; that, if there was at first some uncertainty respecting the two roads of Soria and Calatayud, on the 21st all uncertainty had ceased at the head-quarters, and that Agreda, on the Soria road, was indicated. It was evidently nothing but the false reports picked up at Soria that caused marshal Ney to hesitate. Besides, a better opinion may be formed on this important fact from the original documents. We shall add that, as for the reproach addressed to marshal Ney, that he lost time from jealousy of marshal Lannes, there is not the slightest foundation for such a reproach, though it has often been deserved in Spain by our generals. The better part of the triumph would have fallen to the share of marshal Ney if he had succeeded, for it was he who would have taken Castaños. The real cause is that which Napoleon himself assigned for the conduct of the marshal, and which I have pointed out in my narrative. One may refer to such a judge as Napoleon, especially when his opinion was not formed under the influence of ill-humour; for, besides his infallibility in this matter, he had the advantage of being close to the events,—he knew all the facts, and did not suffer himself to be biassed by any consideration. At any rate, here are the documents, hitherto unpublished: the reader, when he has perused them, will decide for himself:—

The major-general to marshal Ney, at Aranda.

"Burgos, November 18, 1808—noon.

"The Emperor orders you to set out to-morrow, before light, with your two divisions, the whole of your artillery, the 26th regiment of horse chasseurs, and general Beaumont's brigade of cavalry, which marshal Bessières will place at your disposal, and to proceed for San Estevan de Gormaz, and thence to Almazan or Soria, at your option, according to the intelligence which you shall receive. You will intercept at Almazan the road from Madrid to Pampeluna, and you will then find yourself on the rear of general Castaños. On your route, and particularly at Almazan, you shall have the most precise information. If you learn either that general Castaños has retreated upon Madrid, or that he has retired from Calahorra or from Alfaro, and that his line of communication with Madrid was that from Saragossa by Calatayud or Daroca, your expedition would then have for its first object the subjection of the town of Soria, which it is important to reduce before marching further. To this end you will proceed to that town; you will disarm it and blow up the old walls; you will cause the insurrectionary committees to be seized; you will form a government of the most respectable men; and you will tell the town to send a deputation to the king. You will put yourself in communication with marshal Lannes, who is marching with Lagrange's division, Colbert's brigade, and the whole corps of marshal Moncey, upon Calahorra, Alfaro, and Tudela. Marshal Lannes will proceed for Lodosa on the 21st; he will be there on the 22nd, and join marshal Moncey's corps. You, monsieur le duc, will be in the evening of the 21st at Almazan, and on the 22nd at Soria. The Emperor will

Lannes himself had been beaten, and, imposed upon by such-like reports, the daring marshal had this time been fearful of being too

be on the 21st at Aranda. Thus, on the 22nd, the left will be at Calahorra, the centre, which you form, will be at Almazan or Soria, the right upon Aranda."

The major-general to marshal Ney, at Almazan.

"Burgos, November 21, 1808—4 P.M.

"On the 22nd marshals Lannes and Moncey attack the enemy at Calahorra; you are, therefore, to continue your movement upon Agreda, to get upon the flanks of the enemy, and to form your junction with marshal Lannes, if that is necessary."

The major-general to marshal Ney, by Agreda.

"Aranda, November 27, 1808—10 morning.

"It appears that, after the battle of Tudela, the army of Aragon retired into Saragossa, and that the army of Castaños retreated upon Tarazona, and if you had been at Agreda on the 23rd it would have been taken.

"His majesty desires me to repeat the order to pursue Castaños—do not leave him, but pursue him with the bayonet at his loins. No rest till your army has got hold of a piece of the army of Castaños.

"Listen not to the reports of the country. It was said that at Tudela there were upwards of 80 thousand men; and there were not more than 40 thousand, including the peasants, and they ran away as soon as our troops marched towards them, leaving behind colours and cannon. This rabble is not made to withstand you, and nothing in Spain can resist your two divisions when you are at their head. Do not, then, leave Castaños, and get your share of him."

The major-general to marshal Ney, by Agreda.

"Aranda, November 28, 1808—7 evening.

"The Emperor desires me to give you orders to pursue Castaños with the sword at his loins. If he proceeds towards Madrid, you will follow him. Be incessantly at his heels. The Emperor goes to-morrow to Somo-Sierra, and his intention is to have Castaños cut off, if possible, towards Guadalaxara. But it is essential that you, monsieur le maréchal, that you should pursue him, and not let him throw himself upon the French corps marching to Madrid, and which might have at the same time to defend itself against the efforts of the English, who, according to accounts, are setting themselves in motion. The Emperor's head-quarters will be to-morrow at Bocequillas, and the day after at Buytrago. Thus, monsieur le duc, the object which you have to accomplish is neither the defence, nor the conquest, nor the occupation of a territory, but to follow, to attack, and to fight the army of Castaños, particularly if it should proceed for Madrid."

The major-general to marshal Ney at Guadalaxara.

"Chamartin, December 8, 1808.

"The English are running away as fast as their legs can carry them; but we have been here for a moment in a serious situation. It is a fault to have come hither too late; it is also a fault not to have followed the spirit of your first instructions: they informed you that marshal Lannes was to attack the enemy on the 23rd, that you were destined to cut off and pursue Castaños, and consequently to proceed rapidly upon Agreda, instead of stopping two days, as you have done, in pure waste, at Soria.

"His majesty does not approve of your having mingled your corps with that of marshal Moncey: you ought to pursue Castaños, and leave the duke de Conegliano to besiege Saragossa. The Emperor cannot conceive why, when you left Saragossa on the 2nd, you did not leave Dessoles' division with marshal Moncey, thereby exposing him to the necessity of making a retrograde movement. However, what is past is past: his majesty is too well acquainted with your zeal to be angry with you: he will even put it in your power to repair all this. The Emperor has hesitated to give orders to Dessoles' division and the Poles to return to Saragossa, in order to spare his troops fatigue. His majesty has preferred making alterations in his ulterior plans. He has just ordered marshal Mortier to proceed to Saragossa.'

The Emperor to marshal Lannes.

"Aranda, November 27, 1808.

"Your aide-de-camp arrived on the 26th, at 8 in the morning, and informed me rash. On the 25th of November, after passing the 23rd and 24th at Soria, he had marched, on repeated intimations from head-quarters, had arrived in the evening of the 25th at Agreda, on the 26th at Tarazona, where he at length learned, with great regret, the error into which he had fallen, and the lost occasion for immense results. What had then happened to him had happened to all our generals, who suffered themselves to be deceived by the exaggerations of the Spaniards, exaggerations against which Napoleon strove in vain to put them on their guard, by repeating to them that the troops of the insurrection were mere *canaille*, which ought to be trampled down. Of this he himself, a few days afterwards, set a memorable example.

Marshal Ney effected his junction with marshal Moncey, who was much weakened by the departure of Lagrange's and Musnier's divisions, sent in pursuit of Castaños. Marshal Ney, desirous of at least rendering his presence useful on the spot, agreed with marshal Moncey to assist him in the investment of Saragossa, in which the brothers Palafox and the Aragonese fugitives had shut themselves up. Meanwhile general Maurice Mathieu was pushing with equal rapidity and vigour the wrecks of Castaños, retreating in disorder upon Calatayud. Lannes remained ill at Tudela, but offered Napoleon to mount his horse again even before he was recovered, if it were necessary to make head in any quarter against the English, and to throw them into the sea. Would to Heaven, indeed, that Napoleon had consigned to such an officer the duty of pursuing those formidable enemies of the Empire!

It was not till the 26th, again owing to the difficulty of communications, that Napoleon received the news of the vigorous conduct of Lannes at Tudela, of the dispersion of the Spanish armies of the centre and the right, and of the non-execution of the movement prescribed to marshal Ney. Regarding that marshal as one of the first military officers of his time, he attributed his error solely to the false ideas which the French generals formed of Spain and of the Spaniards; and though the fine manœuvre which he had ordered from Soria had miscarried, he nevertheless considered the regular armies of Spain as annihilated and the Madrid road as henceforth open to him. In fact, the Aragonese, under Palafox, were barely capable of defending Saragossa. The Andalusians, conducted by Castaños, were retreating, to the number of eight or

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of the brilliant affair of Tudela. I congratulate you upon it. Marshal Ney has not fulfilled my object on this occasion. Arriving at noon on the 22nd at Soria, he ought, according to the orders which he had received, to have been early on the 23rd at Agreda. But, having suffered himself to be imposed upon by the inhabitants, and giving credit to the heap of absurdities which they circulated, believing upon their word that there were 80 thousand troops of the line there, &c., he was fearful of compromising himself, and remained on the 23rd and 24th at Soria. I gave him orders to set out immediately and to fear nothing. He ought to have been at Agreda on the 25th. He had heard your cannonade on the 23rd and 24th, and he thought that you had been beaten, without reason, and without any reasonable indication. I have since given him orders to pursue Castaños with the sword at his loins. I am engaged in recalling marshal Victor's corps, which I had sent towards Aragon, in order to be at length able to march for Madrid."

nine thousand, upon Calatayud, and could do nothing more than augment the garrison of Madrid, by falling back upon that capital by way of Siguenza and Guadalaxara, if they were allowed time. The marquis of La Romana, with six or seven thousand fugitives, destitute of everything, was laboriously gaining the kingdom of Leon, across the snow-covered mountains. Lastly, on the Madrid road itself was left nothing but wrecks of the army of Estremadura, already so roughly handled in advance of Burgos.

There was but one obstacle that could have stopped Napoleon—that was the English army, of which he had only the most vague and uncertain accounts. But that army itself was not yet in a state to undertake anything. Sir John Moore, conducting his two principal columns of infantry across the north of Portugal, had arrived at Salamanca, with 13 or 14 thousand infantry, worn out by the long march which they had performed, and by privations to which English soldiers were not at all accustomed. General Moore had not with him either a horse or a cannon, his cavalry and his artillery having taken the route from Badajoz to Talavera, under the escort of a division of infantry. Lastly, sir David Baird, landing at Coruña with 11 or 12 thousand men, advanced timidly towards Astorga, being yet 60 or 70 leagues from his commander-in-chief. These three columns knew not how they were to contrive to form a junction, and in their separate state were neither capable nor desirous of entering into action. They found themselves by no means encouraged by what they beheld around them; for, instead of receiving them with enthusiasm, the Spaniards of Old Castille, terrified at the defeat of Blake, and submitting to a mere squadron of French cavalry, received them coldly, and would not furnish them with anything but in exchange for gold sovereigns or silver piastres, delivered at the same time as the supplies themselves. Such was the account given by the discreet Moore to his government, to undeceive it in respect to the Spanish insurrection, and to prove to it that the English army was engaged in a very perilous adventure.

Napoleon was ignorant of these circumstances; he knew only that the English were coming through Portugal and Gallicia; but he persisted in his plan of drawing them into the interior of the Peninsula, in order to envelop them by means of some great manœuvre, while marshal Soult and general Junot, left upon his rear, were to keep them in check in front. For acting in this manner, Madrid, whence one might operate by the right on Portugal or Gallicia, became the best centre of operation, and this was a new motive for marching thither without delay. Napoleon gave orders in consequence, as soon as he was acquainted with the affair of Tudela.

In the first place, he directed marshal Ney, whom he wished to have at hand, for the purpose of employing him on difficult occasions, particularly against the English, to relinquish the investment of Saragossa, to march upon Madrid by the same route as Castaños, to pursue him to the last extremity, and until he had not a man left. He enjoined general Maurice Mathieu, who was pursuing Castaños with part of marshal Moncey's troops, to stop, to return to marshal Moncey the troops belonging to him, that the latter might resume the operations of the siege of Saragossa with all his divisions. He again urged general St. Cyr, charged with the war in Catalonia, to accelerate the operations that were to conduct him to Barcelona, and lead to the raising of the blockade of that great city. Having made these dispositions on his left, Napoleon sent the following instructions upon his right.

Marshal Lefebvre, posted at Carrion, to connect the centre of the French army with marshal Soult, to whom had been assigned the task of reducing the Asturias, was to follow the general movement upon Madrid, and to proceed, with Milhaud's dragoons, upon Valladolid and Segovia, in order to cover the right of the head-quarters. General Junot, whose first division was approaching, was to hasten his march, for the purpose of taking marshal Lefebvre's place on the southern slope of the mountains of the Asturias, where marshal Soult would soon appear again, after reducing the Asturias themselves. These two corps, one of which, under marshal Bessières, had formerly conquered Old Castille, the other of which, under Junot, had formerly conquered Portugal, united under marshal Soult to meet the English first in Old Castille and then in Portugal, according to the operations that one might be led to direct against them. Lastly, the head of the 5th corps, the last that left Germany, having begun to make its appearance at Bayonne, Napoleon ordered marshal Mortier, its commander, to come to Burgos, and take the place that was about to become vacant on the transfer of the head-quarters to Madrid.

Having thus regulated everything on his wings and his rear, Napoleon marched direct for Madrid. He had with him only marshal Victor's corps, the imperial guard, and part of the reserve cavalry, that is, much less than 40,000 men. These were more than he needed to meet any enemy whom he had to conquer, before he opened for himself the capital of Spain.

Having first moved marshal Victor to the left of the Madrid road, in order to support the rear of marshal Ney, he brought him back by Ayllon and Riaza upon that road to the very point where it begins to rise for the purpose of crossing the Guadarrama. He had already sent Lasalle, with the light cavalry, to the foot of the Guadarrama. He sent thither, besides, Lahoussaye's and Latour Maubourg's dragoons. Lastly, he dispatched to the same quarter the guard, the fusileers of which, under general Savary, who had been accustomed to command them in Poland, advanced to Bocequillas, to observe the relics of the marquis de Belveder, which had taken refuge between Sepulveda and Segovia. On the 23rd he set out himself from Burgos for Aranda.

After the rout of Burgos, the capital found itself uncovered; but the Junta of Aranjuez, not yet imagining, in its presumptuous ignorance, that Napoleon could soon march thither, had merely dispatched what forces were left disposable at Madrid to the gorges of the Guadarrama. There had thus been collected on the summit of the Guadarrama, towards the narrow pass leading from one slope to the other, the wrecks of the army of Estremadura, and such men belonging to the divisions of Andalusia as had remained at Madrid. This was a force of about 12 or 13 thousand men, placed under the command of an able and valiant officer, don Benito San-Juan. He had established an advanced guard of 3000 men beyond the Guadarrama, at the very foot of that slope which we should have to ascend, and a little to our right, and then distributed the nine thousand others at the pass of Somo-Sierra, at the bottom of the gorge which we had to go through. One part of his force, posted on the right and left of the road, which rose forming numerous windings, was to stop our soldiers by a double fire of musketry. The others barred the causeway itself, near the most difficult part of the pass, with 16 pieces of cannon in battery. The obstacle might be considered as one of the most serious that one is liable to meet with in war. The Spaniards imagined themselves invincible in the position of Somo-Sierra; and the Junta itself relied so much on the resistance which had been prepared there as not to leave Aranjuez. It hoped, moreover, that Castaños, whom it would not believe to be destroyed, would have time to come by the Guadalaxara road, to place himself behind the Guadarrama, between Somo-Sierra and Madrid, and that the English, making a corresponding movement to that of Castaños, would press forward, some by Avila, the others by Talavera, to cover the capital of Spain. We have already seen what foundation there was for such hopes.

The orders issued on the 26th for the march to Madrid being completely executed on the 29th, Napoleon himself proceeded on the 29th to the foot of the Guadarrama, and established his head-quarters at Bocequillas. General Savary had pushed a reconnaissance upon Sepulveda, not to disperse the corps which was there, but to learn its force and its intention. After taking some prisoners, he had retired, having no orders to advance further. The Spaniards, surprised at keeping their ground, had sent news to Madrid of a considerable advantage gained over the imperial guard.

Napoleon, having arrived at Bocequillas at noon on the 29th, mounted a horse, entered the gorge of Somo-Sierra, reconnoitred it with his own eyes, and decided on all his dispositions for the following morning. He ordered Lapisse's division to proceed to the right of the causeway, in order to storm at daybreak the post of Sepulveda, and Ruffin's division to set out at the same moment, to climb the acclivity of the Guadarrama, to the very pass of Somo-Sierra. The 9th light was to follow from height to height the right brink of the chasm, and the 24th of the line the left brink, so as to annul the defences established on the two flanks of the road. The 96th was to march in column upon the road itself. Then were to come the cavalry of the guard, and Napoleon with his staff. The fusileers of the guard were directed to support this movement.

At this period of the year, though the weather had become superb, there was yet no sun, excepting in the middle of the day. From six to nine in the morning a thick fog covered the country, especially the mountainous part of it; then, after that hour, a bright sun gave the army real spring days. Napoleon, in ordering Sepulveda to be attacked at six in the morning, reckoned upon making himself master of that accessory position by nine, the moment when the column marching towards Somo-Sierra would have reached the summit of the pass. Thanks to the fog, then, it was to arrive there unperceived, and to commence firing from the top of the mountain when the fire at the foot was over.

Next day, the 30th, the column sent against Sepulveda had scarcely time to show itself. The three thousand men placed for its defence fled in disorder, and ran off towards Segovia, to join the other fugitives under the marquis de Belveder.

The column climbing the acclivities of Somo-Sierra arrived unperceived very near to the point which the enemy occupied in force. The fog clearing off all at once, the Spaniards were not a litle surprised to find themselves attacked from the heights on the right and on the left, by the 9th light and the 24th of the line. Dislodged from post to post, they defended themselves but feebly on both margins of the chasm. But the main body of the assemblage was on the road itself, behind sixteen pieces of artillery, which opened a destructive fire on the column that followed the causeway. Napoleon, wishing to teach his soldiers that, with the Spaniards, they must not consider danger, but drive over them wherever they found them, ordered the cavalry of the guard to take at a gallop all that was before it. A brilliant cavalry officer, general Montbrun, advanced at the head of the Polish light horse, a young troop of *élite*, which Napoleon had formed at Warsaw, that he might have all nations and all costumes in his guard. General Montbrun, with those gallant young soldiers, dashed at a gallop upon the sixteen pieces of cannon of the Spaniards, in defiance of a horrible fire of musketry and grape. The first squadron received a discharge which threw it into disorder, sweeping down thirty or forty men in the rank. But the squadrons which followed, passing beyond the wounded, reached the pieces, cut down the gunners, and took all the cannon. The rest of the cavalry started off in pursuit of the Spaniards beyond the pass, and descended with them the back of the Guadarrama. The brave San-Juan, covered with blood, having received several wounds, strove in vain to stop his soldiers. There was, as at Espinosa, at Tudela, a frightful rout. Colours, artillery, two hundred waggons with stores, and almost all the officers, were left in our hands. The soldiers dispersed on the right and left in the mountains, and made off more particularly to the right, in order to reach Segovia.

In the evening, all the cavalry was at Buytrago, with the head-quarters. It was the French who informed the Spaniards of the disaster of what was called the army of Somo-Sierra. Napoleon was delighted to have proved to his generals what the Spanish insurgents were, what his soldiers were, and in what estimation both were to be held, and to have overcome an obstacle which some had seemed to think extremely formidable. The Poles had about fifty men killed or wounded at the pieces. Napoleon loaded them with rewards, and included in the distribution of his favours M. Philippe de Segur, who had received several shot-wounds in this charge; and he destined him to carry to the Legislative Body the colours taken at Burgos and Somo-Sierra.

Napoleon hastened to spread his cavalry from Buytrago to the very gates of Madrid, and to proceed thither in person, to endeavour to take that great capital by a mixture of persuasion and force, wishing to spare it the horrors of a capture by assault. Luckily, it was not in a state to defend itself; and, besides, the tumult which prevailed there would have rendered defence impossible, even though it had had walls capable of resisting the formidable foe by whom it was threatened.

On the news of the taking of Somo-Sierra the silly presumption of the Spaniards suddenly vanished, and the Junta had hastily left Aranjuez for Badajos. On retiring, it had proclaimed its resolution to go and prepare in the south of the Peninsula means of resistance the power of which Baylen, it alleged, had plainly revealed. But it was not the less determined to dispute Madrid with the conqueror of the West. The violent and anarchical part of the population would have it so, and talked of putting to death any one who should propose to capitulate. Thomas de Morla and the marquis de Castellar had been charged with the defence, in concert with a Junta, which met at the Post-office, and in which men of all sorts had seats. There were left at Madrid three or four thousand troops of the line, of very indifferent quality; but to this garrison was added a frantic population both of the city and the country, which had demanded and obtained arms, useless in its hands for saving the capital, and formidable to honest men only. Some furious persons having fancied that they discovered in the cartridges served out to them a blackish dust, which they declared to be sand and not powder, had laid the blame on the marquis de Péralès, corregidor of Madrid, a personage long a favourite with the multitude, because, in the gratification of his licentious taste, he had publicly made it his business to seek out the handsomest women of the lower class. One of these, deserted by him, having accused him of preparing this adulterated ammunition, and of being concerned in a plot against the safety of Madrid, the band of cutthroats seized the unfortunate man and murdered him, as they had murdered so many others since the fatal revolution of Aranjuez, and then dragged his body about the streets. After affording themselves this satisfaction, the barbarous rulers of Madrid made some hasty preparations for defence, under the direction of professional men. Madrid is not fortified: it is, as Paris was some years ago, before the construction of the immense works which have rendered it invincible, surrounded by a mere wall, neither bastioned nor terraced. Battlements were formed on this wall; the gates were barricaded, and cannon placed at them. These precautions were taken more particularly at the Alcala and Atocha gates, leading to the high road by which the French would come. Behind the gates were cut entrenchments; barricades were raised in the corresponding streets, that, the first resistance being overcome, there might be another left to conquer.

Opposite to the Alcala and Atocha gates rise, on commanding ground facing Madrid, the palace and park of Buen Retiro, separated from Madrid by the famous promenade of the Prado. The wall enclosing the Retiro was battlemented; several mounds of earth were thrown up, cannon were dragged to them; a fanatic multitude, capable of ravaging, but not of defending it, was placed there by way of garrison. The women, uniting their efforts with those of the men, set about unpaving the streets and carrying the stones to the roofs of the houses, to be thrown down upon the assailants. The bells were rung day and night, to keep the population astir. The duke de l'Infantado had been secretly sent off from Madrid, to seek the army of Castaños, and bring it back to the city.

In all this agitation there were no very serious means of opposing Napoleon. He arrived on the morning of the 2nd of December under the walls of Madrid, with the cavalry of the guard and Lahoussaye's and Latour-Maubourg's dragoons. This day was the anniversary of the coronation, that also of the battle of Austerlitz, and for Napoleon, as well as for his soldiers, a superstition was atached to that memorable date. The weather was perfectly serene. That fine cavalry, on beholding its glorious chief, raised unanimous acclamations, which mingled with the shouts of rage set up by the Spaniards on seeing us. Marshal Bessières, duke of Istria, commanded the imperial cavalry. The Emperor, after surveying for a moment the capital of Spain, dispatched an officer of his staff to summon it to open its gates. This young officer had the greatest difficulty to get in. A butcher of Estremadura, charged to guard one of the gates, insisted that nobody but the duke of Istria himself ought to come upon that mission. General Montbrun, who was present, having scouted that ridiculous pretension, was obliged to draw his sword to defend himself. The officer, when admitted into the interior of the city, was assailed by the populace, and would have been murdered, had not the troops of the line, feeling their honour interested in enforcing respect for the laws of war, saved his life by snatching him out of the hands of the assassins. The Junta directed a Spanish general to convey its negative answer. But the leaders of the populace required that thirty of the mob should escort that general, to have an eye upon rather than to protect him; for that furious multitude espied treason everywhere. The Spanish envoy, thus surrounded, appeared before the imperial staff, and it was easy to guess, from his embarrassed attitude, under what tyranny he and all honest men at Madrid were placed at that moment. On the repeated observation that the city could not hold out against the French army; that, by resisting, they would only expose a population of women, children, and old men to slaughter in consequence of an assault, the envoy cast down his eyes without replying, for, before the witnesses who were watching him, he durst not betray the sentiments of which he was full. He was sent back, with his sorry escort, and assured that the firing would commence immediately.

Napoleon had as yet with him his cavalry only, and he expected his infantry towards the close of day. He made a reconnaissance himself on horseback around Madrid, and formed a plan of attack which might be divided into several successive acts, so as to summon the place after each of them, and to reduce it rather by intimidation than by the employment of formidable military means.

Towards evening, Villatte's and Lapisse's divisions, of marshal Victor's corps, having arrived, he made dispositions for storming the Buen Retiro, which commands Madrid on the east, and the gates de los Pozzos, Fuencarral, and del Duque, which command it on the north. The moonlight was superb. In the evening the troops took position. General Senarmont prepared the artillery to batter the walls of the Buen Retiro, and everything was ready for a first act of vigour. Previously, general Maison, charged with the gates de los Pozzos, Fuencarral, and del Duque, took all the outworks under a violent and extremely well-directed fire. But, on coming near the gates, he paused, waiting for the signal of attack.

Napoleon, before he commenced, dispatched another officer, a Spaniard taken at Somo-Sierra. This officer was the bearer of a letter from Berthier, at once threatening and mild, to the marquis de Castellar, governor of Madrid. An answer was soon returned: it was negative, and intimated that time must be allowed for consulting the authorities and the people before any resolution could be taken. At daybreak, therefore, Napoleon in person took his station on the heights, having the Buen Retiro on the left, and the gates of los Pozzos, Fuencarral, and del Duque on his right, and gave orders himself for the attack. A well-directed Spanish battery having covered the spot where he was with balls, he was obliged to move a little further. It was not, however, by such balls that such a man was fated to fall. As soon as the morning fog had given place to a brilliant sun, which for some time past had shone continually, general Villatte, charged to act on the left, advanced with his division upon the Buen Retiro. General Senarmont having broken down the walls of that fine park with cannon, the infantry entered at the point of the bayonet, and had soon dislodged four thousand men, citizens and men of the lower class, who had pretended to defend them. The resistance was next to none, and our columns, passing through the Buen Retiro without difficulty, debouched immediately upon the Prado. That superb promenade extends from the Atocha to the Alcala gate, and takes them in some measure in rear. Our troops gained possession of them and of the artillery with which they were armed. Companies of *élite* then fell upon the first barricades of the streets of Atocha, San Jeronimo, and Alcala, and carried them in spite of a very brisk fire of musketry. They were obliged to take by assault several palaces situated in those streets, and to put to the sword the defenders who occupied them.

On the right, general Maison, who had been forced to remain all night under a murderous fire, in order to save the houses of the suburbs, attacked the gates of Fuencarral, del Duque, and San Bernardino, for the purpose of penetrating to an extensive building, which served the life-guard for quarters, and the walls of which, solid as those of a fortress, were capable of withstanding cannon. He succeeded in getting into the interior of the city, and surrounding on all sides the building of the life-guard, while sustaining a tremendous fire. The field-artillery having failed to make a breach in the walls, general Maison advanced at the head of a detachment of sappers to break open the doors with hatchets. But the materials heaped up behind these doors rendered it impossible to force them. The general then ordered a violent fire of musketry to be poured from the neighbouring houses upon this building. He had been for twenty-one hours under fire, when he was struck by a ball, which shattered his foot. Two hundred men, killed or wounded, were already extended before this formidable edifice, when the Emperor ordered a pause, before making a general assault. He was master of the gates of Fuencarral, del Duque, and San Jeronimo, attacked by general Maison; of those of Alcala and Atocha, attacked by general Villatte; and his artillery, from the heights of the Buen Retiro, was sufficient to reduce in a short time that unfortunate city. However, at eleven in the morning, he suspended the action, and sent a fresh summons to the Junta of defence, declaring that everything was prepared to batter down the city if it resisted any longer, but that, though ready to give a terrible example to the cities of Spain which persisted in closing their gates against him, he chose rather to owe the surrender of Madrid to the reason and humanity of those who had made themselves its rulers.

The capture of the Buen Retiro, and of the gates on the east and north, had already made a strong impression upon the defenders of Madrid. Not one rational person doubted the consequences of a capture by assault. The populace itself had experienced at the Atocha and Alcala gates what was gained by firing from the tops of houses upon the French, and the violence of men's minds began to cool a little. The Junta of defence took advantage of this to send Thomas de Morla and Don Bernardo Iriarte to the head-quarters.

Napoleon received them at the head of his staff, and with a very cold and stern countenance. He knew that Don Thomas de Morla was that governor of Andalusia under whose command the capitulation of Baylen had been violated. He determined to address him in language that should ring throughout all Europe. Thomas de Morla, daunted by the presence of the extraordinary man before whom he appeared, and by the visible though repressed anger revealed by his features, told him that all sensible men in Madrid were convinced of the necessity of surrendering; but that it was necessary to make the French troops retire, and to allow the Junta time to pacify the people, and to induce them to lay down their arms. "In vain you employ the name of the people," replied Napoleon, in an angry tone. "If you cannot find means to pacify them, it is because you have yourselves excited and misled them by lies. Assemble the clergy, the heads of the convents, the alcaldes, the principal proprietors, and if, between this and six in the morning the city has not surrendered, it shall have ceased to exist. I neither will nor ought to withdraw my troops. You have slaughtered the unfortunate French who have fallen into your hands. Only a few days since you suffered two domestics of the ambassador of Russia to be dragged away and put to death in the streets because they were Frenchmen. The incapacity and the weakness of a general had put into your hands troops which had capitulated on the field of battle of Baylen, and the capitulation was violated. You, monsieur de Morla, what sort of a letter did you write to that general? Well did it become you to talk of pillage, you who, having entered Roussillon in 1795, carried off all the women, and divided them as booty among your soldiers. What right had you, moreover, to hold such language? The capitulation of Baylen forbade it. Look what was the conduct of the English, who are far from priding themselves on being strict observers of the law of nations. They complained of the convention of Cintra, but they fulfilled it. To violate military treaties is to renounce all civilisation, to put ourselves on a level with the Bedouins of the desert. How then dare you demand a capitulation, you who violated that of Baylen? Behold how injustice and bad faith always turn to the prejudice of those who incur the guilt of them! I had a fleet at Cadiz; it was the ally of Spain: you directed against it the mortars of the city where you commanded. I had a Spanish army in my ranks: it pleased me better to see it come over in English ships, and fling itself from the top of the rocks of Espinosa, than to disarm it. I preferred having nine thousand enemies more to fight to violating good faith and honour. Return to Madrid. I give you till six to-morrow morning. Go back then; you have nothing to say to me about the people but to tell me that they have submitted. If not, you and your troops shall be put to the sword."*

These severe and deserved reproaches made Thomas de Morla shudder with terror. On returning to the Junta he could not conceal his agitation, and Don Bernardo Iriarte was obliged to give an account for him of the joint mission on which they had been to the French head-quarters. The impossibility of resistance was so evident that the Junta itself, though divided, acknowledged by a majority the necessity for submitting. It again sent Thomas de Morla to Napoleon, to inform him of the surrender of Madrid, upon certain insignificant conditions. In this same night between the 3rd and 4th, the marquis de Castellar purposed to escape with his troops as well from the clemency as from the severity of the conqueror. Followed by his soldiers and all who were most compromised, he went out at the west and south gates, which the French did not occupy. Next day, although the furious populace still vented cries of rage, the armed men having received and accepted the invitation not to resist any further, the gates of the city were given up to general Belliard. The French army took possession of the principal quarters, and established itself in the great buildings of Madrid, particularly in the convents, at the cost of which Napoleon required that it should be subsisted. He gave orders for a general and immediate disarming: then, without deigning to enter Madrid himself, he went to Chamartin, to lodge amidst his guard, in a small country-house belonging to the family of the duke de l'Infantado. He directed Joseph to pass the Guadarrama, and to come and reside, not in Madrid, but out of it, at the royal mansion of the Pardo, two or three leagues distant. His intention was to make Madrid tremble under a prolonged military occupation, before he restored to it the civil government with the new royalty. His conduct on this occasion was as skilful as it was energetic.

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* These are the very words of Napoleon, as recorded at length in the *Moniteur* of that time.

He purposed, without employing cruelty, but merely intimidation, to place the nation between the benefits which he brought it and the fear of terrible punishments against those who should persist in rebellion. He had already ordered the confiscation of the estates of the dukes de l'Infantado, Ossuna, Altamira, Medina-Cœli, Santa-Cruz, and Hijar, of the prince of Castel Franco, and of M. de Cevallos. These last two were punished for having accepted office under Joseph and then deserted him. Napoleon was resolved to use particular severity towards those who passed from one camp to another, and who should add to a resistance, perfectly legitimate in itself, treachery which was not so. The duke de l'Infantado and the prince of Castel Franco had been merely weak; M. de Cevallos had acted like a traitor. Orders were therefore issued to seize him wherever he should be found. But he had fled. Napoleon caused Messrs. de Castel Franco and Santa Cruz, who had not had time to get out of the way, to be apprehended. He likewise ordered the duke de St. Simon, a Frenchman by birth, who had incurred the penalty of those who serve against their country, to be seized and brought before a military commission. His intention was not to act with rigour, but to intimidate by the temporary confinement in a State prison of those whom he caused to be apprehended and condemned. He had also the presidents and royal *procureurs* of the council of Castille seized and carried to

France. He treated in the same manner some of the popular leaders implicated in the murder of French soldiers and of Spaniards who had fallen victims to the fury of the populace. At the same time, he issued orders for the most complete and general disarming. He required, as we have said, that the convents should receive part of the army and feed it at their cost.

While exercising these apparent severities, he purposed to strike the mass of the Spanish nation by the idea of the benefits which must arise from French rule. In consequence, he decided by a series of decrees the suppression of the lines of customhouses between one province and another, the removal of all the members of the council of Castille, the immediate supply of the place of that council by means of the institution of the court of cassation, the abolition of the tribunal of the Inquisition, the prohibition for any person to possess more than one commandery, the abrogation of feudal rights, and the reduction to one-third of all the convents existing in Spain.

A desire to spare the clergy and the nobility had induced him at first to hesitate respecting the opportuneness of these important measures, when he was still at Bayonne, engaged in preparing the Spanish Constitution. But, since the general insurrection, the difficulty having become as great as it was possible to imagine, he no longer had need to show any indulgence to this or that class, and had only to think how to gain the sound and intelligent part of the nation by wise institutions, leaving it to time and force to reconcile the rest of it.

These decrees being promulgated, he declared to various deputations which were presented to him, that, as for himself, he had no occasion to enter Madrid, being in Spain only a foreign general, commanding an auxiliary army of the new dynasty; that, as for king Joseph, he should not restore him to the Spaniards till he deemed them worthy to possess him by a sincere return towards him; that he would not replace him in the palace of the kings of Spain to see him expelled a second time; that, if the inhabitants of Madrid were resolved to attach themselves to this prince by the more enlightened appreciation of all the benefits promised by a new royalty, he would give him back to them, but not till all the heads of families, assembled in the parishes of Madrid, should have taken, on the Holy Bible, an oath of fidelity to him; otherwise, he would relinquish the design of imposing upon the Spaniards a sovereign whom they rejected; but that, having conquered them, he would exercise the rights of conquest over them; he would dispose of their country as he thought proper, and should probably dismember it, taking for himself as much as he should deem it right to add to the territory of France.

He turned his attention moreover to the forming of the commencement of an army for his brother Joseph. He ordered him to collect into a regiment of several battalions all the Germans, Neapolitans, and other foreigners, who had been long serving in Spain, and who desired nothing better than to find a new paymaster. This regiment was to be called the Royal Foreign (*Royal-Etranger*) and to amount to 3200 men. He ordered the Spanish Swiss, who had continued faithful, or who were disposed to come over to Joseph, to be collected into a regiment, which should be called Reding, because there was an officer of that name who had behaved well. It was hoped that this regiment would amount to 4800 men. He directed all the Spanish soldiers who had embraced the cause of Joseph, to the presumed number of 4800, to be collected under the name of Royal Napoleon; and lastly, by the name of royal guard, the French who, after Baylen, had taken service under Castaños, to escape captivity. It was supposed that these, joined to the conscripts drawn from Bayonne, would furnish an effective of 3200 men. This would form a first nucleus of 16,000 soldiers, who might prove valuable, if they were well paid, and pains were taken with their organization.

After taking these measures, Napoleon awaited the effect of them, persisting in residing himself at Chamartin, and leaving Joseph in the pleasure-house of the Pardo, where he lived separate, and in royal state, without having occasion to bow before the superior sovereignty of the emperor of the French. While waiting for the Spaniards to comprehend him, Napoleon continued to make his dispositions for the entire conquest of the Peninsula.

He had brought to Madrid the corps of marshal Victor, composed of Lapisse's, Villatte's, and Ruffin's divisions, the imperial guard, and the greater part of the mass of dragoons. On the report that the corps of Castaños was retreating by Calatayud, Siguenza, and Guadalaxara, towards Madrid, he had sent Ruffin's division, with a brigade of dragoons, to the bridge of Alcala. This corps of Castaños', in fact, pursued to extremity by general Maurice Mathieu, at the head of Musnier's and Lagrange's divisions, and the Polish lancers, briskly attacked at Bubierca, where it had sustained considerable loss, was falling back in disorder upon Guadalaxara, numbering no more than nine or ten thousand men, instead of the twenty-four whom it comprehended at Tudela. Castaños had been deprived by the Junta of the command, which was transferred to general de la Pena. Tossed in this manner from chief to chief, soured by defeat and hardships, it had mutinied, and taken definitively for its commander the duke de l'Infantado, who, as we have seen, had secretly quitted Madrid, in order to bring reinforcements to the defenders of the capital. The entry of the French into Madrid, and the presence of Ruffin's division, with the dragoons, at the bridge of Alcala, left this former army of the centre no other resource than retreat upon Cuença. It ran no risk of being disturbed there till the French should take the resolution of marching for Valencia, which could not be immediate.

Napoleon, seeing the army of the centre retiring three-fourths dispersed, had left the dragoons to pick up the stragglers, and recalled to him Ruffin's division of Victor's corps, destining that corps to march for Aranjuez and Toledo, in pursuit of the army of Estremadura. After securing his left, by driving the old army of Castaños to Cuença, he purposed to secure his right by pushing beyond Talavera the wrecks of the army of Estremadura, which had fought at Burgos and Somo-Sierra. He dispatched Ruffin's and Victor's divisions, preceded by Lasalle's light cavalry and Lahoussaye's dragoons, and kept Lapisse's division and the imperial guard at Madrid. Lasalle hastened to Aranjuez and Toledo, and the dragoons ran to the Escurial, to drive off the disorderly remnant of the army of Estremadura. That army was in rout when it commenced its retreat. It was still more so when it felt the point of the swords of our horse. It exhibited nothing but confused bands, which, like all troops incapable of fighting, revenged themselves upon their leaders for their own cowardice. The unfortunate Don Juan Benito, who had not left the field of battle of Somo-Sierra till the last, and covered with blood, was their first victim. With the fugitives from Somo-Sierra, he had rejoined at Segovia what was yet left of the detachment of Sepulveda and of the troops beaten at Burgos by marshal Soult. These different assemblages, after having for a moment approached Madrid by the road from Segovia to the Escurial, fled for Toledo, on learning the surrender of the capital. They were joined by the garrison of Madrid, which had left the city with the marquis de Castellar. Their indiscipline surpassed all belief. They plundered, they ravaged, much more than the conquerors, that country which was their own, and which it was their duty to defend. Their officers, overwhelmed with shame and grief at such a spectacle, exerted themselves to introduce some order into this retreat, and to save the inhabitants from the horrible treatment to which they were exposed. The gallant Don Juan Benito, the most severe because he was the bravest, became the object of their fury. Having endeavoured to restrain them at Talavera, he was attacked in an humble cell which served him for a lodging, dragged to the public road, and hung on a tree, where these monsters, who had not followed him to the fight, amused themselves for several hours in riddling him with balls. Such were the men to whom Spain, in her patriotic blindness, committed her defence against a royalty which had in her eyes the fault of being foreign.

General Lasalle, always galloping at the head of his squadrons, arriving soon at Talavera, drove these undisciplined bands to the bridge of Almaraz, over the Tagus. This bridge, about which the Spaniards had thrown up some works, could only be taken by infantry. General Lasalle paused there, waiting till orders from the Emperor should prescribe fresh operations in the south of the Peninsula.

While the Spanish armies were driven back in this manner, that of Palafox on Saragossa, that of Castaños on Cuença, that of Estremadura on Almaraz, that of Blake on Leon and the Asturias, and we had thus in a few days again become masters of half of Spain, the English, who had been assured that they had only to come to gain trophies, and to complete at most the victory already secured, found themselves in the most cruel embarrassment; for they had not yet succeeded in collecting their several detachments into a single corps. The only progress which they had made in this respect was to unite the infantry, brought by Ciudad Rodrigo and Salamanca, and the artillery and cavalry, which had come by Badajoz and Talavera, under the command of general Hope. The latter, who had even well-nigh fallen among Lasalle's squadrons, had got off by a skilful march in the mountains, and had at length, by Avila, rejoined his commander-in-chief towards Salamanca. After this junction, general Moore numbered about 19,000 men. But he had a last junction to effect,—that with sir David Baird, who was coming by Coruña and Astorga with about 11,000 men. The English general thought more than ever of retreating. It was not with 30,000 men that he could make head against the French, the Spanish armies being everywhere annihilated. His anxiety to withdraw from danger, and to join sir David Baird, had suggested the salutary idea of relinquishing the line of retreat through Portugal, and adopting that of Gallicia, which afforded the twofold advantage of increasing his force by one-third, and of bringing him near a good port for embarking. He was inclined, therefore, to march by Toro for Benavente, and to order sir David Baird to proceed thither by Astorga. In acting thus he gave himself the appearance of threatening the communications of the French, because he had but a step to take in order to reach Valladolid or even Burgos; whereas he was in reality on the road to Coruna, that is, to the sea, his safest refuge. Thanks to this movement, he ensured his retreat, he seemed to do something for the Spanish cause, and he provided himself with a reply to the representations of Mr. Frere, who, having become the chief adviser of the insurrectional government, was incessantly reproaching the English army for not acting. The unfortunate sir John Moore, who was both discreet and brave, who was accustomed to methodical war, who had been promised an enthusiastic reception, resources of all sorts, and easy victories, and who found the Spaniards discomfited, running away in all directions, scarcely able to feed themselves, was in a state of surprise, dissatisfaction, and disgust not to be described, and saw no safety but in beating a retreat by the shortest route. For the rest, he did not disguise from his government any of these disagreeable truths.

Napoleon had not at first concerned himself about the English, though he was well aware that a certain number of them were coming from Lisbon and from Coruña, because he intended in the first place to annihilate the Spanish armies, and because he purposed, in the next, to suffer the British army to penetrate into the interior of the Peninsula, in order to make the more sure of enveloping and taking it. Well conceived as was this idea, had he but known how dispersed and dispirited the English army was, he would have done better to fall upon it, and to destroy Moore at Salamanca and Hope in the mountains of Avila. But who can know everything in war? when, in fact, nothing is known but what is guessed from certain indications; and Napoleon had here too few to conjecture with accuracy the situation of the English; which was not at all surprising, since Moore, among a friendly people, was himself completely ignorant of the movements of the French army. Napoleon, however, having learned, from the excursions of his cavalry towards Talavera, that the English were between Talavera, Avila, and Salamanca, and that from the Tagus they were proceeding to the height of the Duero, judged that the moment for acting against them was come, and he made dispositions for collecting the forces necessary for their destruction.

He ordered marshal Lefebvre to proceed from Valladolid for Segovia, and to descend from Segovia upon the Escurial, which would bring him nearly to Madrid. His intention was to make him take the position of the Escurial, Toledo, and Talavera, in order to bring marshal Victor's corps back to Madrid. Marshal Lefebvre was lastly to receive the Polish division, which till then had remained behind, and the Dutch, left for some time on the coast of Biscay. With Milhaud's dragoons and Lasalle's cavalry he was to form the right of the army upon Talavera. He would then number about 15,000 men.

Napoleon, in preparing to attack the English army, the solidity of which he was aware of, resolved to have at hand one of his best corps, led by one of the most energetic of his lieutenants. That corps was the 6th, its commander marshal Ney. He had reproved marshal Ney for the tardiness of his march upon Soria, and was anxious to make amends for that reproof by giving him the English to beat. He had already recalled him from Saragossa to Madrid, and had commissioned him to push Castaños by the way with the sword at his loins. He enjoined him to hasten his march, that he might be able to rest for a moment at Madrid, before he went forward to the right for the Tagus or the Duero.

Napoleon was, therefore, about to unite at Madrid itself the corps of Victor, Lefebvre, Ney, the imperial guard, and a considerable mass of cavalry; which would soon enable him to strike a decisive blow. The recall of marshal Ney, with the whole of the 6th corps, including Lagrange's division, which had been temporarily annexed to marshal Moncey's, for the battle of Tudela, would render it impossible for the latter to continue the siege of Saragossa, for he had not sufficient force left to hold the country while attacking the city. Napoleon ordered marshal Mortier to turn off with the 5th corps, and to take a position on the Ebro, in order to cover the siege of Saragossa, but to leave to marshal Moncey the exclusive direction of the attacks.

Delaborde's fine division, the first of general Junot's, had just arrived at Vittoria. Napoleon assigned Burgos to it. Napoleon ordered Heudelet's division, Junot's second, which immediately followed the first, to advance, with all possible haste, in the same direction. Lorge's dragoons, who accompanied the 5th corps, likewise received that destination. Millet's dragoons, a little behind these last, were drawn to Madrid. Napoleon prescribed to marshal Soult a march conformable to these various movements. That marshal had penetrated into the Asturias, driven before him the wrecks of the Asturians returned from Espinosa, and pushed on to the camp of Colombres. In consequence of warm and repeated fights, he had taken a certain number of prisoners, and a great quantity of stores and merchandize, accumulated by the English in the ports of Cantabria. Napoleon enjoined him to recross the mountains, and to descend into the kingdom of Leon, where, again joined with Junot and with Lorge's and Millet's dragoons, he was to make head against the English if they advanced upon our right, or to push them briskly if they fell back before the troops sent from Madrid, and even enter Portugal in pursuit of them. Thus, with three *corps d'armée*, besides the imperial guard and an immense cavalry at Madrid, with two *corps d'armée* and a great quantity of cavalry also upon his right, in rear, he was prepared to act against the English in all directions, and could pursue them by whatever route they should retreat. He awaited only the arrival of marshals Lefebvre and Ney, to run from Madrid to fresh operations. For the rest, the weather had continued to be perfectly fine. The month of December was like real spring, both at Madrid and in the Castilles. Our corps performed long marches, without experiencing any of the ordinary inconveniences of the season. Napoleon rode out on horseback every day around Madrid, which he never entered, reviewed his corps, made a point of supplying them with all that they had lost in their long marches and in fight, and directed his particular attention to a great military establishment at the Buen Retiro, whence he could control Madrid, and where he was certain to leave in safety his sick, his depôts, and his *matériel.* Always careful to ensure his line of operations, what he had ordered at Miranda, Pancorbo, and Burgos, he again ordered at Somo-Sierra, on the very plateau which had been the theatre of the battle, and at Madrid, on the height of the Buen Retiro, situated facing that capital. He had resolved to have field-works thrown up around that fine park, and a fortified retreat annexed to it, near the porcelain manufactory (where the kings of Spain produced imitations of the porcelain of China), and that, in this retreat, there should be a place sufficiently spacious to hold the wounded of the army, and its *matériel* in artillery and provisions. He intended, moreover, that this retreat should bristle with cannon, and that it should require a regular attack to storm it.

While things were passing as we have seen around Madrid, other events were taking place in Aragon and in Catalonia. In Aragon, ever since the battle of Tudela, the going and coming of our different *corps d'armée* had temporarily deprived marshal Moncey of the means of acting efficaciously against the city of Saragossa. The day after the battle, troops were required to be sent in pursuit of the corps of Castaños, and, in default of those of marshal Ney, Musnier's and Lagrange's divisions had been dispatched under general Maurice Mathieu.

From that time marshal Moncey had been left with no more than Grandjean's and Morlot's divisions, which numbered only nine or ten thousand men. Marshal Ney had come, it is true, debouching from Soria, and offering to concur in the siege of Saragossa with Dessoles' and Marchand's two divisions. But on the very day when, in concert with marshal Moncey, he was about to attack that famous capital of Aragon, and to make himself master of Monte Torrero, orders arrived from the head-quarters to pursue Castanos to extremity, and, while pursuing him, to return to Madrid. If Napoleon could have known what was passing there, he would have left to marshal Ney the conduct of the siege of Saragossa, and to general Maurice Mathieu the pursuit of Castaños. The latter, with Musnier's and Lagrange's divisions, would have brought to Madrid nearly as large a force as marshal Ney, with Dessoles' and Marchand's divisions. There might thus have been avoided a cross and useless movement of general Maurice Mathieu's, coming back in order to proceed to Saragossa, and of marshal Ney's, retiring from it, to march for Madrid by Calatayud. But accidents and false movements are multiplied in war with numbers and distances; and Napoleon added every day to the chances of errors by the prodigious extent of his operations. Marshal Ney, like all his lieutenants, too happy to serve near him, hastened to execute his orders, quitted marshal Moncey, who was thus left quite alone, and deeply mortified that he could not undertake anything against Saragossa, on account of the weak state to which he was reduced, particularly as marshal Ney was to take Lagrange's division to general Maurice Mathieu and to send him back Musnier's division only. He even took away with him the famous Polish lancers, so accustomed to Aragon, and left marshal Moncey nothing but the regiments of provisional cavalry formerly attached to his corps. Marshal Moncey, recovering Musnier's division only, was obliged to defer the attack of Saragossa. It is true, that, meanwhile, the heavy artillery was brought, under the direction of general Lacoste, from Pampeluna to Tudela, and conveyed by the canal of Aragon from Tudela to Saragossa. The Aragonese, on their part, were recovering from their defeat and fortifying themselves in their capital. All these delays on both sides served thus to lead to a memorable siege.

Serious events, not less worthy of record than those which have been already related, had occurred in Catalonia. Since the retreat of Joseph upon the Ebro, general Duhesme, who, in the early part of his establishment at Barcelona, made continual sorties, sometimes forward towards the Llobregat, sometimes backward towards Girona—general Duhesme found himself blockaded in Barcelona, and incapable of stirring beyond the gates. Lechi's and Chabran's two divisions, extremely reduced by war and fatigues, numbered scarcely 8000 infantry, and, including artillery and cavalry, hardly amounted to 9500 men. All the efforts made to provision Barcelona by sea had failed, the English occupying the bay of Roses, the citadel of which was defended by 3000 Spanish regular troops. General Duhesme, therefore, saw that he was liable to be soon destitute of provisions, either for himself or for the numerous population of that capital. It was for this reason that Napoleon had so often urged marshal St. Cyr to hasten his operations, and to march briskly to the relief of Barcelona.

For traversing the whole of Catalonia, in insurrection, and occupied by numerous corps of troops, general St. Cyr had, besides general Reille's division, about 7000 strong, Souham's French division, comprehending 6000, Pinot's Italian division of 5000, Chabot's Neapolitan division of 3000, 1000 artillerymen, and 2000 horse, forming a total of 23 or 24 thousand combatants. Once united with Duhesme, if he should succeed in raising the blockade, he should have from 34 to 36 thousand men to reduce this important province, the most difficult to conquer of any in the Peninsula, as well on account of its surface studded with obstacles, as for its very bold, very restless inhabitants, dreading for the sake of their industry too close a connexion with the French empire.

The Spanish army which defended that province, and of which it was not possible to form any but an approximative estimate, amounted to about 40,000 men. It was composed of troops of the line, drawn from the Balearic islands, and conveyed to Catalonia in English ships; troops of the line from Portugal, likewise transported by the English navy to Catalonia; a division from Grenada, under general Reding; a division of Aragonese, under the marquis de Lassan, brother of Palafox; lastly, the regular troops of the province. It had for its commander-in-chief Don Juan de Vives, who had formerly served against France during the war of the Revolution, and boasted much of successes obtained in it. It was seconded by volunteers, called Miquelets, formed into battalions, denominated *tercios*, and performing the duty of light troops. Active, brave, excellent marksmen, these volunteers, running about on the flanks of the Spanish army, rendered it numerous services. To these forces must be added the *somathènes*, a sort of militia composed of all the inhabitants, who, according to ancient custom, rose *en masse* at the first sound of their bells, and had to defend the villages and towns, and to occupy and dispute the principal passes. These troops of the line, these Miquelets, these *somathènes*, aided in their resistance by a country covered with asperities and destitute of alimentary substances, presented more serious difficulties than were to be met with in the other provinces. It should be added that Catalonia was studded with fortresses, which commanded all the communications by land and sea, such as Figueras, which we possessed, Roses, Girona, Hostalrich, and Tarragona, which we did not possess.

Its distance and its configuration separated this province from the rest of Spain, and rendered it a distinct theatre of war. For this reason, Napoleon had selected for conquering it a general, excellent when alone, dangerous when he had neighbours, whom he always seconded ill, so meanly jealous as to imagine that Napoleon, envious of his glory, had sent him to Catalonia in order to ruin him: but, setting aside this eccentricity, an able general, profound in his combinations, and the first officer of his time for methodical war, Napoleon, be it understood, being above comparison with any of the generals of the age.

The means collected in Catalonia, as elsewhere, smacked of the precipitation with which the preparations for this war had been made. The *matériel* of the army was insufficient; shoes and clothing were wholly wanting. Reille's division was a medley of all corps and all nations, an inconvenience compensated, it is true, by the valour of its commander. Souham's division, though formed of old skeletons, swarmed with conscripts. The Italian division of Pino was composed of Italians, seasoned and trained in the school of the Grand Army. The means of transport, indispensable in a country where no resource is to be found on the ground itself, were absolutely null. There was nothing there that was not seen in the Castilles, where Napoleon himself commanded. General St. Cyr, nevertheless, imagined that all this was maliciously done for him, and that Napoleon, on the summit of his glory, meant to measure his successes, and, in particular, to render them less rapid than his own.*

The instructions of general St. Cyr left him *carte blanche* as to the operations to be executed in Catalonia, and were imperative on one point only, the necessity of raising the blockade of Barcelona as speedily as possible. As we had Figueras, there were three places to reduce in the direction of Barcelona—Roses to the left on the coast road, Girona and Hostalrich to the right on the land road. In this mountainous country, those fortresses were so situated as not to be avoided without difficulty, if one made a point of pursuing the roads passable for artillery. Still, to stop for the purpose of undertaking three regular sieges before raising the blockade of Barcelona, was an impracticable thing. General St. Cyr determined to confine himself to one only, that of Roses, for two reasons sufficiently cogent to excuse the delay that would arise from it; the first was, that Figueras, without Roses, did not form a sufficient *point d'appui* beyond the Pyrenees, for the garrison of Roses would have incessantly annoyed Figueras, and nothing could have entered or left the latter place if the neighbour fortress were not taken; the second was that the bay of Roses was the usual shelter of the English squadrons blockading Barcelona, and that their presence prevented the revictualling of that city. General St. Cyr, being destined to establish himself there, had no inclination to be famished in the place, as general Duhesme was apprehensive of being at that moment.

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* One is ashamed, when reading the Memoirs, otherwise so remarkable, of marshal St. Cyr, relative to the campaign in Catalonia, of the meannesses which they contain, along with the soundest and most enlarged views. I have read his whole correspondence with the imperial staff, and I affirm that it completely contradicts his assertions, upon a single point, be it understood, that the Emperor had taken care to stint him in means, in order that the successes in Catalonia might not eclipse the successes in Castille. One is, indeed, grieved to see so superior a mind abase itself to such paltry conjectures. The Emperor disliked the unsociable character of marshal St. Cyr, but he did justice to his eminent qualities, and was not jealous of them. We see in his History of Cæsar that he was jealous perhaps of Cæsar or Alexander, but his jealousy descended no lower.

Notwithstanding the urgency of the staff, incessantly recommending celerity in his operations, general St. Cyr resolved to undertake the siege of Roses before he penetrated into Catalonia. He passed the frontier in the first days of November, at the very moment when, as we have seen, the principal masses of the French army began to act in Castille, at the moment when marshals Lefebvre, Victor, and Soult were engaged with Blake and the marquis of Belveder. Reille's division, placed at first at la Jonquère, moved on the 6th to Roses. Pino's division immediately followed, escorting the convoys of heavy artillery. Souham's division came third, and established itself in rear of the Fluvia, a streamlet that waters the plain of Lampourdan. This last division was directed to cover the siege of Roses against any Spanish troops which might attempt to annoy it. While our armies in Castille and Aragon enjoyed splendid weather, that of Catalonia was exposed to deluging rains, which, for several days, inundated the country, and rendered every movement impossible. Our soldiers endured these hardships with patience. They had for their commander a general who, in the ranks of the army of the Rhine, had learned to endure everything, and to require all around him to do the same without murmuring.

It was impossible to move before the 12th of November. The rain having ceased, the troops approached Roses, and cooped up the garrison within the walls. It consisted of nearly 3000 men, commanded by a good officer, and provided with skilful engineers, of whom, for the rest, there was never any want in Spain. The fortress of Roses is a pentagon, situated between the sea and a sandy beach, in the centre of a deep spacious bay, screened from dangerous winds. At the entrance of this bay is a fort called Fort du Bouton, erected on a height, and protecting by its cannon the greater part of the road. Mazuchelli's division sent two battalions to commence the attack of this fort. There, as before the principal fortress, it was necessary to drive back within the walls the garrison supported by the fire of the English squadron, consisting of six sail of the line and several small vessels.

After various sorties, vigorously repulsed, the trenches were opened before Roses, in the night between the 18th and 19th of November, on two opposite fronts, to the east and west, so as to cut off by the fire of the trenches the communication with the sea. In a few days a battery, established near the shore, rendered the road so dangerous for the English, that they were obliged to sheer off, and to leave the garrison to itself.

The little town of Roses, composed of a few houses of fishermen and tradesmen, was situated to the east, outside the fortified enclosure. It was attacked in the night between the 26th and 27th. The Spaniards, who had shown themselves so weak in the field, suddenly displayed extreme energy behind their walls, defended themselves vigorously, and did not retire till they had lost 300 men, and left us 200 prisoners. This action cost us 45 men killed or wounded. From this moment the garrison ceased to have any external support.

Meanwhile, operations were pushed against Fort du Bouton. Some pieces of heavy calibre had been hoisted by main strength up to the height, and, after dismantling the fort, the assailants had obliged the garrison to evacuate it. On the 3rd of December the third parallel was opened before Roses. On the 4th the breaching battery was prepared, and the assault only remained to be made, when the garrison, sixteen days after the trenches had been opened, consented to surrender themselves prisoners of war. The resistance had been honourable and conformable to all rules. We there took 2800 men, a great number of wounded, and a considerable *matériel* brought by the English. Thanks to this important conquest, the communications by sea with Barcelona became, if not certain, at least very practicable, and our line of operations, supported upon Figueras and Roses, was ensured at once by land and sea.

During this siege, general St. Cyr had received, either from general Duhesme or from the imperial head-quarters, pressing solicitations to direct his efforts at length upon Barcelona. He had, with his usual obstinacy, refused to do so, till Roses should be in his power; but, now that this fortress had capitulated, he had no further motive for delay. In fact, when general Duhesme, blockaded, had scarcely any provisions left, when Napoleon advanced to Madrid—(he entered it on the same day that general St. Cyr entered Roses)—it became urgent to move the left of the French armies to the same height as their right, and thus to turn Saragossa on both sides. Roses being taken, general St. Cyr hesitated no longer to march for Barcelona.

He had sent into Roussillon his cavalry, which he could not feed in the Lampourdan. He ordered it back, to take it with him to Barcelona. His artillery, though extremely desirable in the rencounters which he was likely to have with the Spanish army, was a very embarrassing incumbrance to drag along through Catalonia, especially as he was obliged to avoid the high road, which was closed by the fortresses of Girona and Hostalrich, not yet in our possession. General St. Cyr adopted an extremely bold course: this was to leave his artillery at Figueras, leading by hand the horses destined to draw it. General Duhesme had written to him from Barcelona that he had an immense *matériel* in the arsenal of that place, and that, in case horses were brought, everything requisite to form a complete train of artillery would be found. In consequence, he decided to take with him only horses, mules, infantry, and not one vehicle. He gave to each soldier four days' provisions and fifty cartridges, placed some biscuit and some more cartridges upon mules, and prepared to set out thus lightly equipped. If, in this daring march which he was about to undertake, he should meet with the Spanish army, he was determined to break through it with the bayonet; for the real victory for him was to reach Barcelona, where he was expected by a French army, abundantly furnished with the necessary *matériel*, and which, joined to his own, would place him above all events.

All being thus regulated, he advanced towards the Fluvia on the 9th of December, leaving upon his rear Reille's division, which was indispensable at Roses and Figueras for preserving our base of operations, and went forward with 15,000 foot, 1500 horse, 1000 artillerymen, that is to say, with 17 or 18 thousand men. A strong advanced guard, composed of an Aragonese corps under the marquis de Lassan, and of a detachment of the army of Vives under general Alvarez, had already made several attempts upon Souham's division, which were victoriously repulsed. General St. Cyr drove back this advanced guard from the banks of the Fluvia to those of the Ter, and obliged it to retreat precipitately. Two routes, both very difficult to traverse, presented themselves to him. The land-route, on the right, offered him Girona and Hostalrich, under the cannon of which it was extremely dangerous, if not impossible, to pass. The sea-route, which presented itself on the left, offered him the danger of the English shipping, cannonading all the passes seen from the sea, and that of the Miquelets, adding their musketry to the artillery of the English. He resolved to follow alternately each of these routes, by means of cross-roads communicating with both. For the moment, he sought to persuade the Spaniards that he was marching for Girona, with the intention of besieging that place, after taking Roses. Accordingly, on the 11th, he advanced in the direction of Girona, and when he saw the Spanish advanced guard, marching thither in all haste, he stole off to the left, and proceeded towards La Bisbal, a road which would lead him to Palamos, along the sea-coast. He arrived on the evening of the 11th at La Bisbal; left it on the 12th for Palamos, after meeting at the pass of Calonja with Miquelets and *somathènes*, who kept up a fire upon his wings. The soldier, under able direction, encouraged by the successes which he had already obtained, having no incumbrance to detain him, was alert though heavily laden, well disposed, and quite prepared to undertake anything.

If, however, the Spaniards had been at all accustomed to war, they would have chosen the moment when general St. Cyr was separated from Reille's division, without having yet joined Duhesme's corps, and when he hazarded himself, without artillery, against an enemy who had abundance of it, to stop him with the whole of their forces. It is true that no plan is good when one has troops not capable of keeping in line; it is true also that the

Spanish officers were ignorant of the particulars of general St. Cyr's march, and that none of them had sufficient intelligence to guess them. Still it is incontestable that the moment in which this general was destined to be weakest was that when he moved from the Pyrenees, without having yet touched at Barcelona, and that, if they wished to meet him on any occasion, this was the very occasion they should have chosen for uniting *en masse*, and waiting for him at all the passes leading to Barcelona. But the insurgents had detached about 10,000 men to the Fluvia, and the rest were employed in blockading Duhesme in Barcelona. General Claros, who commanded at Girona, on seeing general St. Cyr debouch upon that place, had contented himself with dispatching a courier to Don Juan de Vives.

General St. Cyr, firm in the accomplishment of his design, set out on the morning of the 12th from Palamos, had to sustain the fire of some English gun-boats which did little mischief, and directed his course for Vidreras, regaining, this time, the main land-road, because he supposed that the Spaniards, misled by the direction which he had taken from La Bisbal to Palamos, would throw themselves *en masse* towards the sea. It actually happened as he had foreseen. A corps sent from Barcelona, under Milans, proceeded by Mataro along the coast; some detachments from Hostalrich, Miquelets, and *somathènes*, hastened towards the coast to defend, with the English, the principal passes, where they expected to meet with the French.

General St. Cyr, taking cross-roads, proceeded from Palamos for Vidreras, and saw the troops of Lassan and Alvarez, whom he had misled by inducing them to throw themselves upon Girona, obliged to follow him at a distance, instead of barring the way against him, and encamping on his rear so far off as to render any attack impossible. They were not in sufficient force to cope with 17 or 18 thousand French, under a skilful and energetic leader.

General St. Cyr, having behind him the 10,000 men of Alvarez and Lassan, whom he at first had before him, having moreover upon his left the different detachments guarding the coast, advanced like a wild boar beset by hunters. The road which he had taken led direct to Hostalrich, and under the cannon of that place. Thanks to the lightness of his equipment, he was enabled to proceed over the heights around Hostalrich, without following the beaten track, got off with a few balls, which did him no more mischief than those of the English gun-boats, halted on the 14th in the environs, and marched the next day, the 15th, for Barcelona, having avoided the two fortresses which closed the land-route, and having now nothing to fear upon that route but the main army of Don Juan de Vives itself. In the afternoon of the 15th he actually fell in with a detachment of that army, the one which had come from Barcelona under the command of Milans, and fell in with it at the entrance of the defile of Trenta-Passos. He hastened to force this defile, unwilling to have it to pass in the face of the Spanish army, which he expected to find every moment in his road, for he was but two days' march from Barcelona.

Don Juan de Vives, apprised by the courier who had been sent to him, had at length relinquished the blockade of Barcelona, to oppose the march of general St. Cyr. He had dispatched Milans before him with four or five thousand men, and brought with him 15,000, of whom the division of Grenada, under general Reding, formed a part. The rest of the grand army of Catalonia was in the environs of Barcelona, on the Llobregat.

General Don Juan de Vives took a position at Cardedeu, on the wooded heights over which runs the high road to Barcelona. He was there with the 15,000 men brought from his camp, and was waiting for Milans to rejoin him on his right with 5000. A host of Miquelets covered the environs. It was this regular force, posted in an excellent position, accompanied by a numerous artillery, and seconded by bold riflemen, that the French general had to overthrow, in order to open for himself the road to Barcelona.

His resolution was soon taken. By sounding he would merely have encouraged the Spaniards and discouraged the French, by enlightening both respecting their situation, for the one had cannon, the other nothing but muskets; he would merely have given time to Claros, to Alvarez, to Lassan, to overtake and attack him in rear, while Vives was attacking him in front. He therefore sent orders to Pino's division, which marched first, not to deploy, not to fire, for it would be wasting time and ammunition, of neither of which they had any to throw away; to climb head foremost the steep route to Cardedeu, and to clear themselves a way with the bayonet. Unluckily, before the orders of the general-in-chief were delivered and comprehended, Mazuchelli's brigade, of Pino's division, had deployed on the left of the Barcelona road, under the fire of Reding's division, the best of the Spanish army, and it suffered severely. General St. Cyr immediately marched Souham's French division, in close column, to the extreme left of that brigade, ordering it to rush, without deploying, upon the enemy with the bayonet. He prescribed a similar movement right ahead of him, and upon the high road, to Fontana's brigade, the second of Pino's, and directed it, in close column, upon the centre of the Spaniards. He sent two battalions to the right of this same road, to threaten the extremity of the Spanish line. His cavalry, ready to charge wherever the ground would permit, advanced in the intervals between the columns. These orders, executed with precision and extraordinary vigour, were followed by the most speedy and complete result. Souham's column, on the extreme left of our line, and Fontana's brigade, at the centre, attacked the Spanish line with such resolution that they broke and overthrew it in the twinkling of an eye, thus disengaging on its two wings Mazuchelli's brigade unadvisedly deployed. The Italian dragoons and the 24th French dragoons, dashing off at a gallop, charged the Spaniards, already driven back, and threw them into frightful disorder. The enemy fled in all directions, leaving on the field of battle 600 dead, 800 wounded, 1200 prisoners, all his artillery, not excepting a single cannon, and a quantity of stores, which we were in great need of. Generals Vives and Reding, hurried along in the rout, escaped by a miracle, the one towards the sea, where he embarked to rejoin his camp on the Llobregat, the other towards the Barcelona road, which he succeeded in reaching, thanks to the swiftness of his horse. This victory, won in less than an hour, gained us, besides all that we wanted, the road to Barcelona and an irresistible ascendency over the enemy. Lassan, Alvarez, Claros, arrived towards evening upon our rear, but too late to take part in the action. The battle being over, they had nothing to do but to return to Girona, or to proceed through by-ways to the camp on the Llobregat.

There was but one march more to make in order to reach Barcelona. It was of importance to arrive there for the purpose of procuring provisions, for the biscuit of our soldiers was entirely consumed. General St. Cyr, placing on the artillery and cavalry horses such of the wounded as could be removed, and being compelled to leave to the discretion of the *somathènes* those who were incapable of bearing the journey, marched for Barcelona, where he arrived on the 17th, to the astonishment of the Spaniards and the joy of Duhesme's soldiers, whom the sight of a French army, coming to raise the blockade, filled with the greatest delight. On every side they embraced one another with transport, and promised themselves the happiest results from this junction.

Besides the cannon taken at Cardedeu, general St. Cyr found at Barcelona a very fine and numerous artillery, and quite ready for the horses which he brought with him to be harnessed to it. He had lost very few men, and numbered 17,000 fit for service. General Duhesme, on his part, still had, exclusively of sick and wounded, 9000 fit for active service. There was, therefore, a real effective of 26,000 men, equal in number and far superior in quality to all that the Spaniards could oppose to them. Their concentration was the glorious result of a march as bold as it was skilfully conducted.

Though Barcelona was not so destitute of alimentary resources as had been represented by general Duhesme, who had exaggerated his distress in order to excite the zeal of those who were charged to raise the blockade, yet it behoved the French not to shut themselves up there long, if they meant to live. General St. Cyr, in fact, was resolved to follow up his advantages, to seek the Spanish army everywhere, and to destroy it entirely, and then to besiege the fortresses of the province one after another. He allowed his soldiers to rest on the 18th and 19th of December; on the 20th he left Barcelona and proceeded for the Llobregat.

In allowing his soldiers time to rest and to rally, he was not sorry to allow the Spaniards also time to concentrate themselves in the camp which they had long before prepared on the Llobregat, a few leagues from Barcelona. If it is judicious to endeavour to divide a formidable enemy, it is judicious, on the contrary, to strive to find in a mass an enemy far more expert at running away than at fighting, in order to destroy him by a single blow. General St. Cyr marched with his *corps d'armée*, and Chabran's division, one of Duhesme's. To the other, Lechi's division, he assigned the guarding of Barcelona. With 20,000 men he had a force sufficient to overturn whatever he should meet with on his way. On the evening of the 20th he arrived before the Llobregat, the course of which he had followed from Molins-del-Rey to San Feliu. The Spaniards were there, to the number of 30 and some thousand men, with a powerful artillery, established on wooded heights, and covered by the Llobregat, which was fordable only at a few points. The bridge of Molins-del-Rey had been strongly defended by means of works very difficult of access. With good troops, the enemy might have depended upon such a position and have deemed himself safe.

General St. Cyr set about making himself master of it with that art which rendered him one of the first tacticians of his age. On the morning of the 21st of December he posted Chabran's division before Molins-del-Rey, enjoining him to prepare a battery there, as if it was intended to act seriously at that point, and to neglect nothing to persuade the Spaniards that this was the real point of attack. He then directed him, when they should see that the other columns had crossed the Llobregat lower down, to fall impetuously upon the bridge, to carry it, and to place himself upon the Valence road, which led precisely upon the rear of the enemy. While he was making these dispositions with Chabran's division, he moved Pino's division lower down to the left, with orders to cross the Llobregat at the ford of Lors, and still lower down Souham's division, with orders to cross it at the ford of St. John Despi. Having passed the Llobregat, these two divisions were to turn the position of the Spaniards, to attack it vigorously, and to carry it. This movement would throw the Spaniards upon Chabran's division, if it had followed his instructions. In that case, but a very small number could escape.

The dispositions of general St. Cyr were punctually executed, in part at least. General Chabran made very cleverly the feigned attack prescribed on Molins-del-Rey. Pino's and Souham's divisions likewise duly crossed the Llobregat at the two points specified, which brought them to the foot of the enemy's positions in such a manner as to turn them. On arriving before these positions, they climbed them steadily under a well-directed fire, which proved that the Spaniards had already gained some instruction. At the moment when we were coming up to them, their second line, passing in column through the intervals, and performing this manœuvre with a certain precision, seemed to manifest an intention to stop us. But it broke at the sight of our bayonets; and the Spanish reserves, not waiting till it had evacuated the ground, fired and did as much harm to it as to ourselves. The whole mass then fled in disorder, leaving behind its artillery and its stores, and flinging away muskets and knapsacks. If, at this moment, general Chabran, following up a feigned attack by a serious attack, as he had received orders to do, had carried Molins-del-Rey in time, and debouched upon the rear of the Spaniards, not one of them would have escaped. General Chabran, it is true, took the position, but too late for his presence on the Valence road to have all the utility desired. For the Spaniards this battle was, nevertheless, a frightful rout, which put into our hands fifty pieces of cannon, an immense quantity of muskets thrown away in the flight, and twelve or fifteen hundred prisoners picked up by the cavalry. In that number was the Spanish general Caldagnes. The dispersion of the enemy was complete, as at Tudela and Espinosa.

Of the whole army of general Vives, not more than 1500 men rallied at Tarragona, without arms, and deeply dispirited. From that moment general St. Cyr was master of the field in Catalonia, and no obstacle prevented him from traversing it in all directions, to undertake any sieges that he should think fit to engage in. Barcelona was submissive, being incapable of attempting anything more.

A fortress reduced by means of a regular siege, one of the boldest and most difficult marches through a country covered with enemies, two battles gained, a decisive ascendency acquired for our arms—such were the results obtained by the army of general St. Cyr between the 6th of November and the 21st of December, which made ample amends for some delays for which this able general was reproached. One might have acted more speedily, not more effectively.

Thus, in the second half of December, the French were free in their movements in Catalonia, engaged in Aragon in preparing for the siege of Saragossa, masters of the Asturias and of Old Castille through marshal Soult, in possession of Madrid and of New Castille by the bulk of the French army, and were sending patroles of cavalry through La Mancha to the Sierra Morena. They had but a step to take to possess themselves of the south of the Peninsula; but Napoleon resolved first to have at hand the corps which he expected, either to take the English in rear, if they ventured towards the north of Spain, or to penetrate into the south if they retired into Portugal—a possible alternative, and which there was reason to expect, according to the contradictory accounts furnished by deserters and prisoners.

But, at the very moment when the fortunate events which we have been recording were taking place in Catalonia, the corps on march had arrived, and more circumstantial reports threw a light upon the situation. Marshal Ney had entered Madrid with Marchand's and Lagrange's divisions (the latter having become Maurice Mathieu's, in consequence of the wound of general Lagrange). Dessoles' division, having stayed behind for some days to pacify the province of Guadalaxara, had left there the 55th of the line, with artillery and a detachment of dragoons, and itself entered Madrid after the sixth corps. Marshal Lefebvre, rejoined, as we have said, by Valence's Polish division, had descended by the Guadarrama upon the Escurial, and been sent to Talavera, preceded by Lasalle's light cavalry, and by Milhaud's dragoons. Napoleon, therefore, had at Madrid the corps of Victor, Ney, and Lefebvre, the imperial guard, and Latour-Maubourg's, Lahoussaye's, and Milhaud's divisions of dragoons, comprehending about 75,000 men capable of marching immediately. He had consequently a force sufficient for striking a decisive blow wherever he pleased. Behind there were coming Delaborde's division, which had already reached Burgos, Loison's division, which was following it, Lorge's dragoons, placed beyond Burgos, Millet's dragoons on this side of it, and lastly marshal Soult, repassing from the Asturias into the kingdom of Leon, with Merle's and Mermet's divisions, and a detachment of cavalry. Napoleon expected every moment to receive precise information concerning the English, before he took a definitive resolution in regard to them.

General Moore, quite as much embarrassed as himself to learn the truth in a country where the people told the French nothing, out of hatred, and the English very little more, from dislike of foreigners, even when these foreigners were auxiliaries—general Moore, after long hesitations, had at length adopted a plan of campaign. Alarmed at his situation amidst French armies, disgusted with his allies, whom he had believed to be ardent, devoted, eager to second him, and whom he had found dispirited, dismayed, supplying nothing but for money, he wished to retire, and would, in fact, have retired, if the entreaties of the central Junta, which had taken refuge at Seville, had not prevented him, and, above all, if the English minister, Mr. Frere, had not backed the entreaties of the Junta by imperative admonitions.* The prudent general Moore, who, as we have seen, had abandoned his line of communication with Portugal to create a new one for himself upon Gallicia, and had marched towards the Duero, in order to join sir David Baird there, had just added something to this resolution: that was to proceed to Valladolid, which would give him still more the appearance of threatening the communications of the French, and of serving in some measure the cause of the Spaniards without compromising either his junction with sir David Baird or his retreat upon Coruña. This resolution once taken, the English general had marched from Salamanca for Valladolid, directing sir David Baird to join him by Benavente. But scarcely had he commenced this movement, when, the Spaniards having murdered a French officer who was carrying orders from the Emperor to marshal Soult, and sold his dispatches to the English cavalry for a few louis, he learned that marshal Soult was passing from the Asturias into the kingdom of Leon; that he would there be inferior in force to the British army; for it was said in the intercepted dispatches that the marshal had at that moment but two divisions of infantry, which could not amount, with the cavalry, to more than 15,000 men, while the English would have 29 or 30 thousand, after the junction of the principal corps with sir David Baird. General Moore, in this situation, having rather to desire than to avoid an action, nevertheless resolved, in accelerating his junction with sir David Baird, to effect it further in rear than he had at first designed, and, instead of forming it towards Valladolid, to bring it about by Toro upon Benavente. On the 20th of December they joined at Mayorga, having about 29,000 men, of whom 24,000 were infantry, 3000 cavalry, 2000 artillery, and 30 pieces of cannon, an excellent army, moreover, which had already become accustomed in Portugal to encounter the French. General Moore hastened to write to the marquis of La Romana, who had just left Leon with the relics of Blake's army to seek refuge in Gallicia, not to leave him alone in presence of the French, whom he should soon have to meet. The marquis of La Romana, who had by this time become the Spanish generalissimo and special commander of the armies of Old Castille, Leon, Asturias, and Gallicia, had rallied about 20,000 men in a state of absolute destitution, incapable of being brought before an enemy, and thinking so themselves, for they had no longer any wish to meet the French. For this reason the marquis of La Romana was leading them by Leon and Astorga into Gallicia, where he hoped to reorganise them under the protection of the mountains, which winter rendered more secure. General Moore, less regretting his support than alarmed to see the roads of Gallicia encumbered, they being now the only line of retreat of the English army, prevailed upon him by dint of entreaties to return to Leon. The marquis of La Romana actually led back thither nearly 10,000 men, the least destitute, the least disorganised of that army of Blake's, from which the Spaniards had promised themselves such wonders. The Spanish general even sent an advanced guard of five or six thousand men to Mansilla, on the river Esla.

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* The dispatches of sir John Moore, published by his family, cannot leave any doubt on all these points.

General Moore, having joined his lieutenant, sir David Baird, and numbering 29,000 men, good troops, with about 10,000 Spaniards, useful at least as light troops, began to advance with stealthy step towards marshal Soult, at the same time wishing and fearing to meet with him; wishing it when he thought of the small number of the marshal's soldiers, fearing it when he thought of the mass of the French spread over Spain, and of the rapidity with which Napoleon knew how to move them. On the 21st he marched for Sahagun, where general Paget took some men from a detachment of Lorge's dragoons.

It was on the 19th of December that Napoleon learned with certainty, from deserters of general Dupont's, that the English army, 15 or 20 thousand strong, said these deserters, had left Salamanca to proceed to Valladolid. Reports of the cavalry informed him at the same time of the taking of some English in advance of Segovia, who probably belonged to the corps which, under general Hope, had been obliged to make so many circuits for the purpose of rejoining general Moore at Salamanca. Napoleon knew, moreover, with certainty, that another corps had come by Coruña to Astorga. He supposed, therefore, that the English army might amount to 30,000 men, and he had at first some difficulty to account for its movements; for, till then, he had always believed it to be more disposed to seek refuge in Portugal than to run upon the rear of the French. But he soon guessed the truth, in concluding from its march to the north that it intended to change its line of retreat, and to place it on the route to Coruña. His resolution was instantly taken with that promptness of decision and that unerring judgment which never forsook him.

So far from being uneasy at finding the English upon his line of operations, he wished to see them venture still further than they had done, that he might throw himself upon their rear. He enjoined marshal Soult, and all the corps which were on march for Burgos, or beyond it, such as Delaborde's division of Junot's corps and Lorge's dragoons, to concentrate themselves between Carrion and Palencia, and to pass the time not in marching forward, but in railying; for he was more desirous to attract the English than to repel them. As for himself, by a movement in rear, briskly executed, he designed to pass the Guadarrama between the Escurial and Segovia, that is to say, to the right of Madrid, and to throw himself upon the flank of the English, if luckily they should venture far enough into Old Castille to meet marshal Soult. If, as it was reported, they had appeared at Valladolid, it would be possible, by advancing rapidly by the Escurial upon Villacastin, Arevalo, and Tordesillas, to envelop them, and to take them to the last man. But it would be necessary to proceed in the utmost haste in that direction, and to take advantage of the weather, which was splendid around Madrid, for executing that decisive march.

Napoleon, informed on the 19th of December, ordered marshal Ney to set himself in march on the 20th, with two divisions, which, besides the advantage of having that marshal at their head, were among the best of the Grand Army. Marshal Ney was to be joined on his route by Lahoussaye's dragoons, who were to proceed to him by Avila. Dessoles' and Lapisse's divisions, the latter borrowed from marshal Victor's corps, were to follow as speedily as their then position around Madrid permitted. In case the intelligence, still uncertain, by which this considerable movement had been decided upon, should be confirmed, the Emperor designed to set out, with the whole of the imperial guard, foot and horse, and an immense reserve of artillery, to join marshal Ney, and to crush the English if he could come at them. He would thus take with him about 40,000 men, and marshal Soult could collect about 20,000. These would be more than were required to overwhelm the English and to take them all prisoners with good manœuvring.

Napoleon consigned to marshal Victor the duty of guarding Madrid and Aranjuez with Ruffin's and Villatte's divisions, and Leval's German division, which marshal Lefebvre had not taken with him to Talavera. He joined with him, moreover, Latour-

Maubourg's division of dragoons, the most numerous in the army. As for marshal Lefebvre, who had at Talavera Sebastiani's fine French division, a good Polish division, Lasalle's cavalry and Milhaud's dragoons, that is to say 10,000 infantry and 4000 excellent horse, he ordered him to leave Talavera, where he had had leisure to rest, to move expeditiously to the bridge of Almaraz across the Tagus, to take that bridge from the army of Estremadura, to drive it beyond Truxillo, and thus to get rid of it for a long time, and then to steal away by his right to proceed by Placencia for the Ciudad-Rodrigo road. It was possible, in fact, that if the English, beaten but not enveloped, should take for their retreat the road to Portugal, they might be cut off from it by Ciudad-Rodrigo. There were, therefore, many chances of barring their return to the sea. As for the old army of Castaños, which had retired to Cuença, marshal Victor, with Ruffin's and Villatte's French divisions, Leval's German division, and Lahoussaye's dragoons, was strong enough to prevent any attempt, if perchance it should think of making one. At any rate, instructions were left that marshal Lefebvre, on the first signal, should make a retrograde movement towards Arunjuez and Madrid.

Napoleon having thus provided against all contingencies, and confirmed himself more and more in the opinion that he had formed respecting the march adopted by the English, set out himself on the 22nd, after sending off the guard after Dessoles' and Lapisse's divisions. He repeated the order to his brother to remain at the royal house of the Pardo, thinking that it was not yet time to restore him to the inhabitants of Madrid, and to substitute the civil government for the military government.

Leaving Chamartin on the morning of the 22nd, he passed rapidly through the Escurial, and arrived at the foot of the Guadarrama, when the infantry of his guard was beginning to ascend it. The weather, which till then had been superb, had suddenly become terrible, at the very moment when forced marches were to be performed. Thus Fortune had already changed for Napoleon; for, after sending him the sun of Austerlitz, she now sent him the hurricane of the Guadarrama, on an occasion when it behoved him not to lose a moment in coming at the English. Was it then decreed that, always successful against coalesced Europe, we should not once be so against implacable England? Napoleon, seeing the infantry of his guard accumulating at the entrance of the gorge, in which the gun-carriages also were crowded together, spurred his horse into a gallop and gained the head of the column, which he found detained by the hurricane. The peasants declared that it was impossible to pass without being exposed to the greatest dangers. This, however, was not sufficient to stop the conqueror of the Alps. He made the chasseurs of his guard dismount, and ordered them to advance first in close column, conducted by guides. These bold fellows, marching at the head of the army, and trampling down the snow with their own feet and those of their horses, formed a beaten track for the troops who followed. Napoleon himself climbed the mountain on foot, amidst the chasseurs of his guard, merely leaning, when he felt fatigued, upon the arm of general Savary. The cold, which was as severe as at Eylau, did not prevent him from crossing the Guadarrama with his guard. His intention was to go on to Villacastin, but he was obliged to pass the night in the little village of Espinar, where he lodged in a miserable post-house, like many more in Spain. On the mules, laden with his baggage, had been brought wherewithal to serve him for a supper, which he shared with his officers, cheerfully conversing with them on that series of extraordinary adventures which had commenced at the school of Brienne, to end he knew not where; and sometimes complaining of his generals of cavalry, who had been beating the country between Valladolid, Segovia, and Salamanca, for several weeks, without informing him in time of the proximity of the English army. It was left for deserters from Dupont's corps, led by accident, to acquaint him with a fact so important to his ulterior operations.

Next day, the 23rd, the Emperor proceeded with his guard to Villacastin. But, having crossed the mountain, snow was succeeded by rain, and frozen ground by frightful quagmires. The troops sank in the inundated grounds of Old Castille as they had done two years before in the soil of Poland. The infantry advanced with difficulty; the artillery could not stir. On the following day, the 24th, they could not proceed further than Arevalo. Marshal Ney, who, with two divisions of infantry and Lahoussaye's dragoons, formed the head of the column, though he was two days in advance, had not got beyond Tordesillas.

The Emperor, weary of waiting, resolved to go himself to the advanced guard in order to direct the movements of his various corps, and left the imperial guard, and Dessoles' and Lapisse's divisions, which he had brought with him, for the purpose of repairing to the advanced posts. Arriving on the 26th at Tordesillas, at the head of his chasseurs, he received a dispatch from marshal Soult, brought to him from Carrion in twelve hours. Marshal Soult, after having left the Asturias, and proceeded from Potes to Saldana, was that same day at Carrion, having, on his left, Delaborde's division at Paredes, and Lorge's dragoons at Frechilla. The presence of the English, between Sahagun and Villalon, one march from the French troops, had been signified to him. Since his junction with generals Delaborde and Lorge, he had 20,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry. He was able, therefore, to defend himself, without, however, having the means of overwhelming the English, who were before him to the number of 29 or 30 thousand.

This dispatch filled Napoleon with hope and anxiety. If the English, he replied to the marshal, remain for a day longer in that position, they are undone, for I shall be upon their flank. On that same day marshal Ney actually entered Medina de Rio-Seco, and marched upon Valderas and Benavente. Napoleon ordered marshal Soult to pursue the English with the sword at their loins;

if they retreated; but, if they attacked him, to beat a retreat of one march, *for the further they ventured*, he said, *the better it would be.*

Unluckily, Fortune, which had so often been kind to Napoleon, would not grant him the satisfaction of taking an English army entire, though he had deserved this success by the skill and boldness of his operations. General Moore, having arrived on the 23rd at Sahagun, and making preparations for another march, to meet the marshal, whom he hoped to surprise in a state of great numerical inferiority, had picked up a double piece of information. On the one hand, he had learned that forage, in considerable quantity, was provided for the French cavalry at Palencia; on the other, the marquis of La Romana had received and communicated to him intelligence that strong columns were proceeding towards the Guadarrama, evidently for the purpose of crossing from south to north, from New into Old Castille. On this twofold information, received in the evening of the 23rd, general Moore had countermanded the movement ordered upon Carrion, and resolved to wait before he ventured further. On the next day, the rumour of the approach of numerous French troops having increased, he became apprehensive of some great manœuvre on the part of Napoleon, and determined to commence his retreat immediately. He had, in fact, begun it in the evening of the 24th for the infantry, and had continued it on the next day, the 25th, for the cavalry and the rear-guard. Sir David Baird had retired upon the Esla by the ferry of Valencia; and the main body of the army likewise upon the Esla, by the bridge of Castro-Gonzalo. Both these points of passage led to Benavente. General Moore had, at the same time, entreated the marquis of La Romana to guard well the bridge of Mansilla, on the same river, that the French might not be able to turn it; which was equivalent to asking him to sacrifice himself for the safety of the English army. On decamping, general Moore took care to write to the Spanish government at Seville, to the English government in London, that, if he retreated, it was after having executed an important manœuvre and rendered a great service to the Spanish cause; for, by drawing Napoleon to the north, he had disengaged the south, and given time to the forces of the southern provinces to organise themselves and to arrive in line.

This presumptuous manner of representing events, very unusual with general Moore, was suggested to him by the desire to colour the sorry campaign which he had been doomed to make. At bottom, he had never thought, when once arrived on the theatre of operations, and learned the value of the Spanish armies, of anything but falling back upon Portugal, and then upon Gallicia. His movement to the north, given out for an important manœuvre, undertaken for the benefit of the Spaniards, had therefore no other object but to change his line of retreat, and to remove it from Oporto to Coruña. For the rest, he was at Benavente on the 26th, escaped from the net in which Napoleon had well-nigh caught him, since, on the one hand, marshal Soult was on that same day only at Carrion, and, on the other, marshal Ney was only at Medina de Rio-Seco. The stragglers, the baggage, and the last corps of cavalry, having in the evening and on the morning of the 27th passed, the bridge, a creation of the old dynasty, of the time when royalty, counselled by wise ministers, executed noble works in Spain, was blown up. It was a pity, and a cause of great displeasure to the Spaniards.

Impatient to come at the English, Napoleon, hastening to the advanced guard, and with his chasseurs, could nevertheless not be at Valderas before the 28th, and at the approaches to Benavente before the 29th. General Moore, conducting a solid but slow army, which could not fight till it had eaten heartily, and which could not eat but upon condition of carrying a great quantity of baggage along with it, had lost a day at Benavente in making all the *matériel* which embarrassed his march file away before his face. On the 29th he set out with a rear-guard of light troops and cavalry, when the chasseurs of the imperial guard rushed from Valderas, having at their head the impetuous Lefebvre-Desnoettes, who was accustomed to dash upon the Spaniards without counting them, and to gallop over them, whatever might be their number. He brought with him four squadrons of chasseurs of the guard. The Esla, which runs at some distance from Benavente, and the bridge over which at Castro-Gonzalo had been destroyed, was swollen by the torrents of winter rain. After seeking a ford and finding one, Lefebvre-Desnoettes crossed the river with his squadrons, and, galloping upon the rear of the English, began to cut down some of them. But he had not seen the English cavalry, united in mass with the rear-guard, and at this moment issuing from Benavente to cover the retreat. Almost the whole of this cavalry, nearly 3000 strong, bore down upon the chasseurs of Lefebvre-Desnoettes, and enveloped them. Not disconcerted, he charged all who attempted to bar his way for recrossing the Esla, then swam over, with his men, to regain the other bank; for, having but three hundred horse, it was impossible for him to fight three thousand. Most of his men contrived to escape, but about thirty were killed or taken, and he himself, leaping the last into the river, had like to have been drowned, as his horse, struck by a ball, could no longer support him, when two Englishmen saved and took him prisoner. He was conducted as a valuable trophy to general Moore. The English general had all the courtesy natural to great nations. He received the brilliant general who commanded Napoleon's light cavalry with infinite attentions, made him take a place at his table, and presented him with a magnificent Indian sword. The main body of the English army continued its march for Astorga, whither sir David Baird had already received orders to repair.

While the English army was extricating itself by blowing up the bridges, the Spanish army of La Romana, behaving as people do when at home, had not destroyed the bridge of Mansilla, thrown over the Esla in advance of Leon, as that of Castro-Gonzalo, over the same river, is in advance of Benavente. La Romana, not less in haste to flee than the English, had, nevertheless, left a rear-guard of 3000 men at the bridge of Mansilla. This bridge was in the route of marshal Soult coming from Sahagun. On the 29th, the very day of the misadventure of general Lefebvre-Desnoettes, general Franceschi, commanding marshal Soult's light cavalry, threw himself at a gallop upon the bridge of Mansilla, which no pains had been taken to obstruct, overthrew a line of infantry which was guarding the bridge, crossed it in pursuit of the fugitives, and attacked and overturned a second line of infantry on the other bank, took its artillery, killed or wounded some hundred men, made prisoners of 1500, with a great number of guns, and then proceeded for the city of Leon, which he forced the enemy to evacuate. Thus the river Esla was passed at all points; and though the mountains of Gallicia, which you enter on leaving Astorga, presented serious and numerous obstacles, still the speed of our soldiers admitted of their overtaking the English army, if the ground did not give way under their feet. But the rain continued, and the roads, destroyed by the passage of two armies, those of La Romana and Moore, might be rendered impracticable.

Napoleon, having arrived at Benavente, unluckily had not with him the bulk of his forces; for marshal Ney, generals Lapisse and Dessoles, and the imperial guard, though they had all hastened to join him, neither followed himself nor his horse chasseurs. On the 31st of December, 1808, he was at Benavente. Marshal Soult, who had taken the Leon road, was much nearer to the enemy. Napoleon had given him orders to pursue him without intermission. But the mud was deep, and the soldiers sank up to the middle of the leg.

On the 1st of January, 1809, a year destined to be not less fertile in sanguinary scenes than the most destructive years of the century, marshal Bessières, preceding Napoleon, hastened with seven or eight thousand horse towards Astorga, while general Franceschi, preceding marshal Soult, hastened thither by the Leon road. They were there on the evening of the 1st. It is impossible to convey an idea of the disorder exhibited by the road, and in particular by the town of Astorga itself. Notwithstanding the urgent requests addressed by general Moore to the marquis of La Romana to leave the road from Astorga to Coruña intact, and to go and shut himself up in the Asturias, in order to annoy the right flank of the French, the Spanish general had paid no attention to them, and had preferred gaining the Coruña road himself, thinking Gallicia safer than the Asturias, because it was further distant, and better protected by mountains. The two armies, English and Spanish, so different in manners, spirit, and appearance, had therefore met on the Astorga road, and, obstructing one another, had encumbered it with their wrecks. There were everywhere to be seen Spaniards in rags, halting, not because they were fatigued, but because they had been touched by the swords of our horse; English, unable to march, mostly drunk; an immense number of carts, drawn by oxen, and laden with Spanish tatters or the rich *matériel* of the English. There were numerous captures to make; but what most forcibly struck our soldiers was a painful sight, that of a considerable number of fine horses, which had died of wounds on the road. The English, as soon as their horses were knocked up, stopped, fired a pistol-ball through the head, and then went forward on foot. They chose rather to kill their companion in war than to leave him for the enemy's use. We had never obtained this kind of courage from our horse-soldiers. All the dwelling-houses along the road were devastated. The English, not finding the inhabitants disposed to give them what they wanted, called them ungrateful wretches, plundered and then burned their houses, and often expired, intoxicated with Spanish wine, amidst the flames which themselves had kindled. "We ungrateful!" replied the unfortunate Spaniards. "They came to serve their own turn, and they are going without even defending us!" The Spaniards had arrived at such a point, that they almost regarded our soldiers as deliverers.

At Astorga the spectacle appeared more melancholy than anywhere else. The *matériel* abandoned by the English was immense. The number of their sick and of their stragglers had increased in proportion to the distances travelled. A firm and honourable proclamation of general Moore's, forbidding marauding, pillage, and drunkenness, had produced no result; for this army, which supports itself by discipline alone, when it loses that by fatigue and precipitation, loses all that renders it respectable. Next to the satisfaction of making it prisoner, we could not have a greater than to see it pass from so much regularity and steadiness to such disorder, despondence, misery, and misconduct.

Napoleon, closely following his advanced guard, entered Astorga himself on the following day, the 2nd of January. On the way he had been overtaken by a courier coming from France, and had stopped upon the road itself to cast his eye over the dispatches which he had brought. A great watch-fire was kindled, and he fell to reading the contents of those dispatches. They acquainted him with what he had previously never doubted, the probability of a great war with Austria for the beginning of spring. The good understanding between that power and England, disguised at first, when she had been fearful of betraying her designs, her armaments, denied and even slackened when she was afraid of a sudden return of the troops of the Grand Army to the Danube, were no longer concealed now that she conceived the more considerable and better portion of Napoleon's forces to be detained at the extremity of the Spanish peninsula. She was mistaken in supposing that the force left between the Elbe and the Rhine was not sufficient to overwhelm her; and this she was doomed to learn from new and terrible experience. But, after letting slip the opportunity when the French were engaged upon the Vistula, she would not neglect that when they were engaged upon the Tagus, and she was arming with an evidence which left no doubt of her designs. At the same time, the East was becoming overcast. It was not by means of pacific negociations that one could flatter one's self to obtain from the Turks what had been promised to the Russians. Russia, moreover, still faithful to her alliance, at the settled price of the provinces of the Danube, always admonishing Austria not to expose Europe to a fresh shock, manifested, however, less enthusiasm for the French alliance since the marvellous had disappeared, and, instead of Constantinople, the question related to Bucharest and Jassy. This latter acquisition would assuredly have been a desirable one, for, after the lapse of forty years, Russia is not yet in possession of those two capitals: but it was a mere reality (so at least she then believed), and not a prodigy. She still repeated that, if Austria had become aggressive, she should join the French to make her repent it; but the warmth of her demonstrations had lost its intensity; at any rate she would be too much occupied herself on the Lower Danube not to leave the Upper Danube exclusively to the French, and Napoleon must expect that the task of overwhelming Austria, Germany, England, would rest upon him alone, as in time past. He should, therefore, be obliged to employ January, Eebruary, and March in preparing his armies for Germany and Italy. This would be long enough for his wonderful power of organization, but not too long. He turned back, quite pensive, to Astorga. His absence of mind had been so visible as to strike those about him.

On his arrival at Astorga he changed all his plans. Be it understood, however, that he did not relinquish his intention to cause the English to be pursued with the sword at their loins, but he gave up the pursuit of them in person. He entrusted this commission to marshal Soult, who, marching upon the Leon road, was much nearer to Astorga than marshal Ney, marching by Benavente. He placed under his command Merle's and Mermet's divisions, which were there already, Delaborde's and Heudelet's divisions, which composed Junot's corps, and which had just joined him. Bonnet's division, formed of provisional regiments, had remained in the Asturias. But Merle's (formerly Mouton's) division and Mermet's division were excellent. Junot's whole corps had been formed into the two divisions of Delaborde and Heudelet, and it was well seasoned by its last campaign in Portugal. Heudelet's division was still behind, but Delaborde's had joined marshal Soult, and thus the latter had at hand three fine divisions of infantry, comprehending about 20,000 men. To these Napoleon added Lorge's and Lahoussaye's dragoons, which, with Franceschi's cavalry, numbered 4000 horse. Reinforced by Heudelet's division, marshal Soult would have 30,000 soldiers; but till then only 24,000. Marshal Ney, at the head of Marchand's and Maurice Mathieu's divisions, was to support him in case of need. Napoleon ordered marshal Soult to pursue the English to the last extremity, and not to neglect anything to prevent them from embarking.

Napoleon then sent back Dessoles' division to Madrid, to remain in that capital, and to be ready for whatever might happen. He kept Lapisse's division in Old Castille, intending that some troops should remain in that province. Lastly, he directed the imperial guard, and proceeded himself, to Benavente, from Benavente to Valladolid, to govern from that residence the affairs of Spain and of Europe.

There was, in fact, no other great manœuvre to execute in pursuit of the English. It was requisite to march rapidly, to push them roughly, and for this operation one of Napoleon's lieutenants was as fit as himself, especially if it was marshal Ney. Unluckily, this marshal was too far behind to be principally charged with the pursuit. Be this as it may, Napoleon, not deeming himself necessary at the tail of the English, thought that he should be better placed at Valladolid, because from that point he could conduct the war in Spain, and be there upon the route of the couriers from France, whereas, if he were posted at Astorga or Lugo, couriers would be obliged to make a circuit of one hundred leagues in order to come to him, and he could not, while directing the armies in Spain, have turned his attention to the organization of those of Italy and Germany. He proceeded, therefore, to Valladolid, with his guard, which he wished to keep as near to events in Germany as himself.

Having dissolved Junot's corps to reinforce that of marshal Soult, he resolved to compensate general Junot by giving him the command of the troops engaged in the siege of Saragossa, which marshal Moncey was conducting with not sufficient energy for him. He subsequently destined marshal Moncey to operate upon the kingdom of Valencia, which he was already acquainted with. Marshal Lefebvre, whom he had enjoined to drive the Spaniards from the bridge of Almaraz to Truxillo, had, it is true, taken that bridge, but also conceived the singular idea of proceeding upon Ciudad-Rodrigo before he had received any order to that effect, taking a former intimation of Napoleon's for a definitive instruction. In this movement he had suffered himself to be cut in two by the Tietar, which had overflowed its banks, and he had sent one part of his corps for Toledo, while he took the other to Avila. Napoleon, highly displeased, placed under the authority of Joseph's staff the corps of marshal Lefebvre, with which he could no longer entrust a commander so incapable, though very brave on the day of battle. This corps was divided between Madrid, Toledo, and Talavera, till, affairs in the north of Spain being terminated, attention could be paid to those of the south. After making these dispositions, Napoleon, as we have just said, removed to Valladolid, to attend there to the organization of his armies in Germany and Italy, as well as to the direction of those in Spain.

Marshal Soult had set out, with Merle's, Mermet's, and Delaborde's divisions, Franceschi's cavalry, and Lorge's and Lahoussaye's dragoons, in pursuit of general Moore. Uuluckily, the road had become almost impracticable, from the continual rains, and the passage of two armies, the one English, the other Spanish. There were met with every moment convoys of stores, arms, provisions, encamping apparatus, belonging to the English, and conducted by Spanish muleteers, who fled the moment they beheld the helmets of our dragoons. English soldiers were picked up by hundreds, worn out with fatigue or gorged with wine, who suffered themselves to be surprised in a state which rendered them incapable of making any resistance.

On the 31st of December general Moore began to enter the mountains at Manzanal, a few leagues from Astorga. On the 1st of January he was at Bembibre, where he had in vain exerted all his authority to keep his men out of the cellars and the houses before the coming of the French dragoons. He had himself left Bembibre, constantly forming the rear-guard with the cavalry and the reserve, but without being able to induce all his men to follow him, so that a good number of them fell into our hands. Our dragoons, coming up at a gallop, dashed upon a long file of English soldiers, mostly drunk, women, children, aged Spaniards forsaking their habitations without knowing where to seek an asylum, fearing their allies, who plundered them in their flight, and their enemies, who arrived famished, with the sword in their fists, and dispensed from all consideration for insurgent populations. Those who had the courage to stay congratulated themselves upon it, when they compared the humanity of our soldiers with the brutality of the English soldiers, whom no curb could check, notwithstanding the honourable efforts of their general and their officers to maintain discipline.

At Ponferrada general Moore had to choose between the Vigo and the Coruna roads, both leading to fine seaports, perfectly adapted to the embarkation of a numerous army. He preferred that of Coruna, because, in following it, three marches fewer would bring him to the point of embarkation. He had persuaded the marquis of La Romana to take the Vigo road, which passes through Orense, so as to leave that to Coruna unincumbered. He reinforced him with 3000 light troops under general Craufurd, which were to occupy the position of Vigo, supposing that it should be found necessary to fall back to that place in order to embark. He dispatched courier after courier to sir Samuel Hood, commanding the British fleet, with orders to send all the transports from Vigo to Coruna.

On the 3rd of January he marched for Villafranca. Wishing to halt there and to give all who were marching with him a little rest, he resolved to have a rear-guard fight at Pietros, in advance of Villafranca, in a very fine military position, and where one might defend one's self advantageously.

The road, after passing through a very narrow defile, descended into an open plain, passed through the village of Pietros, then rose again up to an eminence planted with vines, which general Moore had chosen for the purpose of solidly establishing there 3000 infantry, 600 horse, and a numerous artillery.

General Morte, with his fine division, and general Colbert, with his light cavalry, marched up to the first defile, the infantry foremost, to overcome any resistance that might be made. But the English were further on, at the second position, at the extremity of the plain. We passed without obstacle, and the cavalry, heading the column, dashed away at a gallop into the plain. There it found a multitude of English tirailleurs, and was obliged to wait for the infantry, which, speedily arriving, soon dispersed, on its part, as tirailleurs, for the purpose of repulsing the enemy. General Colbert, impatient to bring the troops into line, was engaged in placing himself some companies of voltigeurs, when he received a ball in his forehead, and expired, expressing touching regrets at being so soon removed, not from life, but from the glorious career that was opening before him.

General Merle, having debouched in the plain with his infantry, passed through the village of Pietros, then assailed the position of the English by means of a very strong column, which attacked it in front, while a swarm of tirailleurs, gliding between the vines, endeavoured to turn their right. After a very brisk fire, the English retired, leaving us a few dead, a few wounded, and some prisoners. This rear-guard action cost us about fifty wounded and killed, in particular general Colbert, an officer of the highest merit. Darkness did not permit us to push any further. The enemy evacuated Villafranca in the night to proceed to Lugo, which, it was said, offered a strong military position. On entering Villafranca, we found it devastated by the English, who had broken open the cellars, ravaged the houses, drunk all the wine they could, and who had skulked into all corners of the town, in spite of the repeated efforts of their officers to rally them. We took several hundred more, with a great quantity of stores and baggage.

Next day the pursuit was continued, and our men could scarcely advance so fast as the English, notwithstanding the advantage which our infantry had over them in respect to marching, on account of the state of the roads and the difficulty of forwarding artillery. Our soldiers lived upon all that the English left, after plundering and driving their unfortunate allies to despair.

Continually marching thus at the heels of the enemy, we came in sight of Lugo in the evening of the 5th of January. We had picked up by the way a quantity of artillery and a considerable treasure, which the English had thrown down the precipices. Our soldiers, not afraid to descend into the deepest ravines, filled their pockets. They saved a sum, in piastres, equivalent to about 1,800,000 francs.

In the evening of the 5th the English army appeared in order of battle in advance of Lugo. General Moore, finding himself closely pressed by the French, and expecting to have them on his hands in a few days, seeing his army dissolving from the excessive rapidity of its march, took the resolution, which it is often necessary to take when beating a retreat, to halt in a good position and offer battle to the enemy. With solid soldiers like the English soldiers, in an excellent defensive position, he had great chances of conquering. If victorious, he should repel the enemy for a long time, distinguish his retreat by a signal achievement, raise the courage of his soldiers, and he could quietly finish his march to Coruna. If vanquished, he should suffer at once all the ill that he was liable to suffer in detail from this precipitate retreat. Besides, in war, when prudence counsels, the general ought to brave defeat, as the soldier ought to brave death. It was, moreover, impossible to choose a better position than that of Lugo for the execution of such a design. The town, surrounded by walls, rose above an eminence, which, terminating in a perpendicular cliff over the bed of the Minho on one side, was bordered on the other by a small river, towards which it gradually sloped. Numerous enclosures covered that slope, and facilitated the defence of it. On this field of battle general Moore ranged in two lines the 16 or 17 thousand infantry which he had left. He placed his artillery on his front, and filled with tirailleurs the numerous enclosures which covered the accessible side of his position. He called back to him his cavalry, which had marched at the head ever since they had entered the mountainous region, and showed us about 20,000 men, firmly established in advance of Lugo. These were all who were left of the 28 or 29 thousand that he had at Sahagun. He had sent five or six thousand, some upon Vigo, others in advance, and lost about three thousand.

The French, arriving in the evening of the 5th before Lugo, scarcely discerned the enemy. They halted opposite, at St. Juan de Corbo, in a position equally strong, where they could, without losing sight of the English, await in safety the rallying of all those who had been left behind.

On the next day, the 6th, Mermet's and Delaborde's divisions, which followed Merle's division, arrived in line; but they had left behind half their effective, and, besides this mass of stragglers, their artillery and their convoys of stores. It was not in this state that they could think of attacking the English, for they were inferior in a triple point of view—in number, in material resources, and in the ground on which they would have to fight.

Every moment, however, they were rejoined by the stragglers and the convoys of artillery, and on the following day, the 7th, they were much fitter for giving battle. But before the strong position of the English, inaccesible on one side, since it was a precipice down to the Minho, and very difficult to carry on the other, on account of the numerous enclosures which covered it, marshal Soult hesitated, and resolved to wait till the next day, the 8th. On that day most of our means were collected, excepting, however, part of the artillery. But, still engrossed by the difficulties which this position presented, marshal Soult again deferred till the following day, the 9th, the execution, by his right, on the left flank of the English, of a movement of cavalry, which might shake them.

It was presuming too far upon the patience of general Moore to imagine that, having arrived on the 5th at Lugo, and having passed there the 6th, 7th, and 8th, he should stay on the 9th. General Moore, in fact, having spent the three entire days in sending off his baggage and his most fatigued troops, in raising the spirits of his army, in recovering in short the honour of arms by the thrice-repeated offer of battle, conceived himself dispensed from tempting Fortune any longer. Having realized part of the results which he purposed to obtain by halting, he decamped secretly in the night between the 8th and 9th of January. He took care to leave behind him plenty of fires and a strong rear-guard, to deceive the French.

On the following day, the 9th, the French found the position of Lugo evacuated, and again made large seizures of provender and *matériel*. They collected in the environs of Lugo, and in the town itself, seven or eight hundred prisoners, who had been unable to withdraw in time, notwithstanding the repeated commands of their officers. The restoration of discipline effected by general Moore was of short duration; for, between Lugo and Betanzos, on the 9th, 10th, and 11th, whole regiments broke up, and our dragoons were able to seize nearly two thousand English, and a considerable quantity of baggage. On the 11th general Moore reached Betanzos, and, crossing at last the belt of hills that encircles Coruna, he descended to the shores of the large and beautiful bay, on an inlet of which the city is situated. Unfortunately, instead of the multitude of sails which were expected, nothing was to be seen but a few ships of war, fit at most to escort an army, but not to transport it. The great mass of transports had hitherto been prevented by contrary winds from working up from Vigo to Coruna. This sight filled general Moore with anxiety, and the English army with despondency. Nevertheless they took measures to defend themselves in Coruna until the fleet should appear. Between the town and the heights by which they had arrived at it ran the stream of the Mero, broad and swampy at its mouth. It was crossed by the bridge of Burgo. This bridge the English blew up. They also blew up, with a tremendous explosion that shook the whole bay like a hurricane, an immense mass of powder they had collected in a magazine situated at some distance from the walls. Lastly they took up a position with the best troops on the circle of hills round Coruna. The first line of heights, though very elevated and well adapted for defence, was too distant from the town, and might therefore be turned. It was therefore abandoned to the French, and a stand was made on the nearer and less commanding heights, which rested on Coruna itself. All the invalids, the wounded, the lame, and the *matériel*, were collected on the shore, to be immediately embarked on board some ships of war and transports previously moored in the bay. In this position general Moore waited in painful anxiety for a change of wind, without which he should be forced to capitulate.

It was only an advanced guard which had followed the English, on the evening of the 11th, to the Burgo bridge, on the Mero, and had seen it blown up. On the following day only, the 12th, appeared first the Merle brigade, and then the Mermet and Delaborde brigades successively. On being stopped by the Mero, marshal Soult sent out the Franceschi cavalry to the left, to look for fords, which it succeeded in finding, but none of which were fit for artillery. He lined the sea-coast on his right with detachments, which strove to arrange batteries that might throw their shot to the head of the bay, and up to the quays of Coruna, a thing which was extremely difficult at such a distance.

Obliged to repair the Burgo bridge, marshal Soult employed the 12th and the 13th on that operation, pending which the laggards and the heavy baggage had time to come up. The bridge having been made practicable on the 14th, he advanced a part of his troops over the Mero, crossed the line of commanding hills that had been abandoned to him, and took up his position on their declivity, opposite the lower range, nearer Coruna, which was held by the English. The Mermet brigade formed the extreme left, the Merle brigade the centre, and the Delaborde brigade the right, close against the bay of Coruna. At that distance it was possible to erect some batteries, that began to tell across the bay.

Not feeling himself strong enough, however—for he numbered at most 18,000 men, whilst the English, after all they had lost, detached, or already embarked, still amounted to 17 or 18 thousand fighting men—marshal Soult resolved to wait until his ranks should be filled by those who had been left behind, and until his whole artillery should have been brought into line. The English, on their side, awaited the appearance of the fleet, which still remained out of sight, and they were in a state of torturing anxiety. The chief officers of their army even suggested to sir John Moore that he should open a negociation whereby they might be allowed, as the capitulation of Cintra had allowed the French, to retire on honourable terms. Having, however, no chance of escape if the transports did not arrive very speedily, it was doubtful that they would have obtained conditions that would have been satisfactory to them. General Moore therefore repudiated all thought of capitulating, and resolved to trust to fortune, which granted him, indeed, as we shall presently see, the safety of his army, but not of his person, and gave him glory at the cost of life.

On the 14th, 15th, and 16th, the wind having shifted, several hundred sail appeared in the bay, and crowded together near the quays of Coruña, beyond the reach of the French guns. They could be seen from the heights we occupied, and the sight filled our soldiers with extreme ardour. They loudly demanded to be led to action without more loss of time, for the English army was about to escape from them. Marshal Soult, who had arrived in presence of the enemy on the 12th, had employed the 13th, 14th, and 15th in rectifying his position, waiting the coming up of the last of his men, and, above all, placing on a most advantageous point towards his extreme left a battery of twelve pieces, which, pointing athwart the English line, raked it from end to end.

On the morning of the 16th, having finally reconnoitred the position of the English, he resolved to make an attempt so as to outflank and turn their line. The little village of Elvina, situated on our extreme left, and on the extreme right of the English, in the hollow ground between the two armies, was held by a large body of sharpshooters of sir David Baird's division. About midday of the 16th the French Mermet division marched, by order of marshal Soult, upon the village of Elvina, whilst our left battery, firing from behind our soldiers, caused the greatest carnage throughout the whole extent of the enemy's line. The Mermet division, gallantly led, carried the village of Elvina, and forced the English to retreat. At that moment general Moore, who had come upon the field with the determination of fighting vigorously before he reembarked, pushed forward the centre of his line, composed of Hope's division, to the village of Elvina, to succour sir David Baird, and detached a part of Fraser's division to his extreme right, to hinder the French cavalry from turning his position.

The Mermet division, having thus to do with superior forces, was recalled; and then general Merle entered into action with his old regiments, which formed our centre. The conflict grew desperate; the village of Elvina was taken and retaken several times. The 2nd light regiment covered itself with glory, but the day ended without any decided advantage on either part. Marshal Soult, who had on his right the Delaborde division, which, if brought down upon the centre of the English, would without doubt have overwhelmed them, nevertheless put a stop to the battle, not wishing, apparently, to engage all his remaining troops, and being reluctant to ask too great favours of Fortune against an enemy that was ready to retire.

The battle ended then at the close of day, after a bloody action, in which we lost three or four hundred men between killed and wounded, and the English lost about twelve hundred by the murderous effects of our artillery. In leading his regiments under fire, general Moore was struck by a cannon-ball that broke his arm and collar-bone. He was carried on a litter into Coruna, and expired there at the close of a campaign which, if less skilfully conducted, might have been disastrous for England. He died gloriously, much regretted by his army, which, though it sometimes censured him, nevertheless did justice to his prudent firmness. General sir David Baird was also severely wounded. General Hope took the command in chief, and, re-entering the town, he began the embarkation that same evening. The walls of Coruna were strong enough to stop us, and give the English time to set sail.

They embarked on the 17th and 18th, leaving behind, in addition to the wounded collected by us on the battle-field of Coruna, some invalids and prisoners, and a considerable quantity of *matériel*. They had lost in this campaign about six thousand men, including invalids, prisoners, wounded, and killed, more than three thousand horses killed by their riders, an immense *matériel*, no particle, certainly, of their military honour, but much of their political weight with the Spaniards; and they withdrew with the reputation, for the moment at least, of being powerless to save Spain.

More keenly pursued, or less favoured by the season, they would never have escaped out of the Peninsula. Subsequently, as always happens in such cases, some historians, imagining after the events arrangements which no one thought of whilst they were pending, have transferred from marshal Soult to marshal Ney the blame of having allowed the embarkation of the English, who ought, say these writers, to have been overtaken and captured to the last man. In the first place, it is doubtful, considering the inclemency of the season and the frightful state of the roads, that it would have been possible to march fast enough to overtake them, and that marshal Soult himself, who was continually engaged with their rear, could have come up with them so as to surround them. Though fortune had granted him three days at Lugo and four days at Coruna, before we can be sure that his hesitation was a fault, we should be certain that his infantry, but half of which came up every evening to answer to the roll-call, was sufficiently rallied, and that his artillery was sufficiently provided, to fight with advantage an English army, equal in numbers, and posted, every time it was reconnoitred, in positions the most difficult of access. But if such a question may be raised with regard to marshal Soult, none such can be raised with regard to marshal Ney, who was placed at some days' march from the British army. The supposition that he could have taken the Orense route, and turned Coruna by way of Vigo, rests upon no foundation whatever. Neither the Emperor, who was on the spot, nor marshal Soult, who had been empowered to call for the aid of marshal Ney if he had need of him, imagined at the time that he could have made such a détour. To do so marshal Ney must have marched double the distance by impracticable roads, totally inaccessible to artillery. And, in fact, when marshal Soult, towards the end of the retreat, that is to say, on the 9th of January, signified his desire that the Marchand division should proceed to Orense to observe the marquis de La Romana and the three thousand English under Craufurd, marshal Ney gave orders to that effect to general Marchand, who could only accomplish the movement with a part of his infantry and without a single cannon. Marshal Ney would certainly have remained immired and stuck fast on that route had he attempted it with his whole force.

What might have been done, but was not, was to march the troops of marshal Ney immediately after those of marshal Soult, so that one day would have sufficed for their junction. Now, at

Lugo, where we had three days at our command, and at Coruna, where we had four, it would have been possible to fight the English with five divisions. Marshal Ney, placed by orders from headquarters at the disposal of marshal Soult, offered the latter to join him, and received from him only a tardy request to lend him one of his divisions, when there was no longer time for that division to arrive to good purpose.* Another instance this of the discordant intentions and efforts that prevailed when Napoleon ceased to be present. The real misfortune in this case, the real mistake was, that he was not personally in pursuit of the English, obliging his lieutenants to unite for their destruction. But he was detained elsewhere by the fault, the irreparable fault of his life, that of having attempted too many enterprises at once; for whilst he ought to have been at Lugo to crush the English, he was called to Valladolid to prepare to confront the Austrians.†

His attention being more and more claimed by the pressing importance of the events in Austria and Turkey, which revealed to him the prospect of a new general war, he even decided to quit Valladolid for Paris, leaving the affairs of Spain in a state which allowed him to hope soon for the entire submission of the Peninsula. The English, in fact, were driven into the ocean; the French were in possession of all the north of Spain as far as Madrid; the siege of Saragossa was proceeding actively; general St. Cyr was victorious in Catalonia. It was Napoleon's design to send marshal Soult into Portugal with the 2nd division, with which that of general Junot had been incorporated; to leave marshal Ney in the mountains of Gallicia and the Asturias, to bring into thorough subjection those difficult and obstinate regions; to establish marshal Bessières with a large cavalry force in the plains of the two Castilles; and to send marshal Victor, with three divisions and twelve regiments of cavalry, against Seville, by Estremadura, whilst marshal Soult was to march against Lisbon. Once master of that capital, marshal Soult might dispatch one of his divisions, by way of Elvas, to marshal Victor, to aid in subduing Andalusia. Saragossa being taken, the troops of the old Moncey division, engaged in the siege, might march to Valencia, and terminate on their side the conquest of the south of Spain. Pending these well-planned movements, Joseph would remain at Madrid with the Dessoles brigade (Ney's third, returned to Madrid), and with marshal Lefebvre's division, including a German brigade, a Polish, and a French (Sebastiani). Thus he would have a considerable reserve with which he might overawe the capital and move in any direction, as need should dictate. According to these views, should no modification be caused by the intervention of Europe, the whole Peninsula, including both Spain and Portugal, would be subdued in two months, without the employment of one additional soldier.

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* This circumstance is proved by the correspondence of the marshals.

† The following is what he wrote on the subject to the minister of war and to the king of Spain:—

To the minister of war.

"Valladolid, January 13, 1809.

"You will see by the bulletin that the duke of Dalmatia entered Lugo on the 9th. He was to be at Betanzos on the 10th. The English seem to intend embarking at Coruna. They have already lost 3000 men taken prisoners, twenty pieces of cannon, five or six hundred baggage and munition waggons, part of their treasure, and 3000 horses, which they themselves slaughtered according to their odd custom. Everything leads me to hope that they will be overtaken before they embark, and that they will be beaten. *I sometimes regret that I was not there myself, but the distance from this place is more than a hundred leagues; which, added to the delays to which the couriers are subjected by the brigands that always infest the rear of an army, would have put a space of twenty days between me and Paris; I dreaded this particularly at the approach of the fine season, which gives reason to fear new movements on the continent.* The duke of Elchingen is in second line behind the duke of Dalmatia; the force of the English is about 18,000. It may be computed that, with fatigued men, invalids, prisoners, and men hanged by the Spaniards, the English army has been diminished by a third; and if to that third we add the slaughtered horses, which render the cavalrymen useless, I do not think that the English can muster 15,000 men in good condition, and more than 1500 horses. This is a long way off from the 30,000 men whom that army reckoned."

To the king of Spain.

"Valladolid, January 11, 1809.

" . . . I am obliged to stay at Valladolid to receive my dispatches from Paris in five days. The events in Constantinople, the actual state of Europe, and the new formation of our armies of Italy, Turkey, and the Rhine, prohibit my removal to a greater distance. *It was not without regret I was forced to quit Astorga.*

"There are 1000 men of my guard in Madrid; send them to me."

But for the present Napoleon resolved that his army should rest a whole month, from the middle of January to the middle of February, the period during which he calculated that the siege of Saragossa might still be protracted. In the course of that month marshal Soult would rally his troops, unite with them the portions of Junot's division which had not yet rejoined, and would prepare his artillery; the Dessoles and Lapisse brigades would have time to return to Madrid and rest there; the cavalry would be remounted and put in marching order; and everything would thus be in complete readiness for acting in the south of the Peninsula. The only immediate operation prescribed by Napoleon consisted in pushing forward marshal Victor with the Ruffin and Villatte corps on Cuença, to overthrow the remains of the army of Castanos, which seemed to be meditating some stroke. Napoleon's orders were given in conformity with these views. He sent the remains of Junot's corps to join marshal Soult; he had a small park of siege artillery prepared for marshal Victor, in order to be able to force the gates of Seville if that capital resisted; he ordered depôts of horses to remount the artillery, and sent to Bayonne for battalions of conscripts to recruit the several corps during the month's rest that was granted them. Finding that general Junot, who had replaced marshal Moncey in the command of the 3rd division, and marshal Mortier, who commanded the 5th, did not co-operate vigorously enough in the siege of Saragossa, he sent marshal Lannes, who had recovered from his fall, to take the superior command of both divisions, so that there might be more vigour and more combined action in the conduct of that siege, which was becoming an operation of war equally singular and terrible.

Lastly, Napoleon took measures for the return of Joseph to Madrid. That prince had hitherto remained at the Pardo, very anxious to return to his capital, but not daring to do so without his brother's permission, though urgently invited thither by the whole population, who regarded his return as a sure pledge of a milder rule, and as a proof that the civil would soon supplant the military power. Napoleon, in fact, had resolved, for reasons of profound policy, that his brother should become an object of desire for his subjects, and he had required that proof should be furnished him from the parish registers of Madrid that the oath of allegiance had been taken by all the heads of families. It was not, he alleged, that he pretended to impose his brother on Spain; the Spaniards were quite free not to accept him for their king; but in that case, having no cause to spare them, he would apply the laws of war to them, and would treat them as a conquered people. Moved by this threat, and delivered from the hostile influences which had excited them against the new royalty, the inhabitants of Madrid flocked to their respective parishes to plight their allegiance to Joseph upon the gospels. This formality, accomplished in December, had not yet procured them in January the king they desired though they loved him not. Napoleon at last consented that Joseph should make his entry into the capital of Spain, previously signifying that he would receive in Valladolid a deputation bringing him the register of the oaths taken in the parishes. He received that deputation less harshly than the one which Madrid had sent him in December, but he declared to it, in very plain terms, that, if Joseph was a second time obliged to quit his capital, it should undergo the most cruel and terrible military execution. Napoleon very distinctly discerned in the alleged devotion of the Spanish people for the house of Bourbon the demagogue passions that stirred them, and which took that strange way to manifest themselves; for it was the most violent democracy under the appearance of the purest royalism. This people, extreme in all things, had in fact begun again the work of assassination in revenge for the disasters of the Spanish armies. Since the murders of the unfortunate marquis de Paralès in Madrid, and of Don Juan Benito at Talavera, they had massacred in Ciudad Real Don Juan Duro, canon of Toledo, and a friend of the prince of the Peace; and at Malagon, the ex-minister of finance, Don Soler. Wherever there were no French armies, honest men trembled for their property and their lives. Napoleon, resolving to make a severe example of the assassins, ordered the arrest in Valladolid of a dozen of ruffians known to have been concerned in all the massacres, particularly in that of the unfortunate governor of Segovia, Don Miguel Cevallos; and he had them executed, notwithstanding the apparent entreaties of the principal inhabitants of Valladolid.* "You must make yourself feared first, and loved afterwards," was his frequent remark in his letters to his brother. "They have been soliciting me here for the pardon of some bandits who have committed murder and robbery, but they have been delighted not to obtain it, and subsequently everything has returned to its proper course. Be at the same time just and strong, and as much the one as the other, if you wish to govern." Napoleon likewise insisted on the arrest of a hundred assassins in Madrid, who murdered the French on the pretext that they were foreigners, and the Spaniards on the pretext that they were traitors; and he ordered that some of them should be shot, further desiring that these acts should be imputed to himself alone, so that above the known clemency of the new king there should lower over the guilty the terror inspired by the vanquisher of Europe.

These orders having been given, Napoleon quitted Valladolid and proceeded with the utmost speed to Bayonne, so eager was he to arrive in Paris. His brother having, in a complimentary letter on the occasion of the new year, addressed him in the following terms: "I pray your majesty to accept my wishes that, in the course of this year, Europe, pacified by your efforts, may render justice to your intentions,"†—Napoleon replied,—"I thank you for what you say relatively to the new year. I do not hope that Europe can yet be pacified this year. So little do I hope it that I have just issued a decree for levying 100,000 men. The rancour of England, the events of Constantinople, everything in short, indicates that the hour of rest and quiet is not yet arrived!" The terrible days of Essling and Wagram were announced as it were in these hard and melancholy words. Napoleon set out from Valladolid on the morning of the 17th of January with some aides-de-camp, escorted by piquets of the imperial guard, which had been stationed in advance along the road from Valladolid to Bayonne. He rode the whole way on horseback. He stated everywhere that he would be back in about twenty days, and he even told Joseph so; promising him that he would return in a month if he had no war with Austria.

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* *To the king of Spain.*

"Valladolid, January 12, 1809—noon.

"The operation effected by Belliard is excellent. You must have a score of rascals hanged. To-morrow I hang seven here, notorious for having committed all sorts of atrocities, and whose presence was an affliction for the honest folks who secretly denounced them, and who are recovering courage since they are quit of them. You must do the same in Madrid. If a hundred incendiaries and brigands are not got rid of there, nothing is done. Of these hundred have a dozen or fifteen shot or hanged, and send the rest to France to the galleys. I have had quiet in France only in consequence of arresting 200 incendiaries, September murderers, and brigands, whom I sent off to the colonies. Since that time the tone of the capital changed as if at a whistle."

To the king of Spain.

"Valladolid, January 16, 1809.

"The court of Alcades of Madrid has acquitted, or only condemned to imprisonment, the thirty rascals arrested by order of general Belliard. They must be tried again by a military commission, and the guilty must be shot. Give orders forthwith that the members of the Inquisition, and those of the council of Castille, who are detained at the Retiro, be transferred to Burgos, as well as the thirty rascals arrested by Belliard.

"Five-sixths of the inhabitants of Madrid are good; but the well-disposed need encouragement, and they can only be encouraged by holding the rabble in check. Here they made incredible exertions to procure pardon for the bandits who were condemned; I refused; I had the fellows hanged, and I have since ascertained that at the bottom of their hearts the petitioners were very glad not to have had their suit granted. I think it necessary that your government should display some vigour against the rabble, especially in the beginning. The rabble likes and esteems only those it fears, and the fear of the rabble can alone make you liked and esteemed by the whole nation."

† Letters of Joseph and Napoleon deposited in the Secrétairie d'Etat.

Having permission to establish himself in Madrid, Joseph made preparations for his solemn entry into that capital. He was fond of pomp, as were all the brothers of the Emperor, being compelled to seek in outward show what he found in his glory. Joseph wanted money, and he had obtained from Napoleon two millions in cash, to be debited against the price of the confiscated wools, of which the Spanish treasury was to have its share. Napoleon had procured these two millions by coining, under the new king's effigy, a great deal of plate seized at the houses of the principal grandees whose property he had sequestrated for treason. Joseph, however, wished to reappear in his capital under the auspices of some brilliant exploit. The expulsion of the English from the Spanish soil after the battle of Coruna, which was represented as having been disastrous for them, was itself an imposing achievement, and one that tended to destroy all confidence in the support of Great Britain. But news was daily expected of an exploit by marshal Victor against the remains of the army of Castanos, which had retired to Cuença; and Joseph made all his arrangements for entering Madrid upon intelligence of what had been done in that quarter. The taking of Saragossa would have been the most welcome of events of that kind, but the strange pertinacity of that town forbade such a hope as yet.

Marshal Victor had marched with the Villatte and Ruffin divisions to the Tagus as soon as the arrival of the Dessoles division in Madrid had rendered it possible to withdraw from that capital some of the troops it contained. He had moved to his left against Tarancon, in order to meet the troops that had sallied out from Cuença. The following were the reasons for this sort of offensive movement on the part of the old army of Castanos, which had passed after his disgrace under the orders of general La Pena, and recently under those of the duke del Infantado.

When general Moore, quite dismayed at what he was about to attempt, had advanced along the Burgos road, ostensibly to menace the enemy's communications, but in reality to approach the road to Coruna, he had been apprehensive of soon seeing all the forces of Napoleon turned against him, and he had requested that the armies of the South should make a demonstration against Madrid, with a view of attracting thither the attention of the French. The central Junta, incapable of commanding, and competent only to transmit the demands for succour which the insurgent bodies addressed to each other, earnestly pressed the army of Cuença to operate some movement of the kind suggested by general Moore. The duke del Infantado, always unfortunate in war as in politics, lost no time in sending out a part of his troops in advance of Cuença, along the road to Aranjuez. Reduced at first to eight or nine thousand very indocile and disorderly soldiers, who had been handed over to him by La Pena, he had succeeded in restoring some discipline amongst them, and had successively augmented them, first with laggards that rejoined, and afterwards with some detachments from Grenada, Murcia, and Valencia, until his strength amounted to a score of thousands. In accordance with the dispatches of the central Junta, he sent off between 14 and 15 thousand men to Uclès on the Tarancon road, giving the command of this detachment, which formed the bulk of his army, to general Vénégas, who had shown some energy in the retreat of Calatayud, and he proposed to follow it himself with a rear-guard of five or six thousand men.

Marshal Victor, being enabled to dispose of the Ruffin division since the return of that of Dessoles to Madrid, immediately sent it to Aranjuez to join the Villatte division, which was already on the banks of the Tagus with Latour-Maubourg's dragoons. On the 12th of January he moved his two divisions of infantry and his dragoons on Tarancon, the whole forming a force of twelve thousand men of the best troops in Europe, capable of overthrowing three or four times more Spaniards than he was about to encounter.

Knowing that the Spaniards were waiting for him at Uclès, in a pretty strong position, he conceived the plan of setting against them only Latour-Maubourg's dragoons and the Villatte division, which were quite sufficient to dislodge them, then making a détour to his left across the mountains of Alcazar with the Ruffin division, and cutting off their retreat so that they could not escape.

On the morning of the 13th the Villatte division advanced boldly against Uclès. The position consisted of two rather elevated peaks, between which lay the little town of Uclès. The Spaniards had their wings resting against the two peaks, and their centre in the town. General Villatte fell upon them with his old regiments, and drove them from all their positions. Whilst on the left the 27th light infantry broke the right wing of the Spaniards, in the centre the 63rd of the line stormed the town of Uclès, and put to death nearly two thousand of the enemy, with the monks of the convent of Uclès, who had fired on our troops. On the right the 94th and 95th of the line, manœuvring to turn the Spaniards, obliged them to retire upon Carrascoso, where the Ruffin division was in wait for them in the gorges of Alcazar. The unfortunate fugitives, running in all haste to Alcazar, were met by the Ruffin division, which came upon them through a narrow gorge. They immediately took up a position to defend themselves like men of resolution, but, being attacked in front by the 9th light infantry and by the 96th of the line, and in flank by the 24th, they were constrained to lay down their arms. A part of them made an attempt to escape by the gorge of Alcazar, whence the Ruffin division had debouched, and which was occupied only by general Senarmont's artillery, which had been left behind on account of the badness of the roads. The general might have been borne down by the fugitives; but, with the same intrepidity and intelligence as he had shown at Friedland, he formed his artillery into a square, and, firing in every direction, he stopped the fugitive column, which was thus thrown back on the bayonets of the Ruffin division. About thirteen thousand men laid down their arms in consequence of this brilliant operation, and surrendered thirty flags with a numerous artillery.

Without losing an instant, marshal Victor rushed upon Cuença to attack the little that remained of the duke del Infantado's army. But he had fled precipitately in the direction of Valencia, leaving in our hands more wounded invalids and *matériel.* Our dragoons picked up the remnants of his army and sabred several hundreds.

After this exploit there was a certain prospect of long quiet in Madrid, and the victory of Uclès proved that the south of the Peninsula might be overcome without much difficulty. The attempt, however, could not yet be made. It was necessary that Joseph should first establish himself in Madrid, that the French army should have rest, and that Saragossa should have been taken. The events of Coruna were now thoroughly known. It was known that the English had retired in disorder, abandoning all their *matériel,* and having lost on the route or on the field of battle a quarter of their effective, their principal officers, and their commander-in-chief. The capture, at Uclès, of a whole Spanish army, an exact counterpart of the affair of Baylen, if the capture of a Spanish army could have produced the same effect as that of a French army, was a new trophy most proper to adorn the entry of king Joseph into Madrid. It was Napoleon's desire that there should be something triumphal in that entry. He placed the Dessoles and the Sebastiani divisions with his brother, in order that the latter might have with him the finest troops in the French army, and that he might only appear amongst the Spaniards surrounded by the old legions that had vanquished Europe. "*I sent them lambs,*" he said, in speaking of Dupont's young soldiers, "*and they devoured them ; I will send them wolves, who will devour them in their turn.*" It was at the head of those formidable soldiers that Joseph entered Madrid on the 22nd of January, amidst the pealing of bells and the firing of cannon, and in presence of the inhabitants of the capital, tamed by victory, resigned almost to the new royalty, and, though still mortified at heart, yet preferring in a manner the sway of the French to that of the bloodthirsty populace who shortly before had assassinated the unfortunate marquis de Peralès. The mob alone was angry and still to be feared. But a hundred of its leaders, the most notorious for their crimes, had lately been arrested, and at the Retiro, facing Madrid, stood a formidable work, bristling with cannons, and capable of reducing the capital of the Spains to ashes in a few hours. Joseph was, therefore, received with much deference, and even with a certain satisfaction, by the bulk of the peaceable inhabitants, but with concentrated rage by the populace, who felt themselves dethroned on the accession of a regular government; for it was their own reign, rather than that of Ferdinand VII., of which they deplored the fall. Joseph repaired to the palace, where he was waited on by the civil and military authorities, the clergy, and such of the grandees of the court of Spain as had been unable or unwilling to quit Madrid. Joseph was so much looked upon as the protector of the Spaniards, who pleaded for them to the conqueror whose terrible hand was outstretched over them, that it was not considered a crime to go and see him. But so much are men subdued by glory that in reality the Spaniards were nearer to liking (if anything they could like in the court of France) the fearful grandeur of Napoleon than the indulgent weakness of Joseph; and if the latter was the pretext, the former was the true motive, that still caused many a homage to be laid at the feet of the new monarch.

Joseph then had courtiers enough about him in his palace to believe himself established there. The celebrated Thomas de Morla accepted office from him. Petitions were addressed to him for the mitigation of certain sentences. More than one intimation was sent to him from Seville, that it would not be impossible to bring Andalusia to terms; for, besides that the central Junta had fallen into the lowest degree of contempt by its manner of governing, it had lost the president who alone had imparted some credit to it, the illustrious Florida Blanca. For one who was not in the secrets of destiny, it was natural to be mistaken as to the fate of the new dynasty imposed on Spain, and to think that it was beginning to become established, like those of Naples, Holland, and Cassel.

Amidst these appearances of submission, one single event, constantly predicted, but too slow to be accomplished, the capture of Saragossa, held men's minds in suspense, and still left some hope to the obstinately resisting Spaniards. We have seen the Spaniards fly on the plain without any care for their military honour and their ancient glory; they effaced at Saragossa all the humiliations inflicted on their arms, by maintaining against our soldiers the most glorious defence that a besieged city ever made against foreign invasion.

We have already made known the inevitable delays occasioned in the siege of Saragossa by the movements and counter-movements of our troops round that place. Though the victory of Tudela, which opened Aragon to our soldiers and suppressed every obstacle between Pampeluna and Saragossa, had been won on the 23rd of November, it was not until the 10th of December that marshal Moncey had been able to approach Saragossa, having been deprived, in the first place, of the best part of his forces by the dispatch of two divisions in pursuit of Castanos, then having been joined by marshal Ney, and quitted by him again at the moment he was about to attack the outworks of the town. At last, being reinforced on the 19th of December by marshal Mortier, who had orders to cover the siege, and even to second the besiegers on pressing occasions, without fatiguing his soldiers in the works and assaults, he availed himself of that very limited aid to invest the place more closely and carry the outworks. On the 21st of December, the Grandjean division, by a bold and skilful manœuvre, took possession of the Monte Torrero, which commands the town of Saragossa, and on which the Aragonese had erected a work; whilst the Suchet division of Mortier's *corps d'armée* made itself master of the heights of St. Lambert, on the right bank of the Ebro; and on the left bank the Gazan division of the same body carried the position of San Gregorio, drove back the enemy into the faubourg, and took prisoners or killed 500 Swiss who had remained true to Spain. That day's work had decidedly shut up the Aragonese within the town itself, and enabled the besiegers to begin the works of approach. After so far co-operating with the third *corps d'armée*, marshal Mortier resumed the passive part of an auxiliary, whose duty was confined to covering the siege. Leaving the Gazan division on the left of the Ebro, to blockade the faubourg situated on that bank, he crossed over to the right bank with the Suchet division, and took up a position far from the theatre of the attacks, at Calatayud, so as to hinder any attempt that might be made by the Spaniards, from Valencia or from the centre of Spain. This was sufficient for connecting the operations at Saragossa with the general range of our operations in Spain; it was too little for the progress of the siege, for the third *corps d'armée*, formed, subsequently to the departure of the Lagrange division, of the Morlot, Musnier, and Grandjean divisions, hardly exceeded 14,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, 1000 artillery, and 1000 engineers. With such difficulties as were to be encountered, the beseigers ought to have been able to avail themselves of the 8000 men of the Gazan division, who were blockading without attacking the faubourg on the left bank, and the 9000 men of the Suchet division, who were posted towards Calatayud at a distance of twenty leagues. This arrangement, which was made in obedience to orders transmitted from a distance by Napoleon, whose wish it was to keep Mortier's corps always fresh and ready for service elsewhere, had the inconvenience common to plans laid down too far from the spot, that, namely, of not fitting with the actual state of things. We repeat that the 36 or 38 thousand men that constituted the two corps put together would not have been more than enough for the conquest of Saragossa.

Both parties turned all these delays to account in preparing the most terrible means of attack and defence both within and without Saragossa. Proud of the resistance they had made in the preceding year, and having proved the strength of their walls, the Aragonese were resolved to avenge themselves by the defence of their capital for all their defeats in the open field. After the battle of Tudela they had retired into the place to the number of 25 thousand, and taken with them 15 or 20 thousand peasants, rank fanatics and smugglers, good shots, and capable of killing, one by one from a roof or a window, those same soldiers whom they fled from in the plain. To these were added many of the inhabitants of the country, whom terror had driven from their houses, so that the population of Saragossa, usually 40 or 50 thousand souls, amounted at that period to more than a hundred thousand.

Palafox was still the commander. Brave, presumptuous, possessed of little intelligence, but led by two clever monks and seconded by two affectionate brothers, the marquis de Lassan and Francis Palafox, he exercised an unbounded influence over the Aragonese populace, particularly since it had come to be known that the prudence of Castanos, which was denounced as treason, had always been opposed by him with a headlong rashness, which was called heroism. The peaceable middle classes of Saragossa were destined to be cruelly sacrificed in that horrible siege to the fury of the multitude, which governed, through the instrumentality of two monks, Palafox, the town, and the army. Immense stores of corn, wine, and cattle, had been amassed through the very fears of the inhabitants of the environs, who carried with them in their flight to Saragossa all that they possessed. The English, moreover, had sent abundant munitions of war; and thus the besieged had all the means for indefinitely prolonging their resistance. To make it endure the longer, gibbets had been erected in the public places for the immediate execution of any one who should talk of surrendering. Nothing, in short, had been neglected that could add, to the natural pertinacity and true patriotism of the Spaniards, the support of a barbarous and fanatical patriotism.

In the army of Aragon, enclosed within the walls of Saragossa, there were numerous detachments of troops of the line, and many very able and zealous officers of engineers. In old military nations that have degenerated from their ancient valour, skilled arms are always those that longest maintain their superiority. The Spanish engineers, who were so skilful in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, had preserved a part of their old ability, and they raised numerous and formidable works round Saragossa.

The town, as we have stated (Book xxxi.), was not regularly fortified, but its site and the nature of its constructions were such as to render it very strong in the hands of a people resolved to defend it to the death. It was surrounded by a wall without either bastions or terraces; but it was protected on the one side by the Ebro, on the right bank of which it was situated, having only a faubourg on the left; and on the other side by a range of large edifices, such as the castle of the Inquisition, and the convents of the Capuchins, of Santa Engracia, St. Joseph, the Augustins, and Santa Monica—real fortresses, which it would be necessary to batter and breach before making way into the town, and which were covered by the Huerba, a small stream, enclosed between deep banks, and running along half the outer wall of Saragossa, before its junction with the Ebro. Within the town were vast convents quite as solid as those beyond the walls, and large massive square houses, receiving light from their interior quadrangle, as usual in southern countries, having few openings on their outer sides, and devoted beforehand to destruction, for it was thoroughly determined that, when the outworks should have been forced, every house should be converted into a citadel which should be defended to the last extremity. Every house was looped and battlemented, and internal communications were opened from the one to the other. Every street was intersected by barricades with plenty of cannons. But before being reduced to this interior system of defence, the besiegers reckoned on holding out a long time in their outworks, which were really of considerable strength.

To compensate for the want of a regularly fortified wall, there had been erected, in front of the position occupied by our left, a wall of dry stone with an embankment, extending from the castle of the Inquisition, situated on the margin of the Ebro, to the convent of the Capuchins and to that of Santa Engracia. At that spot the town formed a salient angle, and was met by the little stream of the Huerba, which ran along it until it fell into the lower Ebro opposite our extreme right. A *tête-de-pont*, of a quadrangular form and strongly entrenched, had been formed at the point where the Huerba met the town. Lower down the stream, on the Huerba itself, and in front of its bed, was the convent of St. Joseph, a sort of fortress with four fronts, which had been surrounded by a ditch and a bank. Behind that line ran a portion of wall, embanked in some places, and everywhere bristling with artillery. A hundred and fifty guns covered these various works. The besiegers would therefore have to carry the line of the convents and the Huerba, then the embanked wall, and after it the houses, and to take them one after the other under the fire of forty thousand defenders—some, it is true, indifferent soldiers; the rest, fanatics of singular prowess behind walls; all provided with victuals and munitions, and resolved to bring destruction upon a town that did not belong to them, but to trembling and submissive inhabitants. Such, too, was the superstitious reverence for a very ancient cathedral, that of *Our Lady del Pilar*, that all were assured the French would fail against its miraculous protection.

Setting aside the eight thousand men of the Gazan division, who were only employed in watching the faubourg on the left bank, and the nine thousand of the Suchet division placed at Calatayud, general Junot, who had just taken the chief command, had, for the besieging of this place, guarded by forty thousand defenders, fourteen thousand infantry, two thousand artillerymen or engineers, and two thousand horse, young and old, French and Poles, all admirable soldiers, led by matchless officers, as the reader will presently perceive.

The commander of the engineers was general Lacoste, one of the Emperor's aides-de-camp, an officer of great merit, active, indefatigable, full of resources, seconded by the engineer colonel Rogniat, and by the chef-de-bataillon, who was afterwards the illustrious general Haxo. Forty officers of the same arm, all eminent for bravery and skill, compelted his staff. General Lacoste had not lost for the works of his arm the month spent in marchings and countermarchings of troops, and he had caused to be conveyed from Pampeluna to Tudela by land, and from Tudela to Saragossa by the canal of Aragon, 20 thousand tools, 100 thousand sand-bags, and 60 guns of large calibre. At the same time he had employed engineer soldiers in constructing several thousand gabions and fascines. In these various operations he was most ably assisted by general Dedon of the artillery.

On the night of the 29th of December, whilst Napoleon was pursuing the English beyond the Guadarrama, whilst marshals Victor and Lefebvre were driving the Spaniards into La Mancha aud Estremadura, and general St. Cyr had just made himself master of the country in Catalonia, general Lacoste, in concert with general Junot, opened the trenches within 160 fathoms of the first line of defence, which consisted, as the reader is aware, of fortified convents, portions of embanked wall; and a part of the bed of the Huerba. The plan of attacking in three places was adopted on his recommendation: the first attack, on the left, before the castle of the Inquisition, was assigned to the Morlot division, but it was intended rather as a diversion than as a real attack; the second, in the centre before Santa Engracia and the *tête-de-pont* of the Huerba, was to be made by the Musnier division, and was to be quite in earnest; the third, to the right, before the formidable convent of St. Joseph, was to be made by the Grandjean division, and was the most important of the three, because, after taking the convent, it was to be continued beyond the Huerba on the weakest part of the wall, and on a quarter by which the besiegers expected to get access to the Cosso, a wide street that traverses the whole town, and very much resembles the Boulevard in Paris. The trenches having been gallantly opened, the first parallel was completed without loss of time, and steps were taken for opening the second, with a view to approaching the convent of St. Joseph on the right, and the *tête-de-pont* of the Huerba in the centre.

On the 31st of December the regular troops of the garrison made a sortie, which was sharply repulsed. It was not in the open field that the Spaniards could recover their natural prowess. The second parallel was opened on the 2nd of January, and the following days were employed in placing thirty guns, already arrived, in several batteries, in order to destroy the *tête-de-pont* of the Huerba and the castle of St. Joseph, and also to reply to the enemy's artillery behind that first line of defence. During the progress of these works, on which two thousand men were employed daily under the direction of the engineer soldiers, the besieged threw showers of stones and grenades from mortars into our trenches. We replied to them with the fire of sharpshooters, who were posted behind sand-bags, and shot with great accuracy at all the enemy's embrasures.

Our batteries, having been completed, began to fire on the 10th, some directly, some recochetting, upon the *tête-de-pont* of the Huerba and the convent of St. Joseph. Though the Spanish artillery was well served, the superiority of ours soon enabled it to extinguish the fire of the former, and to open a large breach in the convent of St. Joseph on the right, and to begin in the centre a breach on the *tête-de-pont* of the Huerba. This one not being practicable, the storming of it was postponed; but not so that of the convent of St. Joseph, because the breach there was practicable, and its capture would greatly accelerate the approaches. The firing had continued until four in the afternoon of the 11th of January, and, the breach being quite practicable at that hour, the besiegers advanced boldly to storm the convent. At the very same moment the enemy made a sortie, which was repulsed at double quick time, and our men proceeded at once from defence to attack. The difficult enterprise devolved on two old regiments, the 14th and 44th of the line, with two battalions of the regiments of the Vistula. They were commanded by an officer named Stahl, chef de bataillon in the 14th, and a man justly admired by the whole army. The convent was of a square form, and was flanked by the Huerba. The enemy had placed in it three thousand men.

At the hour before mentioned, whilst chef-de-bataillon Haxo, with four companies of infantry and two four-pounders, marched openly from the trenches, and took the convent of St. Joseph in the rear, sweeping with his fire the face next the Huerba, which dismayed the defenders, and made a considerable number recross the stream, chef-de-bataillon Stahl advanced in front to the edge of the ditch to ascend the breach. But the fragments of the wall had not filled the ditch, which was eighteen feet deep, and cut vertically, for the dry and solid soils of Spain stand at a very slight inclination without masonry. The intrepid Junot, who was present at the operation, had provided his grenadiers with ladders, by means of which some of the party descended into the ditch, others jumped into it unaided, and followed their brave leader Stahl to the breach under a rain of balls. But they had much difficulty in climbing it. Whilst they were engaged in the perilous effort, Daguenet, an officer of engineers, ran along the bottom of the ditch at the head of forty voltigeurs, turned to the left along the side face, and perceived a bridge thrown across the ditch, and leading into the interior of the work. He mounted it with his forty men, and, rushing upon the garrison of the convent, facilitated chef-de-bataillon Stahl's entry by the breach. Three hundred Spaniards, who had been left behind by their fugitive comrades, were put to the sword or drowned, and forty were taken prisoners.

This operation, which had occupied at most half an hour, cost us 30 killed and 150 wounded, almost all of them severely, a fact which, coupled with the small extent of the works attacked, sufficiently proved the severity of the action.

Once in possession of the convent, our men immediately set to work to insure their position, and protect themselves from the efforts of the enemy, and from the numerous artillery of the place, which poured out grenades, bombs, and grape, in increasing abundance as we advanced. Every day cost us from 40 to 50 men put *hors de combat*, and generally with very severe wounds.

On the 16th, the breach in the *tête-de-pont* of the Huerba having been declared practicable, it was resolved to storm it, and forty Polish voltigeurs, led by officers and soldiers of the engineers, climbed the work rapidly, some with their hands, others with ladders. Whilst they were climbing, a mine was sprung by the enemy, but without wounding any of our men. They made their way into the *tête-de-pont* and drove out the defenders, who recrossed the Huerba and blew up the bridge.

Having taken on the right the convent of St. Joseph, which was washed by the Huerba, and in the centre the *tête-de-pont* of the Huerba, we were masters of the outer line of works throughout half their extent. It was the most important half, for the works of the left were useful only as a demonstration. The next thing to be done was to cross the Huerba at the two points of contact with it which we had secured, to throw bridges covered with epaulments over that narrow but deep stream, and to breach the portions of wall beyond it, which rested on the convent of Santa Engracia on the one side, and on that of the Augustins on the other. Lastly, it was requisite to erect new batteries to resist those of the town, which became more numerous and more murderous as the assailants approached. The interval from the 16th to the 21st of January was employed in this way.

During this time the sufferings both of the besieged and the besiegers grew more severe. The crowded state of the town, and the multitude of sick and wounded within it, had produced an epidemic. Every day showers of projectiles augmented the number of victims to the siege, even among those who took no part in the defence. But a furious populace, wrought to fanaticism by the monks, overruled the peaceable inhabitants, in whose eyes that hopeless resistance was but an act of useless barbarity. The gallows erected in each of the principal streets silenced all complaints. All sorts of news, too, were invented to keep up the courage of the besieged. Napoleon was reported to have been beaten by the English, marshal Soult by the marquis de la Romana, and general St. Cyr by general Vives. The arrival of a powerful army to succour the town was promised, and these news, announced by beat of drum by the public criers, called forth wild vociferations, that resounded even in our camp.

What we have related of the general events of the war is enough to show what truth there was in these rumours designedly propagated by Palafox and the monks by whom he was led. Nor, after all, were these stories totally false, for Palafox's two brothers, the marquis de Lassan and Francis Palafox, had gone forth with terrible orders to raise the country in every direction—to Tudela on one side, and to Calatayud, Daroca, Teruel, and Alcanez on the other. All the men capable of bearing arms were called out, and were to march under chosen officers, one to every ten, in order to form an army to break the blockade. Every village was obliged to furnish pay and provisions to the men who marched. Those that did not march were to destroy our commissariat, kill our invalids, and starve our camp. These orders were given under threat of the most severe penalties in case of disobedience.

It must be owned that the Aragonese had shown very patriotic zeal in executing them. Twenty or thirty thousand men were already in motion from Alcanez, on the right of the Ebro, and from Zuera, Perdiguera, and Licinena on the left. In spite of the efforts of our cavalry, no meat arrived in our camp, the sheep sent to it being intercepted on the way. Our soldiers, without meat to make soup, and often with but a deficient ration of bread, sustained severe privation without murmuring, and anticipated without dismay two or three months more of an atrocious siege. They were sad, however, when they thought of their small number, and considered that all the difficulties of the siege lay upon 14,000 of them, whilst Gazan's 8000 foot had nothing to do but to blockade the faubourg on the left bank, and Suchet's 9000 men were living at their ease in Calatayud. More than 1200 had already sunk under their fatigues or the enemy's fire. When they were wounded or seized with sickness they were carried to the hospital of Alagon; a filthy place, in which there was only rotten linen, without victuals or medicines. General Harispe was sent to inspect it, and with the humanity of a hero he severely punished the negligent administrators, carefully reorganized the establishment, and procured at least for our soldiers the comfort of not being worse off in the hospital than in the trenches. At last the 21st brought to the camp the illustrious marshal Lannes, who was then approaching the close of his heroic career, for it was in January, 1809, within a few months of the terrible day of Essling; and his presence was fitted to support the spirits of the soldier, and restore his confidence if he had lost it. He was delighted with general Junot's bravery, but there was need of a commander, who, taking upon himself to modify the Emperor's orders, should make all the French forces co-operate towards the success of the siege. It was for this that marshal Lannes was useful in the first place.

He began, by virtue of his superior command, by making the 5th corps co-operate towards the taking of the place and the suppression of the troubles without that tended to starve our camp. He ordered general Gazan, who was posted with his division before the faubourg on the left bank, to undertake its attack in regular form. By depriving the inhabitants of that ground they would be driven into the interior of the town and increase its crowded condition, whilst we should have the means of battering it from the left bank of the Ebro. He appointed colonel Dode, an excellent engineer officer, to superintend this operation.

Marshal Lannes next ordered marshal Mortier to quit his position at Calatayud, where he was of no use, since no hostile force could come upon us from Valencia, and to cross over to the left bank of the Ebro, to disperse the gatherings that annoyed us.

Marshal Mortier crossed the Ebro on the 23rd, in obedience to orders, and, leaving the 40th of the line to support the Morlot division, which was the weakest of the besieging force, he advanced with the 34th, 64th, 88th of the line, the 10th hussars, the 21st chasseurs, and ten guns, on the road to Perdiguera. He found in position at Liciñena, on the slope of the mountains, the greatest part of a body of 15,000 men, which was advancing from the north of Aragon to succour the besieged capital. This force consisted of troops of the line and peasants, and comprised detachments from the regiments of Savoy, Prado, and Avila, Jaca battalions, Palafox chasseurs, and other troops, of old and new formation. Marshal Mortier assailed the Spaniards with the 64th of the line, which marched against them in front with the steadiness and resolution of our old regiments, whilst the 34th and 88th of the line, turning them by the heights, drove them down into the plain. The Spaniards did not withstand this double attack; they fled as fast as they could run across the plain, and passed within reach of the 10th chasseurs, who charged the mass of fugitives at a gallop, and sabred them without mercy.

Fifteen hundred were left dead on the field. We took six pieces of cannon and two flags. At the same moment the adjutant-commander Gasquet, having advanced with three divisions of the Gazan division parallel to marshal Mortier, routed about 3000 Spaniards of the same body, and took from them men and cannon. Marshal Mortier, having repulsed the levies of northern Aragon for all the rest of the siege, descended the course of the Ebro to Pina, with orders to exterminate the insurgents, spare the villages that were submissive, burn those that were otherwise, and send cattle to the camp of the besieging army, under an escort of cavalry.

Whilst marshal Mortier was clearing the left bank, general Junot had sent general Wathier, commander of the cavalry of the 3rd division, with 1200 choice infantry and 600 horse, to disperse an assemblage formed by the insurgents of eighty parishes within the jurisdiction of Alcanez. They were entrenched in the town of Alcanez, which they had barricaded and embattled. In that position general Wathier charged them at the head of his cavalry, as he might have done in the plain, and with such impetuosity that he entered pell-mell with them into the town, forced all the barricades, and put more than 600 of them to the sword. The rest were pursued by our cavalry, and escaped to their homes. The town was plundered, and all the cattle found in the surrounding country was sent off to Saragossa.

By means of these various expeditions the besieging army had nothing more to fear for its rear. Still it received no sheep but such as were well escorted, and meat remained very scarce in our camp.

Whilst marshal Lannes was having these operations executed in the environs of Saragossa, the extreme activity with which the engineering works were prosecuted by general Lacoste, and his lieutenants Rogniat and Haxo, at last rendered it practicable to make the general assault which should place the besiegers within the town and enable them to begin the terrible war against the houses.

On the right attack two *ponts de chevalet* covered with epaulments were thrown across the Huerba beyond the convent of St. Joseph, which had been stormed on the 11th of January. Having crossed the Huerba at that point, the assailants proceeded towards an oil-mill, an isolated building contiguous to the wall of the town. A branch trench was carried to another point of the same wall a little to the left; and in these two places two assaults were to begin as soon as the cannon should have made practicable breaches.

In the centre it was found advisable to forego all use of the *tête-de-pont* of the Huerba, taken from the beseiged, on account of the flanking fire to which it was exposed. The Huerba was passed by tunnelling opposite the convent of Santa Engracia at the very point of the salient angle made by the town at that place. A breaching battery playing upon the convent was to make its walls accessible for a storming party. Having mastered these several breaches, two on the right and one in the centre, we should have three entrances to the town, all opening into large streets which joined the *Cosso* at right angles.

On the 26th of January fifty pieces of ordnance of large calibre played together upon Saragossa, some opening the breaches on the right and the centre, others throwing bombs, shells, and balls into the town, which bravely endured that fiery rain, for the Spaniards could hold out against anything behind their walls, provided they were not face to face with the enemy; and as for the inoffensive population, they cared no more for them than for the cattle they slaughtered for their daily food. The fire having been kept up the whole day on the 26th and half the day on the 27th, the three breaches appeared practicable, and it was resolved to proceed immediately to the general assault.

The whole 3rd corps was under arms, with Junot and Lannes at their head. On the right the Grandjean division, consisting chiefly of the 14th and 44th of the line, was in the works, awaiting the word of command for action. In the centre the Musnier division, most of them Poles, impatiently awaited the same order. It was supported by the Morlot division, which was massed on its right to second the assault of the centre. The 40th of the line and the 13th cuirassiers occupied the place vacated by the Morlot division, and were to repulse any sorties that might be made from the castle of the Inquisition, against which only a false attack had hitherto been made.

At noon Lannes gave the eagerly desired word of command, and the storming columns issued immediately from the works. A detachment of voltigeurs of the 14th and 44th, having at their head a detachment of sappers, and commanded by chef-de-bataillon Stahl, issued from the isolated oil-mill before mentioned, and rushed to the breach that lay furthest to the right. The enemy, foreseeing that a storming party would proceed from that building, had mined the ground our soldiers had to traverse. Two tremendous explosions took place, but fortunately in the rear of our first storming column, without cutting off one man. Our soldiers rushed to the breach and took possession of it; but when they attempted to advance beyond it they were stopped by a fire of musketry and grape from houses behind, as well as from batteries erected at the top of the streets. The fire was such that it was impossible to stand against it; and the assailants, after having many men put *hors de combat*, particularly the brave Stahl, who was severely wounded, were obliged to content themselves with establishing a position on the breach and forming a communication there with the oil-mill from which they had marched. The soil turned up by the enemy's mine served to facilitate their work.

At the second breach, opened close to the former and a little to the left of it, thirty-six grenadiers of the 44th, led by a brave officer named Guettemann, mounted the breach, crossed it in spite of a shower of balls, and made a lodgment in the houses next the wall. A column followed them, and strove to debouch from the houses into the streets. But the moment any one showed himself at a door or a window, he was brought down by a tremendous fire of musketry issuing from a thousand openings. Our men, however, got possession of the contiguous houses by opening interior passages from the one to the other, and, proceeding in this way towards the left, they reached one of the chief streets, the Calle Quemada, which runs straight from the wall to the *Cosso*. But the grape from the barricades rendered advance impossible, and the assailants of this second breach, though more fortunate than those of the first, were obliged to content themselves with the capture of a dozen houses.

In the centre the action was not less keen. Voltigeurs from the Vistula, led by a detachment of soldiers and officers of the engineers, mounted to the breach in the convent of Santa Engracia.

Between the Huerba and the convent-wall, they had to traverse unsheltered a space of 120 fathoms, which they crossed in double quick time under a most violent fire. They reached the breach without much serious loss, and climbed it without other obstacle than that of the musketry, for the singular courage displayed by the Spaniards behind their walls was not such as to make them wait for us with their bayonets on the top of every breach. The brave Poles, mingled with our sappers, entered the convent, drove out its occupants, debouched on the square of Santa Engracia, forced their way even into the houses surrounding it, and proceeded to a small convent adjoining, which they also carried. Masters of the square of Santa Engracia, they were so likewise of the great street of that name, which, like that of Quemada, joined the *Cosso* at right angles. But numerous barricades, bristling with artillery and pouring out grape, prevented their advancing further without enormous loss. Any further advance could only be made by sapping and mining.

A piece of open ground lay between the convent of Santa Engracia and the point of the angle which the town wall made about the middle of its extent. Our soldiers rapidly crossed that space, which was mined, and, by most extraordinary good luck, it happened that not one of our men was struck, though vast funnels were opened in the earth by the simultaneous explosion of several mine-chambers. From that angle running towards the left was a line of dry stone wall, with a ditch and embankment, terminating at the convent of the Capuchins, and further on at the castle of the Inquisition. Though it was no part of the plan of attack to carry that line of works, which had not been breached, the Morlot and Musnier divisions dashed at it with unparalleled daring, in consequence of an unforeseen accident.

The Morlot division having been incommoded by a battery placed on the convent of the Capuchins, some carabineers of the 5th light infantry made a charge to rid themselves of the annoyance. The regiment followed them, and the battery was taken. At this sight the 115th of the line, one of the newly-formed regiments, could not remain in the trenches. Rushing to the long wall between Santa Engracia and the Capuchin convent, it leaped down into the ditch, scaled the scarp through the embrasures, took possession of the wall and all the artillery, and dared to advance into the interior of the town; but there the furious populace shot down our soldiers, firing upon them with almost certain execution from the adjoining houses. Bolder at this point than at the others, the Spaniards even advanced from their entrenchments to recapture the Capuchin convent. Monks acted as their leaders, and women urged them on. But they were driven back at the point of the bayonet, and our men remained masters of the convent, but were exposed to a tremendous fire of artillery, which pierced the walls in several places. They tried to shelter themselves with sand-bags, but, not being able to hold their ground without cover along the wall, they were obliged to fall back behind it, at the same time without abandoning it, but, on the contrary, endeavouring to secure their footing.

In this bloody day the assailants had got possession of the whole range of the town wall. Had it been an ordinary siege, consummated by the taking of the fortified part of the place, Saragossa would have been ours. But we had to carry each island of houses one after the other against a frantic populace, and the great horrors of the strife were but beginning. The Spaniards had lost six hundred men put to the sword, and two hundred prisoners, with the whole line of their outer wall. The loss on the French side was 186 killed and 593 wounded:* that is to say, nearly 800 put *hors de combat*, a considerable loss, due to the excessive ardour and heroic temerity of our troops.

Struck by this frightful spectacle, marshal Lannes himself ordered the engineer officers no longer to allow the soldiers to advance without cover, for he would rather lose time than men. They were to proceed by way of sapping and mining, and to blow up the buildings, but, above all, to be frugal of the blood of his army. That great warrior, as humane as he was brave, experienced a deep impression from what he had seen.†

The occupation of three points in the fortifications of the town made it unnecessary to push forward a fresh attack on the extreme left against the castle of the Inquisition, for the work now to be done was to assail the Spaniards in their houses; and as the wall and its appurtenances no longer constituted their main defence, they were of little importance. The Morlot division was left in observation on the left with the Musnier and Grandjean divisions, both together mustering nine thousand men. Our men proceeded to the taking of each house by sap and mine, whilst general Gazan was to push on his works before the faubourg on the left bank, so as to deprive the population of that last asylum. To this end he received a portion of the siege artillery, which was no longer needed on the right bank, since the town wall had been laid open, and our men had to fight from street to street.

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* We give the precise numbers, because on this occasion they are furnished in detail in the reports existing in the war depôt.

† His dispatches to the Emperor testify what he felt. They contain the following passages:—"Never, sir, have I seen so much desperate pertinacity as our enemies display in the defence of this place. I have seen women come and meet their death before the breach. We have to lay siege to each house severally. If we did not take great precautions we should lose many men in this way, the enemy having from 30 to 40 thousand men in the town exclusive of the inhabitants. We occupy everything from Santa Engracia to the Capuchins, and we have taken fifteen pieces of ordnance.

"In spite of all the orders I had given to hinder the soldiers from rushing too far ahead, it was not possible to control their ardour. The consequence is, that we have had 200 more wounded than we ought to have had." (Dated, Head-quarters, before Saragossa, January 28, 1809.)

"The siege of Saragossa in no respect resembles the war we have hitherto made. It is a business that requires great prudence and great vigour. We are obliged to take all the houses by mining or by storm. The unfortunate men defend themselves with a desperate pertinacity which it is impossible to conceive. *In short, sir, it is a war that excites horror.* The town is at this moment on fire in three or four places; it is shattered by shells; but all this does not intimidate our enemies. We are working hard to approach the faubourg. It is a very important point. I hope that, when we shall have made ourselves masters of it, the town will not hold out long.

"A gathering of some thousand peasants yesterday attacked the 400 men left at El Amurria. I ordered general Dumoustier to march last night with a column of 1000 men, 200 horse, and two four-pounders. I am sure he will have killed or dispersed all that rabble. Good as they are behind their walls, they are just as contemptible in the plain."

The Musnier and Grandjean divisions formed themselves into two moieties of 4500 men each, which relieved each other in that dreadful struggle, in which it was necessary alternately to work as sappers, and to fight hand to hand in narrow passes. Never had the like been seen even at the time when war consisted almost entirely in sieges. The Spaniards had barricaded the doors and windows of their houses, cut passages from one to the other on the inside, and made loopholes in the walls so as to be able to fire into the streets, which, moreover, were crossed at intervals by barricades mounted with artillery. So, the moment our soldiers attempted to enter them, they were assailed by a shower of balls from the upper stories and from the ventholes of the cellars, and by the grape from the barricades. Sometimes, in order to make the Spaniards waste their fire, they amused themselves by presenting a shako at a window on the point of a bayonet, when it was instantly pierced with balls.* There was no choice left then but to move like them from house to house, to advance under cover against a covered enemy, and to proceed slowly, in order not to lose the whole army in combats of that horrible kind. A long and desperate struggle was the necessary result.

The Spaniards, whom the taking of their walls had exasperated to the highest degree by the aggravation of their danger, were brought to an actual state of frenzy. They would no longer content themselves with acting on the defensive, but sought to recover what had been taken from them. In the centre they aimed at repossessing themselves of the Capuchin convent in order to outflank the position of Santa Engracia. On the right they remained masters of the convents of Santa Monica and the Augustins, contiguous to the two breaches we had seized, and they made incredible efforts from those points to dislodge us. The monks, more active than ever, aided by some of those female enthusiasts whose excitable nature renders them even more ferocious than men when they give themselves up to violent courses, led into action bands consisting of the most fanatical of the population and the most determined portion of the troops of the line. Thus, at the central approaches, after having attempted with their artillery to breach the Capuchin convent, which remained in our hands, they dared to return once more to the charge without cover. Our soldiers again drove them back at the point of the bayonet, and this time so thoroughly deprived them of all hope of success as to cure them of all desire to repeat such attempts.

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* This is a fact I had from the lips of the illustrious and ever-to-be-regretted marshal Bugeaud. He was captain of grenadiers at the siege of Saragossa, and he related the details of it once more to me some days before his death.

The success begun at Santa Engracia was followed up. From that convent ran a tolerably wide street of the same name, and abutting on the *Cosso*. It was lined on both sides with enormous edifices: on the right (of the French) was the convent of the Nuns of Jerusalem and the madhouse; on the left the monastery of St. Francis. These edifices being taken, the besiegers would have a means of debouching on the *Cosso* (an interior boulevard, as we have said), and would be in possession of the principal and widest thoroughfare in the town.

They went to work then at house after house on both sides of the street of Santa Engracia, in order to get hold of the large buildings it was essential to possess. When our men entered a house, either by the opening made in it by the Spaniards, or by one of their own making, they charged the defenders with the barricade, and drove them out or killed them if they could. But often they left behind them in the cellars or the garrets men who obstinately remained in houses one or two floors of which were already taken. Thus, the two parties were mingled together, and the French had, beneath their feet or above their heads, and firing through the floors, men habituated to that kind of warfare, familiarised with the nature of its perils, and displaying in it a sagacity and courage they had never exhibited on the plain. Our soldiers, brave in every kind of fight, but wishing to abridge the strife, employed various means to that end. They rolled bombs into the houses of which they had secured the middle part; sometimes they put bags of powder in them and blew up the roofs with their defenders. Or they had recourse to mining, and pulled down the whole house. But when they had destroyed too much in this way they had to march without cover, and fully exposed to the enemy's marksmen. A few days' experience taught them not to charge the mine too heavily, and to produce only as much destruction as was necessary to open a breach for themselves.

In this way they proceeded down the street of Santa Engracia to the convent of the Nuns of Jerusalem, into which they endeavoured to gain access by mining. Our miners soon perceived the presence of the enemy's miners, who were advancing towards them to defeat their purpose. But we got the start of them in charging our mine, and the Spaniards were buried in theirs. A breach having been made in the convent of the Nuns of Jerusalem, it was taken at the point of the bayonet, many of its defenders were killed, and a certain number made prisoners. From that convent our men made their way into the madhouse, which was likewise on the right side of the street. But it was necessary also to procure a covered way on the left side of the street, in order to reach the gigantic monastery of St. Francis, after the capture of which there would remain nothing between us and the *Cosso.* They began, therefore, to mine in that direction.

Whilst the besiegers' centre was advancing from house to house towards the *Cosso,* their progress on the right was as keenly contested, and was achieved by the same means. We had deprived the Spaniards of the convents of Santa Monica and the Augustins, by blowing them up with their defenders at the moment they would have dealt in that way with us but for the sagacity and skill of our miners. Our men had then advanced, always after the method already described, along the streets of Santa Monica and St. Augustin, leading into the *Cosso.* The Spaniards had devised a new expedient to retard our progress: this was to set fire to their houses, which, as they contained little wood, and had arches instead of floors, burned slowly, and were inaccessible whilst they were burning. Our men were then reduced to the necessity of making their way through the street, under cover of sand-bags; but the first that showed themselves before they were protected by the epaulment were almost sure to be wounded or killed. Whilst, by one of the two breaches on the right, our men were advancing along the streets of Santa Monica and St. Augustin towards the *Cosso*, by the second they were advancing along the Calle Quemada, likewise towards the same goal, passing from one side of the street to the other, sometimes underground by aid of the miner, sometimes on the surface by aid of epaulments of sand-bags. In this way they arrived by these several streets at two great edifices, both touching on the *Cosso*, the one forming its bottom, the other its side; and there the two hostile parties had to exert all their courage, all their artifices, and employ the most violent means, sometimes mining and countermining to blow each other up, sometimes crossing bayonets, or shooting at each other at a distance of a few paces. In these thousand fights, the most extraordinary conceivable, our soldiers generally had the advantage, in consequence of their sagacity and boldness, and, if they often lost numbers, it was because their impetuosity in attacking exposed them openly to an enemy that was always under cover. We had not less than a hundred men killed and wounded every day since the house-fighting began, and the Spaniards, who had to brave the double danger of our fire and the epidemic, had as many as four hundred men every day carried to the hospitals. It was in one of these attacks that the brave and able general Lacoste was killed by a ball in the forehead. Colonel Rogniat succeeded him, and was also wounded; so also was chef-de-bataillon Haxo.

In operations of this kind was spent the time between the 26th of January, the day of the general assault, and the 7th of February, when the faubourg on the left bank was attacked. Marshal Lannes had ordered general Gazan to make very active exertions in that quarter, and the latter, always in the saddle though ill, and seconded by colonel Dode, was near enough to the faubourg on the 7th to make a breach in the large convent of Jesus, which was not far from the Ebro, and very near another, the capture of which would be decisive for the taking of the faubourg. In fact, the general was able on the 7th to bring into play twenty guns of large calibre, open in two hours a large breach in the convent we wanted to take, and drive out four hundred Spaniards by whom it was garrisoned. A column of voltigeurs rushed in and soon took possession of it; but, attempting too impetuously to quit the convent, which was isolated, and to advance either upon the houses of the faubourg, or against the second convent, which it was most important to secure, they were driven back by the severity of the fusillade. It was then resolved to push forward the approaches from the first convent, already taken, to the second, called that of St. Lazarus, which was washed by the Ebro, and was in contact with the head of the great bridge. From that point it would be possible to become masters of the bridge, cut off the retreat of the troops that defended the faubourg, and conquer it at a blow. The whole artillery of the right bank was instantly sent to general Gazan, in order that this important operation should be executed as soon as possible.

In the interior of the town, where the assailants of the right and the centre were engaged, the subterraneous warfare we have described continued to be waged with the same ferocity. On both sides, however, the sufferings it entailed were severely felt. The epidemic was raging in Saragossa. More than 15 thousand out of the 40 thousand engaged in its defence were already in the hospitals. The inactive population were dying without any one heeding them. There was no time to bury the dead, or to carry off the wounded. They were left amidst the ruins and the rubbish, whence they diffused a horrible stench. Palafox himself laboured under the prevailing malady, and seemed approaching his last hour, yet nothing of the firmness of command was wanting. The monks who governed under him, retaining their unbounded influence over the populace, had every man hung on a gibbet who was accused of timorous weakness. The bulk of the peaceable population abhorred this tyranny, but durst not say so. The wretched inhabitants of Saragossa wandered like shadows about their desolated city.

In such extremities as these men think only of their own sufferings, and do not take sufficient account of those of the enemy, which hinders them from accurately appreciating their real position. Our soldiers, ignorant of the state of things within Saragossa, and seeing that after forty and some odd days' hard fighting they had barely got possession of two or three streets, began to ask themselves what would become of them if they had to conquer the whole town by the same means.—"We shall perish in the attempt," they said. "Was there ever such a war as this? What are our officers thinking of? Have they forgot their business? Why do they not wait for reinforcements and fresh *matériel*, and bury these bedlamites under bombs, instead of sending us to be killed one by one for the sake of taking a few cellars and garrets? Could they not find some way more useful to the Emperor for expending our lives, which they say are his due, and which we do not refuse to sacrifice for him?"* Such was the tenor of the conversation every night at the bivouacs of that moiety of the Grandjean and Musnier divisions whose turn it was to rest. Lannes soothed and cheered them by his harangues. —"You suffer, my friends," he said to them; "but do you suppose that the enemy is not suffering also? For one man you lose he loses four. Do you suppose that he will defend all his streets as he has defended some of them? He is at the end of his strength, and in a few days you will be triumphant and possessors of a town on which the Spanish nation has set all its hopes. Come, my friends; a few efforts more, and all your toils and troubles will be at an end." The heroic marshal, however, did not think as he spoke. Bearing himself as a general with them, but as a soldier with the Emperor, he wrote to him that he knew not when that terrible siege would end; that to fix any probable term was impossible, for there were single houses that had cost whole days.

Neither Lannes nor his soldiers, however, relaxed in activity or courage, notwithstanding their complaints. Whilst the central assailants were mining from the madhouse to the large monastery of St. Francis, they discovered that the besieged were also mining. They then charged their mine with 3000 pounds of powder, and, in order to effect a greater carnage, they made a feint of an open attack, in order the more to attract the enemy to the spot. Hundreds of Spaniards immediately thronged every floor, and awaited us steadily. Major Breuille, of the engineers, then gave orders to fire the mine, the whole town shook with the tremendous explosion, and a whole company of the Valencia legion was blown into the air with the fragments of the monastery of St. Francis. Every heart shrank with horror for a moment; and then, dashing through the ruins, the flames, and the balls, our men drove the Spaniards before them at the point of the bayonet. But the latter took refuge in a belfry and on the roof of the convent church, and, flinging hand-grenades through an opening they had made, they forced our soldiers to retreat for a moment. In spite, however, of all their resistance, we were masters of the fort, and at that point we were at last in contact with the *Cosso*. Mining operations were immediately begun to pass under it, and to blow up with still more terrible explosions both sides of that public promenade.

We had also reached the Cosso by the approaches of the right, along the streets called Quemada, Santa Monica, and St. Augustin. Our troops had taken the college of the Ecoles Pies, undermined the vast edifice of the university, and pushed a point towards the Ebro to join the party attacking the faubourg. The university was to be blown up on the day the faubourg was taken.

It was the 18th of February. We had been fifty days attacking Saragossa, had spent twenty-nine days in penetrating within its walls, twenty-one in making way along its streets, and the moment was approaching when the exhausted courage of the enemy would find in some great incident of the siege a decisive reason for surrendering. On that same day, the 18th, the university was to be blown up in the town, and in the faubourg the convent adjoining the bridge of the Ebro was to be taken. On the morning of the 18th, mounted on horseback with general Gazan at his side, Lannes ordered the attack of the faubourg to be begun. Fifty pieces of artillery played upon the convent, the walls of which were of brick and four feet in thickness. At three o'clock in the afternoon the breach was practicable. A battalion of the 28th and one of the 103rd charged into it at double quick step, and killed three or four hundred Spaniards. Had the breach been wide enough to give passage to the whole Gazan division, it would have been all over with the 7000 men who guarded the faubourg, for they could have moved from the convent to the bridge and cut off the faubourg from the town. As many troops, however, were introduced as was possible, and they hastened from the convent to the bridge. The garrison of the faubourg, finding their retreat cut off, endeavoured to cut their way through. Three thousand men rushed to the entrance of the bridge; our men tried to stop them, got mixed with them, cut down a part of them, but the rest made good their escape. The four thousand remaining in the faubourg were forced to lay down their arms, and to surrender the faubourg itself.

This brilliant and decisive operation, conducted by Lannes himself, cost us only ten killed and 100 wounded. It took from the population their principal asylum, and laid open the town to all the fire of the left bank. Whilst this event was in progress in the faubourg, the troops of the Grandjean division were under arms waiting for the moment when the university should be blown up to rush into the ruins. It was blown up at last by a charge of 1500lbs. of powder, with a horrible noise, and the soldiers of the 14th and 44th immediately rushed forward and took possession of the head of the *Cosso* and its two sides. The central assailants required only one day more to undermine and destroy the middle of the *Cosso*.

However obstinate was the courage of those monks and peasants, who had gladly exchanged the monotony of their convents or the hard life of the fields for the emotions of war, their fury could not hold out against the repeated blows of the 18th. Only a third of the fighting population was left standing; the non-combating portion was in despair. Palafox was dying. The Junta of defence, yielding at last to such accumulated disasters, resolved to capitulate, and sent a flag of truce, who presented himself in the name of Palafox. The unfortunate defenders of Saragossa had so often repeated that the French armies were beaten, that they had come at last to believe the tale. The envoy therefore requested permission to send out an emissary from Saragossa to know if the Spanish armies were in good truth dispersed, and if the resistance of that unhappy city was really useless. Lannes replied that he never gave his word in vain, even for a *ruse* in war, and that they might believe him when he affirmed that the Spaniards were beaten from the Pyrenees to the Sierra Morena, that the remains of La Romana's force were taken, the English were embarked, and Infantado was without an army. He concluded by saying that they must surrender unconditionally, for otherwise he would blow up the whole centre of the town next day.

Next day, the 20th, the Junta repaired to the camp and consented to the surrender of the place. It was agreed that all that remained of the garrison should come out by the principal gate, that of Portillo, lay down their arms, and become prisoners of war, unless they would enter the service of king Joseph.

On the 21st of February, 10,000 infantry and 2000 horse, pale, gaunt, and drooping, defiled before our pity-stricken soldiers. The latter then entered the hapless city, which presented only ruins filled with purtrefying corpses. Of 100,000 individuals, inhabitants of Saragossa, or who had taken refuge within its walls, 54,000 had perished. A third part of the buildings was knocked down, the two other thirds, shattered with balls and stained with blood, were reeking with deadly miasmata. The hearts of our soldiers were deeply moved. They too had suffered sore losses. They had had 3000 men put *hors de combat* out of 14,000 who participated actively in the siege. Of 40 officers of engineers, 27 were wounded or killed; and among the latter was the illustrious and unfortunate Lacoste. Half the engineer soldiers had fallen. Nothing in modern history had resembled this siege, and only in two or three instances, such as Numantia, Saguntum, or Jerusalem, did the records of antiquity present similar scenes. Nay, the horror of the modern siege surpassed that of its antique parallels by all the might of the means of destruction devised by science. Such are the sad consequences of the collision of great empires! "Princes and peoples deceive themselves," says an ancient writer, "and thousands of victims suffer innocently for their errors."

The resistance of the Spaniards was prodigious, above all, for its obstinacy, and attested their natural courage, as much as their conduct in the open field showed them to be deficient in that acquired courage which constitutes the strength of regular armies. But the courage of the French, 15,000 of them attacking 40,000 entrenched enemies, was more extraordinary still; for without fanaticism—

without ferocity—they fought for that ideal of greatness whereof their flags were then the glorious emblem.

Such was the end of this second Spanish campaign, begun at Burgos, Espinosa, and Tudela, finished at Saragossa, and marked by the presence of Napoleon in the Peninsula, the precipitate retreat of the English, and a new apparent submission of the Spaniards to king Joseph. Napoleon's manœuvres had been admirable, admirable also his troops, and yet, though the results were great, they did not equal those we had obtained against the skilfully organised troops of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. It seemed as though so much science, experience, and valour were baffled by the inexperience and disorganisation of the Spanish armies; as the skill of a master of fence is sometimes defeated by the awkwardness of one who had never before handled a sword. In the open field the Spaniards did not stand their ground, but fled, leaving behind them their muskets, cannons, and flags; but they themselves were not taken, and we had yet to conquer their vast plains, their rugged mountains, their consuming climate, their hatred of the foreigner, their alacrity to begin again a kind of adventures that had cost them little more than the trouble of running away, which was easy for men so agile and so denuded; and from time to time also we had to vanquish some terrible resistance behind walls, like that of Saragossa! It is true, however, that Saragossa was the last effort of this kind to be apprehended on the part of the Spaniards. Indefatigable as they were, they might be wearied out; blind as they were, they might be enlightened, and made to appreciate the advantages of the government which Napoleon brought them by his brother's hand. After Espinosa, Tudela, Somo-Sierra, Coruna, Uclès, and Saragossa, they were actually prostrate and disheartened, at least for the time; and if no new complications of general policy afforded them aid, they were once more about to be regenerated by a foreign dynasty. But the secret of destiny was then unpenetrated and impenetrable. On receiving a letter from prince Cambacérès, wishing him a good year, Napoleon replied, "In order that you may address the same wish to me thirty times over again, *we must be discreet.*" But having discovered the necessity of being discreet, would he be able to be so? There, we repeat, was the question, the sole question. He alone under God held in his hands the destiny of the Spaniards, the Germans, the Poles, the Italians, and, unfortunately, of the French as well as all the rest.

Whilst his armies, after resting a brief space, were preparing to march, that of marshal Soult from Coruna to Lisbon, that of marshal Victor from Madrid to Seville, that of Aragon from Saragossa to Valencia, we have to follow himself from the summits of the Guadarrama to the banks of the Danube, and from Somo-Sierra to Essling and Wagram. He had still some fair days to hope for, because it was still time to be discreet, and the last most irremediable faults had not been committed. It was not impossible, in fact, though doubtful, considering the course things were taking, that Spain should be regenerated by his hands, that Italy should be emancipated from the Austrians, that France should remain great as he had made her, and that his tomb should be reared on the banks of the Seine, without having rested for a while on the remote verge of the ocean.

END OF VOL. IX.

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